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The New Map of Europe 

The New Map of Africa 

The Foundation of the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire 

Paris Reborn 

The Little Children of the Luxem¬ 
bourg 

The Blackest Page in Modern His¬ 
tory 

The Reconstruction of Poland and 
the Near East 


Songs from the Trenches 







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THE 

NEW MAP OF ASIA 

(1900—1919) 


BY 

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS 

AUTHOR OF “THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE,” “THE 
NEW MAP OF AFRICA,” ETC. 



THIRD PRINTING 


> > ’ i 

5 1 

) ) 9 

’ x » 


NEW YORK 
THE CENTURY CO. 




Copyright, 1919, by 
The Centuby Co. 

Published, September, 1919 
Second Edition, October, 1919 
Third Edition, July, 1921 

A\S ^02 



PRINTED IN U. S. A. 



RODMAN WANAMAKER 




FOREWORD 


This afternoon I saw two German delegates, 
followed by a long line of plenipotentiaries of 
the allied and associated powers, sign the 
Treaty of Versailles. The ceremony in the Hall 
of Mirrors, to which the world has been looking 
forward eagerly since the armistice of November 
ii, thrilled neither participants nor spectators. 
Cannon were booming to announce the end of the 
war and the birth of the League of Nations. 
But the war was not ended. The League of Na¬ 
tions was not born. The signers knew that the 
document over which they bent was not the chart 
of a durable world peace. That is why they were 
indifferent. Their apathy was communicated to 
us who looked on. 

The futility of the Treaty of Versailles is due 
to three causes. In its first articles, it creates 
a league of nations, the possibility of the ex¬ 
istence of which is taken away by the stipulations 
of the rest of the treaty. It attempts to settle a 
few of the moot questions in Europe and else- 
ix 


FOREWORD 


where by the application of force, which means 
that the decisions arrived at can be maintained 
only by force and only so long as force continues 
to be applied. The treaty is silent altogether con¬ 
cerning questions that have been for more than a 
century as disturbing factors in provoking world 
wars as were Prussian militarism and the aspira¬ 
tions of Germany. 

Since the framers of the Treaty of Versailles 
limited the changes of the status quo solely to 
territorial and economic matters where the 
change would be to the disadvantage of Ger¬ 
many, the vast continent of Asia, home of more 
than half the human race, was affected by but 
one provision of the treaty. Germany was com¬ 
pelled to renounce “in favor of Japan all her 
rights, titles and privileges” in the province of 
Shangtung. This amounted to a solemn affirma¬ 
tion of the doctrine of European eminent domain, 
extended now to include Japan among the priv¬ 
ileged powers. And the reason for the inclusion 
of Japan was the same reason as for the exclu¬ 
sion of Germany! 

“The New Map of Asia,” planned several 
years ago to follow “The New Map of Europe” 
and “The New Map of Africa,” has been writ- 


FOREWORD 


ten during the Peace Conference, with the aim 
of presenting the principal facts and problems 
of Asiatic history since 1900 in so far as they are 
the result of or have been largely influenced by 
the maintenance and extension of European in¬ 
tervention. My work is incomplete. I have had 
to pick and choose here and there and to eliminate 
much of importance. But I trust that the in¬ 
terest of the reader will be aroused to go for 
fuller information and more competent criticism 
and discussion to the many excellent books that 
have been published in recent years on particular 
phases of contemporary Asiatic history. 

To the authors of these books—rtheir names 
would fill pages—and to the compilers of the “An¬ 
nual Register/' the “Statesmen’s Year Book” and 
the “Japan Year Book,” I wish to acknowledge 
my constant indebtedness. Above all, I have 
been helped by the Japanese, Chinese, Siamese, 
Indian, Greek, and Hedjazian plenipotentiaries, 
and by members of the Japanese, Chinese, Sia¬ 
mese, Persian, Russian, British, Palestinian, 
Zionist, Syrian, Armenian, Georgian, Korean, 
and Hellenic delegations. My colleagues of the 
Japanese press have been particularly kind and 
helpful. It is a pleasure to take this occasion also 


XI 


FOREWORD 


of thanking Mr. T. H. McCarthy for his valuable 
aid in following certain threads of international 
diplomacy throughout the war, and my publish¬ 
ers and the editors of the Century Magazine and 
Mr. Rodman Wanamaker for the encouragement 
and the unique opportunity they have given me 
to make the studies upon which this book is 
based. 

Herbert Adams Gibbons. 

Paris, June 28, 1919. 


xii 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER PAGE 

I Great Britain and the Approaches 

to India.3 

II The Two Shields of India: Af¬ 
ghanistan and Tibet . . . . 13 

III India in the Twentieth Century . 38 

IV British Asiatic Colonies and Pro¬ 

tectorates . 56 

V Paring Down Siam. 75 

VI France in Asia. 95 

VII Portuguese and Dutch in Asia . .114 

VIII The United States in the Philip¬ 
pines . .124 

IX The Disintegration of the Otto¬ 
man Empire.142 

X The Ottoman Empire and the 

World War.172 

XI Palestine and the Zionists . . . 192 

XII The Future of the Ottoman Races 229 

XIII The Attempt to Partition Persia . 261 

XIV Persia Before the Peace Confer¬ 

ence .295 

XV Russian Expansion Across Asia . 308 

xiii 









XIV 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER PAGE 

XVI The Island Extension of Japan . 337 
XVII Korea Loses Her Independence . 346 
XVIII The Russo-Japanese War . . . 370 

XIX China the Victim of European Im¬ 
perialism . 385 

XX China Becomes a Republic . . . 424 

XXI The Constitutional Evolution of 

Japan .453 

XXII Germany is Expelled from Asia . 483 


XXIII Japan and China in the World War 496 

XXIV The Challenge to European Emi¬ 

nent Domain. 5 2 5 

Index. 557 

MAPS 

FACING 

PAGE 

I European Eminent Domain in Asia Title 


II The Shrinking of Siam .... 84 

III The Stepping-Stones from Asia to 

Australia.132 

IV The Railways of Asia .... 324 

V The Great Powers in China . . 388 






THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


“If it is true in America that people must be left to 
govern themselves irrespective of their capacity for the 
task, then it is also true in Europe, Asia and Africa. 
The world is not large enough to contain two moralities 
on a subject like this.” 

L. Curtis : The Problem of the Commonwealh. 

II faut en tout pays, bourg, village, cite, 

Plaine ou mont, proclamer la Sainte Verite: 

Que les peuples ont tous une meme origine, 
D’Amerique, d’Europe ou d’Afrique ou de Chine, 
Tous n’ont qu’une patrie et la meme pour tous, 

La Terre qui nourrit le moindre d’entre nous. 

Mirza Riza Khan, 

Persian Delegate to the Hague Convention, 1907. 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


CHAPTER I 

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AP¬ 
PROACHES TO INDIA 

D URING the nineteenth century was de¬ 
veloped the British policy of becoming 
master of every approach to India by land 
and sea. If the policy was partly unconscious 
and instinctive, the result is as logical an evolu¬ 
tion toward a goal as if every step had been 
thought out and planned beforehand. In the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, mo¬ 
mentous decisions were taken to make effective 
and conclusive the work of a hundred years. 
The unsuccessful attempt of Germany to chal¬ 
lenge Britain’s world empire made possible the 
consecration of the British plans by the Confer¬ 
ence of Paris. British possession of all the ap¬ 
proaches to India is written into the compact of 
the society of nations. 


3 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


None can understand the foreign policy of 
Great Britain, which has inspired military and 
diplomatic activities from the Napoleonic Wars 
to the present day, who does not interpret wars, 
diplomatic conflicts, treaties and alliances, ter¬ 
ritorial annexations, extensions of protectorates, 
with the fact of India constantly in mind. 

It was for India that the British fought Na¬ 
poleon in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and Syria. 
At the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain asked 
for nothing in Europe. Her reward was the con¬ 
firmation of her conquest of Malta, the Cape of 
Good Hope, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Cey¬ 
lon. After 1815, Great Britain became cham¬ 
pion of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in 
order to bar to any other power the land route 
to India. When Mohammed Ali, starting from 
Egypt, sent his armies to overthrow the Otto¬ 
man Empire, he found a British fleet and army 
in Syria, just as Napoleon had found them. 
Against the natural instinct of the British peo¬ 
ple, the Foreign Office consistently opposed the 
affranchisement of the Balkan States, and con¬ 
doned the massacres of Christians by Moslems. 
The Crimean War was fought to protect Turkey, 
and if the treaty of San Stefano had not been re- 
4 


GREAT BRITAIN 

nounced, Lord Beaconsfield would have started 
another war with Russia in 1877. The British 
Government opposed the piercing of the Isthmus 
of Suez. But when the canal was an accom¬ 
plished fact, control by the Suez Company was 
acquired. The British then did, themselves, 
what they would have fought any other European 
nation for trying to do. They made the first 
breach in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
by the Cyprus Convention and the occupation of 
Egypt. With Egypt safely in British hands, the 
Foreign Office did not hesitate to change its Bal¬ 
kan policy. The incorporation of eastern Ru- 
melia in Bulgaria was supported in 1885. Eight 
years before, British statesmen would not have 
hesitated to plunge Europe into a bloody war to 
prevent the formation of a large Bulgaria. 

The occupation of Egypt was to have been 
provisional. The British Government solemnly 
declared to the other powers that it had no 
intention of settling permanently on the Nile, and 
that it would evacuate Egypt “at an early mo¬ 
ment.” The occupation dragged on. There 
was always a good reason for not leaving. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, the British re¬ 
conquered the Sudan to assure their position in 
5 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Egypt and the Red Sea, and fought the Boer 
War to prevent South Africa from passing out 
of their hands. The idea of the Cape-to-Cairo 
Railway—“all British”—was launched. By 
pushing up the Nile, the British came into con¬ 
tact with the French at Fashoda. If the French 
had thought it possible, or if they had had allies 
to help them, they would have declared war 
against Great Britain. Instead of fighting, the 
statesmen of the two countries came to an un¬ 
derstanding on all colonial questions. This was 
not hard to accomplish, because the French had 
set their hearts on Morocco and did not claim 
any of the approaches to India. On May 8, 
1904, an agreement was signed between Great 
Britain and France, settling their disputes 
throughout the world. The basis of the compro¬ 
mise was mutual disinterestedness in Egypt and 
Morocco. The principal factor which led Great 
Britain into the entente cordiale was a desire to 
get rid of French intrigue in Egypt. This was 
necessary to hold permanently the route to In¬ 
dia by the Suez Canal. 

The agreement with Russia, concluded three 
years later, was also dictated by the policy of 
guarding the approaches to India. Russia’s pen- 
6 


GREAT BRITAIN 


etration into Persia, her arrival on the borders of 
Afghanistan, and her intrigues in Tibet were the 
factors which brought about the Anglo-Russian 
agreement of 1907. But in order to understand 
the working out of British policy in regard to 
India, it is necessary to follow the development 
of British activity in putting safeguards around 
India by land and sea. British initiative was not 
crowned with success until the years immediately 
preceding the recent world war. The war with 
Germany interrupted—even threatened—the ap¬ 
proaches to India. But it ended in assuring 
Great Britain control over all southern Asia from 
the Mediterranean to the Pacific. 

To protect India by sea, the British decided 
to control the Arabian Sea on the west, the Gulf 
of Bengal on the east, and all the passages from 
the Indian Ocean to these waters. In the mind 
of the British Foreign Office, unquestioned su¬ 
premacy of the seas meant the occupation of 
islands; and supremacy of the straits leading to 
the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Siam, the occu¬ 
pation of the mainlands bordering them. Later, 
the policy of control was extended to include the 
littoral of the Arabian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Siam. Then, it was evident that the littoral 
7 • 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


could be made secure only by occupation of the 
hinterland! From London and Liverpool to 
Hongkong, the control of the sea could not be 
maintained by a fleet alone. The result? Gib¬ 
raltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, Aden, Perim, the 
Sudan on the route to India from the west; So- 
kotra, the Seychelles, and other islands guarding 
the Arabian Sea; the Bahrein Islands dominating 
the Persian Gulf; Ceylon at the tip of India; the 
islands and mainland of the Gulf of Bengal; Sin¬ 
gapore and the Malay Peninsula, and the north¬ 
ern side of Borneo on the route to India from 
the east. 

On land, India is surrounded by Baluchistan; 
Afghanistan; the Russian provinces of Bokhara 
and Turkestan; the Chinese provinces of Sin- 
kiang and Tibet; Nepal; Bhutan; and Burma. 
Since the Government of India annexed Balu¬ 
chistan and Burma, Persia, the Sze-chuan and 
Yunnan provinces of China, French Indo-China, 
and Siam have had common boundaries with 
India. 

The sovereignty of British India was extended 
over Baluchistan from 1875 to 1903, and over 
Burma from 1879 to 1909. Because Baluchistan 
8 


GREAT BRITAIN 


and Burma were on the sea-coast, the British 
were satisfied with nothing less than actual po¬ 
litical control and effective military occupation. 
But once started, there is no limit to “safe¬ 
guards.” The appetite grows in eating. When 
the recent war broke out, Great Britain was 
ensconcing herself in southern Persia, not with 
the consent of the Persians, but by reason of an 
agreement with Russia. Afghanistan was forced 
to accept British control. In Egypt, not the 
consent of the Egyptians, but an agreement with 
France, gave Great Britain what she considered 
her “rights” on the Nile, and those rights were 
never satisfied until the head-waters of the Nile 
were reached. 

As the control of southern Persia followed 
logically the incorporation of Baluchistan into 
India, expansion at the expense of Siam followed 
the absorption of Burma. In 1909, Great Brit¬ 
ain achieved command of the coast of the Gulf 
of Bengal by wresting from Siam the tributary 
states of Kelantan, Trengganu, and Keda. To 
protect India on the land side, military occupa¬ 
tion has followed the sending of punitive expedi¬ 
tions to punish tribesmen for raiding protected 
9 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


states. New territories occupied became in turn 
protected, and so the process continued until the 
great mountain frontiers were reached. 

On the confines of India only three independent 
states remain, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. 
But these states are not independent in fact. 
They are bound hand and foot to the Govern¬ 
ment of India. There has been a British Resi¬ 
dent in Nepal for a hundred years. The British 
are allowed to recruit freely for the Indian 
Army from among the splendid dominant race 
of Ghurkas, and the prime minister, who is all- 
powerful, holds the rank of Lieutenant-General 
in the British Army. The rulers of Afghanis¬ 
tan and Bhutan receive large subsidies on condi¬ 
tion of “good behavior,” which means doing al¬ 
ways what the Government of India says and 
treating with the outside world only through the 
Government of India. Part of Bhutan was an¬ 
nexed to Bengal in 1864, and the country has 
received a British subsidy since 1865. In 1907, 
the dual control of clergy and laity, which had 
been in force ever since the British began to 
occupy India, was done away with in Bhutan. 
The difficulties in Tibet were a warning that could 
not be disregarded. A maharaja was elected. 


10 


GREAT BRITAIN 


and this gave the British the opportunity to get 
effective control of the country without conquer¬ 
ing it. In consideration of doubling the subsidy, 
the Bhutan government surrendered control of 
foreign relations to the British in 1910, and al¬ 
lowed them to occupy two strong positions inside 
the Bhutan frontier. Judging from the history 
of the formation of British India, unless we are 
on the threshold of a radical change in interna¬ 
tional relations, one is safe in predicting that 
both Nepal and Bhutan will become integral parts 
of India in the near future. 

The situation in regard to Afghanistan has 
been different. The treaty of 1893, which fol¬ 
lowed long and costly wars, gave the British pre¬ 
dominance in Afghanistan. But Russia, in her 
Asiatic expansion, was not disposed to allow Af¬ 
ghanistan to become British without a struggle. 
Russian imperialism turned against British im¬ 
perialism its own argument. If the British were 
alarmed at Russian intrigues in Afghanistan on 
account of the menace to India, the Russians were 
equally alarmed at British intrigues on account 
of the menace to Transcaucasia and Siberia. 
The Russians did not hesitate to stir up the Af¬ 
ghans and the frontier tribesmen of the north- 


11 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


west territories against the British. After pen¬ 
etrating Mongolia, the Russians desired to ex¬ 
tend their influence over Tibet—and, for exactly 
the same reason as the British, had been follow¬ 
ing out their own imperialistic policy. In the 
minds of British statesmen, Afghanistan and 
Tibet became the two shields of India. During 
the first decade of the twentieth century, these 
two countries, as well as Persia, became—to the 
Government of India and the British Foreign 
Office—“safeguards” which must be added to the 
British Empire. War with Russia was avoided 
because of the Convention of 1907. In the same 
decade Germany became a menace to India 
through the Bagdad Railway conception. Great 
Britain had determined to allow neither Russia 
nor Germany to reach the Persian Gulf. Hav¬ 
ing compounded colonial rivalries with France 
and Russia, she had no way of arriving at a 
diplomatic understanding with Germany. The 
Bagdad Railway question was decided on battle¬ 
fields from Flanders to Mesopotamia. 


12 


CHAPTER II 


THE TWO SHIELDS OF INDIA: AFGHAN¬ 
ISTAN AND TIBET 


A fghanistan is a country of 250,000 

square miles, between Persia and the tribes 
of the Indian northwestern frontier. On 
the south is Baluchistan, and on the north Bok¬ 
hara and other Russian territories. The moun¬ 
tains of the north and east and center descend 
into valleys on the Persian and Baluchistan boun¬ 
daries. Since the Russian penetration into cen¬ 
tral Asia, the British have considered the con¬ 
trol of Afghanistan of vital importance; for if 
the Russians had been able to extend their influ¬ 
ence over Afghanistan, they could not only have 
reached the Persian Gulf but also have threat¬ 
ened the Punjab by stirring up the tribesmen of 
Kafiristan, Waziristan, and Swat. 

To include Afghanistan in their sphere of in¬ 
fluence, the British did not hesitate to invade the 
country in 1839, 1842, 1878, and 1880. The mil- 

13 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

itary operations were on a large scale and exceed¬ 
ingly costly. But after British influence had 
been thoroughly established in the Punjab and 
Baluchistan, the problem of threatening Afghan¬ 
istan was not so difficult as in earlier days. The 
twentieth century opened, however, with Anglo- 
Russian rivalry greater than it had ever been 
before, and it was a common sentiment in British 
political circles that Great Britain’s next great 
war would be against Russia and France. Rus¬ 
sia was threatening British colonial supremacy 
in Asia, France in Africa. Some British im¬ 
perialists were outspoken in their advocacy of 
an entente with Germany against the Franco- 
Russian menace. The conventions of 1904 and 
1907 turned Great Britain from a potential ally 
for Germany (which was what Cecil Rhodes 
advocated) into a potential enemy. 

After more than twenty years on the throne, 
Emir Abdul died in September, 1901. Between 
the two great rivals, Russia and Great Britain, he 
ruled with discernment and courage. The year 
before his death, although worried over rumors 
of Russian aggression, he had refused to fall into 
a trap laid for him by the Government of India. 
When the British suggested that Russian pene- 
14 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


tration could be checked by railway and telegraph 
construction, undertaken by the British, he 
thought the remedy as bad as the evil. He al¬ 
lowed his autobiography to be published in No¬ 
vember, 1900, in which there was frank criticism 
of the vacillating, though not disinterested, Brit¬ 
ish policy. He asserted for Afghanistan the 
right to direct diplomatic relations with London 
and to an outlet to the ocean, with a port. It was 
his idea that he should be able to negotiate di¬ 
rectly with London. He did not want Afghan¬ 
istan to be exploited by India in the matter of 
trade relations. As an indication of his resent¬ 
ment of India’s pretension to monopolize Afghan 
trade, he forbade the export of horses to India 
and the import of salt from India. Abdul was 
partisan of a triple alliance with Persia and Tur¬ 
key, formed to resist attempts to encroach upon 
the sovereignty of Moslem countries and to ex¬ 
ploit them. He maintained that the proper pol¬ 
icy for Afghanistan was to be friendly with the 
least aggressive great power, and hostile to what¬ 
ever power wished to pass through the country 
and interfere with its independence. 

Although Abdul had no real love for England, 
he fully recognized the value of the British al- 

15 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


liance, and was faithful to it. Under his des¬ 
potic rule, Afghanistan had become united and 
prosperous, and a regular government, recog¬ 
nized by the tribesmen, had been established. 
Like Mohammed Ali of Egypt, Abdul was will¬ 
ing to encourage foreign trade and industries 
under foreign supervision, but not at the cost of 
loss of independence. 

Abdul’s successor was his eldest son, Habibul- 
lah Khan, a young man of thirty who spoke Eng¬ 
lish and was friendly to the British. He had 
been well trained by his father and had already 
exercised authority as regent during Abdul’s long 
absence in Turkestan. The new emir made him¬ 
self popular with the army by raising the pay, 
and as he thought he had no competitors for the 
throne to fear, he issued a proclamation inviting 
the return of the exiles from India. On the first 
anniversary of his reign, he announced the in¬ 
tention to enforce his father’s plan of compulsory 
military service. 

In 1902, Russia suggested to Grea-t Britain 
that it would be a great convenience if Russian 
and Afghan officials on the frontier were allowed 
to communicate directly for commercial pur¬ 
poses. Although the Russian Government said 
16 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


that it still recognized the existing agreement by 
which Russia was excluded from direct diplo¬ 
matic intercourse with Afghanistan, there was a 
campaign in the Russian press to urge that the 
agreement be canceled. Why should not Rus¬ 
sia enjoy the same privileges as Great Britain in 
political and commercial intercourse? 

Russia's chances of penetration into the mar¬ 
kets and political life of Afghanistan were 
harmed by the oppressive policy pursued in 
Turkestan. Four thousand Turkomans and 
Jamshids emigrated to Herat and were received 
very cordially by the Afghans. The emir 
granted them a place for residence. At the end 
of 1904, however, the British were still worried 
over the pushing forward of the Russian railways 
toward the Afghanistan frontier. A mission 
was sent at the end of the year to Kabul to talk 
over with the emir a plan of action in case of 
Russian aggression. It was necessary, also, to 
make an agreement concerning the tribes on the 
northwestern frontier. With an eye to business, 
the mission was instructed to secure also greater 
facilities for trade between Afghanistan and 
India. 

Sir Lewis Dane's mission was regarded as 

17 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


distinctly encouraging. The emir consented to 
renew the treaty his father had made, to ac¬ 
cept the arrears of the subsidy which he had 
steadfastly refused since his accession, and an in¬ 
crease of fifty per cent, of the subsidy. He said 
he would employ this money to strengthen the 
defenses of the country. On the evening before 
the departure of the mission, the emir invited 
Sir Lewis and other British officers to dinner, to¬ 
gether with his courtiers. It was the first time 
that he or they had eaten with infidels. Nothing 
definite was secured in the way of new conces¬ 
sions, for Sir Lewis Dane did not want to go too 
far at the beginning. But it was in his mind to 
pave the way for the reorganization of the Af¬ 
ghan Army with British officers, and for railways 
to connect Afghanistan with British India so that 
British troops could be thrown into Afghanistan 
quickly in case of a Russian attack. Habibullah 
Khan had assured Sir Lewis that he would later 
announce his acceptance of the invitation of the 
viceroy to visit India. 

During these first years of the new reign, the 
British had been able to render Afghanistan a 
great service in settling an old boundary dispute 
with Persia. The river Helmund had been 
18 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


agreed upon as the boundary between Afghanis¬ 
tan and the Persian province of Seistan in 1872, 
but the river-bed had moved in thirty years con¬ 
siderably to the west. The Persians claimed the 
old bed as a boundary and protested against the 
action of the Afghans in erecting new dams. 
Colonel MacMahon was sent from Quetta in Jan¬ 
uary, 1903, with a large expedition to map out 
a new boundary and to arbitrate the quarrel, 
which was threatening to become serious. After 
two years’ work, both countries accepted Colonel 
MacMahon’s arbitration in new delimitation of 
boundary line. The British officers and engi¬ 
neers had much opposition on the Persian side 
on account of Russian intrigue, but succeeded 
finally in impressing both Persians and Afghans 
with their sense of fairness and good will in the 
matter. 

In the chapter on Persia, I explain the rea¬ 
sons for and the circumstances leading up to 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. This 
composition of differences between the two great 
powers influenced the situation in Afghanistan 
as vitally as in Persia. The following are the 
provisions of the conventions in regard to Af¬ 
ghanistan : 


19 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


1. Great Britain disclaims any intention of changing 
the political position of Afghanistan, and promises 
neither to take measures in Afghanistan nor to encour¬ 
age Afghanistan to take measures to threaten Russia. 
Russia recognizes Afghanistan as outside her sphere of 
influence, and agrees to act in political relations with 
Afghanistan through Great Britain and to send no 
agents to Afghanistan. 

2. Great Britain, adhering to the provisions of the 
Treaty of Kabul of March 21, 1905, undertakes not to 
annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan or to intervene 
in the internal administration of the country, with the 
reservation that the Emir fulfill engagements contracted 
by him in the Treaty. 

3. Russian and Afghan officials in the frontier prov¬ 
inces, or appointed for that purpose on the frontier, 
may enter into direct relations in order to settle local 
questions of an unpolitical character. 

4. Russia and Great Britain agree to recognize the 
principle of equality of treatment for commerce so that 
facilities secured for British and Anglo-Indians, com¬ 
merce and merchants, shall apply equally to Russian 
commerce and merchants. 

5. These arrangements are not to come into force 
until Great Britain has notified Russia of the Emir’s 
assent to them. 

The convention was a distinct political ad¬ 
vantage to Great Britain, in that it made Afghan¬ 
istan an inviolable buffer state for the protection 
of India. The fear of Russian aggression was 
removed. On the other hand, the advantages to 
Russia were both political and commercial. The 


20 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


status quo of Afghanistan was maintained and 
Russia secured most-favored-nation treatment 
without having to apply force or to continue in¬ 
trigues which might have a boomerang effect on 
her own protected states of Bokhara and Khiva. 

The emir’s reply to the Anglo-Russian Conven¬ 
tion was not published, but there can be no doubt 
that its provisions were considered as satisfac¬ 
tory by him and his subjects. Aside from the 
stipulation that Afghanistan treat with outside 
nations through Great Britain, the sovereignty 
of the emir and the independence of the country 
were maintained. Equal opportunity for Rus¬ 
sian and British commerce took away the great¬ 
est source of intrigue and political unrest. If 
Persia had been treated by the contracting pow¬ 
ers in the same way as Afghanistan, much trouble 
in store for Great Britain in western Asia could 
have been avoided. 

During the last decade of Habibullah Khan’s 
reign the history of Afghanistan presented little 
of interest. The emir had to put down conspira¬ 
cies against his life, and to face a storm of fanat¬ 
ical criticism on the part of his subjects when he 
attempted to introduce European customs and 
conveniences. He managed, however, to keep 


21 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

his position, and to strengthen his authority in 
frontier regions. Roads were built and plans for 
railway construction made. Telephones were in¬ 
troduced. Caravan routes became safe. As the 
emir’s subjects were still without education, polit¬ 
ical unrest was confined to palace conspiracies. 

The greatest task of Habibullah Khan was to 
cooperate loyally and effectively with the British 
to put down feuds among frontier tribes, and to 
prevent raids into British territory. In 1910, 
the Indian and Afghan governments reached an 
agreement that outlaws should be removed to a 
distance of not less than fifty miles from the bor¬ 
der. Except in the Knost Valley, the emir was 
able to carry out this agreement. The territories 
of the Indian northwest frontier will not be paci¬ 
fied until they are effectively occupied or until the 
sale of arms to the tribesmen has been made im¬ 
possible. The mountainous character of the 
country and difficulties of communication make 
the task of policing an onerous and not wholly 
successful one. 

If Great Britain and Russia had not been al¬ 
lies in the present war, the entry of Turkey into 
the war on Germany’s side might have caused 
trouble for the British in Afghanistan. For- 


22 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


tunately for British security in India, Russia held 
strongly northern Persia during the first three 
years of the war. And before the collapse of 
Russia, Great Britain was able to reestablish the 
military situation in Mesopotamia and southern 
Persia. So the proclamation of the Holy War 
did not have in Afghanistan the effect confidently 
expected by Berlin. When the Viceroy of India 
notified Habibullah Khan of a state of war be¬ 
tween Great Britain and Turkey, the emir ex¬ 
pressed his regret and issued a strict neutrality 
proclamation. A mission sent by Emperor Wil¬ 
liam at the end of 1915 to induce the Afghans 
to attack India failed. When the mission tried 
to return to Turkey in May, 1916, some of its 
members were captured by the Russians and Brit¬ 
ish. Indian revolutionaries were found among 
them. 

Since the Russian revolution Afghanistan has 
been exposed to anti-British intrigue much more 
than before. The Russians withdrew from Per¬ 
sia, and there was no barrier against Moslem and 
pan-Turanian agitators. The collapse of the 
Russian Empire brought freedom to the emirates 
north of Afghanistan. The Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 is no longer recognized by 

23 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the Russians. In fact, the Bolshevists declare 
that one of their aims is to help India re¬ 
cover her independence, and to destroy British 
imperialism in Asia. The future attitude of Af¬ 
ghanistan toward Great Britain depends largely 
upon what happens in India and in the native 
Asiatic states of the former Russian Empire. 
As far as the Afghans themselves were con¬ 
cerned, the British had no cause for anxiety until 
the beginning of 1919. 

During the Peace Conference, the news ar¬ 
rived in Paris of the assassination of Habibullah 
Khan. As telegrams from Afghanistan are lib¬ 
erally “edited” in their passage through India and 
are always late and always meager, different in¬ 
terpretations of the assassination were possible. 
Some French and British writers feared a recru¬ 
descence of anti-foreign agitation, and saw the 
hand of the Bolshevists. Others attributed the 
assassination to a palace plot. British official 
circles declared that it had no international sig¬ 
nificance. Subsequent events proved that the as¬ 
sassination was directed against British influence 
in Afghanistan. Not only did the new emir de¬ 
clare his complete independence of Great Britain. 
He invaded India. Frontier tribes went over to 
24 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 

him. The British found themselves with an¬ 
other Afghan war on their hands. They did not 
hesitate to bring the Afghans to terms by adopt¬ 
ing a policy of frightfulness so universally con¬ 
demned when it was the Germans who used it. 
Aeroplanes dropped bombs on Kabul until the 
emir cried for peace. 

Maintaining Afghanistan as a shield to India 
has been the work of eighty years. Aside from 
Russia, there was no complication internationally. 
The other shield to India, Tibet, was not a mat¬ 
ter of concern until the twentieth century. Brit¬ 
ish relations with Tibet have meant dealing with 
China as well as with Russia. The problem 
could not be disposed of by an agreement with 
Russia. Ever since Great Britain thought she 
had the matter arranged, Tibetan affairs have 
been singularly involved by the rise of the repub¬ 
lican movement and by the civil wars in China. 

Tibet, a frontier province of China with an 
area of nearly half a million square miles, has not 
yet been fully explored by Europeans. No cen¬ 
sus has been taken for nearly two hundred years: 
so it is impossible to estimate the population of 
this remote country, as little known as some parts 
of South America. 


25 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

When the British extended their influence 
northward to the Himalayas and eastward to 
Burma, the question of trade relations with Tibet 
arose. The Government of India made treaties 
with China in 1890 and 1893 to regulate com¬ 
mercial relations with Tibet. But the Tibetans 
did not want to trade with the outside world. 
It was impossible to open up satisfactory commu¬ 
nications with the fanatical inhabitants of this 
bleak mountainous region of central Asia. The 
Tibetan problem had come before the Indian Gov¬ 
ernment several times, especially in the dealings 
with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Interven¬ 
tion on the part of the British presented many 
difficulties. There was an unwillingness to of¬ 
fend China, and commercially the game did not 
seem to be worth the candle. Tibetan hostility 
to foreigners was a religious question. The head 
of the government was the dalai lama, who 
lived in a palace near Lhasa. The lama was at 
the same time the religious head of the nation, 
and his court was a monastery. The Tibetans 
allowed no foreigners to enter or even come near 
Lhasa. Chinese authority, represented by two 
ambans, was purely nominal. There were less 
26 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


than five thousand Chinese troops in the country, 
divided into three garrisons. 

As long as the Tibetans maintained their ex¬ 
clusiveness against all foreigners, the British 
were content to let well enough alone. But in 
1900, the news was published of the visit of an 
envoy from the dalai lama to Petrograd with 
a letter and presents to the czar. It was the first 
time that the spiritual head of Tibet had sent a 
mission to a European sovereign. It leaked out 
that the initiative had not been taken by the 
dalai lama, but that the Russians had secretly 
sent envoys to the dalai lama some time before. 
British uneasiness was increased when a second 
Tibetan mission was received with great cere¬ 
mony at Petrograd by the czar and czarina in 
July, 1901. An inspired note in the Russian 
press stated that the object of the mission was 
to obtain religious liberties for the Buddhist sub¬ 
jects of the czar! The mission was headed by 
a former Russian subject, a Buddhist from the 
Transbaikal Province. As Russia was at this 
time pursuing an aggressive policy in Mongolia 
as well as in Manchuria, this open departure from 
all precedent on the part of the dalai lama cre- 
27 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ated much uneasiness at Peking. London was no 
less worried. A new form of approach to the 
Indian frontier, and thus a new menace to India, 
was scented. 

The British press began to recall the fact that 
the Tibetans had invaded Sikkim in 1886 and had 
not been driven out for two years. The inabil¬ 
ity to get results from the trade treaties of 1890 
and 1893 was also mentioned. It was pointed 
out that the Chumbi Valley, like Bhutan and Sik¬ 
kim, was geographically a part of India, and that 
former ideas of annexing it had been given up 
only out of deference to the feelings of China. 
But now that Tibet was in relations with Russia, 
British India had a right to ask that old-standing 
boundary questions be settled, and that trade re¬ 
lations be enforced. Great Britain, however, un¬ 
like Russia, would respect the sovereignty of 
China and treat through Peking. 

In response to a suggestion from China that 
frontier and trade questions be discussed on the 
spot, Great Britain informed China in May, 1903, 
that the Viceroy of India would appoint com¬ 
missioners to meet Chinese and Tibetan repre¬ 
sentatives at the nearest inhabited place on the 
Tibet side of the frontier. 

28 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


Colonel Younghusband was appointed British 
commissioner. Taking with him the British 
political officer of Sikkim, he went to meet the 
Chinese and Tibetan envoys at Khamba Jong in 
July, 1903. This town was in Tibetan territory, 
north of Sikkim, on the other side of the great 
Himalayan passes. At the end of the year, the 
Chinese and Tibetan envoys had not yet arrived, 
but Colonel Younghusband was letting no grass 
grow under his feet. A British-Indian force of 
three thousand had been concentrated, and road¬ 
building was pushed in order to make feasible 
the invasion of Tibet. Nothing less than the 
forcible opening up of Tibet and the placing of 
a British Resident at Lhasa was contemplated by 
the Government of India. The policy was clear, 
as it had been in other cases. In order to pre¬ 
vent Tibet from falling under Russian influence, 
it was to be controlled by Great Britain without 
regard for the feelings of either the suzerain state 
or of the Tibetans themselves. If the Tibet¬ 
ans opposed Colonel Younghusband’s mission— 
which was nothing less than a military expedi¬ 
tion—they were to be shot down in their own 
country. 

The London press began to speak of the neces- 
29 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


sity of a clear understanding between Great 
Britain and Tibet. But there was agitation in 
Liberal circles about the methods the Indian Gov¬ 
ernment proposed to employ, and questions were 
asked in parliament. The Russian ambassador 
in London warned Lord Lansdowne that Russia 
would view with apprehension an attempt to dis¬ 
turb the status quo in Tibet, and denied that 
Russia had designs upon Tibet. It was necessary 
for the Foreign Office to publish a Blue Book 
which covered the disputes and negotiations be¬ 
tween India and Tibet and China from 1874 to 
1904. The official despatches revealed the pro¬ 
posal of the Indian Government to send a mili¬ 
tary expedition to Lhasa, and establish a perma¬ 
nent Resident there, before opening negotiations. 
The home government had refused to sanction 
this proposal, but had yielded in principle to the 
invasion of Tibet. Colonel Younghusband was 
to be permitted to advance as far as Gyangtse, 
but was told not to use force unless the mission 
was attacked or communications threatened, and 
was instructed to withdraw as soon as negotia¬ 
tions were completed. 

None who knew the feeling of the Tibetans 
doubted their strong disinclination to open up 
30 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


their country to outsiders, and it seemed certain 
that the Younghusband mission would meet with 
opposition. The British military authorities had 
no illusions. The elaborate preparations and the 
size of the “guard” demonstrated that hostilities 
were expected. Early in 1904, Colonel Young- 
husband crossed the Tang Pass. When no 
envoys appeared, the advance on Gyangtse 
began. 

The Tibetans were defeated in three engage¬ 
ments during ten days. Their weapons were 
ludicrously inadequate and their leadership inex¬ 
perienced. The British killed six hundred, in¬ 
cluding the Tibetan general, in the first engage¬ 
ment, and took two hundred prisoners. But 
after the expedition had reached Gyangtse, the 
Tibetans persisted in the hopeless sacrifice. 
Colonel Younghusband sent a letter to the dalai 
lama, fixing June 25 as limit for a response and 
declaring that if no answer were received, the 
British would march on Lhasa. The letter was 
returned unopened. Colonel Younghusband re¬ 
ceived reinforcements and occupied Lhasa on 
August 3. The battles were really massacres, as 
the British lost only thirty-seven, while fifteen 
hundred Tibetans were killed in all. 


31 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

The dalai lama fled to Mongolia, but the 
Tibetans were compelled to sign a treaty with 
Great Britain on September 7. The terms of the 
treaty were that Tibet should be opened up to 
trade; that British consent should be obtained be¬ 
fore making territorial concessions to other for¬ 
eign powers; that no other foreign power should 
intervene in Tibetan affairs or send representa¬ 
tives or agents into Tibet; and that no power 
should be granted commercial concessions with¬ 
out similar or equivalent concessions being given 
to the British. An indemnity of five hundred 
thousand pounds was imposed. The British were 
to continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until 
the indemnity was paid and until trade marts 
had been open for three years. 

As a strong feeling of protest arose in par¬ 
liament, not only on account of the injustice to 
the Tibetans but for fear that permanent occu¬ 
pation of the Chumbi Valley might offend China, 
London reduced the indemnity to one third. In 
view of Russian and Japanese aggression in the 
Far East, the British legation at Peking was 
anxious not to have its influence impaired. The 
real object of the expedition was to show the 
Tibetans that Great Britain would not tolerate 
32 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 

Russian influence in any country bordering on 
India. 

Not until April 27, 1906, were the British and 
Chinese able to come to an agreement regarding 
Tibet. China accepted the Younghusband treaty 
in a modified form. Great Britain promised not 
to annex Tibetan territory or interfere with the 
administration of the country, while China agreed 
to prevent intervention by any other power and 
to be responsible for the payment of the reduced 
indemnity. 

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 put an 
end to the conflict over Tibet. Both powers 
agreed to recognize Tibet as under the suzerainty 
of China, to respect its territorial integrity, to ab¬ 
stain from intervention in internal administra- 

V 

tion, to refrain from sending representatives to 
Lhasa, and to treat with Tibet only through 
China. Great Britain’s “special interest” to 
maintain the present regime was recognized by 
Russia. But both powers bound themselves not 
to seek or obtain on their own account—or on 
behalf of their subjects—railway, road, tele¬ 
graph, or mining concessions or other rights in 
Tibet, or to send even scientific missions into the 
country before 1911! 


33 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

The mutual hands-off policy adopted by Great 
Britain and Russia in regard to Tibet, and the 
continued absence of the dalai lama from Lhasa, 
gave China the opportunity of establishing ef¬ 
fective control over the country. The defeat of 
Russia by Japan had encouraged national move¬ 
ments throughout Asia. The year 1908 was 
notable for the birth among all Asiatic peoples 
of a new spirit whose influence was felt from 
Constantinople to Peking. China became as jeal¬ 
ous of her territorial integrity as Turkey. The 
Chinese determined to make their suzerainty in 
Tibet a reality. The army was reorganized with 
Chinese officers, trade agents were sent to many 
places, and settlement by Chinese peasant farm¬ 
ers was encouraged. At the end of September, 
1908, the dalai lama visited Peking. His desire 
to be recognized by China as the sovereign of 
Tibet was met by the answer that even his spir¬ 
itual power depended upon China. A year later, 
when the dalai lama returned to Lhasa, he 
found the Chinese in effective military occupa¬ 
tion. The Chinese amban had become the vice¬ 
roy of a real Chinese province. When the dalai 
lama attempted to restore the old order of the 
days before the Younghusband expedition, 
34 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


Chinese troops entered Lhasa and shot down the 
Tibetans who desired to aid their old ruler in 
reestablishing his sovereignty. The dalai lama 
fled to India. An imperial edict was issued at 
Peking deposing him. 

The revolution of 1912 led to a mutiny of the 
Chinese troops at Lhasa, whose pay and supplies 
had been cut off. When they looted the monas¬ 
teries, the Tibetans were strong enough to expel 
them, and they had to leave Tibet by way of In¬ 
dia. The dalai lama returned to Lhasa and was 
able to secure a decree from Peking giving back 
to him his old position with all its power and 
privileges. 

When the Chinese Government prepared to re¬ 
conquer the country, the British intervened at 
Peking and warned China that any attempt to 
make Tibet a Chinese province again would be 
strongly opposed. At the suggestion of the Brit¬ 
ish, Chinese and Tibetan delegates met in India 
in 1913 to arrange for the relations between 
the two countries. The dalai lama cultivated 
friendly relations with the British in order to 
prevent the Chinese from returning to Tibet. At 
the outbreak of the war in 1914, the relations 
between China and Tibet were not yet clearly 
35 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

established. It seems certain, however, that the 
dalai lama had been successful in availing him¬ 
self of the influence of the Indian Government 
against a recrudescence of Chinese nationalistic 
aspirations. Telegrams from India announced 
that he had offered to contribute a Tibetan regi¬ 
ment to the war against Germany. 

In the decade between the Younghusband ex¬ 
pedition and the European war, trade relations 
with Tibet proved increasingly profitable to the 
British, in spite of the inaccessibility of the coun¬ 
try and the great cost of transportation over the 
high Himalaya passes. During the first three 
years of the war, trade increased fifty per cent, 
over the figures of 1914. Most of Tibet’s ex¬ 
ports to India were raw wool, and imports from 
India, Manchester cotton piece goods. 

Added to the advantage of lucrative trade, the 
British profited by the opening up of Tibet in 
making more secure the Indian frontiers north 
of Assam and northeast of Burma. At the be¬ 
ginning of the war, survey and exploration work 
was being carried on in order to establish natural 
boundary lines between India and China, admin¬ 
istrative control had been extended over parts of 
the Burma frontier tribal area, and a new dis- 
36 


AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET 


trict, Patas, had been peacefully established. 

The participation of China in the world war 
on the side of the Entente did not bring to the 
enemies of Germany all the advantages that were 
expected. For China was in the midst of a po¬ 
litical and social evolution that relegated the 
European conflict to the background. China was 
in the throes of civil war during the whole of 
1918. Tibet did not escape being a battle-field. 
At the end of the year, it was reported that the 
Tibetans had freed their country from Chinese 
invaders. But one is permitted to wonder 
whether the war in Tibet was racial or politico- 
social. Has it been Tibetans against Chinese, 
or narrow traditions against new ideas? The 
latter seems the more probable. If the Chinese 
Republic emerges from the civil war a strong fed¬ 
eral organism, imbued with the spirit of the 
twentieth century and destined to “Europeanize” 
China, Tibet, instead of being a shield to India, 
may become the point of contact of Japan and 
China with India in the movement to give Asia 
to the Asiatics. 


37 


CHAPTER III 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


T HE title of no people to rule over another 
is more questionable in its origin -and in its 
development than that of the British to 
rule over the Indians. What fair-minded Eng¬ 
lishman could read the history of the East India 
Company and continue to believe that his fellow- 
countrymen of the end of the eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth century fought and 
worked in India from the burning desire to help 
the Indian races to a higher civilization? The 
builders of the British Empire in India had ad¬ 
mirable qualities—qualities essential to the mak¬ 
ing of successful pirates and freebooters—re¬ 
sourcefulness, persistence, and military genius 
developed under extraordinarily difficult circum¬ 
stances. Ruffians though they were, earlier Brit¬ 
ish administrators were free from cant. They 
did not hesitate to admit that they were out for 
the loot, and that might made right. They did 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


not attempt to justify their actions. They did not 
speak of the blessings of the pax britannica , and 
they never got angry over the unwillingness of 
their victims to laud their efforts. 

During the course of the nineteenth century, 
the British Government substituted itself for the 
East India Company, but did not change the old 
system. Directly administered territories were 
constantly added to the inheritance of the East 
India Company but did not change the old sys¬ 
tem. A host of British functionaries and a 
large British army were quartered on the country, 
and their salaries charged to Indian revenues. 
Indian troops were raised and trained to fight 
against other Indians to forge more deeply the 
bonds of economic and political serfdom. In 
1876, Queen Victoria assumed the title of Em¬ 
press of India. The British Crown is repre¬ 
sented in India by a viceroy, who with the 
Secretary of State for India, a member of the 
British cabinet, has virtually unlimited power. 
The various parliamentary statutes under which 
India was governed were consolidated into the 
Government of India Act, passed in 1915 an< ^ 
amended in 1916. Slight changes, under pres¬ 
sure of Indian agitation, were suggested to par- 
39 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


liament in 1918 that would give some Indians a 
small measure of self-government. The Indians 
are now demanding full self-government. This 
is one of the great questions confronting British 
statesmen in the period of reconstruction. But 
a strenuous effort is being made in London to 
prevent the League of Nations from having any¬ 
thing to do with India. The Indian question is 
considered as an internal British question. 

How blind men are to the signs of the times! 
In the fifteen provinces of India under direct ad¬ 
ministrative control, and ruled by British law, 
live two hundred and fifty millions, mostly 
Aryans. The protected states of central India, 
whose rulers have managed to preserve their 
thrones and a semblance of independence, con¬ 
tain seventy millions. In all, the Government of 
India holds sway over one fifth of the inhabitants 
of the world, whose discontent with the present 
form of British rule grows rapidly every year. 
Unless a serious effort is made to administer 
India for the benefit of the Indians and give the 
Indians the opportunity of attaining self-govern¬ 
ment, it is hardly probable that the Society of 
Nations will be able to consider India as an in¬ 
ternal British problem. India is the foyer for 
40 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 

political unrest throughout Asia, the repercussion 
of which is influencing profoundly the entire 
world. Interwoven with the course of events in 
India are the problems of Persia, Central Asia, 
Siberia, and China. Within the limits of India, 
seventy million Mohammedans proclaim their in¬ 
ability to remain indifferent to what is going on 
in the Mohammedan world. Did they not re¬ 
cently protest at Paris against the expulsion of 
the Sultan of Turkey from Constantinople? 

The movement for self-government that swept 
across Asia in the first decade of the twentieth 
century was nowhere more enthusiastically and 
intelligently taken up than in India. The Indian 
people had real grievances against the British, 
social and economic as well as political. Socially, 
the handful of British military and civilian 
officials were becoming more and more arrogant 
in their attitude toward the natives. The gulf 
separating the British from the people of the 
country was widening. No Britisher tolerates 
assumption of social equality on the part of a 
native, even though ruler of a large state. A 
maharaja told me in 1916: “The limit of en¬ 
durance has been reached. We cannot stand the 
British much longer.” Economically, famines 
41 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


are more and more frequent, and the British 
authorities seem to be less able to cope with them 
than formerly. Trade returns show that Eng¬ 
land is taking a hundred and fifty million dollars 
every year out of India with no commercial or 
material return. This has been going on so long 
that India has become the most impoverished 
country in the world. Politically, the agitation 
against absolute British rule has grown threaten¬ 
ing in the past ten years, and at no time have the 
British been more alarmed than in the winter 
following the Entente triumph over Germany. 

Contemporary books on Indian political and 
economic life are almost invariably polemical. 
The writer develops a brief pro or contra. The 
champion of British rule, however, confines him¬ 
self to generalities and assertions unsupported by 
facts or figures. He tells you what would happen 
to India if the British loosened their control, and 
justifies repression of agitation for self-govern¬ 
ment on the ground that order must be main¬ 
tained. I have read a great number of articles 
and several books on the British side. Not one 
of them contains statistics to point out benefits 
to the Indian population resulting from British 
rule. There is no disposition to study export 
42 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


and import figures, agriculture, sanitation, de¬ 
velopment of educational facilities, and to com¬ 
pare the social and economic status of the Indian 
under native rule with that of the Indian under 
direct British rule. The reading of books like 
Captain Trotter’s “History of India,” published 
by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowl¬ 
edge, and Lovat Fraser’s “India under Curzon 
and After,” causes one to realize that intelligent 
and high-minded Englishmen have never put 
themselves in the other man’s place in thinking 
about India. Some of the finest men I have ever 
known have served Great Britain in India in a 
military or civilian capacity. But they never 
questioned their right to draw large salaries from 
the Indian peoples against their will, to raid and 
shoot down frontier tribes, to flog and condemn to 
death Indians for acting precisely as they would 
have acted under similar circumstances. Dom¬ 
inant races are alike in their inability to see wrong 
in whatever actions may be necessary to pre¬ 
serve their rule. The Britisher is sincere in his 
patriotism. He believes he is serving his coun¬ 
try, if not humanity. But if he would analyze 
the motives behind British rule in India and his 
presence there, he could not escape the conclusion 
43 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


that bearing the white man’s burden means (i) 
selling goods in a market where others do not 
enjoy an equal opportunity; (2) preference in 
investment and concession privileges; (3) getting 
on the pay-roll. 1 

Reading books on India is like traveling in 
India. You visit big cities, you attend Durbars 
and military reviews. You are called upon to 
admire railway construction and irrigation and 
plague hospitals and governmental machinery. 
The histories are full of military expeditions and 
ceremonies and viceregal achievements. And the 
people at whose expense the show is mounted? 
One goes through hundreds of pages. The 
people are not mentioned except in case of an 
outbreak. Then the writer tells you of a suc¬ 
cessful punitive expedition or of a trial, ending 
in the condemnation of the agitators. The Na¬ 
tionalist leader, Mr. Lajpat Rai, expresses the 
Indian’s point of view in a verse of four lines: 

1 If it be objected that orderly government is sufficient com¬ 
pensation to India for commercial exploitation, the ready reply 
is forthcoming that the administration is paid for separately 
in hard Indian cash; and far from being a philanthropic service, 
provides congenial and remunerative employment for a large 
number of Englishmen who could not have found the same 
opportunity elsewhere.—-Richard Jebb: Studies in Colonial 
Nationalism (London, 1905), p. 322. 


44 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


The toad beneath the harrow knows 
Exactly where each tooth-point goes. 

The butterfly upon the road 
Preaches contentment to the toad. 

Within the scope of this volume, it is impos¬ 
sible to discuss the problems of British rule in 
India. During- the recent war, two books were 
written that put the problem of India before the 
world. Mr. H., M. Hyndman was not allowed 
by the British censor to publish his “Awakening 
of Asia” until after the armistice had been signed. 
Mr. Hyndman’s ancestors served Great Britain 
in India. He has been a close student of and 
writer upon Indian affairs for more than forty 
years. “England’s Debt to India” is a compila¬ 
tion of what Britishers, past and present, have 
said and written about the relations between 
Great Britain and India. Mr. Lajpat Rai has 
suffered personally at the hands of the British 
and is a bitter opponent of the present form of 
British rule. But his bias does not affect, of 
course, the value of the hundreds of textual quo¬ 
tations. Although more than two years have 
passed since Mr. Rai’s book was published, I have 
looked in vain for a refutation or rectification of 
the facts it sets forth. 


45 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

The Nationalist movement first became menac¬ 
ing in 1907. It has continued ever since, and has 
developed strong leaders. The methods of re¬ 
pression adopted by the British have had the 
disastrous effect of destroying the confidence of 
the Indians in the just administration of law, 
always the strongest hold of the British on sub¬ 
ject races. It was not until prominent Indians 
had been arrested, imprisoned, and transported 
without trial or even accusation, that the Indians 
resorted to terrorism and bomb-throwing. De¬ 
fiance of law and justice was fought with its 
own weapons. When political offenders were 
hanged in batches of ten, some without any evi¬ 
dence against them at all, the Nationalists re¬ 
sorted to assassination. When students were 
flogged without having been given a chance to 
defend themselves, because they were not told 
of what crime they were accused, Indian univer¬ 
sities became centers of anti-British agitation. 
In 1910, the Press Act took away the freedom of 
the press. In 1911, the right of assembly was 
denied the Indians by the enactment of the Se¬ 
ditious Meetings Act. In 1913, the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act amended Indian law of 
conspiracy by making it penal to conspire to com- 
46 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


mit an offense, even though the conspiracy was 
accompanied by no overt act in pursuance of its 
object. This gave the British authorities a legal 
cover, which they had before lacked, for arbitrary 
arrest. There is no Habeas Corpus Act in India. 
A John Hampden would be regarded as a Bol¬ 
shevist or an anarchist, and treated as such. 

On the eve of the great war, the British au¬ 
thorities had come to recognize that rigorous re¬ 
pression of criticism of the government was 
excellent propaganda for the Nationalist move¬ 
ment. None could close his eyes to the warning 
to the British Government in the unprecedented 
action of the Municipal Council of Bombay, which 
ordered the public markets closed for eight days 
as a protest against a sedition trial under the 
new repressive laws. Some degree of self-gov¬ 
ernment, some participation in good posts on the 
pay-roll, had to be granted to the Indians. The 
most crying of economic injustices, the stifling 
of the Indian cotton industry for the benefit of 
English manufacturers, was attacked by Anglo- 
Indian officials, who admonished London against 
the folly of continuing this traditional barefaced 
exploitation in disregard of the growing agita¬ 
tion. A significant change had taken place. Na- 
47 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tionalism was no longer confined to editors and 
students. Merchants and landowners were be¬ 
ing contaminated. Encouragement was coming 
even from princes whose personal fortunes were 
naturally on the side of the British. 

At this moment the war broke out. As usual, 
India was called upon to aid England. Indian 
troops reached the battle-fields of France before 
Kitchener’s volunteer army. Indians served at 
Gallipoli and in Egypt. The Mesopotamian Ex¬ 
pedition was undertaken and financed by the 
Government of India. The Indian princes came 
to the front with munificent gifts and offers of 
service. Most important of all, the announce¬ 
ment was made that “the people of India” gave 
a “gift” of one hundred million pounds to the 
British Exchequer. The. Indians had nothing 
whatever to do with the transaction, which the 
London “Nation” described as “merely a case of 
one official in India signaling to another in Eng¬ 
land.” Said the “Nation”: 

This is sheer dishonesty. India is not self-governing, 
and this particular action is not the action of a body 
justly claiming to represent the will or interests of the 
Indian people. The people of India have no voice in 
this or any other act of government, and, if they had, they 
48 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


would be forced to think twice before contributing out 
of their dire poverty this huge sum to the resources of 
their wealthy rulers. Nor ought a poor subject people 
already burdened with large increases of war taxation to 
be compelled by its Government to make this gift. 

Indian public opinion, however, accepted the 
enormous levy, as well as military service in the 
war against Germany. As in Egypt, the Na¬ 
tionalists who went over to the German side and 
worked for the victory of Germany were very 
few and of secondary importance. Men of posi¬ 
tion and intelligence among Egyptian and Indian 
Nationalists had no illusions about Germany. 
They were not fools enough to compromise the 
justice and the triumph of their cause by con¬ 
spiring with a nation that was fighting for the 
very antithesis of Nationalist principles. On the 
other hand, from the first days of the war, British 
statesmen declared unequivocally that the war 
against Germany was not a war for territorial or 
commercial aggrandizement. The Bt itish people 
had drawn the sword solely for the defense of 
the principle of the right of nations to govern 
themselves. These declarations were accepted 
by the Indians as a solemn pledge on the part of 
the British, who bound themselves to the fulfill- 
49 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ment of these ideals by the very fact that they 
made Indians pay for the war and fight. 

No British official denied the necessity of recog¬ 
nizing the obligation. In the dark days of the 
war, the British cabinet appreciated the loyalty 
and aid of India. There was a tendency to be 
liberal in the reforms proposed and the measure 
of self-government granted to the Indians. The 
inclination of the British Government to do the 
right thing was strengthened by two significant 
facts. Mohammedans and Hindus had arrived 
at an understanding to work together in pressing 
claims for self-government. In 1916, the British 
viceroy held a conference with Indian princes at 
Delhi. He was astonished—and not a little 
alarmed—to be confronted by Hindu rulers of 
every grade and sect sitting side by side with 
Mohammedan chieftains. And they chose as 
their spokesman one of the most enlightened 
princes of India, the Gaikwar of Baroda, whose 
relations with the British had been strained ever 
since the king’s visit. The gaikwar was ac¬ 
cused of lacking in deference to the Emperor of 
India. 

Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, and Mr. 
Montagu, Secretary of State for India, were 
50 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


asked by the British Government to make a report 
on India, embodying proposals for administrative 
and legislative concessions that might safely be 
granted to the people of India after the war as 
a token of Great Britain's appreciation of India's 
participation in the war. But powerful in¬ 
fluences combined to prevent any change in the 
system of government. Former Anglo-Indian 
officials, who were drawing comfortable pensions 
in England from India, and functionaries high up 
on the pay-roll were united in the determination 
to preserve undiminished the places and the power 
of British officials in India. 

The proposals of the Montagu-Chelmsford Re¬ 
port would have been hailed with satisfaction by 
the small number of Indians interested a genera¬ 
tion ago in the amelioration of political and eco¬ 
nomic conditions. But at the end of a great war, 
fought to establish the liberty of all races, and 
in the prosecution of which India had contributed 
blood and treasure, the attempt to preserve the 
autocratic central government and English offi¬ 
cialdom graft could not be successful. It was 
too late. At a special congress, which met in 
Bombay at the end of August, 1918, held in con¬ 
junction with a meeting of the All-India Moslem 
5i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


League at the same time and place, representative 
Indian patriots passed resolutions setting forth 
the minimum that Hindus and Moslems were 
willing to accept in the way of reforms and con¬ 
cessions. The second and third resolutions indi¬ 
cate the present temper of the Indian people: 

Resolution II: That this Congress re-affirms the 
principles of reform contained in the Resolutions relating 
to Self-Government adopted in the Indian National Con¬ 
gress and the All-India Moslem League held at Lucknow 
in December, 1916, and at Calcutta in December, 1917, 
and declares that nothing less than Self-Government 
within the Empire can satisfy the Indian people and, by 
enabling it to take its rightful place as a free and Self- 
Governing Nation in the British Commonwealth, 
strengthen the connexion between Great Britain and 
India. 

Resolution III: That this Congress declares that the 
people of India are fit for responsible Government, and 
repudiates the assumption to the contrary contained in 
the Report on Indian Constitutional reforms. 

The Bombay Congress demanded the recogni¬ 
tion by the British Parliament of the rights of 
the people of India as British citizens; equality 
before the law; right of open and lawful trial; 
free press; and that “corporal punishment shall 
not be inflicted upon any Indian subject of His 
Majesty save under conditions applying equally 
to all other British subjects/’ Hindus and Mos- 
52 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 


lems were unanimous in asking for the immediate 
institution of responsible government, as in other 
portions of the empire, and declared that the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Report contained “pro¬ 
posals as a whole disappointing and unsatisfac¬ 
tory.” 

The counter-proposals of the Indians stipulated 
the abolition of the Privy Council; an adequate 
Indian element in the Council of India; the choice 
of four fifths of the members of the Legislative 
Assembly by election; India's control of her own 
finances; the promise of Great Britain to establish 
full responsible government within fifteen years; 
the granting of at least twenty-five per cent, of 
commissions in the Indian Army to Indians, the 
proportion to be gradually increased, and the 
right to trial by peers and the Habeas Corpus 
Act for Indians. Not a single one of these de¬ 
mands was unreasonable. The Indians simply 
asked for rights in their own country that the 
British had won and deemed precious and indis¬ 
pensable in their country. 

Hindus and Moslems were united, also, in 
asking that India be represented at the Peace 
Conference in the same manner as other portions 
of the British Empire, not by delegates chosen in 
53 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


London but by genuine representatives of the 
Indian people. 

Like the Egyptian and Irish questions, the In¬ 
dian question was not courageously faced by the 
British Government at the time of the Peace 
Conference. Repression was attempted, and 
British officials tried to explain away Indian 
nationalism as a German scheme promoted by 
German gold, or as the work of Bolshevist agents. 
The result was the agitation in different centers 
in March and April, 1919, which led to the 
Amritsar affair. British public opinion was 
shocked when it leaked out that a British general 
had given an order to fire upon unarmed civilians, 
which cost more than a thousand lives in a few 
minutes. The Government, after a minute and 
exhaustive inquiry, relieved General Dyer, and 
Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, told 
Parliament that the Government and the nation 
repudiated the policy of British officialdom in 
India. Mr. Montagu frankly stated that during 
the war the British nation had condemned too un¬ 
equivocally the policy of “frightfulness” to con¬ 
done it when British interests were at stake. 

The result of the Amritsar affair has been to 
cause Englishmen to think. British press com- 
54 


INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 

ment on the relations of the Government to the In¬ 
dian people, like that of Mr. Montagu, does credit 
to the British sense of fair play. 

India’s beloved poet and philosopher, who re¬ 
nounced his knighthood in an indignant letter to 
King George, after what he called “the atrocities 
of the Punjab,” believes that the bad features of 
British rule in India are the result of an instinct 
of conquest common to all nations of the Occi¬ 
dent. An honored guest in my home, Sir Rabin¬ 
dranath Tagore (now Dr. Tagore!) expressed in 
one sentence his indictment of European eminent 
domain in Asia. Said Dr. Tagore: “You try 
to force upon us what is alien to our character 
and to the spirit of our civilization.” 

When he laid before Parliament his proposals 
for reform, Mr. Montagu admitted the incon¬ 
sistency of denying liberty to India at the moment 
when Great Britain was struggling for a new 
world order, based upon the freedom and equality 
of all nations. He declared: 

Attention is repeatedly called to the fact that in Europe, . 
Britain is fighting on the side of liberty, and it is urged 
that Britain cannot deny to the people of India that for 
which she is herself fighting in Europe, and in the fight 
for which she has been helped by India’s blood and 
treasure. 


55 


CHAPTER IV 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES AND 
PROTECTORATES 

F ROM Cyprus to Wei-hai-wei, the British 
flag waves over islands and peninsulas and 
ports at every strategic point in the south¬ 
ern half of the continent of Asia. It requires 
only a glance at the map to see that the British 
have succeeded in establishing themselves in 
places where they control the paths of the sea. 
Without the strongest navy in the world, their 
hold on southern Asia would be precarious. 
Mistress of the sea, Great Britain fears no rival. 
She commands: Europeans and Asiatics and 
Americans alike must obey. The commercial 
advantage of this thorough Asiatic extension of 
British eminent domain is incalculable. Lucky 
are the manufacturers and merchants born Brit¬ 
ons—if they desire to trade anywhere. In south¬ 
ern Asia the handicap in their favor is greater 
than elsewhere. And that is saying a great deal! 
56 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 

Starting with Asia Minor and ending with China, 
they have Cyprus; the Isthmus of Suez; Perim 
Island; Aden; the islands of Abd-el-Keru and 
Sokotra; the Kuria Muria Islands and Bay; the 
Bahrein Islands; Koweit; the southern coast of 
Persia; Afghanistan and Baluchistan; the penin¬ 
sula of India; the Laccadive and the Maidive 
Islands; Chagos Archipelago; Ceylon; Burma; 
the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands; the Fed¬ 
erated Malay States; Singapore; Sarawak, Bru¬ 
nei, and British North Borneo; Hongkong; and 
Wei-hai-wei. 

Cyprus keeps guard over the eastern Mediter¬ 
ranean, Syria, and Egypt. Perim Island and 
Aden control the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb at the 
outlet of the Red Sea. The islands of Abd-el- 
Keru and Sokotra, off Cape Guardafui, are senti¬ 
nels at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden. On the 
southeastern side of the Arabian peninsula, the 
Kuria Muria Islands and Bay make a precious 
coaling-station of a kind that the British were 
willing to fight to prevent France from obtaining. 
The Bahrein Islands dominate the Persian Gulf, 
with Koweit at the upper end of the gulf. Pos¬ 
session of the Laccadive and the Maidive Is¬ 
lands, the Chagos Archipelago, and Ceylon, 
57 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

makes India secure. The Andaman and the 
Nicobar Islands watch over the western exit from 
Malacca Strait, while the Federated Malay 
States and Singapore give Great Britain control 
of Malacca Strait. Sarawak, Brunei, and Brit¬ 
ish North Borneo are on the strategically impor¬ 
tant side of the Dutch island of Borneo. Brit¬ 
ish North Borneo is close to the Sulu Archipelago 
and other islands of the Philippine group. 
Hongkong is the great port of southern China. 
Wei-hai-wei, near the end of the Shantung pen¬ 
insula opposite Port Arthur, stands ready to dis¬ 
pute with Japan the control of the exit to the sea 
of the most important and populous portion of 
the Chinese Empire. 

Including India and her dependencies (but ex¬ 
cluding Afghanistan and the parts of Persia, 
Asiatic Russia, and the Ottoman Empire occu¬ 
pied since 1914), the British have gained pos¬ 
session of 2,100,000 square miles in Asia, with a 
population of 360,000,000. In these vast do¬ 
minions live only 170,000 Europeans and Ameri¬ 
cans, of whom a third are not British subjects. 
If we do not count government officials and mis¬ 
sionaries, the European residents of British pos¬ 
sessions in Asia are few and far between. 

58 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 


In the British Empire there are four forms of 
attachment to Great Britain: self-governing do¬ 
minions, colonies, protectorates, and depend¬ 
encies. The last of these terms is vague. Some¬ 
times—and this is the case in several instances in 
Asia—a British dependency is a country over 
which administrative control has not been ex¬ 
tended or which has not been formally recognized 
as a protectorate. It is simply within the Brit¬ 
ish “sphere of influence.” Other powers must 
keep out! 

The Government of India is rapidly evolving 
into a self-governing dominion in the sense that 
its affairs, and in a large measure its policies, are 
not under the direct control of London. In fact, 
the Government of India is not infrequently in 
conflict with the British Foreign Office. But the 
autonomy does not extend to giving the people 
of the country a voice in the government. One 
might say that British India is an autocratic gov¬ 
ernment in the hands of an official caste of for¬ 
eigners, supported by native rulers. Outside of 
the Indian peninsula, Burma, the Andaman, and 
the Nicobar Islands and a portion of Baluchistan 
are provinces. The rest of Baluchistan is con¬ 
trolled by India, partly as a protectorate and 
59 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


partly as dependencies. Aden (with Perim, 
Sokotra, and the Kuria Muria Islands) belongs to 
the Indian province of Bombay, while the Lacca¬ 
dive Islands are incorporated in the Madras 
Presidency. The Bahrein Islands, Koweit, 
Afghanistan, and Sikkim are protectorates of 
India. 

Depending directly upon London are: Col¬ 
onies —Ceylon (with the Maidive Islands), Cy¬ 
prus, Hongkong, Wei-hai-wei and the Straits 
Settlements (with Christmas Island and the Co¬ 
cos Islands); Protectorates —the Malay States 
(five of which are federated under one adminis¬ 
tration), British North Borneo, Brunei, and 
Sarawak; Dependencies —Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, 
and the Yangtse Valley of China. 

British India is dealt with in another chapter. 
Here we shall try to give the salient features of 
British administration and the recent events in 
the territories controlled by Great Britain that 
do not depend upon the Government of India. 

Ceylon, taken from the Dutch during the Na¬ 
poleonic Wars, became a colony at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. The Dutch had never 
exercised any control over the interior. But 
the British were able to pacify the island in fif- 
60 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 

teen years, partly by conquest but mostly by aid¬ 
ing the native kings against rebels. For a hun¬ 
dred years the British have experienced remark¬ 
ably little difficulty in the administration of Cey¬ 
lon. Its population of four and a half millions 
is composed mostly of Sinhalese and Tamils, in¬ 
vaders from India who virtually exterminated 
the native tribes and brought with them the re¬ 
ligions of India. On the tea estates are half a 
million Tamils, immigrants of recent years from 
southern India. The colony is one of the rich¬ 
est British possessions, and is self-supporting. 
Most of its shipping and trade are with India and 
Great Britain, and the larger portion of expendi¬ 
tures for garrisons is taken from local revenue. 
The British authorities have managed the fi¬ 
nances of the colony admirably. The public debt 
is small and accounted for in the construction of 
railways, roads, harbor works and other public 
utilities. Little has been done, however, for edu¬ 
cation. Although the European population is 
less than ten thousand, one fifth of the money for 
schools appropriated from public revenues is 
given to the foreign communities. Until after 
the outbreak of the recent war, the native popu¬ 
lation of Ceylon was uncontaminated by the po- 
61 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


litical unrest prevailing in India. Serious riots 
broke out at Kandy in June, 1915, and spread to 
Colombo and other towns. Martial law had to 
be proclaimed in five provinces of the island. 
Since 1915, the British have had on their hands 
the problem of political agitation. 

The island of Cyprus passed under British con¬ 
trol by a secret convention signed at Constanti¬ 
nople in 1878. It was not ceded by the sultan. 
The British were allowed to administer Cyprus 
in return for an annual tribute and the promise 
of support in maintaining the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. Five years later, however, the 
British installed themselves in Egypt. The 
status of Cyprus was like that of Egypt—a part 
of the Ottoman Empire, paying tribute—until 
Turkey joined the Central powers in the recent 
war. On November 5, 1914, Great Britain an¬ 
nexed Cyprus. Eighty per cent, of the three 
hundred thousand inhabitants are Greeks, who 
have for many years been agitating for the union 
of Cyprus with Greece. In 1915, the British 
Government offered to give the island to Greece 
in return for intervention in the war on the side 
of the Entente. King Constantine refused. 
But as Greece later came into the war, the 
62 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 


Greeks confidently expect that Cyprus will be 
ceded to them on the basis of the principle of na¬ 
tionalities. 

Hongkong is an island at the mouth of the 
Canton River, the cession of which was wrung 
from China after the inglorious opium war of 
1841. Twenty years later, the colony was in¬ 
creased by the seizure of the peninsula of Kau- 
lung, opposite the island. Great Britain took ad¬ 
vantage of the weakness of China after the war 
with Japan to quintuple the area of the colony by 
the lease of more than three hundred additional 
square miles of mainland. Half a million Chi¬ 
nese are now living under British rule in the 
Hongkong colony and leased territory. Since 
1900, the British have worked feverishly to in¬ 
crease their political and economic influence on 
the mainland. In 1901, the Waglan lighthouse 
was taken over by the colonial government. In 
1904, a large district of high land was set aside 
for exclusive European settlement. In 1905, 
British influence on the mainland was extended by 
lending money to the viceroy at Wu-chang to pay 
off the American concession-holders of the rail¬ 
way line. In 1906, the British opposed bitterly 
an effort of the Chinese at Canton to construct a 

63 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Chinese-owned railway to a point outside of the 
British colony. Since the rise of republican feel¬ 
ing in China, the British have had to deal with a 
growing agitation among the Chinese to recover 
possession of what the Chinese consider as one 
of their most important ports. When it was 
realized that the revolutionary movement had suc¬ 
ceeded, there was an outburst of national feeling 
in Hongkong, and republican flags were flown 
from all the houses and carried in processions. 
The British suppressed with severity the at¬ 
tempted political demonstration, and passed a 
special law “for the preservation of peace.” In 
July, 1912, there was an attempt to assassinate 
the new governor of the colony at the moment he 
landed. The assailant, who declared at his trial 
that he'was actuated by no personal malice but 
by love of his country, was sentenced to imprison¬ 
ment for life. The following month, the custom¬ 
houses were attacked and the police station in the 
Hongkong Extension. In December, 1912, when 
the British refused to accept Chinese coins on 
the tramways, the trams were boycotted. The 
British retaliated by threatening to levy an extra 
tax from the native population to provide com¬ 
pensation for the loss sustained through the boy- 
64 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 

cott. In recent years, the Chinese have been 
paralyzed by the civil war between North and 
South. There can be no doubt, however, that 
Young China will endeavor within the next gen¬ 
eration to expel all foreign political influence from 
China. The aim of the Chinese is to get back 
their sovereignty. 

The lease of Wei-hai-wei, like that of the ex¬ 
tension in Hongkong, was secured by Great 
Britain at the time of the disgraceful scramble of 
1898. Besides the port and the bay, it includes 
the island of Xiu-kung, all the islands in the bay, 
and a depth of ten English miles along the entire 
coast of the bay. At the beginning of 1901, 
Wei-hai-wei was transferred from the War Of¬ 
fice to the Colonial Office, and a commissioner ap¬ 
pointed to administer the leased territory under 
the laws and ordinances of Hongkong. This 
action foreshadowed the announcement of the 
following year that the British Government had 
abandoned the idea of fortifying the port and 
keeping a large garrison there. The British 
looked with alarm upon the establishment of naval 
stations on the Chinese cost by rival European 
powers. For half a century, they alone had en¬ 
joyed this advantage with Hongkong, and British 

65 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

diplomacy at Peking was being exercised to 
stiffen the backbone of the Chinese. Under these 
circumstances, fortifying Wei-hai-wei would 
have been illogical. Why should not the leased 
territories acquired by the powers remain unfor¬ 
tified? The British said they intended to use 
Wei-hai-wei as a sanatorium and vacation center. 
They would limit its naval use to an aeroplane 
base, and the bay would be used only for small- 
arm naval practice. After the Russo-Japanese 
War, the consent of China to transfer the rights 
of Russia in Port Arthur to Japan was considered 
to settle the status of Wei-hai-wei. For Wei- 
hai-wei had been leased to the British Govern¬ 
ment on the understanding that it would be re¬ 
turned to China when Russia returned Port 
Arthur. Since Japan was to remain in Port 
Arthur, the British would remain in Wei-hai-wei. 
The leased territory was made a colony, and the 
Chinese Government was summoned to recognize 
Wei-hai-wei as a foreign port on the same footing 
as Hongkong. The future of the port and the 
leased territory around it now depends upon how 
Japan acts in the Shangtung peninsula. If Japan 
intends to stay in Shangtung, the British may 
change their minds about the naval base. They 
66 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 


will certainly endeavor to extend their economic 
influence in the hinterland of the port, and ar¬ 
rive at an agreement with Japan to divide up 
Shangtung. Wei-hai-wei is an admirable sana¬ 
torium: its climate is unsurpassed in the Far 
East. But it also gives Great Britain a valuable 
strategic foothold in North China. 

In the southeast corner of Asia, a long narrow 
peninsula extends for ten degrees beyond the con¬ 
tinent. From its geographical position, the Ma¬ 
lay Peninsula belongs to the East Indies, almost 
all of which have managed to remain under the 
Dutch flag. In this part of the world, the British, 
however, have been as tireless as elsewhere in a 
long and successful effort to control the passages 
of the sea. South from Burma along the west¬ 
ern coast, the British have encroached upon Siam 
down to the neck of the peninsula. The southern 
portion of the peninsula is entirely in their pos¬ 
session. They control also the northern end of 
Borneo and the Borneo coast of the China Sea. 

Singapore is an island at the tip of the Malay 
Peninsula. At the other entrance of the Malacca 
Straits is the island of Penang. In the China 
Sea off the coast of British North Borneo is the 
island of Labuan. The three islands are the 

67 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

links which enable the cable from India to Hong¬ 
kong to be wholly in British territory. Together 
with three enclaves—Province Wellesley, the 
Bindings, and Malacca—on the Malacca Strait 
side of the Malay Peninsula, they form what is 
known as the Straits Settlement Colony. They 
were detached from India and put directly under 
the Crown in 1867. In the first years of the 
twentieth century, Christmas Island, the Cocos 
Islands, and Labuan Island were annexed to the 
settlement of Singapore. The territories of the 
Straits Settlements were “detached” from the 
sultanates of the peninsula, which in turn were 
put under British protection. The Malays have 
either gradually left or have not increased lately 
in number in the colony. The largest part of the 
population consists of Chinese immigrants, al¬ 
though nearly a hundred thousand natives of In¬ 
dia have immigrated to the colony during the past 
twenty years. The wealth of the Straits Settle¬ 
ments is in transit trade. Singapore has become 
the mart for the entire peninsula, and is the ad¬ 
ministrative capital of all the British possessions 
in this corner of Asia. The governor is High 
Commissioner of the Federated Malay States and 
68 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 


other protectorates, and Agent for North Borneo 
and Sarawak. 

Since 1911, the population of the Straits Settle¬ 
ments had increased by a hundred thousand, prin¬ 
cipally through immigration. The revenue of the 
colony is one of the most striking examples of the 
financial advantage—in direct cash—to the Brit¬ 
ish Crown of colonial possessions. In 1916, the 
profit from the colony was three and a half mil¬ 
lion dollars, in addition to grants made to Brit¬ 
ain’s war chest. It was at Penang that the Ger¬ 
man cruiser Emden appeared suddenly in Octo¬ 
ber, 1914, and sank a Russian cruiser and a 
French destroyer. Singapore was the scene of a 
serious riot at the beginning of 1915. On Febru¬ 
ary 15, nearly a thousand members of the Indian 
Fifth Light Infantry mutinied and killed some of 
their officers. For two days they were masters 
of the situation. Then French, Russian, and 
Japanese war-ships arrived and aided the white 
population in putting down the rebellion. Many 
of the mutineers escaped to the jungle. The au¬ 
thorities had them trailed down by Dyak head¬ 
hunters. There were seventy deaths among the 
whites, including many civilians. 

69 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

North of Singapore is the Sultanate of Johore, 
which is inhabited mostly by Chinese. In 1910, 
at the request of the sultan, it became a protec¬ 
torate. Four sultanates north of Johore—Perak, 
Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang—com¬ 
bined in July, 1896, to form the Federated Malay 
States, under British protection. This was the 
triumph of twenty years of tireless effort on the 
part of British advisers. The sultanates had 
long been under British protection, but their 
number in the beginning was nearly twenty. By 
successive consolidation it became possible to 
form a confederation. Since they were put un¬ 
der a common government, the Federated Malay 
States have been endowed with an excellent rail¬ 
way system to the Province Wellesley and to 
Singapore. From Province Wellesley there is 
now a connection north to Bangkok. The area 
of the federated sultanates is twenty-seven thou¬ 
sand square miles, with a total population of about 
a million. Chinese and Malays are pretty evenly 
divided. A third of the Chinese, however, is 
floating mine population. Tin- and gold-mines 
make the protectorates wealthy, as there is an ex¬ 
port duty on tin. The revenue of the states in 
1916 showed a surplus of sixty per cent., eleven 
70 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 


million dollars resting in the coffers after all ex¬ 
penses were paid. Immigration from India is 
allowed and encouraged. Indians are now nearly 
twenty per cent, of the population. As in the 
case of most protectorate treaties, the “protected” 
are bound to furnish troops for the defense of 
the neighboring British colony when Great Brit¬ 
ain is at war with any nation. 

North of the Federated States, extending to 
the narrower portion of the peninsula, the British 
have added <to their dominions at the expense of 
Siam. On March io, 1909, Siam transferred 
her rights over the sultanates of Kedah, Perlis, 
Kelantan, and Trengganu. The population of a 
million consists almost entirely of Mohammedan 
Malays. The trade of these new protectorates, 
now chiefly with the Straits Settlements and 
India, is growing rapidly, stimulated by railway 
development. 

In 1842, Sir James Brooke secured from the 
Sultan of Brunei a concession of the Lupar River 
valley and the gulf on the northwest coast of 
Borneo into which the river ran. By gradual ex¬ 
tensions of the concession in 1851, 1885, and 1890, 
the Brooke family increased its holdings for four 
hundred miles to the northeast until little was 
7i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

left of the Sultanate of Brunei. Sir James 
Brooke, interpreting his concessions as cessions, 
created an independent state and took the title of 
“raja.” The interior boundary of the state, as 
it was begun and increased during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, followed the range of 
mountains which formed a watershed. Naviga¬ 
ble rivers, running west and north, give access to 
the interior. In 1888, Sarawak—as Sir James 
Brooke called his country—and what was left of 
the Sultanate of Brunei were placed under British 
protection. In 1912, Raja Brooke, son of the 
founder, outlined a scheme to form a council of 
former inhabitants of Sarawak to provide for 
the support of the government against possible 
European intrigue to impair the independence and 
integrity of the country. “Then,” he said, “I can 
end my life in happiness and contentment.” The 
Sarawak Government Agency and Advisory 
Council, instituted in London in November, 1912, 
with headquarters in London, is a link between 
Great Britain and Sarawak as well as a trustee 
of invested money and financial advisory body. 
The grandson of the founder succeeded to the 
title on May 17, 1917. Sarawak trades mostly 
with Singapore. There is no public debt and the 
72 


BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES 


revenue appreciably exceeds expenditures. 
Large quantities of coal, petroleum, and gold give 
promise of greater prosperity still. 

Part of British North Borneo was acquired by 
a grant from the Sultan of Sulu, whose archi¬ 
pelago extends almost to the coast of Borneo. 
But the greater portion came from the Sultan of 
Brunei, as in the case of Sarawak. The grants 
were for economic development and the territory 
was simply under the jurisdiction of the British 
North Borneo Company for the purposes of trade 
and exploitation of mineral and forest and agri¬ 
cultural wealth. In 1888, the British Govern¬ 
ment proclaimed a protectorate, and in 1898 
rounded out the state by further annexations 
from Brunei. The protectorate, developed in an 
extensive way, has a great future. 

Narrowed down by the successive encroach¬ 
ments of the British on each side, Brunei was 
compelled to accept British protection in 1888, and 
to sign a treaty granting the administration of 
the state to a British Resident in 1906. As an 
illustration of how the concession and protecto¬ 
rate theory works out under European practices, 
a comparative table of Sarawak, British North 
Borneo, and Brunei furnishes food for thought. 

73 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Area Population Revenue 

Sarawak .42,000 sq. m. 500,000 £180,000 

Brit. North Borneo ... 31,106 sq. m. 210,000 250,000 

Brunei . 4,000 sq. m. 30,000 15,000 


Sarawak and British North Borneo have no pub¬ 
lic debts. But Brunei owes £51,300. These cer¬ 
tainly are interesting figures, especially when we 
consider-that Brunei was virtually all this coun¬ 
try (with the exception of a bit belonging to the 
Sultan of Sulu) before the grandfather of the 
present sultan started giving concessions. How 
we do groan under the white man’s burden! 


74 




CHAPTER V 


PARING DOWN SIAM 


S HORTLY after the entry of Siam into the 
war against Germany, a member of the Si¬ 
amese royal family brought me a manu¬ 
script to read. It was the graduation thesis he 
was offering at the Ecole Libre des Sciences 
Politiques. In it I found: 

We hold to national independence above everything 
else, and will sacrifice everything to that. At no price 
do we wish to submit ourselves to the political domina¬ 
tion or influence of a foreign Power. The Siamese have 
a developed national conscience, and are worthy to con¬ 
stitute a State. It is evident that if States do not wish 
reciprocally to recognize the independence of each other, 
international law will not be able to develop on a solid 
and durable basis. The natural tendency of this state 
of things is that certain Powers try to establish domina¬ 
tion over weaker States in such a way as to arrogate to 
themselves the right to dictate the laws which these Pow¬ 
ers esteem are necessary for the weaker States. 

The excuse is a difference of civilization. But one 
cannot establish scientific criteria of classification. The 
criterion adopted and practiced must be that of force, 
and of physical force alone, without taking into consid¬ 
eration intellectual and moral elements. The error is 
75 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


natural among the large States: for when a big fel¬ 
low meets a little fellow, his quantitative superiority na¬ 
turally leads him to the conclusion that he has a quali¬ 
tative superiority. 

When I asked the prince whether these words 
applied to Germany, and if the feeling expressed 
in them was the cause of Siam’s decision to en¬ 
ter the war, he smiled the inscrutable smile of the 
Orient. Ten years at a famous English public 
school and Oxford, during the formative period 
of life, had not made his smile more easy to 
fathom than if he had just come from Bangkok. 
“Siam,” he said, “does not know much about Ger¬ 
many. My country entered the war for a very 
simple reason. Like China, we followed the 
United States. We wanted to benefit by the ap¬ 
plication of the American principles for which, 
and for no others, President Wilson said the 
American people would fight. If you want to 
understand why we are asking for a voice at the 
Peace Conference, just study the history of Siam 
during the past twenty years.” 

As I did want to understand, I took the prince’s 
advice. 

On the eastern peninsula of southern Asia, 
Siam is the only country which has preserved its 
76 


PARING DOWN SIAM 

independence against the encroachments of Euro¬ 
pean eminent domain. Caught in a vise between 
British and French, what sovereignty they have 
managed to maintain the Siamese owe to the mu¬ 
tual jealousy of their neighbors. In the Anglo- 
French agreement of 1904, Siam, pared down to 
the narrowest possible limits, was left inde¬ 
pendent because French and British statesmen 
could not agree as to which should rule at Bang¬ 
kok. France and Great Britain used the pretext 
of freeing Burmese, Cambodians, Annamites, 
and other races from Siamese suzerainty as a 
means of increasing their own colonial empires. 
During the last thirty years, Siam has been 
robbed of portions of her sea-coast as well as of 
the great valley of the Mekong, leading to China. 
For the preservation of her sovereignty within 
the present boundaries, Siam has had to fight 
hard and consent to the sacrifice of all her border¬ 
lands, even when yielding territory meant serious 
economic handicaps. The history of French and 
British diplomacy in Siam is a practical exposi¬ 
tion of the working of European colonial policy 
in Asia. Never once have considerations of right 
and justice entered into the minds of the states¬ 
men and diplomats, the generals and admirals, 
77 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


who bullied Siam. The criterion adopted and 
practised has been that of force, of physical force 
alone. 

Relations between Siam and France were most 
friendly until France began to penetrate into the 
hinterland of Indo-China. As effective adminis¬ 
trative control was extended over the kingdoms 
of Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking, the French 
found forests and mineral wealth which they de¬ 
sired to exploit. Wherever Siamese sovereignty 
interfered with concessions the French planned 
to establish, the old historical claims of the three 
kingdoms they had conquered were revived and 
pushed to the extreme limit. Siam refused to 
consider France as the inheritor of these claims. 
A French fleet blockaded Bangkok, and Siam was 
compelled to sign a treaty under threat of bom¬ 
bardment. She accepted without discussion the 
French interpretation of frontiers with Indo- 
China. The Siamese would have resigned them¬ 
selves to this injustice. But the French did not 
intend to let the occasion slip to get complete con¬ 
trol of Siam. 

Article VIII of the treaty of October 3, 1893, 
read: ‘The French Government reserves the 
right to establish Consuls where it deems the 
78 


PARING DOWN SIAM 


presence of Consuls necessary for protecting the 
interests of its subjects ( ressortissants ).” Up to 
this time, France had maintained a consulate only 
at Bangkok. As foreigners in Siam enjoyed the 
privileges of a capitulatory regime, the consuls 
of the European powers at Bangkok exercised 
judicial authority over the citizens of their re¬ 
spective nations. The system of capitulatory 
institutions in Oriental countries had its origin 
in the differences in laws, customs, and religion, 
which necessitated special exceptions for foreign¬ 
ers in order that it might be possible for traders 
to settle in the country. The granting of capitu¬ 
latory privileges was not disadvantageous to the 
non-European states: for the presence of for¬ 
eigners brought the benefit of opening up trade 
with the outside world. But since France had 
become a colonial power in the Far East, she 
used the privileges accorded by the capitulations 
in a way contrary to their spirit. 

The word ressortissant is a technical legal ex¬ 
pression. France claimed as ressortissants not 
only the natives of the kingdoms she had con¬ 
quered, but also Chinese immigrants into Siam, 
who were induced to enroll themselves at the 
consulate in order to have the benefit of French 
79 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


protection. These Asiatics were not different 
from the Siamese in civilization. Putting them 
under French consular authority was against the 
raison d'etre of the capitulations, and an abuse 
of good faith. Article VIII of the treaty of 
1893 was used by the French to impair the sov¬ 
ereignty of Siam and to undermine Siamese au¬ 
thority in frontier districts coveted by France. 
Between 1893 and 1896, the number of ressortis- 
sants inscribed in the French consulates increased 
from two hundred to thirty thousand! French 
consuls had upon their books in 1896 twenty 
times as many Chinese as the British. 

The intention of the French to make Siam a 
French protectorate became apparent. Siam 
questioned the right of the French consuls to af¬ 
ford protection to others than French citizens, 
arguing that no difference of race, religion, or 
civilization could be invoked to justify subtract¬ 
ing French proteges from the control of Siamese 
laws. France answered that Siam must be 
“Europeanized.” The King of Siam appointed 
a commission to draw up a penal code. He re¬ 
formed the magistrature, and established a law 
school at Bangkok. In her fight for existence, 
Siam turned to Great Britain for aid. 

80 


PARING DOWN SIAM 

Although the British had long been planning 
to detach outlying territories from Siam, they 
did not look with favor upon similar French 
schemes of territorial aggrandizement. So it 
was intimated to the Siamese minister at London 
that the British were willing to revise the stipu¬ 
lations of their own capitulatory treaty. An 
Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed in 1899 limit¬ 
ing Great Britain’s right of protection. Cate¬ 
gories were established. Children of the fourth 
generation born in Siam and illegitimate children 
were deprived of capitulatory rights, even if their 
parents were British subjects. As to Asiatics 
born in British dominions or in territories of 
princes under the suzerainty of or allied to Great 
Britain, and to Asiatics naturalized in Great Brit¬ 
ain, the capitulatory regime was not to extend 
beyond the second generation. Great Britain 
agreed also to inscribe no new proteges on her 
consular books in Siam. These concessions led 
M. Delcasse (who had begun to work for an en¬ 
tente cordiale with Great Britain) to consent to 
a revision of proteges on the same principles as 
had been agreed to by Great Britain and other 
powers. In 1902 he proposed to limit the French 
right of protection to Cambodians and other 
81 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


bona-fide subjects, and to give orders that no 
more Chinese be inscribed. But the French press 
and Chamber of Deputies did not approve the 
Delcasse agreement. It was not ratified, and no 
change was made in the French system. 

In the meantime, other complaints had been 
accumulating against France. Although the Si¬ 
amese had loyally fulfilled the stipulations of the 
treaty of 1893, the French had not carried out 
their side of the bargain. In 1901 Siam de¬ 
manded that France fulfil the promise to evacuate 
the port of Chentabun, and to allow Siam to re¬ 
sume jurisdiction in the neutral zone along the 
Mekong River and in the Angkor-Battambang 
district, which was an integral part of Siamese 
territory. The French, however, now demanded 
further concessions. They wanted to extend 
their jurisdiction across the Mekong, to have ex¬ 
clusive commercial privileges in the Mekong Val¬ 
ley, and to force Siam to employ Frenchmen in 
Siamese government service. 

The Convention of Paris, drawn up on Octo¬ 
ber 7, 1902, was an attempt to come to an under¬ 
standing between Siam and France. M. Del¬ 
casse realized that the rapprochement with Great 
Britain necessitated abandoning the French 
82 


PARING DOWN SIAM 

dream of a protectorate over. Siam. He was 
willing to make modifications in the abuses of the 
capitulatory regime, and to let the Siamese have 
garrisons on the right bank of the Mekong. But 
Siam was to cede twenty thousand square kilo¬ 
meters of territory and to give French capital 
priority in all concessions in the Mekong Valley. 
The proposed treaty was a one-sided bargain in 
favor of France. All Siam would have gotten 
out of it was a renewal of the promise France 
had several times made to fulfil the obligations 
assumed by her in the earlier treaty of 1893. 
And yet the French Colonial Party would have 
none of it. In 1903, Siam again tried to get 
support from Great Britain against French ag¬ 
gression. This time she received scant encour- 
igement. The British themselves were encroach¬ 
ing upon Siamese sovereignty from the west and 
the south, and had decided to use Siam as one of 
the pawns in their game to arrive at a colonial 
agreement with France. 

The Anglo-French Convention of 1904, which 
settled moot questions all over the world, defined 
the attitude of France and Great Britain toward 
Siam. Siam was no more consulted in the mat¬ 
ter than Egypt, Morocco, and the other countries 
83 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


whose future was being decided upon. The two 
great colonial powers had exclusively in mind 
their own political and commercial interests. 
Great Britain recognized the right of France to 
extend her influence in the eastern provinces of 
Siam in return for French recognition of Great 
Britain’s right to detach other Siamese territory 
in the neck of the peninsula. 

Given a free hand by the British, M. Delcasse 
did not wait until the secret negotiations between 
London and Paris were completed. On Febru¬ 
ary 13, 1904, the Siamese were forced to sign a 
treaty, whose terms were an acceptance of every¬ 
thing the French thought it possible to exact. 
Nearly eight thousand square miles of Siamese 
territory passed to France in the northeast and 
southeast, and the French seized the port of Krat. 
A more extended “neutral zone,” to be policed by 
Cambodians under French officers , was mapped 
out, and a railway authorized, built by the French, 
in this “neutral zone”! In regard to the question 
of French proteges in Siam, the arrangement 
drafted in 1902 was accepted by France in a mod¬ 
ified form, but France refused to allow Siamese 
officials to participate in the revision of the list 
of proteges. This treaty did not satisfy the Co- 
84 



SIAM 

1911 

Q SO tOO / ] 
MILES 


CAPOft£ 




























































PARING DOWN SIAM 


lonial Party in France any more than the Conven¬ 
tion of 1902. Although the French Nationalist 
press maintained that nothing short of annexa¬ 
tion would satisfy ‘'the legitimate aspirations of 
France,” it soon became clear that the Anglo- 
French Convention did not admit the extension 
of French sovereignty over all of Siam. But 
the French went Jhe limit. In 1907 France pre¬ 
sented a revised treaty to Siam. No discussion 
was possible. Siam ceded “the neutral zone” of 
the treaty of 1904, and granted a “perpetual 
lease” of four ports in the upper Mekong Valley. 
In return for the loss of twelve thousand more 
square miles, Siam got back the port of Krat, 
and the consent of France to making Asiatic 
proteges justiciable to ordinary Siamese tribu¬ 
nals after a period of ten years. 

The relations of Siam with Great Britain dur¬ 
ing the first decade of the twentieth century were 
hardly more to the advantage of Siam than those 
with France. British intervention saved Siam 
from annexation to France, and the British 
showed a spirit of justice and liberality in regard 
to the capitulations. But this attitude was not 
dictated by the interests of Siam. The British 
Government drove a hard bargain with the Si- 

85 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


amese in return for the right of the Siamese to 
be masters in their own country. For a long 
time, the British had been quietly extending their 
sovereignty northward from Singapore over the 
tip of the Malay Peninsula, in order to secure 
undisputed control of the Straits of Malacca. 
British policy in regard to the Malay sultanates 
had been inspired in the beginning by fear of 
French ambitions. After the Anglo-French 
Convention of 1904, the British regarded the Si¬ 
amese tributary states of Kelantan, Trengganu, 
Perlis, and Keda as theirs. Naturally, Siam did 
not have the same point of view! Superior force 
again came into play. To round out British pos¬ 
sessions on the peninsula, and to complete British 
control of waterways leading from India to 
China, these four states were ceded by Siam to 
Great Britain on March 10, 1909. Another fif¬ 
teen thousand square miles were lost, and Siam 
found herself with a narrow outlet to the sea only 
on the south. Siam’s sole profit out of the trans¬ 
action was a further limitation granted by Great 
Britain to the working of the capitulatory regime. 

While Siam was being pared down, her gov¬ 
ernment was making splendid efforts to prove 
that an Asiatic race is able to keep abreast with 
86 


PARING DOWN SIAM 

the changed conditions of living demanded by 
Europeanization. At the moment France began 
to plot seriously to destroy the independence of 
Siam, large sums were being spent on public 
works in the interior, and the administration was 
being successfully reformed. On December 21, 
1900, the king opened the railway from Bangkok 
to Korat, which had been ten years in building. 
It was the pioneer line of the government system, 
165 miles long. In the construction, the govern¬ 
ment had to contend with a private British com¬ 
pany which charged much larger sums than those 
agreed upon in the contract. A second line, from 
Bangkok to Petchaburi, seventy miles long, was 
opened for traffic in 1903. Despite the fact that 
these two lines cost twice as much as the esti¬ 
mates, they were built entirely from the state’s 
current revenues. There was no increase of old 
taxes or imposition of new ones. Siam had no 
public debt. From 1896 to 1904 the income of 
the government was doubled, and after all rail¬ 
way construction had been paid for there was a 
large balance in the treasury. Although taxes 
on gambling farms provided nearly a sixth of 
the state’s revenues, the farms were abolished. 
Finances were established upon a gold standard. 

*7 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Since 1904, Siam has borrowed nearly fifty mil¬ 
lion dollars, of which fifteen millions have al¬ 
ready been paid back. The money was spent en¬ 
tirely on works of public utility. Siam owns 
one thousand, two hundred miles of railways. 
Telegraph lines now extend almost everywhere, 
and there are two wireless stations, both owned 
and operated by the government. The telephone 
system of Bangkok has nearly a thousand sub¬ 
scribers. Government and local schools have 
been quadrupled in twenty years, and a univer¬ 
sity, with eight faculties, organized at Bangkok. 

The Siamese have known how to profit by the 
advice and aid of Europeans and Americans, 
without surrendering the administration of the 
country, or sacrificing the interests of the state 
to concession-hunters. Agriculture is develop¬ 
ing, and stock-raising is being encouraged by 
methods that would do credit to any European 
nation. Trade is flourishing, and increases 
yearly by leaps and bounds. The principal 
wealth of upper Siam is the teak forests, which 
the Siamese have not allowed to be ruined by un¬ 
principled cutting. Exploitation is under the 
control of a British conservator, with an ade¬ 
quate staff of insoectors. 

88 


PARING DOWN SIAM 


In 1903, an army reform bill introduced oblig¬ 
atory military service of two years, with the two 
following years in the reserve. Although 
French steel firms encouraged the develop¬ 
ment of the Siamese Army, and were anxious to 
make it efficient in artillery and small arms, the 
political influence of France opposed the modern¬ 
ization of the army. It was intimated to Siam 
that unless liberal exemptions were granted, 
France would be compelled to regard obligatory 
service as an unwarranted innovation to dis¬ 
turb the peace of the peninsula. But at the same 
moment, the French were raising armies on their 
home system in Indo-China. 

Almost all the British shipping-interests at 
Bangkok were transferred to German control in 
1899, and the new openings for investment of 
capital were being taken up by Germans and 
Danes. Within two years, the German flag over¬ 
took the British, and there was a considerable 
falling off of British mercantile interests. Be¬ 
fore the Germans became competitors, the Brit¬ 
ish had eighty per cent, of Siam’s trade in their 
own hands. In the decade before the war Ger¬ 
many succeeded in getting a virtual monopoly 
of Siam’s coastal and river trade, a predominant 
89 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


place in her railways and banks, and increased 
her imports every year. The chief reason for 
German success in Siam, as in other countries 
in which Europeans do not like to live, was her 
ability to send there large numbers of resident 
agents and engineers, who were willing to cast 
in their fortunes with Siam. 

Siam declared war against Germany and her 
allies on July 22, 1917, anticipating the action 
of China by several weeks. Wha-t China in¬ 
tended to do, however, had been clear for a long 
time. But there were no strong pro-German in¬ 
fluences in Siam as in China. Notwithstanding 
their residence in the country and their effective 
aid in its development, the Germans had not been 
able to win either the respect or the affection of 
the Siamese. In 1914 the German residents 
of Siam began to take advantage of the neutral 
country in which they lived to intrigue against 
India, Indo-China, and Hongkong. They sent 
out news of the movement of ships, and fomented 
civil war in China. The Siamese resented abuse 
of hospitality as much as we did, and when they 
followed us into the war, they took the same 
measures against German citizens and German 
property and German shipping as we had done 
90 


PARING DOWN SIAM 


in America. For the time being, German influ¬ 
ence has been banished from Siam. If the Ger¬ 
mans ever recover their position, it will be only 
after their government has been radically 
changed and they recast their ideas about the 
privileges and obligations of hospitality. 

But it would be a fatal mistake for British and 
French to think that Siam has forgotten, or will 
ever forget, what she has suffered through their 
unscrupulous imperialism. The internal devel¬ 
opment and prosperity of Siam, during the very 
years in which the paring-down process took 
place, gives the lie to excuse for aggression, bully¬ 
ing, and robbery, always made by European 
statesmen and writers—that the nation mulcted 
or deprived of independence could not manage its 
own affairs and stood in the way of progress. 
Consequently, some one had to assume unself¬ 
ishly the white man’s burden. How those who 
groan under the white man’s burden do protest 
against the responsibility thrust upon them, the 
responsibility they did not seek, but which, having 
undertaken, they must not—in the name of civil¬ 
ization and for the good of the exploited race— 
abandon! 1 

1 Since writing this chapter, I have received, through the 

91 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


King Maha Chulalongkorn died in 1910, after 
fifteen years of constant but impotent protest 
against the successive attacks upon the integrity 
of Siam. He was succeeded by Maha Vajira- 
vudh, a product of English public school and uni¬ 
versity. The present sovereign has the reputa¬ 
tion of being Anglophile, and I have no doubt 

kindness of the American adviser to the Siamese Government, 
a remarkably clear and able statement of Siam’s case for the 
revision of obsolete treaties. The case for revision is under 
two heads. The first head demands the abolition of treaty pro¬ 
visions imposing extraterritoriality, because it involves the sov¬ 
ereignty of Siam, a free nation; because it makes the admin¬ 
istration of impartial justice difficult if not impossible; be¬ 
cause it puts obstacles in the way of maintenance of order, 
being a continual affront to Siam’s dignity, and a fruitful source 
of irritation; because it is expensive, as it involves the mainte- 
ance of European judges and advisers; because it furnishes no 
incentive (rather the reverse) to the completion of the Siamese 
codes of laws, now in process; and because it is utterly unnec¬ 
essary for the purpose of safeguarding aliens. The second 
head demands the abolition of treaty provisions imposing fiscal 
limitations, because they infringe the sovereign rights of Siam; 
because they have forced Siam to rely for a large proportion 
of her revenues upon opium and gambling monopolies, with 
all the evil consequences to the people which this involves; be¬ 
cause they have imposed this vicious traffic in gambling and 
opium not only to the injury of Siam, but against the will of 
her people and in opposition to the government policy of doing 
away with gambling and the use of opium; and because other 
forms of taxation cannot be made to yield the necessary income. 

In spite of the powerful — the unanswerable — character of 
the plea, the Treaty of Versailles imposed the renunciation of 
treaty privileges only upon Germany. The victorious powers 
evidently do not intend to give up advantages in Siam that they 
would never tolerate any country possessing in territories con¬ 
trolled by them. 


92 


PARING DOWN SIAM 


that he is. But his pleasant personal feelings 
for a host of Englishmen, whom he knows to be 
square and “good sports,” do not reconcile him 
to the impaired inheritance he received from his 
ancestors. Every Siamese, in spite of Occidental 
culture, is thais —the name the Siamese give 
themselves. There is no difference between 
high-born and commoner in intense passionate 
love for country. 

French policy toward Siam has had the op¬ 
posite effect to that which it was intended to have. 
The French thought they were extending their 
influence in the peninsula, and making a greater 
Indo-China. They could afford to trample upon 
Siam's feelings and ignore Siam’s rights. But 
the Siamese were rendered bitter enemies instead 
of being cultivated as useful friends for the fu¬ 
ture. Extension of her colonial dominion at the 
expense of Siam will mean one day for France 
the necessity of getting out of Indo-China al¬ 
together. If she does not go without resistance, 
the Siamese will help in putting her out. It 
might have been otherwise. 

As British methods have been different, the 
case of the British is a little different. And 
Siam owes much of her present prosperity to the 
93 


PARING DOWN SIAM 


loyal and disinterested aid of Britishers. How¬ 
ever, when the moment comes for Asiatic races 
to attempt to get rid of European eminent do¬ 
main, the Siamese will be to all Europeans, 
friends and foes, what they have been during the 
past two years to the Germans. The criterion 
will be once more that of '‘force, and of physical 
force alone.” 


94 


CHAPTER VI 


FRANCE IN ASIA 

D URING the two centuries of European 
world-wide exploration and settlement 
that followed Vasco da Gama and Co¬ 
lumbus, France vied with Spain, Portugal, Hol¬ 
land, and England in colonial expansion. But 
what France gained in the sixteenth and seven¬ 
teenth centuries was lost to England in the eight¬ 
eenth. The treaties of 1713, 1748, and 1763 ex¬ 
acted renunciations on the part of France. The 
Napoleonic Wars completed the destruction of 
her colonial empire. The Congress of Vienna 
left to France only Saint Pierre and Mique¬ 
lon, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and a part of 
Guiana in America; Reunion Island off the coast 
of Africa; and small enclaves in India. After 
the final disposition of the Bourbons in 1830, 
France started to rebuild a colonial empire. The 
Monroe Doctrine denied to France reentry into 
the New World. Under Louis Philippe and Na~ 
95 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

poleon III, a new beginning was made in Africa, 
Asia, and Oceania. 

A hundred years after Napoleon, France holds 
a position in the colonial world second only to 
Great Britain. It has been almost entirely won 
since the Franco-Prussian War. The French 
colonial empire is the achievement of the Third 
Republic. One admits the privileged position 
throughout the world of the British at the time 
Germany and Italy attained political unity. But 
the bitter complaint of Germans and Italians of 
having been born without the possibility of peace¬ 
ful acquisition of colonies is certainly not true 
when directed against France. The German 
Confederation could have asked for Algeria in¬ 
stead of Alsace-Lorraine. In the decade follow¬ 
ing the Treaty of Frankfort no other power 
would have opposed German colonial expansion 
in Africa and in the Far East. Bismarck did not 
believe in colonial acquisitions, and public senti¬ 
ment in Germany was behind him. France was 
allowed to go ahead and stake out uncontested 
parts of the world’s surface. Bismarck re¬ 
garded the extra-European effort of the French 
as an excellent antidote against a policy of re¬ 
venge. Not until the accession of Kaiser Wil- 
96 


FRANCE IN ASIA 

helm II did the Germans think that their future 
was on the sea. Not until 1906, in fact, did pub¬ 
lic opinion in Germany support the theory that 
Germany must demand her “place in the sun.” 

In India, France possesses five separate colo¬ 
nies, with a total area of less than two hundred 
square miles and with about three hundred thou¬ 
sand inhabitants. Mahe, on the Malabar coast 
north of Calicut, is the only French colony on the 
western side of the Indian peninsula. Karikal, 
Pondicherry, and Yanaon, also enclaves in Ma¬ 
dras, are on the Gulf of Bengal. Chandernagor 
is an inland town, north of Calcutta, in the delta 
of the river Ganges. Mahe, Yanaon, and Chan¬ 
dernagor are no more than trading-posts. Pon¬ 
dicherry and Karikal each has a slight hinter¬ 
land with a railway. The administration of the 
colonies is centered at Pondicherry. They are 
represented together by one senator and one dep¬ 
uty in Paris. Pondicherry alone has direct 
steamship service with France. The interest of 
these footholds in India is sentimental, as in the 
case of the considerably larger Portuguese en¬ 
clave of Goa. The French have never been fa¬ 
vorable to proposals to cede these colonies to the 
Government of India against compensations else- 
97 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

where. One realizes how much the remnants of 
the Bourbon colonial empire mean to France in 
reading the protests of the French press against 
the rumored negotiations to sell Martinque to the 
United States. The French are opposed to fol¬ 
lowing the example of Denmark. 

There has been much agitation in the French 
Indian colonies themselves over the reports that 
the French and British Foreign Offices were ar¬ 
ranging a “transaction” in regard to the last 
French footholds in India. The inhabitants of 
Chandernagor sent to the Colonial Minister a 
cablegram on November 12, 1918, which read: 
“Congratulations victory, but there are rumors 
session Chandernagor. We protest with all our 
heart.” This was followed up by a remarkable 
open letter to the Colonial Minister, which was 
given out for publication. The inhabitants of 
the French Indian colonies reminded the govern¬ 
ment of the sacrifices made by their volunteers in 
the war, declared that they had been accustomed 
to live as Frenchmen for hundreds of years, and 
that their plight would be terrible if their priv- 
iliges as French citizens were taken from them. 
All the signers of the petition were Hindus, and 
they did not hesitate to point out the difference 
98 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


between their lot and that of their fellow-country¬ 
men under British rule. France gave them the 
right of voting, including representation in par¬ 
liament, and local autonomy. The British, on 
the other hand, would treat them as a subject race 
without either political or social rights. 

Indo-China is another story. In the south¬ 
eastern corner of Asia, France secured footholds 
in Cochin-China and Cambodia during the reign 
of Napoleon III. After the humiliation of the 
war of 1870, the French turned their attention 
to building up a colonial empire on the eastern¬ 
most peninsula of southern Asia. Starting from 
the southern point of the peninsula, Cochin- 
China, administrative control was extended over 
the eastern part of Cambodia. In 1884, Annam 
and Tonking, on the coast of the China Sea and 
Gulf of Tonking, were put under French protec¬ 
torate. During the past thirty years, the hinter¬ 
land has been gradually penetrated and occupied. 
Laos, inland between the coast protectorates and 
the Mekong River, was wrested from Siamese 
suzerainty by the treaty of 1893. Between 1893 
and 1907 the French completed the occupation of 
Laos and Cambodia at the expense of Siam. If 
the Rhine is the natural boundary between France 
99 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


and Germany, certainly by the same token could 
one consider the Mekong the natural boundary be¬ 
tween Siam and the states of Indo-China. But 
the French claimed as Cambodian territory all 
the tributary waters of the Sang-Ke River, and 
forced Siam to accept this interpretation. They 
insisted upon their right to control the Mekong 
Valley. In the Luang Prabang district of Laos 
they pushed the boundary line considerably to the 
west of the river, just as they were doing in Cam¬ 
bodia. 

The methods employed by the French in acquir¬ 
ing Laos, Cambodia west of the Mekong, and 
the control of the Mekong River have been de¬ 
scribed in the chapter on Siam. How the French 
extended their protectorate over Cambodia, An- 
nam, and Tonking is the old story of European re¬ 
lations with backward races, and does not need 
to be retold. If European eminent domain is a 
right and if European civilization and commercial 
development are benefits to African and Asiatic 
countries which can be conferred in no other way 
than by political control, there is nothing to criti¬ 
cize in the way the French have created Indo- 
China. They have acted no better and no worse 
than Europeans engaged in assuming the white 


TOO 


FRANCE IN ASIA 

man’s burden elsewhere. Siam had to suffer be¬ 
cause she belonged to the Halbkulturvolk cate¬ 
gory. Annamites, Tonkinese, and Cambodians 
could be legitimately considered as rebels by the 
invaders, when they resisted being subjected, be¬ 
cause they belonged to the Naturvolk category. 
Have not the spread of civilization and economic 
prosperity and better health conditions compen¬ 
sated for loss of independence and being taken 
forcibly into tutelage? 

If we waive questions of equity and principle, 
there is much to commend and admire in the or¬ 
ganization and development of Indo-China. To 
an immense task colonial administrators have 
brought splendid energy, wide scientific knowl¬ 
edge, and better governing ability than has been 
shown in many of the French colonies and pro¬ 
tectorates of Africa. Among the men who cre¬ 
ated Indo-China and gave years of their lives to 
its development, I have had the privilege of know¬ 
ing personally several high officials. Men like 
Klobukowski, Sarrault, and Brenier had un¬ 
bounded faith in the civilizing mission of France 
in the Far East, and devoted themselves to what 
they thought were the interests of the natives with 
the zeal and the self-abnegation of missionaries. 


IOI 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


What the French have accomplished in the past 
forty years in Indo-China ranks high in the an¬ 
nals of European colonizing efforts. 

The area of French Indo-China is a little more 
than 250,000 square miles. The population is 
17,000,000, of whom less than 25,000 are Euro¬ 
peans. Indo-China was formed from the union 
of the colony of Cochin-China with the protec¬ 
torates of Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking. In 
1887, the protectorates were united in a customs 
union. Six years later, Laos was added, and in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, Cam¬ 
bodia was greatly increased by extensions on the 
right bank of the Mekong River. In 1900, 
Kwang-chau Wan, a territory and port leased 
to France by China two years before, was 
placed under the administrative control of Indo- 
China. 

The tip of the peninsula, between the Gulf of 
Siam and the China Sea, is the colony of Cochin- 
China. Its capital, Saigon, is one of the world’s 
large rice ports. Most of the land of the colony 
is the delta of the Mekong River, and produces 
over two million tons of rice annually. Vege¬ 
tables, fruits, and cotton yield large crops. The 
country lends itself equally well to stock-raising 


102 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


and forestry, and fishing is a thriving industry on 
the coast. The colony is in the healthy condition 
of exporting thirty per cent, more than it imports. 
Its local budget balances, and it contributes sub¬ 
stantially to the general Indo-Chinese budget. 
About half the Europeans of Indo-China live in 
the colony, and they return a member to the 
Chamber of Deputies in Paris. 

The protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, and 
Tonking are about equal in area. But Cambodia 
is not nearly so thickly populated as the other 
two protectorates. All three have hereditary 
kings, who govern nominally with councils of 
ministers. The kings have no authority and lit¬ 
tle influence, as the administration is in the hands 
of French residents-superior, backed by French 
native troops. 

Cambodia lies between Cochin-China and Siam. 
The Mekong River runs through the middle of 
the protectorate, and is navigable up to Rhone, on 
the Laos frontier. The colony has a stretch of 
sea-coast on the Gulf of Siam. But as there is 
no port, traffic is through Cochin-China. In the 
first decade of the twentieth century, Cambodia 
was substantially increased at the expense of Siam 
by the extension of the frontier toward Bang- 
103 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


\ 

kok up to the headquarters of the river Sang-Ke 
and its tributaries. 

Annam is a strip of coast, with a narrow hinter¬ 
land, extending nine hundred miles along the 
China Sea and into the Gulf of Tonking. The 
northern part of the protectorate, south as far as 
the entrance of the Gulf of Tonking, has been put 
under the administrative government of Tonking 
by the French. Railroads run into Annam from 
Tonking on the north and from Cochin-China on 
the south. There is also a railway running north 
and south from Hue, the capital. But these rail¬ 
ways do not as yet meet, so communication is by 
boat. The interior, in southern Annam, is very 
mountainous and inhabited by tribes of a differ¬ 
ent race. The Annamites stick to the coast. Al¬ 
though in population and area Annam is more 
than twice the size of Cochin-China, and although 
the local budget is nearly as large as that of the 
colony, exports from Annam in 1916 amounted 
to four and a half million francs against Cochin- 
China's two hundred and eleven million francs; 
imports amounted to less than six million francs 
against Cochin-China's one hundred and fifty-six 
million francs. Annam has many small indus¬ 
tries, of which silk-production and silk-weaving 
104 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


promise well. But the chief benefit of France 
from Annam up to the present time has been 
soldiers for her colonial army. The railways in 
Annam are the only ones of Indo-China that 
cost more to run than they bring in. 

Tonking, which was until 1897 a tributary of 
Annam, presents quite a different picture. The 
protectorate is in the gulf of the same name, south 
of the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and 
Kwangsi. Its capital, Hanoi, some distance in¬ 
land from Haiphong, has become a railway center 
and is the administrative capital of Indo-China. 
One of the most important railway projects in 
the Far East links up Haiphong, the port of 
Hanoi, with Yunnan, capital of the second larg¬ 
est province of China, and diverts the trade of 
millions of Chinese through Tonking. Another 
railway line from Hanoi has reached the frontier 
of Kwangsi. When it is continued to the upper 
valley of the Sikiang River, a portion of the 
transit trade of another Chinese province will be 
captured for Haiphong. Tonking, with hardly 
more population than Annam, has nearly fifteen 
times as valuable import and export trade. 

Laos lies between Tonking and Annam and 
the Mekong River. Like Cambodia, it was 
105 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


formerly under Siamese suzerainty, and the 
northern part under effective Siamese adminis¬ 
trative control. But France forced the Siamese 
out between 1893 and 1907. The area of Laos 
is nearly a hundred thousand square miles, twice 
as large as any of the other protectorates. But 
its population is supposed to be less than seven 
hundred thousand. There are three protected 
states in Laos, the most important of which is the 
northern one, Luang Prabang, in a sharp bend 
of the Mekong River. South of Luang Pra¬ 
bang, French-protected territory forms a wedge 
into the heart of Siam. In the west the Mekong 
River is the boundary line with the Shan States 
of British Burma. In spite of its sparse popu¬ 
lation, Laos has great agricultural possibilities. 
But the natives are implacably hostile to the 
French. The value of the country to France lies 
in the gold-, tin-, and lead-mines and in the teak 
forests. Logs can be floated down the Mekong, 
of which the French have succeeded in gaining 
control from Siam. The administration ex¬ 
penses of Laos are charged to Cochin-China and 
the other three protectorates. 

When the war broke out in Europe, the French 
had not yet pacified and extended administrative 
106 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


control over Laos and the mountainous regions 
of Annam. In Cambodia, Tonking, and along 
the coast of Annam, however, French authority 
has been successfully established during the last 
two decades. Governors-General Doumer, Klo- 
bokowski, and Sarrault had a much freer hand 
than their predecessors. The centralization of 
the administration, and the designation of Hanoi 
as the capital of Indo-China, were wise decisions. 
As long as Saigon was the center of administra¬ 
tion, the interests of the protectorates were sub¬ 
ordinated to those of the colony of Cochin-China. 
In 1901, Governor-General Doumer put the 
credit of Indo-China behind railway construc¬ 
tion. He introduced the principle of an Indo- 
Chinese government guarantee of the interest 
on railway loans, and in addition, set aside a 
stipulated sum annually for a railway sinking- 
fund. In this way, railways could be planned 
with other than purely commercial considerations 
in view. Railway extension could be encour¬ 
aged in Tonking, and lines could be run south into 
Annam from Tonking and north into Annam 
from Cochin-China. Effective administrative 
control in Tonking and Annam followed the rail¬ 
ways. 


107 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Another important advantage of pooling the in¬ 
terests of Cochin-China and the protectorates 
was in raising and maintaining military forces 
for service wherever needed. The military 
policy that had met with success in the African 
colonies was introduced into Indo-China. The 
French have taxed the protectorates to pay the 
expenses of French and native troops, and have 
used native troops to extend the colonial influ¬ 
ence of France. This policy is justified by the 
argument that there is solidarity of interest be¬ 
tween “the mother country” and the colonies and 
protectorates. What benefits France benefits the 
natives! For instance, it is to the advantage of 
Tonking that Annam be pacified, and to the ad¬ 
vantage of Tonking and Annam that Cambodia 
west of the Mekong and Laos be taken from 
Siam. Ergo, France has the right to ask the 
Annamites and Tonkinese to give their lives and 
money to extend and fortify the rule of France 
over themselves and their neighbors. In the re¬ 
cent war, the French went further. They as¬ 
serted the obligation of their African and Asi¬ 
atic subjects to fight for France in France. As 
many troops as could be safely taken away from 
Indo-China were shipped to the battle-fields of 
108 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


Europe. Following the example of the British, 
the French called for service in France native 
colonial troops whom they were afraid to leave in 
their own countries, sometimes replacing them by 
French troops! 

It goes without saying that Cambodians, An- 
namites, and Tonkinese have never received the 
French in their countries with open arms. Why 
should they be more enthusiastic about French 
rule than the French would be enthusiastic about 
Asiatic rule? The French have a genius for 
raising native troops, and winning the affection 
and devotion of the Asiatics and Africans whom 
they have trained in arms. But this affection 
and devotion is strictly limited to the young 
troops who give it and to the officers upon whom 
it is bestowed. The natives do not hold the same 
attitude toward civilian officials. This is partly 
because the rank and file of French function¬ 
aries is markedly inferior to that of Britishers 
holding similar posts in the colonies. The best 
of British blood and intellect goes into colonial 
civil service: almost never does a Frenchman of 
similar class enter colonial service at the bottom 
of the ladder. For a Frenchman, a colonial posi¬ 
tion is a makeshift or a punishment, unless the 
109 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


post is an exceptionally good one which puts him 
in the public eye or gives him political influence 
at home: for an Englishman, colonial service is 
an honorable career. The Frenchman outside 
of the army does not possess the Britisher’s amaz¬ 
ing (to Americans, at least!) ability to live con¬ 
tentedly away from home. The impossibility of 
getting the right sort of officials has made French 
administration in Indo-China, in spite of certain 
promising results, costly and sadly lacking in 
efficiency. French engineers and business men 
and traders in Indo-China complain of the civil 
administration more than the natives: for they, 
too, suffer by it. The severest criticism I have 
heard of the way the protectorates of Indo-China 
are run and of lack of consideration in treating 
the natives has been from French travelers. 
French officials do not know the language of the 
people with whom they are dealing, have little 
sympathy with the natives or interest in the fu¬ 
ture of the protectorates, and seem to be bearing 
the white man’s burden for the salary they get 
out of it. 

The Annamites and Tonkinese demand self- 
government. They oppose the arbitrary system 
of taxation, and the closed-door tariff policy of 


no 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


France, both of which are exploitation. They re¬ 
sent doing military service in Laos, and paying 
for the administration of Laos, for the benefit 
of French mining and lumber industries. Since 
the victory of Japan over Russia, the French have 
had to contend with “sedition” in Tonking and 
Annam. In 1908, revolutionary movements 
necessitated increasing the French garrisons by 
eight thousand men. After considerable fight¬ 
ing in 1910, the French deported some of the 
leading “rebels” to Guiana. There were con¬ 
spiracies against the French in 1911 and 1913. 
A bomb thrown, at Hanoi in April, 1913, caused 
the death of two French majors and other Eu¬ 
ropeans. The existence of a conspiracy to over¬ 
throw the French Government was revealed at 
the trial. 

One of the most severe indictments against 
French rule in Indo-China is the lack of educa¬ 
tional facilities accorded to the natives. Indo- 
China has an outstanding debt of three hundred 
and fifty million francs, and forty million francs 
a year is taken from the Tonking protectorate for 
military purposes alone. And yet, in spite of 
thirty-five years of French protectorate, the six 
million inhabitants of Tonking are offered school- 


iii 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ing facilities for eight thousand pupils. In 
Cambodia there are less than four thousand pu¬ 
pils in the schools, and in Annam less than three 
thousand, five hundred. These figures speak for 
themselves. Their testimony is all the more elo¬ 
quent when we consider that according to the last 
educational reports there were two hundred and 
thirty-two girls in the primary schools of Annam, 
whose population is over five millions! 

It is only fair to point out, however, that the 
highest official in Indo-China has repeatedly 
called the attention of the government to the 
necessity of granting larger political rights to 
the natives and of increasing educational facili¬ 
ties in the protectorates under his administration. 
M. Albert Sarrault secured long ago for Indo- 
Chinese the right of admission to French lycees 
and universities. He has encouraged students 
to go to France. It has been his ambition to de¬ 
velop schools along the lines of the Americans 
in the Philippines. Native demands for auton¬ 
omy in local affairs have been recommended fa¬ 
vorably by him. Against -the virtually united 
opposition of French officialdom in Indo-China 
and consistently cold or lukewarm response from 
Paris, Governor-General Sarrault has advocated 


II2 


FRANCE IN ASIA 


the appointment of natives to all administrative 
posts except the highest. During the Peace Con¬ 
ference, M. Sarrault returned to France to urge 
upon the government a liberal policy in the Far 
East as the alternative to serious troubles that 
might lead to the loss of the colonies. 

The destinies of Indo-China will be profoundly 
influenced by the participation of Japan, China, 
and Siam in the* European war. If imperialism 
carries the day in the reconstruction of the world, 
Japan will succeed France in Indo-China, by force 
if not by amicable arrangement. If a genuine 
League of Nations is born of the Conference of 
Paris, France may be able to retain the colony of 
Cochin-China, and possibly southern Annam. 
Tonking and northern Annam will inevitably be 
drawn into political union with the Chinese Re¬ 
public, or will demand and obtain independence. 
The question of Laos will then become one be¬ 
tween Tonking and Siam, in which France will 
have little, if any, say. 


CHAPTER VII 


PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA 


T HE discovery and colonization of extra- 
European territories began with Spain and 
Portugal, and there was a time when the 
Pope could divide the world overseas between 
these two Latin states without a protest from 
other European countries. South and Central 
America remained to Spain and Portugal until 
their own colonists revolted. The republics 
formed were saved from European imperialism 
by the Monroe Doctrine. In Africa, Spain and 
Portugal would have been eliminated at the end 
of the nineteenth century if the great powers 
had been able to agree upon the division of the 
spoils. In Asia, Spain disappeared through the 
destruction of her sea power by the Americans 
under Admiral Dewey. Most of her possessions 
were taken by the United States. The other is¬ 
lands were sold to Germany. 

114 


PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA 


Portugal lost her Ceylon settlements to Hol¬ 
land in the middle of the seventeenth century, who 
in turn was put out by Great Britain at the end 
of the eighteenth century. But the Portuguese 
have retained insignificant footholds in Asia. 
On the west coast of India are the enclaves of 
Goa and Damao; in the Arabian Sea, the little 
island of Dio; in the Malay Archipelago, the 
eastern portion of the island of Timor, with a 
strip called Ambeno on the neighboring island of 
Pulo Cambing; and the island of Macao at the 
mouth of the Canton River in China. The total 
area of the Portuguese colonies is less than a 
thousand square miles, with a population of 
about a million. Goa, the seat of an archbishop¬ 
ric, is an interesting witness of past glory, but 
does not pay expenses. The other colonies barely 
make their way. Great Britain has never gob¬ 
bled them up because she has not needed them 
and they have not been a menace to her mastery 
of southern Asia. For two hundred years, Por¬ 
tugal has never been in antagonism with British 
policy nor allied to one of Britain’s enemies. 

Holland in Asia presents a different problem. 
The Dutch East Indies—consisting of Java, Su¬ 
matra, portions of Borneo, and other islands and 
US 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


archipelagos—are rich colonies in strategic po¬ 
sitions in the Indian Ocean. Their area is nearly 
seven hundred and fifty thousand square miles, 
and a population of fifty millions—largely Mo¬ 
hammedan—makes Holland a Mohammedan 
colonial power of great importance. 

Great Britain’s colonial empire has received 
several accessions at the expense of Holland. 
The Dutch attempt to challenge British sea power 
during the reign of Charles II ended inconclu¬ 
sively. At the Peace of Breda in 1667, the Brit¬ 
ish confirmed Holland’s possession of Surinam 
(Dutch Guiana) in exchange for the cession of 
New York. But after the Napoleonic wars, the 
British insisted upon a foothold on the continent 
of South America as well as upon control of the 
Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon. Berbice, Dem- 
erara, and Essequibo were detached from Suri¬ 
nam and formed into British Guiana. The 
Dutch were compelled to resign themselves to 
the loss of Cape Colony and the foreign settle¬ 
ments in Ceylon, which had been seized by the 
Presidency of Madras twenty years before. 
The Convention of London, signed on August 
13, 1814, and incorporated in the arrangements 
of Vienna, guaranteed to Holland, however, her 
116 


PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA 


East Indies and the island of Curasao in the West 
Indies. This was the last exchange of European 
sovereignty in the New World. A few years 
later, the Monroe Doctrine forbade further ex¬ 
tension of European eminent domain in the two 
Americas. 

The Convention of London has often been 
criticized by British writers. But aside from 
the sense of justice which prompted the conquer¬ 
ors of Napoleon to recognize that the Dutch al¬ 
liance with France had been a case of force ma- 
jeure, atoned for by the aid given at Waterloo, 
sound policy dictated leaving Holland with rich 
colonies. The advantage to Great Britain of 
giving back to Holland the East Indies may not 
have been apparent at the time. Probably it was 
not thought of at all. But in more than one in¬ 
ternational crisis, the fear of losing her colonies 
has acted as a deterrent to anti-British tendencies 
of Dutch foreign policy. The Dutch had to be 
guarded in the expression of their sentiments at 
the time of the Boer War. In the recent Euro¬ 
pean war, joining forces with Germany would 
have proved as great a risk to Holland as taking 
sides against Germany. And in the East Indies, 
the Dutch were far less pro-German than in 
ii 7 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Holland. Their neutrality was much more 
“benevolent” toward the Entente. 

In extent and population, the Dutch East In¬ 
dies are by far the most important island group 
of colonies of Asia—of the entire world, in fact. 
They are nearly seven times as large and seven 
times as populous as our Philippine-Sulu group, 
which lies to the north of the Dutch East Indies. 
With the exception of the northern side of 
Borneo, which is British, and the eastern end of 
Timor, which is Portuguese, the Dutch are in 
undisputed possession of all the islands between 
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean from the 
Strait of Malacca to New Guinea. Sumatra 
forms one side of the Strait of Malacca, and the 
Riau-Lingga Archipelago controls Singapore. 
Sumatra, the Dutch portions of Borneo, and the 
Molucca Islands are larger singly than our en¬ 
tire Philippines. Outside of Java, none of the 
islands has been completely pacified or organized 
administratively throughout. Java and Madura 
(a small island close to the north coast of Java) 
are a crown colony. The rest of the Dutch East 
Indies form outposts and will absorb all of Hol¬ 
land’s colonizing energy and capital for genera¬ 
tions. Consequently, estimates of the population 
118 


PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA 


of the “outposts” are largely conjectural, as in 
the case of some of the Philippines. While Java 
has only one fifteenth of the area of the Dutch 
East Indies, her population is probably three 
quarters of the total. There are four cities in 
Java of over one hundred thousand population, 
and railways extend throughout the island. The 
Dutch authorities have done excellent work in 
extending schools for elementary education in the 
outposts as well as in Java, and have accom¬ 
plished much during the past half-century in en¬ 
couraging agriculture through small holdings. 
In 1914, forced labor was abolished. The Dutch 
maintain the open-door policy toward all. 

But being mistress of a superb colonial do¬ 
minion has not been a bed of roses for Holland. 
Native tribes, especially in Sumatra, have had to 
be continually pacified. Petty colonial wars, in¬ 
glorious and inconclusive, demand continuous 
expenditure and loss of life. Socialists and 
Liberals have seized upon insurrections in the 
East Indies as a means of embarrassing the 
government. From 1902 to 1909, the Achinese 
in the northern end of Sumatra were in rebellion. 
After three years of fighting, the Dutch Govern¬ 
ment was attacked in parliament by members of 
119 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the majority as well as by Socialists. A thou¬ 
sand women and children were killed in the fight¬ 
ing in Achin during the spring of 1904. Mem¬ 
bers of parliament said that the Dutch were be¬ 
having like Huns and Tartars in the Achin ex¬ 
pedition, massacring women and children in or¬ 
der to exploit mines and petroleum wells. Myn¬ 
heer Kuiper attempted to reply to the accusations 
of cruelty. He said that he deplored the death 
of so many women and children, but that the 
Dutch army was under the obligation of making 
war a outrance. The Dutch Socialists then de¬ 
clared that it would be advisable to sell a large 
part of the colonial possessions of Holland to put 
an end to the disgrace on the escutcheon of a 
chivalrous nation. If colonial policy necessitated 
such military expeditions, it would be best to do 
away with colonies. Another interesting argu¬ 
ment advanced against the retention of the East 
Indies was that it would be wise to sell the 
islands before the great powers seized them! 

In 1905, there was bloody fighting in Sumatra, 
Borneo, and the Celebes, which continued until 
1907. In the latter year, during the debates at 
The Hague on the Indian budget, members of va¬ 
rious parties again raised the question of cruelty 


120 


PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA 


to the non-combatant population of the Sultanate 
of Achin. The Colonial Minister insisted that 
the charges had been refuted by official reports, 
but promised that the Governor-General would 
go to Achin to investigate. These discussions 
in parliament led to a reform in colonial adminis¬ 
tration. In 1909, Queen Wilhelmina promised 
in a speech from the throne further reforms, and 
said that a new royal commission would be sent 
to the East Indies with unlimited power to con¬ 
sider and report upon revisions. She pointed out 
that much had been accomplished in Java as well 
as in the outposts. Administrative control had 
been extended; the power of petty native tyrants 
was being broken; Dutch officials had been ap¬ 
pointed to protect the populace; hundreds of miles 
of new roads had been made and many new mar¬ 
kets opened; and the authority of the government 
was stronger than ever before in the places where 
rebellions had occurred. The most important 
step in improving conditions in Sumatra was the 
termination of the agreement made a century 
ago with the states in the west of the island. 
These states had been allowed to sell their prod¬ 
ucts at prices fixed by them, and were free from 
taxation. This system would no longer work. 


121 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Most of the chiefs saw the advantage of admin¬ 
istrative control in developing their trade, al¬ 
though it meant taxation, and were submitting 
without protest. 

In 1913, the Commission on the Defense of the 
East Indies declared that it was necessary to build 
a fleet to protect Holland’s colonies. The pro¬ 
gram proposed was: nine dreadnoughts, six tor¬ 
pedo cruisers, eight destroyers, forty-four tor¬ 
pedo boats, and twenty-two submarines. The 
creation of the new navy was already under way 
when Germany precipitated the European war. 

In view of the precarious position of the Dutch 
East Indies, which Holland cannot hope to de¬ 
fend by her own means, no country is more 
interested in the formation of a League of 
Nations to guarantee the present colonial status 
quo. If Holland is free from the anxiety and the 
burden of defense, the Dutch East Indies have a 
bright future. There is an annual deficit to face 
in the administration of the East Indies which 
has doubled in the three years 1916-1918. But 
if we have world peace and a strict prohibition 
of the sale of arms and ammunition to natives by 
international agreement, there are brilliant pros¬ 
pects for Holland in her Asiatic colonies. Coffee, 


I 22 


PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA 


tea, cocoa, tobacco, tin, coal, and mineral oil will 
bring large profits—if the government does not 
have to spend in armaments more than it earns 
in trade. 


123 


CHAPTER VIII 


THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 

I N the last two years of the nineteenth cen 
tury, Spain disappeared as an Asiatic colonial 
power. Her place in the Pacific was taken 
by Germany and the United States. The ces¬ 
sion of Guam, the largest and southernmost island 
of the Mariana archipelago, to the United States 
in December, 1898, was followed by Germany's 
purchase of the rest of the archipelago and the 
rights of Spain in the Caroline and Pelew 
Islands. By the treaty of April 11, 1899, Spain 
ceded the Philippine archipelago to the United 
States in consideration of a payment of twenty 
million dollars. The United States had already 
begun her career as a Pacific power by the an¬ 
nexation of the Hawaiian Islands in August, 
1898. The territorial readjustment in the Pacific 
was completed in February, 1900, when Great 
Britain, Germany, and the United States signed 
124 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 


a tripartite agreement for the division of the 
Samoan Islands between the latter two powers. 

Hawaii was made a territory almost im¬ 
mediately and granted limited self-government 
and representation in Congress. The Samoan 
Islands continued to be governed in much the 
same way as before. There has never been dis¬ 
satisfaction with the American administration. 
Guam was constituted, and has remained ever 
since, a naval station closed to foreign vessels of 
war and commerce and administered by an 
American naval officer. Guam has no history. 
Its fourteen thousand inhabitants have become 
rapidly Americanized through compulsory ele¬ 
mentary education. 

From the beginning, our occupation of the 
Philippine Islands was entirely different from the 
extension of American sovereignty over Samoa, 
Hawaii, and Guam. The transfer from the 
Spanish to the American flag was not made with 
the consent of the inhabitants. Before the 
United States attacked Spain in the Philippines, 
the larger islands had already revolted against 
the Spanish and were fighting for independence. 
The rebel juntas in Asiatic ports claimed to have 
had a definite understanding with American 
125 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


agents about the significance and purpose of 
American intervention. They believed that the 
enemies of Spain were going to intervene to help 
the Filipinos in their struggle for liberty. The 
Americans were coming, and had asserted that 
they were coming, to oust the Spanish and not 
to instal themselves in the place of the Spanish. 
The revolutionaries of Manila claimed to have 
the same understanding as the juntas of the mean¬ 
ing of American intervention. The rebels wel¬ 
comed the Americans, and it was not until they 
thought they had been fooled that they turned 
their arms against the United States. 

The bitter opposition in the United States to 
the acquisition of the Philippine Islands was un¬ 
fortunately capitalized by the Democratic Party 
as the leading issue of the presidential campaign 
of 1900. The Democrats did not have the con¬ 
fidence of the country. Their candidate, who 
had been defeated four years before on the issue 
of free coinage of silver, was suspected by busi¬ 
ness men of espousing the cause of the Filipinos 
as a cloak for his financial vagaries. Many con¬ 
vinced opponents of the Administration’s Philip¬ 
pine policy were afraid to vote the Democratic 
ticket. This had much to do with the second de- 
126 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 

feat of Mr. Bryan. The United States had be¬ 
come a colonial power by accident. Official and 
popular sanction was given to the acquisition of 
the Philippines for reasons other than the merits 
of the question. The general sentiment about 
departing from national traditions was not 
changed. 

Although the Philippine archipelago contains 
three thousand islands and islets, considerably 
more than half of the total area is in Luzon and 
Mindanao. The Filipinos, approximately nine 
millions at the time of the American occupation, 
are mostly of Malay origin. The greater part 
were long ago converted to Christianity by Span¬ 
ish friars who spread the Spanish language. 
Native dialects are as numerous as the tribes. 
In the interior of the large islands, and in some 
of the remoter ones, there are still pagans and 
savages. In the south, nearly a million Moros 
and some of the Sulus are Mohammedans. The 
Spanish administration of the archipelago did 
not attract Chinese, Japanese, and Hindus. 
Shortly after the American occupation, the Ex¬ 
clusion Act was applied to the Philippines. Con¬ 
sequently, there has been no “Asiatic problem.” 

At the time American sovereignty over the 
127 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Philippines was proclaimed, a promise was made 
to establish civil government as soon as possible. 
But the revolutionaries contended that before 
Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila Bay, the suc¬ 
cess of the movement against Spain was assured. 
They asserted the right to independence. Fight¬ 
ing began as soon as the American Army at¬ 
tempted to extend its authority throughout the 
islands. The Filipinos were encouraged by in¬ 
fluential Americans to assert their rights, and in 
America the pacification policy met with bitter 
opposition which never died down. 

The first Philippine Commission of five mem¬ 
bers, with William H. Taft as Governor-General, 
was instructed to study the problem of establish¬ 
ing civil government everywhere in the islands 
as soon as opposition to American occupation was 
overcome. On September i, 1900, the commis¬ 
sion assumed authority. A civil service was es¬ 
tablished and a million dollars appropriated out 
of customs revenues for public highways and 
bridges. 

At the end of 1900, General MacArthur’s re¬ 
port demonstrated the difficulties before the 
American Army. The Filipinos had an active 
junta at Hongkong and their leaders organized 
128 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 

a wide-spread guerilla warfare in the islands. 
The insurgents would appear and disappear at 
convenience. One day they would be soldiers 
and the next peaceful citizens within the Ameri¬ 
can lines. In ten months, from November, 1899, 
to September, 1900, military stations were in¬ 
creased from 53 to 413, and the Americans had 
lost over a thousand killed and wounded. Gen¬ 
eral MacArthur believed that it would be difficult 
to introduce a republican government and con¬ 
cluded that “for many years to come the neces¬ 
sity of a large American military and naval force 
is too apparent to admit of discussion.” It was 
necessary for Mr. Taft and his associates to leave 
full executive authority in the hands of General 
MacArthur. In 1901, progress in ending the 
revolution was slow. The capture of Aguinaldo 
in March did not lead to a collapse in the revolu¬ 
tionary movement. However, on July 4, Presi¬ 
dent McKinley proclaimed the establishment of 
civil government, and Judge Taft assumed ex¬ 
ecutive control at Manila. Provincial governors 
were placed in the largest islands. The power 
which Congress gave to the President of the 
United States was delegated to the governor- 
general and his associates of the commission. 

129 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Courts were established, road-building pushed, 
and a thousand school-teachers brought from the 
United States. But the United States had to 
keep fifty thousand men under arms in desultory 
guerilla warfare. 

For two years longer the rebellion continued. 
In 1903, Lieutenant-General Miles, ranking offi¬ 
cer of the American Army, after his return from 
an inspection trip, issued a report in which Amer¬ 
ican officers were charged with cruelty toward 
the natives. There was much agitation through¬ 
out the country. Although an investigation 
showed that the charges of General Miles were 
not substantiated, sympathy for the Filipinos in¬ 
creased. At heart, the American people were an¬ 
tagonistic to imperialism. Discussions in Con¬ 
gress over Philippine bills showed how difficult 
it was to adjust the government of an alien peo¬ 
ple against their consent to the spirit of the Amer¬ 
ican Constitution, in which there was no pro¬ 
vision for the administration of colonies. Presi¬ 
dent Roosevelt proclaimed amnesty to political 
prisoners, and supported actively the provisions 
of the Philippine Bill to abolish military governor¬ 
ship and courts martial, and to provide for the 
creation of a Philippine Assembly “two years 
T 3° 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 


after complete peace in the islands/’ The bill 
provided for the transfer of legislative power 
from the Philippine Commission to a Philippine 
Legislature. But the Philippine Commission 
was to constitute the upper house of the legisla¬ 
ture, and Congress reserved the right to approve 
or annul laws passed by the Philippine Govern¬ 
ment ! The members of the Philippine Commis¬ 
sion were to be the Governor-General, the Vice- 
Governor, and the Secretaries of Finance, Public 
Instruction, and the interior. 

After his election, in a message to Congress in 
December, 1904, President Roosevelt declared 
that the Filipinos were “utterly incapable of ex¬ 
isting in independence at all or of building up a 
civilization of their own.” According to the 
President, “our chief reason for continuing to 
hold the Philippines must be that we ought in 
good faith to try to do our share of the world’s 
work. The Filipinos do not need independence 
at all, but do need good laws, good public serv¬ 
ants, and the industrial development that can 
come only if the investment of American and 
foreign capital in the islands is favored in all 
legitimate ways.” 

President Roosevelt was a believer in the the- 

13 1 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ory of the white man’s burden. The United 
States had not sought colonial possessions. But 
the American people could not refuse the respon¬ 
sibility thrust upon them. One might disagree 
with the radical departure from American tra¬ 
ditions and maintain that the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence applied with equal 
force to other nations than ourselves. At least, 
it was not the role of the descendants of Wash¬ 
ington and his followers to consider and treat as 
rebels any people who were ready to give their 
lives for the right to govern themselves. Mr. 
Roosevelt, however, had the courage of his con¬ 
victions and could not be accused of insincerity 
or inconsistency. The course of action he 
adopted in the Isthmus of Panama and his atti¬ 
tude later toward the Egyptian Nationalists 
demonstrated his belief in the Uebermensch doc¬ 
trine, which is the inspiration of whatever ideal¬ 
ism may be advanced as a justification of imperi¬ 
alism. 

Aside from the fundamental question of self- 
government, three problems confronted the 
Americans. Among the Moslems of the Phil¬ 
ippines existed the institution of slavery. 
Throughout the islands, the Spanish friars held 
132 















































































































































IN THE PHILIPPINES 


large portions of the land. The Philippines had 
lost their free-trade facilities with Spain and nat¬ 
urally expected to have American markets opened 
to their produce on the same terms. 

The slavery question has confronted Occiden¬ 
tal states whenever they have attempted to bring 
Moslem countries under their legislation. In the 
development of Africa, Great Britain and France 
had been attempting for years to solve this prob¬ 
lem by expedients. On the one hand, the polity 
they introduced was incompatible with the exist¬ 
ence of slavery; on the other hand, the attempt to 
abolish slavery meant confiscation of property 
and complicated the extension of effective ad¬ 
ministrative control. It was enough for the na¬ 
tives to accept an alien government without at the 
same time seeing their customs radically changed 
and their vital economic interests attacked. But 
there was no hesitation on the part of the Ameri¬ 
can authorities. When Major-General Wood 
was appointed governor of the Sulu Archipelago, 
he issued a proclamation abolishing slavery. 
This intensified the resistance of the Moros to 
American rule, and necessitated punitive expedi¬ 
tions on a much larger scale than if the local 
customs of the people, including tacit acceptance 
i33 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


of the institution of salvery, had been respected. 

In 1902, Governor-General Taft went to Rome 
to discuss directly with the Pope the problem of 
the lands of the friars. He insisted upon the 
point that the expulsion of the friars was a po¬ 
litical and economic question and not a religious 
question. From the moment of American oc¬ 
cupation, the Roman Catholic Church had been 
invited to play a leading part in the constitution 
of the new government. Only Washington felt 
that it was necessary to have the religious admin¬ 
istration of the Catholic Church in the Philip¬ 
pines in the hands of the American hierarchy. 
When the friars saw that it would be impossible 
for them to remain in their old position in the 
Philippines, they decided to sell out their lands 
to the American Government. They tried to 
drive a sharp bargain, but finally consented to 
receive compensation to the amount of seven and 
one fourth million dollars—less than half the 
sum originally demanded. Getting rid of the 
friars was essential to the pacification of the 
Philippines and the establishment of American 
institutions. When the American Government 
gained control of the extensive friar lands, the 
Philippine Commission announced that the lands 
i34 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 

would be sold to native tenants under methods 
similar to the Irish Land Act. 

The adjustment of trade relations with the 
United States proved to be the most serious prob¬ 
lem of all. Unless there was reciprocity between 
the Philippines and the United States, it would 
be impossible to maintain that America had no 
intention to exploit the Philippines. American 
trade interests were unanimous in demanding of 
Congress free entry for American products into 
the Philippines. But they were equally unani¬ 
mous in combating any special measure or modi¬ 
fication of the existing tariffs on imports in favor 
of the Philippines. As the Philippines were large 
producers of tobacco and sugar, these interests 
made their lobby influence felt at Washington 
from the moment Philippine trade relations came 
up for action. 

The Supreme Court, called upon to pass on the 
tariff question, decided that free trade must pre¬ 
vail between the Philippines and the United 
States until Congress made a special and definite 
provision. Since Hawaii was regarded as a part 
of the United States, the Filipinos, although an¬ 
nexed against their will, certainly had the right 
to believe that they would receive the same treat- 
135 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

ment as the Hawaiians. But the first Philippine 
Tariff Law, passed on March 8, 1902, gave to 
Philippine imports only twenty-five per cent, re¬ 
duction from the Dingley rates, and the Philip¬ 
pines were not allowed to place an export duty 
on articles for use and consumption in the United 
States! Duties and taxes were to be kept in a 
separate fund to be used for the government and 
benefit of the islands: but this did not answer 
the objection that we were assuming “the white 
man's burden” with the intention of making it 
profitable to ourselves. At the end of 1902, the 
import duties in the Philippines were reduced to 
one fourth of the Dingley rates. Free trade was 
fought by the sugar and tobacco people. Al¬ 
though Roosevelt recommended in his Decem¬ 
ber, 1905, message that the tariff be entirely re¬ 
moved except on sugar and tobacco, no relief was 
granted the Filipinos until 1910, when the pro¬ 
visions of the Payne Tariff Law established free 
trade, but limited the amounts of sugar, rice, and 
tobacco that could be imported. This limitation 
was not removed until after President Wilson’s 
first election. There was also, as long as the 
Republicans controlled Congress, a duty rebate 
on hemp shipped to the United States. 

136 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 

None can doubt the material benefits to the 
Filipinos of American rule during the first fifteen 
years of our occupation of the islands. But it 
is equally a fact that we held the people under a 
system of government contrary to the spirit and 
letter of American institutions. The violation 
of the dominating principle of our own Declara¬ 
tion of Independence that “all men are created 
equal” and of our belief that “taxation without 
representation” is inadmissible, was defended by 
the familiar pleas which uphold the doctrine of 
European eminent domain. President Roosevelt, 
who had said in 1904 that the Filipinos were “ut¬ 
terly incapable of existing in independence at all, 
or of building up a civilization of their own,” an¬ 
nounced two years later that constantly increas¬ 
ing measures of liberty were being accorded to 
the Filipinos, and that in the spring of 1907, “if 
conditions warranted,” their capacity for self- 
government would be tested by summoning the 
first legislative assembly. On July 20, 1907, 
election of delegates to the assembly was held. 
But suffrage was limited. There was a property 
qualification—a principle Americans had always 
refused to admit for themselves. Less than a 
hundred thousand votes were cast. 

i37 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


The repercussion of the Nationalist feeling that 
swept Asia in 1910 caused uprisings in several 
islands. Our troops were compelled to take the 
field again. The Democratic Party went before 
the country in the election of 1912 with a plank 
promising independence to the Filipinos at an 
early date. Congressman Jones of Virginia in¬ 
troduced a bill granting the Filipinos a provi¬ 
sional government from July 4, 1913, and com¬ 
plete independence after eight years. The bill 
was accompanied by a joint resolution requesting 
the President to negotiate a treaty with other 
world powers to neutralize the Philippines and 
guarantee their independence by international 
agreement. An eminent American, who had 
been an official of our government in the Philip¬ 
pine Islands for some years, wrote at the time: 
“The Filipino people believe that the platform 
of the Democratic Party promised them their in¬ 
dependence at an early date. Rightly or wrongly, 
they have thus interpreted the declarations of the 
leaders of that party made publicly and privately. 
They are not sufficiently practiced in self-gov¬ 
ernment to draw any distinction between prom¬ 
ises and platform promises.’ 5 

But not until August 29, 1916, did the Con- 
138 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 


gress of the United States provide an autono¬ 
mous form of government for the islands, with 
both branches of the legislative body elective. 
By the terms of the present Organic Act, there 
are six executive departments whose secretaries 
are appointed by the governor-general with the 
consent of the Philippine Senate. Only the Sec¬ 
retary of the Department of Public Instruction 
is an American. Since the passage of this act, 
local municipal government has been instituted 
in nearly nine hundred towns. 

The glory of the American occupation of the 
Philippines is the public-school system that has 
been organized in twenty years. There are 
nearly five thousand schools with an enrolment 
of nearly seven hundred thousand students, 
served by more than twelve thousand teachers. 
English is taught in every school. To these im¬ 
posing totals can be added twenty-five hundred 
university students and twenty-six thousand pu¬ 
pils in two hundred private schools. To realize 
what the Americans have succeeded in doing in 
the Philippines, one has only to contrast their 
work in education with that of the French in 
Tndo-China and the Dutch in the East Indies, the 
two neighboring colonial dominions. In Egypt, 
i39 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


a richer country with larger revenue and about 
the same population, the British Ministry of Edu¬ 
cation has under its direct management schools 
for thirty thousand pupils. In the elementary 
vernacular schools of Egypt, the total enrolment 
is about two hundred and fifty thousand! Illit¬ 
eracy in Egypt is ninety-four per cent, after 
nearly forty years of British occupation. This 
is one of the principal accusations of the Egyp¬ 
tians against British rule. Material benefits are 
given the natives in colonies administered by 
European powers. But nowhere in Africa or 
Asia, outside of the Philippines, can one see an 
honest effort being made to help the people to¬ 
ward a higher civilization through education. 

The complaint is rightly made by defenders 
of the European colonial system that the results 
of educating the natives have been unsatisfac¬ 
tory. For political agitators who lead the move¬ 
ment for self-government are, without exception, 
the product of the schools. If only we could 
have text-books for Asiatics without mention of 
the Magna Charta, John Hampden, the fate of 
Charles I and the Star Chamber, and the Ameri¬ 
can and French revolutions! 

The inevitable result of our efforts at educa- 
140 


IN THE PHILIPPINES 


tion in the Philippines is the determination of the 
Filipinos to run their own affairs. It is for¬ 
tunate that the United States went to the Peace 
Congress with the Organic Act of 1916 in active 
and effective operation. The American Gov¬ 
ernment and the American people do not oppose 
the demands of the Filipinos for independence. 
During the Peace Conference, a delegation of 
representative Filipinos visited Washington to 
ask for independence. They received encourage¬ 
ment from officials and newspapers alike. The 
sentiment of the American people was well ex¬ 
pressed by Secretary of War Baker when he told 
the Filipino delegation that “Americans love lib¬ 
erty too greatly to deny it to others.” 


CHAPTER IX 


THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


A FTER the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 
1774, European historians prophesied the 
speedy disintegration of the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire. The Turks had shot their last bolt and were 
powerless to resist the progress of Austria in the 
Balkans and of Russia around the Black Sea. 
They were saved by the European cataclysm at 
the end of the eighteenth century. If the Allies 
who triumphed over Napoleon had been able to 
come to an agreement concerning the division of 
the Ottoman Empire, modern history would have 
been changed. But the statesmen gathered at 
Vienna had no world vision. They saw only the 
interests of the nations they represented, and 
acted accordingly. Napoleon’s expedition to 
Egypt and Syria was a warning to the British. 
To prevent India from becoming a goal for other 
powers, the British laid down the doctrine of the 
142 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The main¬ 
tenance of this doctrine was the keynote of British 
policy in the Near East during the nineteenth 
century. It was reaffirmed at Paris in 1856 and 
at Berlin in 1878. The Crimean War was fought 
to maintain it. Had not France in 1840 and 
Russia in 1833 and 1877 acquiesced in it, Great 
Britain would have fought two other wars. 
Every time Christians of the Ottoman Empire 
tried to liberate themselves from Mohammedan 
oppression, their efforts met with the disapproval 
of a majority of the great powers. 

Three considerations influenced other Euro¬ 
pean statesmen to adhere to the British policy 
when their own particular interests did not 
prompt them to try to disregard it. In the post- 
Vienna period, many agreed with Metternich 
that the realization of national aspirations in the 
Balkans would encourage democracy through¬ 
out Europe. Nationalist movements in Europe 
threatened the status quo of Vienna, which must 
be maintained at all costs. In the second place, 
each great power feared that a diminution of 
Ottoman territory, in whatever form it was made, 
would mean the extension of influence of a rival 
power over the territories detached. Thirdly, 
M3 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


each power hoped through concessions and loans 
to extend its influence in the moribund empire 
to the exclusion of other powers. 

The record of European diplomacy in the Near 
East from 1815 to 1919 has no redeeming fea¬ 
ture. From the Congress of Vienna to the Con¬ 
ference of Paris it did not change. Heartless¬ 
ness and selfishness were its characteristics. 
The interests of the races of the Ottoman Empire, 
Moslem and Christian alike, were consistently 
sacrificed to fancied interests of the powers. 
Never once did European statesmen, assembled 
to solve Near Eastern problems, make a decision 
actuated by a desire to protect or to help the races 
whose fate was in their hands. 

It is an error to believe that there has been a 
change of heart in the twentieth century. Be¬ 
fore the outbreak of the Balkan War, on October 
8, 1912, the six great powers notified the Balkan 
States that: “(1) The Powers condemn ener¬ 
getically every measure capable of leading to rup¬ 
ture of peace; (2) supporting themselves on Arti¬ 
cle 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Powers will 
take in hand, in the interest of the populations, 
the realization of the reforms in the administra¬ 
tion of European Turkey, on the understanding 
144 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

that these reforms will not diminish the sover¬ 
eignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; 
(3) if, in spite of this note, war does break out 
between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire, they will not admit, at the end of the con¬ 
flict, any modification of the territorial status quo 
in European Turkey.” During the recent war, 
the Entente powers made secret treaties to divide 
up the Ottoman Empire into “spheres of influ¬ 
ence” without regard for the aspirations and 
interests of its inhabitants. At the Conference 
of Paris in 1919, as at Berlin in 1878, the rep¬ 
resentatives of the races of the Ottoman Empire 
were not allowed to take part in the deliberations 
to decide their destinies. 

The hostility of the European powers to any 
effort, from within or from without, to detach 
territory from the Ottoman Empire proved in 
the long run unsuccessful. But this policy made 
more difficult the task of races aspiring to free¬ 
dom and resulted in untold suffering to every ele¬ 
ment in the Ottoman Empire. The nations of 
Europe, too, have reaped in blood and tears a 
terrible harvest from the callous intrigues of their 
statesmen, which they did not control. The in- 

145 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tegrity of the Ottoman Empire was not main¬ 
tained in the nineteenth century. In two wars, 
Russia took territory from Turkey at the east¬ 
ern end of the Black Sea. Greece, Serbia, Monte¬ 
negro, Rumania, and Bulgaria, by their own ef¬ 
forts, became free and increased their territories 
until the Turks were virtually driven from Eu¬ 
rope. The war of 1914 brought about the 
crisis in the Near East that more than a century 
of diplomacy and wars had averted. 

In spite of powerful aid constantly rendered 
by the European powers, the Turks were unable 
to preserve their empire. Decay had gone too 
far before they awoke to the peril. But in the 
decade preceding the world war, they made an 
effort to prevent disintegration. 

The Young Turk movement, launched by Mid¬ 
hat Pasha and other reformers at the beginning 
of the reign of Abdul Hamid, met with momen¬ 
tary success. Yielding to popular agitation, the 
new sovereign promulgated a constitution. But 
as the interference of Great Britain to save the 
Turks from the consequences of their defeat by 
Russia removed the fear of the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire, Abdul Hamid was able to 
revoke the constitution and to rule as a despot 
146 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

during thirty years. The Young Turk movement 
gathered irresistible force again when the Turks 
realized that the integrity of the empire was once 
more threatened. An intellectual element among 
the Mohammedans of Turkey believed sincerely 
in the necessity of a constitutional regime, made 
possible by the cooperation of the Christian sub¬ 
ject races. The older statesmen and high mili¬ 
tary and civilian officials were won over to the 
resuscitation of the constitution, however, only 
when the Young Turk conspirators convinced 
them that the abolition of despotism was essen¬ 
tial to prevent the disintegration of the empire. 
It is important to emphasize this fact, which ex¬ 
plains the meaning of the revolution of 1908, the 
ease with which it was effected, and its almost 
immediate perversion into an instrument of forci¬ 
ble assimilation of non-Turkish elements, Moslem 
as well as Christian. 

The history of the years preceding the revolu¬ 
tion of 1908 is exceedingly complicated. As it 
bears principally upon the situation in European 
Turkey, it does not come within the province of 
this volume. 1 It is enough to say that the two 

1 For details of racial rivalry in Macedonia and an account of 
events in European Turkey up to the revolution of 1908, s«<e “The 
New Map of Europe/' pp. 151-168. 

147 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

European powers most interested in the Balkans, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, agreed in the au¬ 
tumn of 1903 to propose to the other powers a 
program of reforms in Macedonia. The other 
powers accepted “the program of Miirszteg,” 
as it was called from the place where Emperor 
Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas had met to draw 
it up. An international gendarmery in Mace¬ 
donia was imposed upon Turkey. The neighbor¬ 
ing states, who had been carrying on an intensely 
bitter racial propaganda in Macedonia, gave this 
proposal of the powers a chance. They with¬ 
drew their bands of comitadjis. But there was 
bad faith all around, as has been the experience 
in every attempted international effort to com¬ 
pose imperialistic ambitions. When the Balkan 
States saw that the great powers were not sincere 
in carrying out the Miirszteg program, proved by 
an utter unwillingness to keep Turkey up to her 
side of the bargain, they resumed their propaganda 
in Macedonia. Russia, checkmated by Japan in 
the Far East, renewed her intrigues in the Bal¬ 
kans. Austria-Hungary followed suit. This 
was the situation when the Young Turks tried 
to save the Ottoman Empire in Europe by an 
immediate and radical change in the government. 

148 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


The moment was propitious. The Russian 
disaster in the Far East was felt throughout Asia. 
The success of Japan instilled a great hope into 
other Orientals, who resented the humiliation of 
European overlordship and the unfairness of Eu¬ 
ropean exploitation. The doctrine of European 
eminent domain had been imposed and sustained 
by force. Did not Asiatics now demonstrate a 
superiority over Europeans not only in fighting 
but also in organizing ability? Russia, over¬ 
whelmingly conquered on sea, was expelled from 
her proudest fortress and held at bay in Manchu¬ 
ria. Japan emerged from the conflict an equal of 
European powers. If Japanese could defy Eu¬ 
rope and get the better of Europeans, why not 
Egyptians, Turks, Persians, Indians, and Chi¬ 
nese? For three years, Young Turk propagan¬ 
dists worked silently but feverishly throughout 
the Ottoman Empire, concentrating their efforts 
upon army officers. I have it from the lips of the 
leaders themselves that this was the burden of 
their argument: “Our country is going straight 
to disaster under Abdul Hamid. If we force him 
to revive the constitution and give us all a share 
in the government, we can regenerate the army 
and the civil administration of the empire. Then, 


149 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


having accomplished ourselves the reforms on the 
ground of the lack of which the powers interfere 
in our internal affairs and the Balkan States push 
their irredentist movements, we can free ourselves 
from European tutelage and thwart the ambitions 
of the Balkan States. Masters in our own coun¬ 
try and with a powerful army, we shall be 
courted instead of bullied by the great powers: 
for we shall hold the balance of power between 
the rival groups.” 

On Friday, July 3, 1908, a Turkish officer in 
western Macedonia wrote to his brother-in-law: 

I must, with the help of God, start out in an hour. 
Therefore, I enclose my wishes and depend upon you to 
carry them out carefully and without delay in case I fall. 
Words are superfluous. You know the causes of my ac¬ 
tion. I prefer death to an ignoble existence. That is 
why I am going to death at the head of two hundred of 
my soldiers who have consented to the sacrifice of their 
lives and who are armed with Mauser rifles. I confide 
to God my wife. For the rest, either death or the safety 
of the country. 

The letter of Major Ahmed Niazi deserves to 
be recorded. For the journey it mentions made 
a new epoch in history. The two hundred Al¬ 
banians who followed their leader to what they 
believed was certain death fired shots that were 

150 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


heard around the world just as clearly as those 
at Lexington. Niazi Bey did not die. His hand¬ 
ful of Albanians increased to thousands, most 
of whom were Anatolian Turks. The general 
to whom Abdul Hamid telegraphed to “capture 
at any cost Niazi and the officers and soldiers ac¬ 
companying him” (as the telegram from Yildiz 
read) was shot by one of his own men. All the 
Turkish divisions in Macedonia went over to the 
revolution. Niazi Bey entered Monastir without 
fighting and captured Marshal Osman Pasha, 
commander of the Third Army. 

Abdul Hamid spent a fortnight telegraphing 
to every part of his dominions orders for troops 
to proceed to Macedonia to put down the rebel¬ 
lion. The answers were identical. The most 
faithful servants of the sultan told him that the 
movement for the constitution was universal in 
the army. Because none was found to fight the 
revolutionaries, the revolution was bloodless. 
Abdul Hamid had to yield. The constitution of 
1876 was resuscitated. On July 25, 1908, the 
world was electrified by the news that Turkey 
had become overnight a constitutional monarchy. 

It is an open question whether there were 
chances of success for the constitutional regime. 

151 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Some writers have maintained that the Young 
Turks were never given a fair opportunity, that 
the odds against them were increased from the 
beginning by the ill will of the great powers, by 
the refusal of the Balkan States to accept an Otto¬ 
man constitutional solution of the Macedonian 
question, and by the disloyalty of non-Turkish 
elements within the empire. There is a large 
measure of truth in the first two charges: the 
third has little foundation. 

Russia and Austria-Hungary were actuated 
by powerful reasons in their uncompromising hos¬ 
tility to the new regime. Ruling over composite 
empires, built upon the destruction of the liber¬ 
ties of subject races, Nicholas and Franz Josef 
feared the internal political repercussion of the 
revolution, if it succeeded, upon their own peo¬ 
ples. A strong and united Turkey would have 
ended their dreams of reaching Constantinople 
and Saloniki. Italy had long been planning to 
seize the province of Tripoli and to inherit other 
choice morsels of the Ottoman Empire. The 
hopes of Germany to control economically—and 
eventually politically—Asia Minor and Mesopo¬ 
tamia would be dispelled if a sense of common 
nationality were born throughout the Ottoman 
152 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

Empire. The British Foreign Office was dis¬ 
mayed. If the regeneration came to anything, 
Great Britain would be forced to return Egypt 
and Cyprus: it would create trouble in India and 
other possessions if the Moslem Turks, either by 
assimilating or cooperating with other elements, 
demonstrated the ability of self-government. 
France was troubled for similar reasons. She 
thought of the influence of Young Turkey upon 
her North African empire, and realized that 
success in the experiment of constitutional gov¬ 
ernment in the Ottoman Empire would put an 
end to her precious privilege as the protector of 
Near Eastern Christians. The subjects of the 
European powers, who lived in the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire under the capitulations, could not be expected 
to rejoice over the prospect of giving up such ad¬ 
vantages as exemption from taxation. Greece 
counted upon possessing some day Crete and the 
^Egean islands. All the Balkan States wanted 
to own Macedonia and Thrace. If the European 
press hailed with satisfaction the birth of a new 
democracy at Constantinople, it was not the same 
with the European chancelleries. No power in¬ 
terfered when Austria-Hungary announced the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when 
i53 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Italy attacked Turkey without declaration of war 
to seize Tripoli. 

Admirers of the Young Turks have condoned 
their cruelties against Armenians, Greeks, Alba¬ 
nians, and Arabs on the grounds that these races 
refused to work with the founders of the new 
regime in the regeneration of the empire. They 
represent the Young Turks as extending the olive 
branch to the other elements, asking the other 
elements to join in the movement that was to 
bring liberty and equality and fraternity, and 
then finding themselves betrayed by those for 
whose benefit the constitution had been reestab¬ 
lished. This fantastic distortion of fact was sent 
out to Europe by members of the diplomatic set 
in Constantinople, European officials in the serv¬ 
ice of Turkey, Levantines of European origin, and 
American missionaries whose hysterical admira¬ 
tion for the Young Turks robbed them of their 
faculties of observation and judgment. To the 
joy and comfort and benefit of the German propa¬ 
ganda, unrepentant Turcophiles (like the French 
Academician, Pierre Loti) kept up this refrain 
throughout the recent war and peace negotiations. 

I had the privilege of living in the Ottoman 
Empire during the first five years of the constitu- 
i54 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

tional regime. In the initial year especially, I 
traveled far and wide and came into contact with 
the leaders of non-Turkish elements. The proc¬ 
lamation of the constitution was received with 
joy by all. I bear testimony to the earnest 
hope of all that better days were dawning for 
Turkey. None refused cooperation. The most 
intelligent and influential felt that the best so¬ 
lution of the Near Eastern question was the es¬ 
tablishment of a genuine constitutional govern¬ 
ment in the Ottoman Empire, where races were 
hopelessly mingled. Among Ottoman subjects, 
there was solidarity of economic interests, and 
long years of exceedingly bitter experience had 
taught that European encouragement to separa¬ 
tist aspirations was invariably inspired by some 
economic or political ambition of a great power. 
Greece of ante-Venizelos days was not a magnet 
for Ottoman Greeks. Arabs preferred the Turks 
to one another. Even the Armenians, who had 
suffered most in massacre and oppression, were 
willing to let bygones be bygones. 

Another reason frequently given for the fail¬ 
ure of the Young Turks is the incompatibility of 
the Mohammedan theory of government with 
democratic institutions. Believers in f he perma- 
i55 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

nent subjection of Islamic countries to European 
control use the sad story of the constitutional re¬ 
gime in Turkey to illustrate their contention that 
independence—or even self-government—cannot 
be granted with any chance of success to Moham¬ 
medan lands and would mean the sacrifice of non- 
Mohammedan elements. This argument against 
allowing Africans and Asiatics to work out their 
destinies as Europeans have done cannot be 
avoided or ignored by critics of European emi¬ 
nent domain and sympathizers with the aspira¬ 
tions of Asiatic races to govern themselves. It 
must be proved that the Young Turkish move¬ 
ment was not an Islamic movement and that its 
leaders were not under the influence of religious 
fanaticism or religious solidarity. 

Not until the time of Abdul Hamid did Turk¬ 
ish foreign policy attempt to create a pan-Islamic 
movement. Religious fanaticism has never been 
a characteristic of the Turk. The history of the 
Ottoman Empire is less marred by religious in¬ 
tolerance and by massacres due to religious hatred 
than the history of European states from the 
fourteenth to the sixteenth century. Formed by 
conquest of Christian and Moslem races alike, the 
Ottoman Empire developed into an enormous po- 
156 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


litical organism with one race dominating others. 
The conquering sultans meted out exactly the 
same treatment to all the vanquished, irrespective 
of religion. If the choice of conversion to Mo¬ 
hammedanism was offered to Christians, and 
sometimes forcibly imposed upon them, it was as 
a means of assimilation. To those who resisted 
successfully the temptation of bettering their ma¬ 
terial condition by throwing in their fortunes 
with the conquering race, a large measure of au¬ 
tonomy was granted. Severe persecution and 
massacre of Christian elements began only when 
the Balkan States became free and started irre¬ 
dentist propagandas, when Russia conquered part 
of Armenia and coveted the rest, when French 
and English intervention in Syria and Egypt 
threatened the disintegration of the empire. The 
animosity against Christian subject races was 
born of the suspicion that they were planning with 
outsiders to detach from the empire the regions 
in which they lived. 

I knew personally most of the Young Turk 
leaders. Never did I have the feeling that a sin¬ 
gle one of them was a religious fanatic in the way 
that an Arab is. The Young Turks were far from 
being religious bigots. Some of them were of 
i57 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Jewish origin; the majority were Freemasons of 
the European variety, i.e., free thinkers and op¬ 
posed to the interference of an ecclestiastical or¬ 
ganization in politics. If, in their foreign policy, 
they did not abandon the pan-Islamic intrigues of 
Abdul Hamid, it was because experience had 
taught that European statesmen were credulous 
and ignorant enough concerning Islam to be 
frightened by this bugaboo. But within the em¬ 
pire the Young Turks did not make Mohammedan 
solidarity a cardinal point in their policy. The 
Committee of Union and Progress never spared 
an enemy because he was a Mohammedan. The 
hostility of the Young Turks against and their 
oppression of Moslem Albanians and Moslem 
Arabs was as uncompromising and as bitter as 
their attitude toward Christians of these and 
other races. The proof of the lack of religious 
solidarity among the Mohammedans of the Otto¬ 
man Empire during the past decade is in the fact 
that the two serious rebellions against Constan¬ 
tinople, which undermined Young Turk author¬ 
ity, were engineered by Mohammedan leaders. 
The Albanian revolts of 1911 and 1912 aided ma¬ 
terially in the easy victory of the Balkan States 
over Turkey. The defection of the Sherif of 
158 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


Mecca and the Arabs of Mesopotamia and the 
Hedjaz, most orthodox of Mohammedans, was 
the decisive factor in the final collapse of the em¬ 
pire. 

In “The New Map of Europe,” I told the story 
of the Young Turk regime from 1908 to 1914, 
with special chapters about Crete, the war be¬ 
tween Italy and Turkey, and the war between the 
Balkan States and Turkey. The Treaty of Lau¬ 
sanne (October, 1912) and the Treaty of Lon¬ 
don (May, 1913) deprived the Ottoman Empire 
of her last province in Africa, the islands of the 
/Egean Sea, and Turkey in Europe except Con¬ 
stantinople and a portion of Thrace. The 
Young Turks took advantage of the falling out 
between the Balkan States to win back almost all 
the ceded districts of Thrace. What a series of 
disasters in five years! Turkey had been the 
loser in many a previous war. But never had 
the losses been so great as during this brief pe¬ 
riod in which the Young Turks had hoped, by 
radical reforms, to save their country. Tripoli, 
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, Epirus, Mace¬ 
donia, Crete—it was to preserve these conquests 
of their fathers, and to demand the return of 
Cyprus and Egypt, that Young Turk visionaries 
i59 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


had conspired against Abdul Hamid, had worked 
for years at the constant risk of their lives, and 
had shown the admirable energy and military 
qualities that crushed the counter-revolution and 
deposed Abdul Hamid in April, 1909. 

I have tried to show that lack of cooperation 
and disloyalty of non-Turkish elements within 
the empire were not to be blamed for the failure 
of the Young Turks to regenerate the empire, 
and that their weakness could not be attributed to 
religious fanaticism. Two causes, one beyond 
their control and the other due to themselves, had 
most to do with the inability of the Young Turks 
to save the empire. 

The odds were against the Young Turks in or¬ 
ganizing the new regime and in introducing a 
parliamentary system. The Young Turks were 
the victims of Hamidian despotism in just the 
same way as the Russian revolutionaries were 
victims of czarist despotism. Neither in Tur¬ 
key nor in Russia were the leaders of the con¬ 
stitutional movement capable of carrying on the 
administration of the country. They had lived 
all their lives in exile or in prison, and were in¬ 
experienced. They were incapable of running 
the intricate machinery of government. Faced 
160 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


with the dilemma of anarchy in administration or 
of coming to an arrangement with the offi¬ 
cials of the corrupt autocratic regime, who 
neither understood nor sympathized with their 
ideals, the Young Turks decided to retain the 
Hamidian functionaries. They were compelled 
to call to the post of grand vizir and to the ma¬ 
jority of cabinet positions Elder Statesmen who 
had served Abdul Hamid. Old Turks became 
Young Turks in name—but in name only! In 
the first year of the constitution, when Abdul 
Hamid made his unsuccessful coup d'etat to get 
rid of the Young Turks, the leaders of the revolu¬ 
tion realized the danger of leaving power in the 
hands of the old officials. In the army, generals 
and superior officers were under constant super¬ 
vision, and could be kept from conspiring against 
the constitution. But civilian administrators 
could not be easily controlled. 

The Committee of Union and Progress, as the 
Young Turk revolutionary organization was 
called, instead of assuming power as a governing 
party, responsible to parliament and the people, 
remained aloof from executive and legislative 
functions. The committee had its agents in the 
cabinet and most of its members were deputies. 
i<k 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


But it was as an outside organization, wholly irre¬ 
sponsible, that the leaders of the committee at¬ 
tempted to dictate governmental policies. The 
despotism of a small group, which kept carefully 
in the background, was substituted for the 
absolutism of Yildiz Kiosk. The committee 
brooked no opposition to its will. Grand vizirs 
and cabinet ministers who refused to take orders 
were deposed or assassinated. The committee 
dictated also to parliament. 

It is unnecessary to tra’ce the parliamentary his¬ 
tory of Turkey during the three years of grace 
before wars with foreign countries broke out. 
No party of opposition arose strong enough to 
hold in check the Committee of Union and Pro¬ 
gress, which became more arrogant and suspi¬ 
cious and headstrong as the difficulties confront¬ 
ing Turkey at home and abroad increased. The 
situation was not the result of deliberate inten¬ 
tion on the part of the Young Turk leaders to 
sacrifice the new regime they had called into be¬ 
ing to their vanity and appetite for political 
domination. The Young Turk leaders were no 
more self-seeking than politicians of other coun¬ 
tries whose names are held in honor for having 
accomplished great things. The Young Turks 
162 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


were victims of the attempt to establish demo¬ 
cratic institutions in a country where the ruling 
class was not converted to constitutional princi¬ 
ples and where the masses had the vaguest, if any, 
conception of Young Turk ideals. Uneducated 
and divided up into racial and religious groups, 
most of the inhabitants of Turkey were unable to 
appreciate the differences and the benefits of a 
constitutional over an absolute regime. The 
Young Turks were not supported by the masses. 
Nor were they under the control of public opin¬ 
ion. How, then, could they be the prophets and 
the servants of their country? 

The error of the Young Turks in their plan of 
regeneration for Turkey was their.belief in the 
possibility of instilling in Ottoman subjects the 
consciousness of Ottoman nationality through 
Turkicization. If the Turkish element had been 
the most numerous, the most virile, the most in¬ 
telligent and most cultivated of the elements in 
the Ottoman Empire, it would have been logical 
to try to build up a national life upon the Turkish 
foundation. The Young Turks were careful 
students of the history of nationalist movements 
in Europe, and of the development of democracy 
in Occidental countries. They had at their 
163 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tongues’ end the shibboleths of revolutionary 
language. Inspired by the Convention, the Tu- 
genbund, the Risorgimento, they started out to 
use classic methods. But, alas, there was no 
analogy between the problem of unifying Turkey 
and the examples of the unification of France and 
Germany and Italy. Nor could there be a pan- 
Turanian movement on the pan-Slavic model. 
The Romanoff method could not be followed be¬ 
cause tbe Turks were not numerically preponder¬ 
ant. A strong and regenerated Ottoman Em¬ 
pire could not be constructed after the Hapsburg 
plan because the Turks were incapable of impos¬ 
ing their will upon other elements through super¬ 
ior education, energy, and industry. 

The Young Turks refused to see the fact that 
they had been the dominant element in the Otto¬ 
man Empire solely because of the despotic form 
of government. There were two classes of 
Turks: peasants, mostly in Anatolia, a sturdy 
stock with admirable characteristics, but depleted 
by the wars of the nineteenth century and by the 
burden of obligatory military service from which 
Christians were free; and the ruling class—land 
owners, higher functionaries, and army officers— 
parasitical and indolent, prosperous only because 
164 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


of a privileged position which a constitutional 
regime would ruin. The Turks had ruled for 
five hundred years by the brains of others, and 
non-Turks were as frequent in high civil and mil¬ 
itary posts as Scotchmen in the British Empire. 
In military affairs, Albanians, Kurds, and Circas¬ 
sians, proud of their race, reached the top more 
quickly and more numerously than Turks. In re¬ 
ligious, educational, and administrative affairs, 
every second official was an Albanian or Arab or 
Christian. 

Under the old conception of the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire, which held up to 1908, there was no distinc¬ 
tion between Moslems of various races in the 
army and in the civil administration. Euro¬ 
peans regarded all Ottoman officials as Turks, 
just as the Turks regarded all Europeans (except 
Greeks and Italians and Balkan races) as one 
race. From the standpoint of the administra¬ 
tion, there was no discrimination. Even Chris¬ 
tians could attain very high posts. Easy-going 
tolerance was the spirit of the old regime. There 
were, of course, injustice, bribery, inefficiency, 
but not racial antagonism. For centuries, parts 
of the Ottoman Empire had defied every attempt 
of the Constantinople government to extend ef- 

165 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


fective administrative control, with its conse¬ 
quences of taxation and conscription. Monte¬ 
negro, Albania, large portions of Kurdistan, 
Mesopotamia, and Arabia were included within 
the Ottoman Empire, as far as the outside world 
knew, and were on the map that way. But the 
Turks had never dared to disturb the inhabitants 
of these regions, who were content to let the great 
world think they were Ottoman subjects so long 
as the Turks did not try to treat them as such. 
There were even Christian Armenian communi¬ 
ties of this same virtually independent character. 

The Young Turk proposition was this: now 
that we have the constitution, the old loose sys¬ 
tem is abolished, and every one, throughout the 
empire, must accept the responsibilities of citi¬ 
zenship, i.e., recognize the authority of Constan¬ 
tinople and conform to common laws for the em¬ 
pire. With amazing disregard of consequences, 
the Young Turks started in to throw overboard 
the expedients and connivances that had kept the 
empire afloat. They were logical in attempting 
to carry out their proposition—relentlessly logi¬ 
cal ! Albanian and Arabic autonomies and local 
privileges no longer existed, they said. The 
Young Turks asked for taxes and called to the 
166 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


colors soldiers in regions the most powerful of 
Ottoman sultans had prudently kept out of. 
When the people refused, armies were sent to en¬ 
force the authority of Constantinople, which had 
never been acknowledged before. Immediately 
they had on their hands rebellions in Albania, the 
Hauran, Mesopotamia, and Arabia. Large sums 
were spent and thousands of lives sacrificed to 
no avail. The Albanian rebellion, in fact, so 
weakened the Turkish armies in Macedonia that 
the victory of Balkan arms was foreseen by close 
observers of the situation in European Turkey. 

Bulgaria declared her complete independence 
and Crete annexed herself to Greece because of 
the Young Turk thesis that Bulgarians and Cre¬ 
tans were still Ottoman subjects. When the 
Young Turks raised questions of prerogatives 
and sovereignty that had long been allowed to lie 
dormant, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Italy seized Tripoli. The state¬ 
ment that Great Britain and France allowed these 
two acts of international brigandage to pass with¬ 
out official protest because Germany bullied and 
they showed the limit of forbearance to preserve 
the peace of Europe, is absurd. One marvels at 
that naivety and ignorance of diplomacy shown 
167 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


by serious writers who reiterated this statement 
during the recent war. The explanation of the 
failure of the British and French chancelleries to 
back Young Turk protests is very simple. If the 
British had protested against the action of Aus¬ 
tria-Hungary or had refused to accept the new 
status for Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would have 
put themselves in a hole about Egypt. Simi¬ 
larly, the title of France to Tunis was such that 
there was nothing to be said officially about the 
way Italy went after Tripoli. 

Abdul Hamid, fully as much as the sultans who 
preceded him, knew that every great power with¬ 
out exception could be bribed by political or eco¬ 
nomic concessions to its own interests, and that 
the Europeans with whom he negotiated had the 
same standards of international morality as him¬ 
self. At the same time, he realized that the Eu¬ 
ropean powers had physical force with their 
moral weakness. He made use of the latter and 
never provoked to the breaking point the former. 
In dealing with internal affairs, Abdul Hamid 
and his functionaries were as much realists as in 
dealing with Europe. They did not fool them¬ 
selves. They knew what they could and what 
they could not do. 


168 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


The centralization and Turkicization policy of 
the Young Turks was considered as one and the 
same thing, and pressed feverishly from the mo¬ 
ment the constitution was declared. Turkish 
was to be the language of the entire empire, 
taught in schools, used in legal documents and 
courts and administrative affairs, and spoken ex¬ 
clusively in parliament. Every one was to serve 
in the army and pay taxes. 

But if the Young Turks were clear on the ques¬ 
tion of responsibilities and obligations, as a re¬ 
sult of the constitution, they had a very confused 
notion of the other side of the shield. The con¬ 
stitution, while imposing obligations, assured 
privileges. If the different elements of the em¬ 
pire were to pay taxes and accept military serv¬ 
ice in proportion to population, they had a right 
to deputies in the parliament and representation 
in the cabinet in the same proportion. This the 
young Turks would not tolerate. The elections 
to the first parliament gave them an overwhelm¬ 
ing majority of deputies, which did not represent 
the will or numerical distribution of the races of 
the Ottoman Empire. One cabinet post—and a 
minor one—was offered to the Christians. Al¬ 
banians and Arabs were ignored unless they 
169 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


joined the Committee of Union and Progress and 
consented to a program against their racial in¬ 
stincts and interests. The second election had 
the same disheartening result. The Young 
Turks could have gotten away with this travesty 
of constitutionalism had they really been the pre¬ 
dominant element and had they had a large num¬ 
ber of leaders with brains and energy and ex¬ 
perience. As the Young Turks enjoyed none of 
these essentials to the parliamentary and admin¬ 
istrative hegemony of a dominant minority, they 
lost out all along the line. Even the European 
powers, who woke up to the danger for the peace 
of Europe of the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire during the war with Italy, could not save 
them. 

The powers had not yet adjusted their Near 
Eastern policies to the new situation created by 
the victory of the Balkan States, when the Euro¬ 
pean war broke out. Turkey could not remain 
neutral. The Young Turks chose to enter the 
war on the side of the Central powers. Had the 
Central empires won the war, the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire might have remained for a time what it was 
in 1914. But the price of territorial integrity 
would have been economic and political subserv- 
170 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


iency to Germany. And the Turks, as the dom¬ 
inant element of the empire, would have disap¬ 
peared probably more completely by the victory 
of their alliance than by its defeat. 


CHAPTER X 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE 
WORLD WAR 

HEN war broke out between the Euro¬ 



pean powers in the summer of 1914, a 


settlement had not yet been definitely 
reached of the problems that arose from the dis¬ 
astrous wars of the Ottoman Empire with Italy 
and the Balkan States. The Turks had been dis¬ 
possessed of the islands of the yEgean Sea and of 
most of European Turkey. They had taken ad¬ 
vantage of Bulgaria’s weakness at the end of the 
second Balkan War to reoccupy Adrianople. A 
frontier line, unsatisfactory to both Bulgaria and 
Turkey, had been drawn just to the north and 
west of the city. Dedeagatch, the nearest port to 
the Dardanelles on the European coast of the 
/Egean, was on the Bulgarian side. But the 
railway to this port from the interior of Bulgaria 
ran through the outskirts of Adrianople. Bul¬ 
garia and Turkey were negotiating to find a solu- 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

tion that would leave Adrianople Turkish and the 
railway Bulgarian. The frontiers and political 
status of Albania were in doubt. No apportion¬ 
ment of the share of the Ottoman public debt to 
be borne by the Balkan States had been decided 
upon. While the Treaty of Ouchy, signed in 
October, 1912, stipulated the return of the Do¬ 
decanese to Turkey after the retirement of the 
Turkish army from Tripoli, Italy remained in 
possession of the islands. She did not seem dis¬ 
posed to give them up, and took refuge in the fact 
that Greece disputed them with Turkey. The 
basis of the claim of Greece was that the Dode¬ 
canese logically fell to her with the other islands 
of the ^Egean. She had been prevented from 
occupying them during her war against Turkey 
only because Italy was holding them. 

In July, 1914, the crisis between Greece and 
Turkey arrived at an acute stage. Aside from 
the question of the Dodecanese, Greece felt that 
it was her duty to make the Sublime Porte prom¬ 
ise to stop the persecution of Ottoman Greeks in 
Asia Minor, who were being dispossessed along 
the coast by Mohammedan monhadjirs (refugees 
from the lost provinces of European Turkey). 
War seemed imminent. Conscious of their in- 
173 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


feriority on sea in the previous war, the Turks 
had ordered two battle-ships—both dreadnoughts 
of the latest type—from a British firm. The 
money for these ships had been raised by house- 
to-house collections throughout the empire, and 
every peasant had contributed his mite. Greece 
forestalled the menace of this increase of the Ot¬ 
toman Navy by purchasing two cruisers from the 
United States. To try to find a peaceful solution 
of the difficulties, a meeting was arranged at 
Brussels between Premier Venizelos of Greece 
and Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha of Turkey. 
M. Venizelos was on his way to Belgium when 
Austria-Hungary delivered the fateful ultimatum 
to Serbia. The grand vizir, foreseeing (or 
knowing?) what was going to happen, did not 
leave Constantinople. 

The day before Great Britain declared war on 
Germany, the Sublime Porte was notified that the 
British Admiralty would be compelled to take over 
the two battle-ships building in an English ship¬ 
yard. Turkey was assured that immediate and 
full financial compensation would be given and 
that, in return for Turkish neutrality, the British 
promised to make no change in the status of 
Egypt. The blunder of retaining the battle-ships 
i74 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


was stupendous in its consequences. When one 
considers the anxiety throughout Turkey over 
the intentions of Greece and the marvelous way 
in which the entire nation had been interested in 
these two battle-ships (there were more than two 
million contributions of less than ten cents), it 
will readily be seen how this decision played into 
the hands of Germany. 

Two German war-vessels, the Gocben and the 
Breslau, succeeded in eluding the net spread for 
them in the Mediterranean and passed into the 
Dardanelles on the evening of August io, 1914. 
The next day, news despatches from Constan¬ 
tinople stated that Turkey had bought these ships. 
The grand vizir explained that Turkey could not 
afford to neglect the opportunity to compensate 
herself in this way for the requisitioning of the 
battle-ships building in England. To bargain 
with Greece on the question of the islands, naval 
power was indispensable. The representatives 
of the Entente powers protested to the Sublime 
Porte against the transfer of the German ships 
to the Ottoman flag. It was not necessary, they 
said, for Turkey to fear Greece or Italy or them¬ 
selves. They were ready, in exchange for a 
strict neutrality, to defend the independence and 
i75 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the integrity of Turkey against any enemies that 
might wish to use the European conflict as an oc¬ 
casion to attack her. 

The answer of the Sublime Porte was unex¬ 
pected and disconcerting. On August 20, Djemal 
Pasha, Minister of Marine, called on Sir Louis 
Mallet, the British ambassador. As the price of 
neutrality, Djemal Pasha proposed the immediate 
abolition of the capitulations; the delivery of the 
two Turkish dreadnoughts retained by Great Brit¬ 
ain; renunciation of future interference in the 
internal affairs of Turkey; the restoration of 
western Thrace to Turkey if Bulgaria joined the 
Central powers; and the handing back of the 
/Egean Islands occupied by Greece and Italy. So 
anxious were the Entente ambassadors to prevent 
what they saw was coming that they went the 
limit to conciliate Turkey. They agreed to ac¬ 
cept the transfer of the Goeben and the Breslau 
if the German officers and crews were repatriated 
and facilities accorded for the passage of mer¬ 
chant vessels through the Bosphorus and the Dar¬ 
danelles. They promised to give a joint guar¬ 
antee in writing to respect the independence and 
integrity of Turkey, with the precise stipulation 
that “no conditions in the terms of peace at the 
176 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


end of the war shall prejudice this independence 
and integrity.” In addition, they declared that 
Great Britain, France, and Russia were willing 
to renounce the capitulatory privilege of extra¬ 
territorial jurisdiction as soon as a modern scheme 
of judicial administration was in working order 
throughout the empire. 

But on September 9, the Sublime Porte notified 
the powers that the capitulations would be abol¬ 
ished on October 1. Even the German and Aus¬ 
tro-Hungarian ambassadors joined in refusing to 
accept this unilateral denunciation of treaty obli¬ 
gations. Identical notes were sent pointing out 
that the capitulations could be abolished only by 
mutual consent of the contracting parties. In the 
meantime, trains of German sailors and officers 
and reservists were arriving. The Germano- 
phile party in the cabinet, although in the minor¬ 
ity, was gaining in popular favor. On September 
21, the British ambassador, in a last vain effort, 
went to the sultan with a personal message from 
King George, regretting the retention of the bat¬ 
tle-ships and begging the sultan not to break 
bonds of friendship that had endured more than 
a century. 

Five weeks passed of tireless diplomatic ac- 
177 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

tivity. The sultan, the heir apparent and the 
grand vizir were prodigal in their assurances of 
friendly intentions. Djavid Bey, Minister of 
Finance, declared that there was no cause for 
alarm. But on October 29, Bedouins raided the 
Sinai Peninsula and three Turkish torpedo boats 
bombarded Odessa and Theodosia. The next 
day, the Russian ambassador informed his British 
and French colleagues that he had received in¬ 
structions to demand his passports. With great 
misgivings and not before they had made a final 
effort at reconciliation did Sir Louis Mallet and 
Monsieur Bompard take the inevitable step. The 
war party in the Ottoman cabinet committed 
Turkey irrevocably by publishing an official com¬ 
munique, which stated that the first acts of hos¬ 
tility in the Black Sea came from the Russian 
side. 

When Turkey joined Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, the conflict between rival European 
powers became a world war. The participation 
of Japan had a limited objective. The interven¬ 
tion of Turkey opened up tremendous possibili¬ 
ties for both groups of belligerents. It is a mis¬ 
take to attribute the action of Turkey to the in¬ 
fluence of a few men in the pay of Germany. 

178 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

France and Great Britain had as many and as 
powerful friends in the Ottoman cabinet and in 
other high positions as Germany. Among the 
rank and file of the Turks, the British and French 
were more loved and less feared than the Ger¬ 
mans. But since the birth of the Young Turk 
regime, British and French diplomacy had shown 
very little sympathy with the efforts to regenerate 
and modernize Turkey. Both powers feared 
pan-Islamism. They were hostile to the develop¬ 
ment of constitutionalism in a Mohammedan 
country and resented the expression of opinions 
and the development of aspirations on the part of 
Young Turk leaders which would penetrate into 
and contaminate their own African subject races. 
The chief influence, however, in Turkey’s choice 
of the Central Powers instead of the Entente was 
the fact that Russia stood on the other side. 
Every Turk knew that the victory of Russia in 
the war would be a menace to the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire. Russia had worked for centuries to de¬ 
stroy Turkey. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Great Britain abandoned her traditional 
policy of antagonism to Russia. The Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907 and the way it was 
being carried out convinced the Turks that the 
179 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

British Government had become their enemy. 
Similarly, by the Anglo-French Convention of 
1904, France and Great Britain entered into a 
conspiracy to rob the Turks of their title to Egypt. 
Much leaked out in Turkey about a secret treaty 
between France and Italy in which France had 
consented long beforehand to Italy’s aggression 
against Turkey. No Turk was naive enough to 
believe that Germany’s feeling for and intentions 
toward the Ottoman Empire were better than 
those of the other powers. But the Turks felt 
rightly that in the evolution of European colonial 
politics, German interest in the twentieth century 
was what British interests had been in the nine¬ 
teenth century in regard to the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. For the sake of a clear title 
to Egypt and the advantage of strengthening her 
position in Southern Asia, Great Britain was 
willing to sell Turkey out to Russia. In the last 
analysis, the entrance of Turkey into the world 
war was determined by the instinct of self-preser¬ 
vation. It was to be the final act in the struggle 
between Muscovite and Osmanli that had been 
going on for hundreds of years and that was to 
end in the breaking up of both empires. Turkey 
180 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


and Germany had the common interest to destroy 
the Romanoff empire. 

The evolution of nationalism in Turkey under 
the constitutional regime was taken seriously by 
only one of the European ambassadors at Con¬ 
stantinople. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein 
realized in May, 1909, that Turkey would not re¬ 
main neutral in the next European war. Symp¬ 
toms to which others were blind did not escape his 
notice. After the Young Turks proved they 
were in earnest and in control of the army by the 
way they forced the abdication of Abdul Hamid, 
Young Turkey was worth cultivating. When 
the war wkh Russia came, the geographical posi¬ 
tion alone of Turkey would be a precious aid in 
shutting off Russia from the outside world. Add 
an Allied army, strong enough to penetrate the 
Caucasus and Persia, and the game was won. 
The German ambassador picked out three men 
as friends for his country. Mahmoud Shevket 
Pasha could be filled with the military future of 
Turkey. 1 Enver Bey, who had already spent a 

1 Mahmoud Shevket Pasha declared in parliament, in the 
spring of 1911, that “the million bayonets of Turkey would de¬ 
cide the fortunes of Europe.” See my “New Map of Europe” 
(American Ed.), p. 252. 

l8l 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


winter as military attache at Berlin, could be sent 
back to Germany with the idea of studying still 
further Germany’s sources of superiority over 
the other great powers “in the next war.” Talaat 
Bey, a politician, could be helped up to high posts. 
When Italy attacked Tripoli, von Bieberstein did 
not allow himself to be confounded. He en¬ 
couraged Enver Bey to go to Tripoli, where he 
would become an implacable enemy of the British. 
He showed Mahmoud Shevket and others the 
proofs of France’s understanding with Italy. 
Von Bieberstein went to London at the time the 
empire in Europe was crumbling. He left among 
his large circle of Turkish friends the firm con¬ 
viction that the disasters of 1912 could be re¬ 
trieved by reforming the army through submit¬ 
ting to German leadership. 

When the Balkan States were united against 
Turkey, scarcely more than a month’s campaign 
led to the complete military collapse of the Turks. 
Three Turkish armies were besieged in Adrian- 
ople, the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Constantinople. 
The rest of Turkey in Europe was in the power 
of Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Montene¬ 
grins. An armistice was declared, but the deter¬ 
mination of the Turks to hold Adrianople neces- 
182 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

sitated a resumption of the war. Nazim Pasha 
was assassinated, and the grand vizir, Kiamil 
Pasha, deposed. Enver (now raised from Bey 
to Pasha), who had luckily for himself not re¬ 
turned from Triopli in time to have his share in 
the odium of the defeats in Thrace and Mace¬ 
donia, managed the coup d'etat. Mahmoud Shev- 
ket Pasha became Grand Vizir as well as Minis¬ 
ter of War. The fortune of arms could not be 
changed. The Turks had to sign in the end a 
peace renouncing most of the European provinces 
and the islands of the ^Egean Sea. Mahmoud 
Shevket was assassinated in June, 1913. Prince 
Said Halim, a member of the Egyptian khedival 
family, became Grand Vizir, Enver Minister of 
War, and Talaat Minister of the Interior. These 
were the men in power when Turkey joined Ger¬ 
many more than a year later: and they remained 
in power throughout the years of bitter convul¬ 
sion in Europe and western Asia. 

The seed sown by Ambassador Marschall von 
Bieberstein bore fruit. The German military 
mission, which started its work in 1909, was 
greatly increased in the autumn of 1913, and 
large powers were conferred upon its new head, 
General Liman von Sanders. The presence of 
183 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

a German at Constantinople, in effective control 
of the Turkish Army and forts, caused a formal 
protest from Russia. But von Sanders and his 
associates, despite the inertia and jealousy that 
has to be contended with by Westerners who try 
to reform Easterners, succeeded in instituting ad¬ 
mirable discipline and organization in the Turkish 
Army and in resisting the political pressure of the 
diplomats to oust them. Turkey was more ready 
to lend effective aid to the Central empires than 
was supposed. She had a quarter of a million 
under arms, and her mobilization had begun in 
midsummer. Partially trained men and recruits 
increased the army by half a million. Left to 
themselves—especially after the disastrous wars 
they had just been through—the Turks could 
have accomplished little in the field. But Ger¬ 
many and Austria-Hungary were able to con¬ 
tribute officers for line regiments, staff officers, 
artillerymen, and engineers. A short war, how¬ 
ever, was a sine qua non to the efficiency of Turk¬ 
ish cooperation. For although the population of 
the empire was still over twenty millions, heavy 
losses from disease had been suffered in the Bal¬ 
kan War; the valuable Albanian element was lost; 
most of the Arabs could not be recruited; and the 
184 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


Turks were afraid to incorporate in large num¬ 
bers the Christian elements. It was evident that 
Turkey could not find new recruits. Losses in 
battle and from disease, therefore, could not be 
made good. 

Turkey was risking everything. She had two 
chances of success: stirring up Egypt, and win¬ 
ning aid from the Tartars of central Asia by de¬ 
feating the Russians in the Caucasus. These 
were the two points—at opposite ends of the em¬ 
pire—where offensive operations were possible, 
if begun immediately. In Mesopotamia, the 
Turks knew they would have to remain on the 
defensive. 'Some troops had to be kept along the 
Higean coast of Asia Minor: for the Greeks could 
not be trusted. Constantinople also had to be 
protected against the Greeks and the Bulgarians. 
It was not known which side Greece and Bulgaria 
would take. Both were bitter enemies of Tur¬ 
key. Both wanted to see the Turks disappear 
from their last foothold in Europe. But it was 
certain that the attitude of the Balkan States, and 
their intervention in the war, would be dictated 
by reasons other than hostility to Turkey. In 
the first year of the war, it was not the menace 
of her neighbors, but the attempt of the Entente 

185 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


powers to force the Dardanelles and capture Con¬ 
stantinople, that immobilized important Turkish 
forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula and around Con¬ 
stantinople. The failure of the British at Gal¬ 
lipoli was only partial. In fact, it is doubtful 
whether we should consider the expedition as a 
failure and the sacrifices unjustified. For the 
menace to Constantinople lasted long enough to 
cause the miscarriage of the offensive projects of 
the Germans and Turks against the Caucasus and 
Egypt. In spite of the long neutrality of Greece 
and the entry of Bulgaria on the side of the Cen¬ 
tral powers, all danger of Turkey being a decisive 
military factor in the war could be discounted by 
the Entente powers before the British finally de¬ 
cided to evacuate Gallipoli. 

Two attempts were made to cross the Suez 
Canal and invade Egypt. Owing to lack of suf¬ 
ficient forces and to absence of means of trans¬ 
portation, they failed miserably. In the Isthmus 
of Suez and in Mesopotamia, the Turks wore 
themselves out before the summer of 1916. Once 
the British had organized their railway communi¬ 
cations and water supply across the Isthmus of 
Suez, the Turks were unable to defend Jerusalem 
and bar the road to Syria. In Mesopotamia, the 
186 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


British occupied Bassorah at the very beginning 
of the war. The Turks scored the success of 
Kut-el-Amara only because of the rashness of 
the British in pushing north too fast and not mak¬ 
ing secure their lines of communication as they 
advanced. In conquering Mesopotamia, the 
problem of the British was rather to assure the 
neutrality and gain the cooperation of the Arabs 
than to face and break down a formidable resist¬ 
ance of the Turks. The recognition of the inde¬ 
pendence of the Hedjaz and the alliance with the 
Sherif of Mecca hastened the disappearance of 
Ottoman authority in the Arabic-speaking por¬ 
tions of the empire. 

The policy followed by the British in Mesopo¬ 
tamia and Arabia was dictated by political con¬ 
siderations. The Germans had hoped to use the 
alliance with Turkey as a means of arousing the 
Islamic world. They induced the sultan, in his 
capacity of Khalib, to declare the j ihad (holy war). 
The essential thing was to prevent the Moham¬ 
medans of Asia and Africa from making com¬ 
mon cause with Turkey. As long as the Turks 
could be kept on the defensive, there would be no 
danger from pan-Islamism. Knowledge of this 
fact is the reason for the equanimity with which 
187 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


friends of the Entente powers viewed the meager 
military results of the first two years of cam¬ 
paigning in the Near East. 

In the northeastern corner of the empire, the 
Turks were handicapped by not having control of 
the Black Sea. There was no railway from 
western Asia Minor to the frontier of the Cau¬ 
casus. After preliminary vicissitudes in Ar¬ 
menia and the Azerbaijan province of Persia, the 
Russians succeeded in gaining definite control of 
Tabriz and in capturing Erzerum, the great 
Turkish fortress that opened the path of invasion 
into Asia Minor. The news of the fall of Er¬ 
zerum came as .a timely antidote to the announce¬ 
ment of the withdrawal from Gallipoli. 

The Germans did everything in their power to 
make Turkey an effective military factor in the 
war. After the intervention of Bulgaria, they 
were able to assist their Ottoman ally in a ma¬ 
terial way. Money and materials of all sorts 
flowed into Turkey. Large numbers of officers 
and engineers were loaned for staff and artillery 
work and for pushing the construction of the Bag¬ 
dad Railway. The intervention of Turkey was 
precious to Germany in bottling up southern Rus¬ 
sia and in compelling the Entente powers to keep 
188 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

large numbers of troops in the Caucasus, Persia, 
Mesopotamia, and Egypt. The Gallipoli expe¬ 
dition and the operations in Egypt and Mesopo¬ 
tamia required the use of an enormous amount of 
tonnage, which seriously embarrassed, if it did 
not cripple, the Entente. But the Germans knew 
full well, after the failure to arouse Egypt and to 
penetrate into the Caucasus, that Turkey was 
doomed and German influence lost in the Near 
East unless decisive victories could be won on the 
western front. It was only a question of time 
when Turkey, like Germany herself, would suc¬ 
cumb to the blockade and to exhaustion. This 
explains Verdun. 

The Petrograd revolution, in March, 1917, en¬ 
abled Germany and her allies to postpone the evil 
day and to regroup forces for one more supreme 
effort to crush the French and British armies in 
France. Nowhere did the collapse of Russia 
militarily and the breaking up of Russia politi¬ 
cally help Germany more than in her relations 
with Turkey. The conclusion of the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk put new heart into the Turks and 
opened up to them the perspective of a glorious 
future. They were content to let Mesopotamia 
and Arabia go: for those regions had never been 
189 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


assimilated by the Turks and had been a source 
of constant weakness to the empire. The goal 
of the Young Turks was to link up their empire 
with the regions Trorn which they had come. 
Once they became again masters of the Cau¬ 
casus, they would be in touch with their fellow- 
Turanians of central Asia. Because the Ar¬ 
menians were in the path to the Caspian Sea, the 
Young Turks tried to exterminate them. The 
Turk has no affinity with the Arab save religion. 
But have not the British and the French the af¬ 
finity of religion with the Germans? With the 
Tartars, the Turks have blood and language and 
ideals of civilization in common. It is easy to 
understand why, to the Turk pur sang, Russia 
has always been the great enemy. 

In the spring and summer of 1918, when Gen¬ 
eral Allenby was preparing for the decisive cam¬ 
paign in Palestine, and when the Germans made 
and failed in their final effort on the western 
front, the Turks seemed to have one thought— 
the recapture of the Caucasus. Their effort was 
concentrated between the Black Sea and the Cas¬ 
pian Sea, and they were marching from success 
to success, easily won, when the politico-military 
structure that had lasted four years collapsed in 


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 


four weeks. Rather than suffer invasion, Bul¬ 
garia sued for an armistice. Turkey read the 
handwriting on the wall. So did Austria-Hun¬ 
gary and Germany. 

The Ottoman Empire could have been wiped off 
the map—completely and without further effu¬ 
sion of blood—before the end of 1918. But who 
would inherit? Russia was no longer there. 
The shades of San Stefano began to stalk, all the 


same. 


CHAPTER XI 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

T EN years of Young Turk rule accomplished 
what a century of European diplomatic 
effort, resulting several times in wars, 
tried desperately to prevent. The Ottoman Em¬ 
pire is in dissolution. The last footholds in 
Africa were lost by the Italian occupation of 
Tripoli (1911) and the proclamation of a Brit¬ 
ish protectorate over Egypt (1914). The Euro¬ 
pean provinces, except Thrace, were liberated by 
the Balkan States (1912). In the recent war, 
Mesopotamia and Palestine were conquered by 
the British and Arabia cast off the Turkish yoke. 

At the beginning of the eleventh year of “the 
Constitution/’ while the Turks enjoyed illusory 
successes through reoccupying Armenia and pen¬ 
etrating into the Caucasus, by a series of bril¬ 
liant military operations General Allenby’s army 
passed into Syria after annihilating two Turkish 
192 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


armies and capturing their artillery and means 
of transport. 

The portions of the Ottoman Empire inhabited 
in majority by non-Turkish elements will not 
again be placed under the Turkish sultan’s rule. 
The civilized world will not tolerate another 
Treaty of Vienna, Paris, or Berlin. The futile 
and disastrous results of old-fashioned diplo¬ 
macy, which sacrificed races subject to the Turks 
for what was deemed the general good of Europe, 
have been demonstrated. 

Among the Near Eastern problems, the es¬ 
tablishment of a Zionist state in Palestine was 
not allowed to remain until the end of the war 
for discussion and settlement. 

On November 2, 1917, in a letter to Lord 
Rothschild, immediate publication of which was 
authorized, Foreign Secretary Balfour made the 
following “declaration of sympathy with Jewish 
Zionist aspirations” on the part of the British 
cabinet: 

His Majesty’s Government view with favor the es¬ 
tablishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facili 
tate the achievement of this object, it being clearly un¬ 
derstood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice 
the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish corn- 
193 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


munities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 

The declaration was guarded and non-com¬ 
mittal. In fact, the reservation concerning “the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine” kept the declaration in 
line with the ideals for which the nations banded 
against Germany were fighting. If the British 
Government’s “sympathy with Jewish Zionist as¬ 
pirations” did not mean prejudice either to civil 
or to religious rights of existing non-Jewish com¬ 
munities in Palestine, no harm or peril could pos¬ 
sibly come of it. As opposed to 100,000 in 
the Jewish communities, there are 630,000 in the 
non-Jewish communities, of whom 550,000 form 
a solid Arabic-speaking Moslem block in racial 
and religious sympathy with the neighboring 
Arabs of Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, and 
Egypt. The Jews could therefore never become 
a menace to the majority. 

But the Zionists did not interpret the declara¬ 
tion of the British Government according to its 
clear wording. From the day of its publication, 
they looked upon the letter of Mr. Balfour to 
Lord Rothschild as official British sanction to the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine by 
194 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

means of wholesale immigration and buying up 
of the land. They considered it as a recognition 
of Jewish nationality in the sense of separate po¬ 
litical and civil status for the Jew from the in¬ 
ternational point of view. The Zionist interpre¬ 
tation of “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspira¬ 
tions” is faithfully expressed in the first editorial 
comment of the London “Jewish Chronicle,” 
which said: 

In place of being a wanderer in every clime, there 
is to be a home for the Jew in his ancient land. The 
day of his exile is to be ended. . . . The invitation to us 
is to enter into the family of nations of the Earth en¬ 
dowed with the franchise of Nationhood, to become 
emancipated, not as individuals or sectionally, but as a 
whole people. 

“Unser Leute” (“our people”) is not the jar¬ 
gon translation of “B’nai B’rith” (“Sons of the 
Covenant”), and yet to thoughtful and earnest 
Jews—not necessarily to devout Jews alone—the 
first expression is synonymous with the second. 
It requires neither rabbinical education nor re¬ 
ligious conviction for the Jew to think of “the 
race apart” as “the chosen race.” Instinct born 
of tradition and fostered by social conditions too 
unfortunately alike throughout the world has 
kept alive the phenomenon- of consciousness of 
i95 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


separate race through religion, felt by Jews alone 
among all the elements that have formed the 
American nation, and felt more strongly than in 
America by the Jews of Occidental and central 
Europe. 

In eastern Europe, where more than half the 
Jews in the world live, the feeling can hardly be 
called a phenomenon. For there race and reli¬ 
gion are inextricably bound up together in de¬ 
termining a man’s national and political status. 
The fact that in the Ottoman Empire and 
throughout the Mohammedan world a man de¬ 
rives his nationality from his religion makes the 
settlement of Near Eastern questions peculiarly 
perilous, even without Zionism to deal with. 

Add Jewish aspirations, if loyally backed by 
newspaper and financial interests throughout the 
world, to indigenous Arab, Syrian, Egyptian, and 
Armenian aspirations, and we have a hopeless 
conflict of interests and ideals. Since the idea 
of a Zionist state in Palestine was brought be¬ 
fore the Peace Conference, I have found opinions 
strongly pro and strongly contra among Ameri¬ 
can Jews, mostly pro among British Jews and 
mostly contra among French Jews. Prominent 
Jews in the intellectual and business and com- 
196 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


mercial world, whose names and statements ap¬ 
pear in Zionist publications in favor of the Zion¬ 
ist interpretation of the Balfour letter, have as¬ 
sured me privately that they view the whole move¬ 
ment with the gravest misgivings. An Ameri¬ 
can Jew, who has had unusual opportunities for 
studying the political and social and economic 
problems of the Ottoman Empire and who was a 
recent visitor to the Palestine colonies, said to 
me: “A Jewish state in Palestine is a chimera 
outside the realm of practical politics: so don’t 
waste your time fighting windmills.” 

This keen and competent observer may be 
right about the chimera. But the attempt, the 
effort to establish a Jewish state in Palestine has 
certainly entered “the realm of practical poli¬ 
tics.” Events of the year 1918 proved that the 
British cabinet had an understanding with the 
Zionist leaders which most assuredly went far 
beyond the declaration of November 2, 1917. 

By those who were watching closely the mili¬ 
tary and political situation in the Near East and 
who knew that Dr. Weizmann had secured the 
ear of Mr. Balfour, the diplomatic move at the 
end of 1917 was not unexpected. Nor have sub¬ 
sequent events in Palestine been unexpected. 

197 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Sudden “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspira¬ 
tions” could have been born only of the knowl¬ 
edge that General Allenby was ready to capture 
Jerusalem, and that Dr. Weizmann, in return for 
Jewish support, was equally ready to enlist Zion¬ 
ism officially in the task of making Palestine vir¬ 
tually a British protectorate. Thus were Egypt 
and the Suez Canal to be covered. Thus was the 
Sherif of Mecca, recognized as “King of the 
Hedjaz” by the Entente powers, to be checked in 
his alarming ambition to refound a strong Ara¬ 
bic empire on the ruins of the former Ottoman 
Empire. 

The British fought gloriously in France for 
over four years. Seven hundred thousand of 
the soldiers who, to defend France, came from 
every part of the world where the British flag 
waves, have been buried in France. Comrade¬ 
ship in arms, sealed by blood, has destroyed the 
traditional antagonism that had been kept alive 
through centuries by economic and colonial 
rivalry. One of the blessings of this war, and 
one of the solid guaranties of peace as well, would 
be a permanent friendship between the people of 
Great Britain and the people of France. Do 
the British realize that the policy pursued by 
198 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

their government is a danger to Franco-British 
friendship ? Certainly not; for they are ignorant 
of what is going on in Palestine, and even if they 
knew, would not see the danger. For they do 
not appreciate how the French feel about Pal¬ 
estine and Syria. Do the Jews who enthusias¬ 
tically support Zionism understand the nature of 
the compact made by Weizmann with the consent 
of Sokalof ? I am sure they do not. I was talk¬ 
ing the other day to an American rabbi who is 
one of the most virile and zealous younger lead¬ 
ers of the Zionist movement—an idealist through 
and through. He seemed not to have studied 
Near Eastern history since the diaspora. He 
did not know that a small band of British imperi¬ 
alists, not content with determining to replace 
international by British control of the Suez 
Canal, planned, through using Zionism to pre¬ 
vent condominium with France and other nations 
in Palestine, to establish an all-rail British route 
from Haifa to Bassorah. 

France was the pioneer among European na¬ 
tions in Egypt. Her sons established the cul¬ 
tural and economic foundations of present-day 
Egypt. France dug the Suez Canal. France 
signed in 1535 the first treaty with the Sublime 
199 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Porte to safeguard the lives and property of 
Christians in Turkey. For almost four centuries, 
the protection of Ottoman Christians and of the 
Lieux Saints (holy places) has been a precious 
prerogative of French foreign policy. Witness 
the treaties of 1569, 1589, 1604, 1637, 1740, and 
1802. How easy it was during the nineteenth 
century to work up public opinion in France to 
fever heat over the question of France’s unique 
position in Palestine and Syria is illustrated by 
the difficulties with England over Mehemet Ali in 
the reign of Louis Philippe; the Crimean War into 
which France entered primarily to prevent Russia 
from replacing her at Jerusalem; the expedition of 
i860 to Damascus; Waddington’s insistence at 
the Congress of Berlin that the clause “les droits 
de la France sont expressement reserves be 
added to the British draft of Paragraph 3 of 
Article 62; and when Italy tried to ignore the 
French protectorate in the Ottoman Empire, the 
appeal of France to the Vatican in 1880 which 
led to the encyclical Aspera rerum conditio. 
Only a few years before the outbreak of the re¬ 
cent war, France’s guardianship of the Holy 
Land was recognized by Italy in the agreements 
of July 27, 1906, and January 13, 1907. In re- 


200 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


lation to the Jews, also, France was the first na¬ 
tion to take measures for their protection and 
education in Palestine. France established the 
Mikweh Israel Agricultural School in 1870, sub¬ 
sidized the work of the Alliance Israelite Uni- 
verselle at Jerusalem, assured by treaty the right 
of protecting North African Jews who had emi¬ 
grated to Palestine, and has participated in the 
appointment of the Grand Rabbi of Jerusalem. 

When the British army entered Damascus, the 
French fleet sailed into Beirut Harbor. If Asi¬ 
atic Turkey is to be apportioned to the victors, 
whatever modus vivendi may be arranged for the 
time being, it is certain that Palestine must fall 
eventually under the protectorate of the power 
that controls Syria or the power that controls 
Egypt. Which power will get Palestine? Dr. 
Weizmann gave the answer of the International 
Zionist Commission in his memorable speech at 
Jerusalem in April, 1918. He stated categor¬ 
ically that “Zionists do not believe in the interna¬ 
tionalization of Palestine or in any form of dual 
or multiple political control over Palestine, whose 
integrity must be protected by one just and fairly 
responsible guardian.” The “one just and fairly 
responsible guardian,” in Dr. Weizmann’s opin- 


201 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ion, was already there; for, when speaking these 
words, he turned to General Sir Edmund Allenby. 

The Grand Rabbi of France stated a few 
months ago that there are only a hundred thou¬ 
sand Zionists in the world outside of America; 
that most of the Zionists in France are of Rus¬ 
sian or Rumanian origin; and that Jews of French 
birth, if interested at all in Zionism, were inter¬ 
ested only out of sympathy with those who wanted 
to go to Palestine to escape persecution. “Zion¬ 
ism is not a pious desideratum on our part. 
What French Jews are interested in is liberty and 
equality in this country for all religions.” But 
as a Frenchman and not as a Jew, the grand rabbi 
and all other prominent French Jews are exceed¬ 
ingly anxious that Zionism be not used to deprive 
France of her traditional past and her legitimate 
future place in the Near East. And French Jews 
fear that Zionism may revive anti-Semitism in 
France. French Catholics and French imperial¬ 
ists are determined that Palestine shall not be 
British. French Socialists, sensing future trou¬ 
ble, have repeatedly declared for territorial and 
political disinterestedness of both nations in Pal¬ 
estine. 

In approaching the great problem of the world 


202 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


peace that we hope our sacrifices will assure, we 
must face facts. When President Wilson made 
his speech of September 27, 1918, at the opening 
of the Fourth Liberty Loan, he said that this had 
become a war of peoples and that statesmen could 
no longer hope to make a peace that would be 
an “arrangement or compromise or adjustment 
of interests,” and warned the leaders of the gov¬ 
ernments with which we are associated that 
“unity of purpose and of counsel are as impera¬ 
tively necessary in this war as was unity of com¬ 
mand on the battle-field; and with perfect unity 
of purpose and counsel will come assurance of 
complete victory. It can be had in no other way.” 
This “unity of purpose and of counsel” is sadly 
lacking between France and Great Britain at the 
eastern end of the Mediterranean. As long as 
Dr. Weizmann’s words above quoted—“Zionists 
do not believe in any form of dual or multiple 
political control over Palestine”—represent Zion¬ 
ist opinion, and Zionists look to Great Britain to 
establish and guarantee a Jewish state in Pales¬ 
tine, the Entente powers cannot arrive at “unity 
of purpose and of counsel.” 

What happened in the Peace Conference at 
Paris during the early months of 1919 proved 
203 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


clearly the difference of opinion between France 
and Great Britain as to the settlement of the Pal¬ 
estinian and Syrian questions. When the claims 
of the King of the Hedjaz were presented before 
the Council of Ten, it was discovered that the 
British had made a secret treaty with the Arabs, 
promising them Damascus! In the session de¬ 
voted to Zionist aspirations in Palestine, after Dr. 
Weizmann had made his impassioned appeal, the 
French asked that M. Sylvain Levy, professor at 
the College of France, be heard. Monsieur Levy, 
recognized and honored as a leader by all his co¬ 
religionists in France, told President Wilson and 
the other members of the Council of Ten that 
he was not in sympathy with the Zionist move¬ 
ment. After an investigation on the spot since 
the British occupation of Jerusalem, Monsieur 
Levy was persuaded that the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Palestine was an impracticable 
and dangerous experiment. The same opinion 
was expressed by other eminent French Jews, 
such as Henri Bergson and Joseph Reinach. 

Zionist aspirations, not only as interpreted and 
carried out by the present leaders of the Zionist 
movement but also in their very nature and es¬ 
sence—it is best to be frank about it—present 
204 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

other dangers to the world peace than friction 
between France and Great Britain. In enumerat¬ 
ing these dangers, I trust my readers will re¬ 
member that I am not recording second-hand 
impressions and arguments. What I write here 
is the result of personal contact with the prob¬ 
lems discussed. 

First and foremost (for it affects the Jews 
themselves), the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine zvould give birth to an alarming anti- 
Semitic movement throughout the Moslem world, 
resulting in boycotts and pogroms. 

The conception of a nation as a millet (reli¬ 
gious community) is ingrained in Moslem races, 
and influences also races which have been sub¬ 
jected to or which have lived in intimate contact 
with Moslem civilization. In countries where 
Mohammedans have the political ascendency, 
non-Moslem millets are simply tolerated. They 
have no legal rights. Their security of life and 
property is based upon the granting of an aman 
(a safe-conduct) which is not permanent. It 
may be withdrawn at any moment. As long as 
non-Moslem millets do not aspire to political con¬ 
trol or even to political equality, the non-Mos¬ 
lems are safe. For centuries, Christians and 
205 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Jews lived in perfect security in the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire and in other Mohammedan states. Massa¬ 
cres of Christians have occurred because of the 
withdrawal of the aman. So long as the Chris¬ 
tians were content with their lot and did not try 
to become politically masters or equals through 
their own efforts or through demanding protec¬ 
tion or aid from outside states, the aman was not 
withdrawn. I know that this statement will be 
indignantly denied by some, but it is made after 
years of study and observation. Starting with 
the massacre of the Greeks in Chios at the out¬ 
break of the Greek rebellion nearly a hundred 
years ago, and examining the circumstances in 
which each massacre has taken place, we find 
that the underlying cause in every case is the re¬ 
fusal of Moslems to tolerate non-Moslem political 
rule or to grant equality to raias (non-Moslem 
subjects). I have lived in the Ottoman Empire, 
have traveled everywhere in perfect security, 
and know how it feels to have the aman suddenly 
withdrawn; for I was in the courtyard of the 
Adana government building when the massacre 
of 1909 broke out. 

Massacres are not due to religious antipathy. 
Moslems do not declare the jihad (holy war) 
206 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

simply to kill non-Moslems. It is their way of 
preventing the assertion of independence on the 
part of non-Moslems among them. Greeks and 
other Christians have not been harmed when 
Armenians were being killed. Armenians have 
not been harmed when Greeks were being killed. 
The Jews who had to emigrate from Spain sev¬ 
eral centuries ago were received hospitably by the 
Turks. There never has been a pogrom. And 
yet, in the Koran, the denunciation of Christians 
cannot be compared with the denunciation of 
Jews. Religiously speaking, Moslems bear far 
more hatred to Jews than Christians. It is al¬ 
ways legally right for Moslems to kill non-Mos¬ 
lems. Only the ciman stands between the non- 
Moslem and death. The Jews have enjoyed se¬ 
curity in the Ottoman Empire and in Persia be¬ 
cause there never has been up to now a reason to 
withdraw the aman. 

Palestine contains two of the four holy places 
of orthodox Islam. Jerusalem is second only to 
Mecca. An attempt to turn the Mosque of Omar 
back into the Temple of Solomon would be more 
foolish and dangerous than to reconsecrate St. 
Sophia. Zionists answer that Zionism does not 
mean the restoration of Jewry in Jerusalem, and 
207 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

that those who point out the inevitable conflict 
with Islam have not grasped the significance of 
the Zionist movement. But if Zionism is mys¬ 
tical and spiritual, why Palestine at all? And 
if the material return to Zion is practical, no 
previously announced good intentions are going 
to prevail against human nature. We have al¬ 
ready had proof of this. Following in the trail 
of Sir Edmund Allenby’s victorious army, the 
Zionist delegation first established headquarters 
at Tel Aviv near Jafifa. But within a few months, 
branch headquarters (the adjective and noun to¬ 
gether form a paradox) were opened in Jerusa¬ 
lem, and Dr. Weizmann declared, “We return to 
this sacred country which our forefathers hero¬ 
ically defended to link up the glorious traditions 
of the past with the future.” 

In vain did Dr. Weizmann continue by stating 
that “this development will not, and must not, 
be detrimental to any of the great communities 
established in the country; on the contrary, it 
will be to their advantage.” In vain did he ex¬ 
press deep sympathy for and profound interest in 
“the struggle for freedom which the ancient Arab 
race is now waging against Turkey,” and his be¬ 
lief that the scattered Arab forces were being 
208 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


cemented with the sympathies of the Entente and 
the freedom-loving powers. The mufti and other 
Moslem notables withdrew from the table. And 
ever since Dr. Weizmann’s speech, there has been 
a constant cry of protest from Arabs, Christian 
as well as Moslem. So unanimous has been the 
protest that the French Government censor al¬ 
lowed to be printed in the Arab newspaper of 
Paris, “A1 Moustaqbal” (number of August 30, 
1918), a letter of a Palestinian Arab, written 
from Jerusalem on May 26, which in violent 
terms states that Moslems will never allow Jews 
to control Palestine. The sentiments of this let¬ 
ter are identical with those repeatedly expressed 
in “A 1 Kibla,” official journal of the King of the 
Hedjaz, formerly Sherif of Mecca, whose aid has 
been decisive to the British in the Palestinian and 
Mesopotamian campaigns. 1 

Dr. Weizmann made strenuous efforts, sup- 

1 Writing a rejoinder to my article on “Zionism and the World 
Peace” ( Century, January, 1919), Dr. Julius Friedlaender, of 
the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, stated in the April 
Century that the Arabs of the Hedjaz were friendly to Zion¬ 
ism. Dr. Friedlaender asserts that he is much more familiar 
than I am with the Arab ideas concerning the Holy Land. T 
hesitate to take issue with a distinguished scholar, but Dr. 
Friedlaender’s knowledge is a second-hand book knowledge of 
the dim past. The files of “A 1 Kibla” for 1918 speak for them¬ 
selves. In March, 1919, the Emir Feisal, who was sent by the 
209 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ported by the British administration, to conciliate 
the Moslems and Christians of the Holy Land. 
Out of a great number invited, only three Arabs 
consented to talk with him. Despite his conces¬ 
sions—use of Arabic as official language, civil 
and administrative equality, prohibition of buy¬ 
ing lands or flocks, limitation of Zionist agricul¬ 
ture to uncultivated government lands at Beer- 
sheba and Khan-Younes against the deposit of 
their value in money in an agricultural bank for 
the amelioration of the lot of the Arabic fellahin 
«—he was told flatly no Judeo-Arabic agreement 
was possible except between the elements already 
settled in Palestine. 

Under the influence of the dazzling victories 
of the autumn of 1918, the International Zionist 
Commission reported a “working agreement.” 
But we must not be deceived by appearances. 
History proves the Mohammedan acceptance of 
the inevitable—cheerful and definite acceptance. 
But history proves also the unwisdom—no, more, 
the impossibility—of changing the political and 
social nature of a Mohammedan country by 

king, his father, to represent the Hedjaz at the Peace Confer¬ 
ence, said to me categorically, “Never will the Arabs give up 
their right to Palestine. It is our country.” 


210 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

forced European immigration. Colonists, prod¬ 
ucts of another civilization, backed in agricul¬ 
tural and commercial competition with indige¬ 
nous elements by large grants of money and pro¬ 
tected by diplomacy behind which stood armies 
and battle-ships, have failed to take root or have 
been massacred. Zionists should study the fail¬ 
ure of France in Tunis, the pitiful shipwreck of 
Italian ambitions in Tripoli, and the disastrous 
results of Greek attempts to increase colonization 
along the Sea of Marmora and the /Egean coast 
of Asia Minor. The resignation of Mohamme¬ 
dans is an article of faith; but their inability to 
accept political domination in their own country 
of non-Moslem elements is also an article of 
faith. Oil does not mix with water. It is a sad 
mistake to attribute the comparative failure of 
earlier Zionist attempts at colonization in Pales¬ 
tine to the corruption of the Turkish rule. Arabs 
are far more Mohammedan than are Turks. 
Their fanaticism is more to be feared. 

If the Peace Conference finally decides to re¬ 
store the Jews to Palestine, immigration into and 
development of the country can be assured only 
by the presence of a considerable army for an 
indefinite period. Not only the half million 


211 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Moslems living in Palestine but the millions in 
surrounding countries will have to be cowed into 
submission by the constant show and the occa¬ 
sional use of force. 

But how can we reconcile such a policy in Pal¬ 
estine with the principles for the world-wide 
maintenance of which we have announced that 
we are fighting? Is the Peace Conference to give 
with one hand and take away with the other? 
We have made the issues of this conflict the 
triumph of right over force and the liberation of 
small nations from the yoke of the foreigner. 
Each race is to be consulted in regard to its own 
destinies. If we consult the Palestinian Arabs, 
Christian as well as Moslem, we shall find them 
unanimous in their desire, their determination, 
not to have Zionism foisted upon them. They 
comprise over eighty per cent, of the population 
of Palestine. Even in the Jewish minority there 
is a strong anti-Zionist element, for Jewry is no 
more united than are Christendom and Islam. 
The Sephardim, who understand the spirit of the 
Orient better than Occidental and Northern Jews 
and who are in large majority among the indig¬ 
enous Palestine Jews, do not sympathize with 
the Zionist program. 


212 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


We are fighting to break down racial and na¬ 
tional barriers throughout the world. Ameri¬ 
cans hope that this war is going to bring together 
every element of the American nation in a com¬ 
mon brotherhood. Native-born and immigrant, 
white and black, Protestant and Catholic and 
Jew, Aryan and Semite and Indian, have one 
allegiance—to the Government of the United 
States, for which all alike shed their blood on the 
battle-fields of France. This sacrifice was de¬ 
manded by a government which does not make 
citizenship depend upon race or religion or color. 
The same responsibilities are exacted of all, the 
same privileges are extended to all. 

Grand Rabbi Levy of France struck the nail 
on the head when he said: “Zionism is not a 
pious desideratum on our part. What French 
Jews are interested in is liberty and equality in 
this country for all religions/’ The great ma¬ 
jority of American-born Jews certainly have the 
same opinion. Not nationhood in an artificially 
created Zion, but complete unrestricted partner¬ 
ship in the political, economic, and social life of 
the United States of America is their goal. It 
must be the goal of all our foreign-born, also, Jew 
and Gentile alike. And do not American Jews 


213 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


realize the glorious change, which can be made 
permanent if they act wisely, that has come over 
the situation of the Jew in Europe since 1914? 
When I was a boy living in the Jewish quarter 
of Philadelphia, Herzl, founder of Zionism, was 
worshiped by the immigrants from Poland and 
Russia because he proclaimed a gospel of eman¬ 
cipation. The immigrants soon realized that the 
emancipation had come with American citizen¬ 
ship and lost their fervor for the ideal of return 
to the Holy Land. As I write, I think of Rus¬ 
sian and Polish Zionists whom I knew well in 
the old days and whom I have met again after 
a lapse of years. One of them, an officer in the 
American Expeditionary Force, laughed heartily 
when I told him the story of Lord Rothschild, 
who said he was for Zionism if he could be am¬ 
bassador of the new state at London. “My 
sentiments! My sentiments exactly!” he ex¬ 
claimed. This war has brought a complete 
change of the status of Jews in eastern and south¬ 
eastern Europe. Who, then, will feel the need 
of returning to Zion? 

If some Jews of Europe and America, how¬ 
ever, follow the will-o’-the-wisp of Zionism and 
insist in the Peace Conference upon their separate 
214 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

nationality, they may succeed in losing for them¬ 
selves and for all others of their religion what 
they have to-day the golden opportunity of gain¬ 
ing. Anti-Semitism need not be reawakened in 
Russia; but the Russian peasants are susceptible 
of being worked upon by fanatics if told that the 
Jews have seized the Holy Land, which means 
more to Russians than to any other Christian 
people. Jews have been enfranchised in Ru¬ 
mania, but Rumanians will reconsider the deci¬ 
sion if the concession is spurned by continued 
wholesale emigration of the Jewish element. 
The Polish question, most difficult of all, will be¬ 
come more delicate if the Jews maintain a state 
within a state by looking to Zion. French Jews 
are living to-day in the millennium. Who cannot 
foresee the change in French public opinion to¬ 
ward them if Zionism plays the game of another 
power? And are German and Austrian Jews 
going to be called upon to take sides with the 
enemies of the nation to which they owe alle¬ 
giance ? 

Through the courtesy of the British Foreign 
Office, I have received a collection of books, pam¬ 
phlets, and periodicals on the Zionist question 
which contain the case for Zionism in Palestine 

215 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


in the most complete and strongest form. Since 
the Balfour declaration, when Zionism entered 
practical international politics, I have met Zion¬ 
ists as much as possible. Newspaper accounts of 
Zionist conventions and meetings and discussions 
of the Zionist movement have been coming to my 
desk for the last year. Neither in the spoken nor 
in the written word, I am sorry to say, is there an 
inclination to take into consideration what Presi¬ 
dent Wilson pleaded for in his speech at the open¬ 
ing of the Fourth Liberty Loan: 

The impartial justice meted out must be a justice that 
plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal 
rights of the several peoples concerned. No special or 
separate interest of any single nation or any group of 
nations can be made the basis or any part of the settle¬ 
ment which is not consistent with the common interest 
of all. . . . Shall there be a common standard of right 
and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the 
strong do as they will and the weak suffer without 
redress ? 

The Jewish advocates of introducing hundreds 
of thousands of Jews into Palestine, immigrants 
backed by outside diplomatic and financial sup¬ 
port and going for the purpose of setting up a 
theocratic government for the Jewish nation, for¬ 
get or ignore the fact that Palestine is already in- 
216 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

habited by a nation which has possessed the land 
for over a thousand years—a nation homogene¬ 
ous in race as well as in religion, a nation with 
traditions more firmly centered, because of con¬ 
tact and ownership, with the harams of Jerusa¬ 
lem and Hebron than their own, a nation whose 
highly perfected language was preferred to He¬ 
brew as a medium by the great Jewish writers, 
Saadia, Maimonides, and (for his prose) Jehuda 
ben Halevy. The Gentile advocates of restor¬ 
ing Palestine to the Jews either have never in¬ 
vestigated the proposition from the point of view 
of the inhabitants of the country, or are actuated 
by the principle of political expediency denounced 
by President Wilson. 

At the time of the Dardanelles Expedition, 
Syrian physicians educated in the American and 
French colleges of Beirut, when they learned the 
terrible need of medical care for British soldiers, 
volunteered their services. They received no an¬ 
swer. An Entente diplomat took up the case with 
the British authorities and urged that Syrians be 
used. “We do not want niggers looking after 
our men/’ was the answer. I should not tell this 
story, for the truth of which I can vouch, were 
it not that here may lie the reef which will wreck 
217 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the ship of a durable peace. Greeks, Armenians, 
Persians, Arabs, Syrians, and Egyptians are not 
“niggers,” and the sooner we wake up to this 
truth the better for the whole Anglo-Saxon race. 
They are getting our education and our ideas. 
Given equal chance, their instincts are as gentle¬ 
manly as ours, their code of honor as high, and 
their intelligence as great. We can no longer 
get away with the “my man” and “here there” 
and “boy” fashion of addressing them. In the 
Near East, as in the Far East, arrogance, inso¬ 
lence, indifference to the political and social 
rights of “natives” in their own countries will 
have to go the way of ante-bellum diplomacy. 
If we do not change radically our attitude toward 
all Asiatic races, the recent war is nothing to 
what is coming, and in the twentieth century, too. 

Assuming that Syrians and Arabs are “nig¬ 
gers,” according to our principles in this war 
their rights are as sacred as ours. Dr. Weiz- 
mann assures them that their rights will be safe¬ 
guarded. But they do not want this assurance 
from Dr. Weizmann, from the British Govern¬ 
ment, from the Entente nations, from the Peace 
Conference. They want to safeguard their own 
rights, freely and unhampered, like every other 
218 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

nation. They challenge the authority of the 
British cabinet to dispose of Palestine. Pales¬ 
tine is theirs. They live in the country. They 
own the country. They have been indispensable 
in the military operation of freeing it from the 
Turks. They have been recognized as belliger¬ 
ents. No reasonable man can deny the justice 
of the unanimous demand of Moslem and Chris¬ 
tian Palestinians of Arab race and language, who 
are over eighty per cent, of the present popula¬ 
tion, that the Zionist scheme be envisaged in re¬ 
gard to Palestine as we should look at it if our 
own countries were concerned. Can the Peace 
Conference say ex cathedra: “We have decided 
to sanction Zionist aspirations. You Palestinian 
Arabs must allow an indefinite number of Jews 
to come into your country, settle there and par¬ 
ticipate in the government. If you do not do so 
willingly, we shall occupy Palestine with a mili¬ 
tary force and treat you as rebels, as disturbers 
of the world’s peace” ? 

We have an illustration as to what Mr. Bal¬ 
four thinks about Zionist immigration when it is 
a question of Britishers who zvould be affected. 
Mr. Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary in the Bal¬ 
four cabinet, conceived the idea of opening 
219 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

eastern Africa to the Zionists. A commission 
was sent out from London in 1904 to study the 
question. The protest against the immigration 
of “Galician and other undesirable eastern and 
southeastern European Jews' 5 on the part of a 
few hundred British colonists in an enormous 
country they had not yet themselves been able to 
cultivate, or even explore, prevented the com¬ 
mission from offering to the Zionists the only 
lands in the colony practicable for white settle¬ 
ment. Premier Balfour admitted the justice of 
their opposition when he saw that force would 
have to be used to make them yield; and the Zion¬ 
ist congress at Basel was offered inland, equa¬ 
torial, undeveloped Uganda instead! Now that 
a similar protest against Zionist immigration 
comes from six hundred and thirty thousand 
Moslem and Christian inhabitants of a very small 
country, is the case different? 

The argument of the Zionists that there is 
room for them, too, in Palestine is absurd. The 
world has never admitted such an argument to 
justify forcible immigration. It smacks of Prus- 
sianism pure and simple. The indigenous popu¬ 
lation of Palestine is not stationary and will in¬ 
crease without immigration under better political, 


220 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 
hygienic, and economic conditions. Who can 
deny the right—a right everywhere jealously 
guarded—of a race to wish to keep intact the 
soil and potential wealth of its own country for 
its own future generations? On the ground that 
there is room for others, the Peace Conference 
could with equal reason and justice insist upon 
the opening up of Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and our own Pacific States to Asiatic im¬ 
migration. But we Anglo-Saxons will have 
none of it. Are we going to force an Asiatic race 
to admit European immigrants against its will? 
Is this the meting out of “impartial justice that 
plays no favorites and knows no standard but 
equal rights’’? 

At the Peace Conference, the Japanese were 
quick to take advantage of the opening afforded 
them by President Wilson’s pronouncements in 
regard to immigration and Zionism. During his 
short visit to the United States in midwinter, 
1919, President Wilson said that he was in favor 
of Zionism, and that he had no doubt his col¬ 
leagues in the Peace Conference held the same 
opinion as himself. But on the following day, he 
announced that the League of Nations would not 
necessitate the giving up by the Americans of 


221 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


their undisputed right to regulate immigration 
into the United States! When President Wil¬ 
son returned to Paris, the Japanese delegates 
mildly suggested that supporting Zionism was 
inconsistent with maintaining the “undisputed 
right” of a people to regulate immigration into 
their country. They wanted to know if there 
was to be one measure for the American and 
European, and another for the Asiatic. 

Zionists fall back upon their acceptance of the 
clause in the Balfour declaration to the effect that 
“nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine.” Zionism, say the 
Zionists, does not mean oppression of or conflict 
with the other communities. If conflict does 
arise, it will be the fault of others, and help will 
be asked from Dr. WeizmamTs “one just and 
fairly responsible guardian” to defend the im¬ 
migrants. But how can the setting up of a Jew¬ 
ish “national home” in Palestine fail to affect 
the civil and religious rights of the present in¬ 
habitants of the land? What other result can 
Zionism possibly have than to rob the Palestinian 
Arabs of their hope to evolve into a modern, self- 
governing state? The spirit of the twentieth 


222 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


century is unalterably opposed to government by 
communities constituted on theocratic principles. 
The evolution of self-governing democracies has 
been possible only through unification and secu¬ 
larization. Utah is an illustration. Doing away 
with polygamy was simply the rallying-cry in the 
inevitable conflict with Mormonism. In Zionist 
congresses, delegates have frequently advocated 
making the United States “the promised land.” 
But the answer always was that the ideals of 
Zionism could not be realized under the Ameri¬ 
can system of civil government. At Paris, Mr. 
Lloyd George advocated Zionism—for Palestine. 
But years ago, when he was lawyer for the or¬ 
ganization at the time of the East African pro¬ 
posal, he told his clients frankly that if Zion was 
to be estabished in a British colony, they would 
have to change their scheme of governing Zion. 

When the whole world is moving toward de¬ 
mocracy, we cannot ask the Arabs of Palestine 
to live under a polity emancipation from which 
is the corner-stone of our own liberties. The 
Zionist argues that the Arabs already live under 
that polity, and that precisely because there is no 
question of asking the inhabitants to change ex¬ 
isting institutions, Palestine is the ideal country 
223 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


for the erection of the Jewish “national home.” 
This argument reveals a dangerous ignorance of 
existing institutions in Palestine. Commenta¬ 
tors on the Koran have invariably represented the 
theocratic system of government as a Moham¬ 
medan theocracy. It is not against the law to 
tolerate non-Mohammedan millets as long as the 
Christian and Jewish sects do not aspire to po¬ 
litical domination or do not interpret their au¬ 
tonomy as a right instead of as a free, and 
temporary, gift. In the Ottoman Empire, pre¬ 
rogatives of the millets, like the capitulations gov¬ 
erning foreigners, originated in the inadaptabil¬ 
ity of Mohammedan law to meet the need of non- 
Moslems. The concessions were not wrung from 
the Turks by force. They were granted freely 
to avoid bother. 

By establishing in the Near East a non-Mo¬ 
hammedan theocracy, on a present footing of 
equality and with the prospect of some day be¬ 
coming the master, we should be doing more than 
bringing Judaism into conflict with Islam. We 
should be sanctioning the perpetuation of the very 
system of government that needs to be changed 
if the peoples of the Near East—and of all Asia, 
in fact—are to participate in our durable peace. 

224 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 


Our goal is the liberation of all races and the do¬ 
ing away with foreign control and exploitation of 
weaker peoples. To attain that goal, we must 
endeavor to show Mohammedan nations the path 
of political evolution we ourselves have followed, 
and to help them along the path. We must up¬ 
hold in the Near East the antithesis of Zionist 
conceptions and ideals. Religion does not de¬ 
cide one's nationality. The state is a secular in¬ 
stitution, created and supported by the people, 
serving and served by the people. “The people" 
comprise all who live within the limits of the 
state; they enjoy equal political rights; and these 
rights are not dependent upon and have no con¬ 
nection whatever with religious belief. A re¬ 
ligious community, governed by rules and tradi¬ 
tions of its own and not subject to the common 
laws made by all the people and applying to all 
alike, is inimical to the development of democ¬ 
racy. Occidental Europe and the United States 
have found out this truth. We cannot establish 
Zionism in Palestine after a war that has been 
fought “to make the world safe for democracy." 

Other considerations of a political order dic¬ 
tated the decision of the British to abandon the 
Zionist program—in the sense it had been con- 
225 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


templated—as the Peace Conference dragged on. 
The revolution in Egypt was a warning that 
could not be ignored. Emir Feisal avoided the 
Palestine question, under pressure from the Brit¬ 
ish, when he presented the Arabic claims before 
the Council of Ten. But he became refractory 
the moment the British, yielding to the French, 
showed a tendency to weaken on their promise 
that Damascus should be his. Mr. Balfour 
called the attention of the Zionist leaders in Paris 
to the strict wording of the declaration of De¬ 
cember, 1917, and said that the British would 
go no farther than that. An inspired press cam¬ 
paign began immediately to demonstrate that the 
Jewish leaders themselves were convinced of the 
impracticability of a Jewish state “at the present 
time.” Shortly after President Wilson told the 
Zionist leaders that he would support their pro¬ 
posals, he received a protest signed by nearly 
three hundred leading American Jews, who sent 
representatives to Paris to combat Zionism. 

When the Zionist movement arose and took 
root in Jewry, the whole world sympathized with 
the reasons for it given by Herzl. The political 
emancipation of the Jew in Russian and Austrian 
Poland, in Russia and in Rumania, has been a 
226 


PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS 

plank in the platform of world-wide democracy. 
The Jews had a right to attempt to emancipate 
their downtrodden brethren in their own way and 
to use the age-old aspiration of Israel to revive 
hope and faith; but the most prominent of Zion¬ 
ists used to explain that the “return to Zion” did 
not mean return to Jerusalem in the material 
sense of the word. It was a mystical idea, like 
“Jerusalem the Golden” to Christians. The 
proof of this is in the fact that Zionist congresses 
have discussed seriously setting up Zion in other 
places than Palestine. Even recently, one of Dr. 
Weizmann’s most ardent supporters said to me: 

“Can I make you see the possession of Jeru¬ 
salem means nothing to Zionists? The aim of 
Zionism is to revivify the religious faith of Jewry 
which our dispersion in the modern world threat¬ 
ens to extinguish. It is, from Alpha to Omega, 
a spiritual movement.” 

Why, then, does Zionism emphasize now the 
temporal aspect? Why Palestine? Why a dis¬ 
tinct nationhood for the Jew? To preserve the 
Ghetto for those whose religion cannot thrive 
outside the Ghetto, are we going to risk putting 
the millions of Jews who live happily and usefully 
in their several countries back into the Ghetto? 

227 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Is it possible to recreate with success anachron¬ 
istic political and religious conditions? Men 
have fought wars to turn back the hands of the 
clock. The wars have not prevented the progress 
of mankind. And how often has peace been dis¬ 
turbed because men failed to comprehend the uni¬ 
versal Zion for all creeds in the words of a Pal¬ 
estinian Jew who said, “My kingdom is not of this 
world”! 


228 


CHAPTER XII 


THE FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

A MONG the many blank checks Germany 
was asked to sign in the Treaty of Ver¬ 
sailles, none demanded more renunciation 
and was more far-reaching in its significance than 
Article 155. It read: 

Germany undertakes to recognize and accept all ar¬ 
rangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may 
make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to any 
rights, interests and privileges whatever which might be 
claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bul¬ 
garia and which are not dealt with in the provisions of 
the present Treaty. 

This stipulation is consistent with the deter¬ 
mination to banish Germany from every portion 
of the world’s surface outside of the German Em¬ 
pire and to impair her sovereignty in not incon¬ 
siderable portions inside the empire. It puts the 
future of the Near East into the hands of Great 
Britain and France and Italy. Japan has no 
interests in Turkey, and it cannot be expected 
229 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


that the United States will pursue a more vigor¬ 
ous policy in regard to Turkey than in regard to 
China. 

Representatives of the races liberated from or 
still subject to the Turks came to Paris with the 
idea that the Treaty of Versailles would establish 
a new order in the Near East. The speeches of 
Allied statesmen had encouraged them to believe 
in the settlement of their destiny in accordance 
with their wishes and interests. For had not the 
Entente powers frequently given as one of the 
principal objects of the war the liberation and 
independence of Ottoman subject races? Had 
they not claimed to be the defenders of small na¬ 
tionalities? They asserted that they were fight¬ 
ing for humanity and a durable peace and not 
for selfish national interests or commercial ad¬ 
vantages or territorial aggrandizement. But 
when May 7, 1919, arrived and the treaty was 
presented to the Germans, the section concerning 
Turkey and Bulgaria could not be otherwise than 
vague. After six months of negotiations, the 
victors were as far from a decision about the 
future of the Ottoman races as they were when 
the Conference of Paris was convened. Never 
once, from the opening day of the congress to the 
230 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 


day the treaty was completed, were the represen¬ 
tatives of Ottoman subject races consulted in 
more than a perfunctory way as to their claims 
and wishes. They were kept as completely in the 
dark as they had been at Berlin in 1878. Only 
one thing was clear—the intention of the leaders 
of the allied and associated powers to use the Ot¬ 
toman subject races and their lands as pawns in a 
diplomatic game according to the old-fashioned 
nineteenth-century precedent. 

It may be urged, however, that the disposition 
of the Ottoman Empire is provided for at the 
beginning of the treaty in the covenant of the 
League of Nations. Article 22 declares that “the 
well-being and development of peoples not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world form a sacred 
trust of civilization,” securities for the perform¬ 
ance of which “should be embodied in this Cove¬ 
nant.The article goes on to read: 

The best method of giving practical effect to this prin¬ 
ciple is that the tutelage of such peoples should be en¬ 
trusted to advanced nations who by reason of their 
resources, their experience or their geographical position, 
can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing 
to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised 
by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. 


231 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


The characters of the Mandate must differ according to 
the stage of the development of the people, the geographi¬ 
cal situation of the territory, its economic conditions and 
other similar circumstances. 

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Tur¬ 
kish Empire have reached a stage of development where 
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as 
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these com¬ 
munities must be a principal consideration in the selection 
of the Mandatory. 

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render 
to the Council an annual report in reference to the terri¬ 
tories committed to its charge. 

The degree of authority, control, or administration to 
be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously 
agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly 
defined in each case by the Council. 

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive 
and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to 
advise the Council on all matters relating to the observ¬ 
ance of the mandates. 

The wording of this article contains several 
“jokers,” which will enable it to be interpreted 
to suit the aspirations of imperialists who plan 
a further extension of European eminent domain. 
Witness: the phrase “advanced nations who by 
reason of their resources, their experience or 
their geographical position, can best undertake 
this responsibility”; the statement that “the char- 
232 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 


acters of the Mandate must differ according to” 
several conditions, the last of which is “other 
similar circumstances”; the adjective “certain” 
before “communities formerly belonging to the 
Turkish Empire”; the qualification “until such 
time as they are able to stand alone”; “principal” 
before “consideration”; and the insertion of “if 
not previously agreed upon by the Members of 
the League” in the next to the last paragraph. 
These “jokers” give the great powers the oppor¬ 
tunity of coming to an understanding about the 
“territories” in accordance with their own ambi¬ 
tions and interests. If further proof is needed 
than the wording of Article 22 to show what th 
victors have in mind, the attitude of “ principal 
Allied and Associated Powers” toward the prob¬ 
lems of the Ottoman Empire during peace nego¬ 
tiations can be adduced. 

During the months from January to May, 1919, 
Near Eastern problems came frequently before 
the Council of Ten and the Council of Four. 
Representatives of the Ottoman subject races 
were invited to present their claims. They were 
given a formal hearing. Then they heard no 
more from the Conference of Paris. There was 
no opportunity for full, heart-to-heart discussion. 

233 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

They had no way of finding out whether their 
claims were approved or disapproved, or why. 
They were not asked to present modified pro¬ 
grams, and it was not pointed out to them where 
their desiderata gave rise to difficulties or were 
deemed impracticable. The principal allied and 
associated powers made no effort to bring to¬ 
gether the various elements of the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire in a common conference to reach an 
agreement of division of territory and to lay the 
foundations of an economic union. The repre¬ 
sentatives of every element in the empire, author¬ 
ized to treat in the name of their people, were in 
Paris. The opportunity was unique. 

But this was the nightmare of the statesmen 
who were feigning to establish justice and free¬ 
dom for all races. They would tolerate no pan- 
Turkish conference: they would recognize no 
agreement among the elements of the Ottoman 
Empire to dispose of themselves. The reasons for 
the silence and unresponsiveness of Entente 
statesmen to the appeals of the Ottoman subject 
races soon became evident. Great Britain and 
France and Italy were bound by the secret treaty 
of April 26, 1915, and by later accords negotiated 
234 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

in 1916 and 1917, to a cold-blooded policy of 
division of the spoils. The treaties and accords 
were made without consulting the peoples con¬ 
cerned and were inspired by selfish political and 
commercial interests. From the beginning of the 
Conference of Paris, the criterion adopted for the 
solution of problems was the reconciliation of 
the imperialistic ambitions of the victorious 
powers. Since there was no other thought in 
the minds of the statesmen than what would be 
advantageous to Great Britain or France or Italy, 
why waste time in reconciling the interests— 
much less in listening to the importunities^of 
Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, Palestinians, Kurds, 
and Arabs? 

In the summer of 1919, the Near Eastern ques¬ 
tion was as insoluble and as dangerous to the 
peace of Europe as it had always been. With 
Germany and Austria eliminated and Russia tem¬ 
porarily out of the running, the three remaining 
powers had a wonderful opportunity to come to 
an understanding in regard to Turkey. But the 
three could no more agree than the six. Because 
of this tragic state of affairs, President Wilson 
was unable to guarantee that the United States 

235 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


would consent to be a mandatory in the Near 
East and thus become involved in the madness 
of Old World imperialism. 

The question of accepting a mandate, however, 
came before the American people. It was in¬ 
evitable that the conception of a society of na¬ 
tions should carry with it responsibilities as well 
as privileges. The difficulty was for Europeans 
to understand why Americans regarded being in¬ 
vested with a mandate as a responsibility. In in¬ 
timate conversations with prominent French and 
British statesmen, I have found that they con¬ 
sidered the Wilsonian conception of attribution 
of mandates a harmless euphemism. Article 22 
in their mind was simply an expedient to dispel 
opposition on the part of the radical elements in 
their own countries and the people who were to 
be the victims of exploitation. “After all,” said 
one of them to me, “your President is a splendid 
politician and he knows just what to throw out 
to capture public opinion.” Americans are curi¬ 
ously enough not cynical in questions of foreign 
policy. Not having borne the white man's bur¬ 
den, we think of colonies and protectorates as an 
altruistic proposition. 

If there is to be a future of independence for 
236 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 


the races of the Ottoman Empire, the United 
States must have a hand in the reconstruction of 
the Near East. The European powers are with¬ 
out surplus capital to invest in the new states, 
and have no functionaries or officials for exporta¬ 
tion at the present time. Certainly, they have 
neither money nor men for carrying on an altruis¬ 
tic work such as is implied in Article 22 of the 
peace treaty. If Great Britain and France and 
Italy go into Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, and 
Mesopotamia, it will not be for helping the in¬ 
habitants of those countries to speedy self-gov¬ 
ernment and independence. It will be for 
extending their colonial domains, for protecting 
existing interests, and developing new interests. 
We can put no faith in the solemn assurances of 
statesmen and in official statements of govern¬ 
ments. Have we not before our eyes the example 
of Egypt, whose independence was guaranteed 
most formally by the British, and which the 
British bound themselves to evacuate within a 
short time? 

Article 22 reads: “The wishes of these com¬ 
munities must be a principal consideration in the 
selection of the Mandatory.” If this treaty pro¬ 
vision is fulfilled, all the subject races (with the 

237 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

exception of the Greeks, who naturally want to 
be united to Greece) will vote for the United 
States as mandatory. Their second choice is 
Great Britain. I am convinced that neither 
France nor Italy would have a majority any¬ 
where. In regard to France, the reason for this 
is not enmity or dislike. In fact, French culture 
is more wide-spread in the Ottoman Empire than 
Anglo-Saxon. But the feeling is well-nigh uni¬ 
versal that France, after the losses of this war, 
and especially with the tremendous new obliga¬ 
tions she must assume in Alsace-Lorraine, Kam- 
erun, and Togoland, will not possibly be able to 
send large amounts of capital and an adequate 
supply of first-class administrators, military offi¬ 
cers, and engineers into the territories liberated 
from the Ottoman Empire. But is not Great 
Britain, after five years of war, in a somewhat 
similar position? What power other than the 
United States can perform the task of manda¬ 
tory? With wounds to bind up and with tre¬ 
mendous existing obligations in Africa and Asia, 
which are being added to by the division of the 
German colonial empire, Great Britain and 
France are unable to become disinterested big 
brothers to the liberated Ottoman races. 

238 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

The alternative to allowing the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire to be cut up into spheres for exploitation 
by Great Britain and France and Italy is the 
assumption of responsibility for the immediate 
future of the whole empire by the United States. 
For if America accepted a mandate for only one 
of the liberated races, our conception of admin¬ 
istering the mandate would inevitably and im¬ 
mediately bring us into conflict with the other 
mandatories. This is a strong statement. I do 
not qualify it, however, for it represents a con¬ 
viction based upon intimate knowledge of what 
is going on behind the scenes in Paris. By taking 
over the future of the Ottoman races, the United 
States would not only be assuming a duty of 
humanity to those races. She would also be aid¬ 
ing powerfully in preventing the disruption of 
the Entente Alliance and the failure of the so¬ 
ciety of nations. If the Foreign offices of Great 
Britain and France and Italy are allowed a free 
hand in carrying out cherished programs, we 
shall have oppression and unrest in western Asia, 
leading to uprisings and ending in war between 
those who are to-day allies. 

In a separate chapter, I explain at length 
the problem of Zionism. Palestine is one of 

239 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


many problems for which the solution slated vio¬ 
lates the right of peoples to dispose of themselves 
and at the same time jeopardizes friendly rela¬ 
tions between powers. I use Palestine as an il¬ 
lustration. Within the limits of this volume, it 
is impossible to deal similarly with the questions 
of Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Kurdistan, Ar¬ 
menia, Turkey narrowed down to her ethno¬ 
graphical limits, the “unredeemed” Greeks, and 
Constantinople and the straits. Each of these 
questions is complex. Each involves the others. 
Each is bound up with special interests and 
colonial dreams of one or more great powers. 

Prophecy is futile. The Byzantine proverb 
still holds good in regard to the region of the 
later Roman Empire: “Think out logically 
what ought to happen and what can reasonably 
be expected to happen, and then be sure that it will 
not happen.” Kiamil Pasha, frequently Grand 
Vizir of Turkey, once said to me: “My friend, 
in writing about us, avoid speculation and sta¬ 
tistics”! But the setting forth of certain facts 
is essential to a proper understanding of the 
problems and dangers before the world in connec¬ 
tion with the future of the Ottoman dominions. 
Ante-bellum conditions and events of the war 
240 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

should have influenced vitally the Near Eastern 
policy of the Entente powers. Unfortunately, 
nothing is changed. Whenever a problem of the 
Ottoman Empire came up at the Paris Confer¬ 
ence, it was envisaged in the light of each power’s 
particular traditional imperialism. The same in¬ 
fluences that precipitated several wars in the nine¬ 
teenth century were at work. Promises to liber¬ 
ate Arabs, Syrians, Armenians, and Greeks were 
war manoeuvers and not intended seriously. 1 
Not President Wilson’s “fourteen points and sub¬ 
sequent discourses,” as had been promised at the 
time of the armistice, but the Anglo-Franco- 
Russo-Italian treaty of April 26, 1915; the Anglo- 
French Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916; the 

1 Alternating the soft and loud pedal in the proclamation of 
ideals is strikingly illustrated by the experience of Poland dur¬ 
ing the war. The statesmen of both groups of belligerents 
acted in exactly the same way toward Polish aspirations, i.e., 
encouraged or discouraged them according to the exigencies 
of the moment. Before the revolution rendered Russia im¬ 
potent, the Entente powers, allies of Russia, were bitterly hostile 
to the resuscitation of Poland, while the Central powers en¬ 
couraged Poland’s aspirations. When the advantage for the 
Central powers of sustaining Poland was over, they became 
Poland’s enemies. On the other hand, the Entente powers, 
no longer having the fear of alienating Russia and needing 
an ally in the East to put in the place of Russia, declared their 
espousal of Poland’s cause. Tn 1916, T was censored by the 
French military censorship for advocating Polish independence. 
In 1918, I was censored by the same people for advising modera¬ 
tion in the advocacy of Polish territorial claims! 

241 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Anglo-French promises to Italy at Saint Jean-de- 
Maurienne in 1916; the Anglo-Hedjaz treaty of 
1917; and the Franco-Russian convention of 
February, 1917, were the bases of the Ottoman 
settlement in the minds of the Entente delegates 
and members of commissions. In discussing just 
settlements, Entente representatives disposed of 
arguments that such or such a measure was in 
the interests of the people concerned by a flat 
non possumus. The American experts on Near 
Eastern affairs were met constantly by the state¬ 
ment, “our treaty obligations come first, of 
course,” and “our traditional policy demands this 
solution.” 

In brief, the actions of Entente fleets and 
armies in the Near East and the position of 
Entente statesmen at the Conference of Paris 
reveal the following policies. British policy: in 
lieu of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, now no longer possible, Great Britain 
must control the approaches to the Suez Canal 
and the Persian Gulf, prevent any other European 
power from approaching Persia on the land side, 
inherit the Mesopotamian and Syrian portion of 
the Bagdad Railway, and substitute herself for 
Russia in central Asia, northern Persia, and the 
242 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 


Caucasus. French policy: to preserve French 
culture and commercial influence in the Near 
East, France must have Syria with a hinterland, 
and Cilicia, and must prevent Anglo-Saxondom 
from getting complete control of the Arabs and 
Armenians. France declares that she has been 
waiting since the Crusades for the political dis¬ 
ruption of Islam at the eastern end of the Medi¬ 
terranean. If she has to give up Palestine to the 
British, there must be compensation in upper 
Mesopotamia and Cilicia. Italian policy: since 
Great Britain and France exclude Italy from the 
eastern end of the Mediterranean, Italy must re¬ 
establish her medieval control of the ^Egean Sea 
and the trade marts of western Asia Minor. 
This means permanent possession of Rhodes and 
the other islands of the Dodecanese, and a large 
slice of the mainland on the Mediterranean and 
TEgtan coasts of Asia Minor. 

British and French policies are irreconcilable, 
whatever the optimists of the Peace Conference 
may have said. To remain friends, it is not 
enough to desire to be friends or even to have 
certain common interests. Friendship between 
nations necessitates absence of causes of conflict. 
Symbols count for more than realities with the 

243 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

French. The British do not realize this. The 
question of Syria is already poisoning Franco- 
British relations. Constantinople is becoming a 
bone of contention, too. British policy raises the 
question of unity of the Arabs. But if this move¬ 
ment once gains momentum, France will be 
threatened in Syria, and Great Britain herself in 
Palestine and Egypt. The French policy, if it 
succeeds, will deprive the Armenians of hope 
of recreating their national life. For without 
Cilicia, Armenia would be cut off from the Medi¬ 
terranean. Italian policy can succeed only at the 
expense of the unity and well-being of the Greek 
nation. Acquiescence in the ambitions of Italy 
makes war between Greece and Italy inevitable, 
and will enable Germany to renew her political 
alliance with Italy. 

The Entente powers were not blind to these 
dangers. Fearful of the disruption of the alli¬ 
ance before Germany was forced to sign the 
Treaty of Versailles, and unable to postpone in¬ 
definitely consideration of the future of the Otto¬ 
man Empire, the expedient of inviting “unoffi¬ 
cially” a Turkish delegation to Paris was adopted 
in June, 1919. Headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, 
Grand Vizir, and other Turks who had not been 
244 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

identified with the Committee of Union and 
Progress, the Turkish delegation reached Paris 
and was received by the Council of Ten on the 
very day the privilege of oral discussion was 
finally and irrevocably denied to the German dele¬ 
gation. The Turks made the classic plea of the 
necessity of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
for the peace of Europe. They maintained that 
they were in the majority at Constantinople and 
in most of Asia Minor, and that where there was 
not a Turkish racial majority, there was always 
a Moslem religious majority. The Turks de¬ 
manded the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, 
with the exception of the Arabic-speaking por¬ 
tions. The Turkish delegation was a British in¬ 
spiration. As the portions of the Ottoman 
Empire Great Britain claimed were not to be in¬ 
cluded in the proposed Turkish state, it was easy 
for the British to be generous. After all, the 
Turks had as much right to live as any one else, 
and the maintenance of Constantinople and Asia 
Minor as a political unity had four advantages: 
(i) it would eliminate the certain conflict between 
Italy and Greece; (2) it would settle the Ar¬ 
menian question in case of American refusal to 
accept a mandate, and would enable France to 

245 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

take Cilicia in fee simple; (3) it would reserve 
for a future and friendly Russia the inheritance 
of Constantinople and the straits; (4) it would 
prevent agitators in the Mohammedan posses¬ 
sions of Great Britain and France from making 
capital of hostility to the calif. All four of these 
reasons appealed to French statesmen in the same 
way as to British statesmen. In a resuscitated 
Turkey, France would still be protector by treaty 
right of Christians, and Great Britain would pre¬ 
serve a privileged commercial position. In re¬ 
turn for another chance to live, the Turks were 
ready to promise anything to the two Occidental 
powers. But where did Italy come in? And 
what was to become of the “unredeemed” Greeks 
and the Armenians? Italy had “rights” secured 
by her secret treaty of 1915 and subsequent ne¬ 
gotiations. M. Venizelos, before the Moslems 
of India protested, had made the Entente leaders 
live up to their promises of days when they 
wanted and needed his help. In the Greek 
premier, whose authority and popularity at Paris 
were far beyond that of the spokesmen of other 
small nations, the “unredeemed” Greeks had a 
precious ally. The Armenians had no such ad¬ 
vocate. Americans and a few Europeans sympa- 
246 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

thized with the Armenians. But none had an 
interest in championing their cause. Zionist in¬ 
fluence was strong enough to prevent the natives 
of Palestine from having a hearing. France 
laid down, as the sine qua non of her aid to the 
Syrians, their unqualified acceptance of a French 
protectorate. As for the Arabs, their claims 
were listened to only in so far as the claims did 
not conflict with British plans and interests. 

The subject Ottoman races, with the exception 
of the Kurds and a certain portion of the Arabs, 
are not ignorant, untutored peoples, refractory to 
discipline and incapable of creating a national life 
in new political organisms. They recognize the 
justice of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, 
and the impracticability of starting out upon their 
new existence without a great deal of financial 
and military aid, and a certain measure of ad¬ 
ministrative aid, from “advanced nations.” But 
in spite of the solution adopted by the Conference 
of Paris, they will be no more content than were 
the Balkan States after the Congress of Berlin. 
And they will defy the great powers at the earliest 
possible moment. Tutelage with no element of 
political and commercial exploitation they would 
gladly submit to. But I found in intimate con- 
247 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


versation with the representatives of these dif¬ 
ferent races that they have no faith in the 
sincerity of any European power. Their pro¬ 
grams are identical: freedom from the Turkish 
yoke; aid from mandatories with no political 
string attached to it; international guaranties 
of early complete independence; membership on 
terms of equality with other states in the Society 
of Nations. The precedent has been set in the 
case of the Hedjaz. The others ask no more than 
is promised and in a large measure has already 
been granted to the Hedjaz. 

On December 30, 1918, M. Venizelos exposed 
the claims of Greece before the Council of Ten. 
He declared that there were over eight million 
Greeks in the world, of whom nearly half still 
live outside the limits of the Kingdom of Greece. 
He estimated at 1,700,000 the Greek population 
of Asia Minor; 365,000 the Greeks of Constanti¬ 
nople and neighborhood; 100,000 the Greeks of 
the Dodecanese; and 235,000 the Greeks of 
Cyprus. M. Venizelcs declared in regard to 
Constantinople that “the natural solution would 
be to give the vilayet to Greece, in establishing 
international guaranties for the liberty of the 
248 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

straits.” But he realized that if the society of 
nations were immediately established, there 
might be international reasons for creating an 
international state in Constantinople and the 
straits. Invoking the principle of nationalities, 
he asked that the Dodecanese be restored to 
Greece by Italy and Cyprus by Great Britain. In 
Asia Minor, M. Venizelos asked for all the 
vilayets bordering on the Higean Sea, with a sub¬ 
stantial hinterland. Smyrna, he said, was one 
of the oldest and most characteristically Hellenic 
of Greek cities. Although there were many thou¬ 
sands of Greeks in the interior of Asia Minor, 
in the Trebizond district on the Black Sea coast, 
and in Cilicia, Premier Venizelos told the Peace 
Conference that the Turks should be allowed to 
form a state in central Asia Minor, and that 
the Greeks, in order to make Armenia viable, 
were willing to sacrifice the Greek population of 
Trebizond and Cilicia to afford the Armenians 
outlets to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean. 
The million Greeks in western Asia Minor are 
rightly called by M. Venizelos, “together with 
the population of the islands, the purest portion 
of the Hellenic race, which has best preserved 
249 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the ethnic type.” M. Venizelos could have gone 
farther. None can deny the assertion that the 
Ottoman Greeks are intellectually the flower of 
Hellenism. For the very reason of their servi¬ 
tude, they have attained a higher degree of uni¬ 
versal education and general Hellenic culture than 
the Greeks of the kingdom. 

The Armenians claim the six vilayets of east¬ 
ern Asia Minor, together with Cilicia, and are in 
accord with the Armenians of the former Rus¬ 
sian Caucasus to form a united state stretching 
from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from 
the Armenian Mountains on the border of Persia 
to the plains of Cilicia. As the Italians oppose 
Greek unification, the French oppose Armenian 
unification. Both nations have tried to denature 
the spirit and prove the impossibility of success of 
the Hellenic and Armenian national movements. 
But the efforts of imperialists at Paris were 
greatly embarrassed by the understanding be¬ 
tween Greeks and Armenians. On February 25, 
1919, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs of Con¬ 
stantinople signed, on behalf of their respective 
nations, a solemn agreement to sustain the terri¬ 
torial claims of each other. The end of the 
agreement read as follows: 

250 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

If our nations had enjoyed liberty, they would have 
numbered dozens of millions. To-day they are reduced 
in Turkey to 2,500,000 Greeks and 1,500,000 Armenians. 
It is only a consequence of the most heinous crimes 
that a Mussulman majority exists in this or that locality; 
and to recognize such a majority would be to excuse, to 
sanction and to encourage the measures of extermination 
which the Turks have employed against us. We have 
always inhabited this country. We have irrigated its soil 
with our sweat and blood. . . . The Turk has been, and 
remains to this day, a terrible parasite living on our flesh. 
He has produced no work of civilization. He has not 
built a single city. He has everywhere sown death and 
ruin. 

We demand that we be no longer compelled to live 
under a Turkish government, and we declare that we 
shall never submit to such a government, under whatever 
control it might be placed. We ask for restoration of oUr 
national domains. If all the Greek and Armenian popu¬ 
lations cannot be included within the limits of our respec¬ 
tive States, these populations should live under a Greek 
or an Armenian government, according to the necessities 
of the case. 

We ask for a great Armenia, with a free and broad 
access to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, and we 
Greeks declare that we will be happy to see Cilicia integ¬ 
rally incorporated into the other six vilayets of Armenia 
and be permitted to develop freely. 

We ask for the restoration to Greece of all of which 
she has been forcibly despoiled and which therefore 
rightly belongs to her, and we Armenians declare it to be 
our wish that Thrace, Constantinople, the vilayets of 
Aidin and Brusa, and the sanjaks of Ismidt (Niko- 
media) and Bigha be integrally incorporated into Greece. 


251 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

This agreement, presented at the Peace Confer¬ 
ence with their own personal approval by Pre¬ 
mier Venizelos and President Boghos Nubar 
Pasha of the Armenian national delegation, is 
contrary to the stipulations of the secret treaty 
by which Great Britain and France bought the 
intervention of Italy in the war. It embarrassed 
and angered the diplomats who threatened and 
tried to bully Greeks and Armenians. But from 
the standpoint of the races living in Turkey, it 
is a splendid step forward and is bound to have 
a radical influence upon the future of the Otto¬ 
man Empire. Subterranean influences destroyed 
the hopes of Greeks and Armenians at Paris. If 
both races continue to stick together, they will 
succeed in upsetting the diplomatic combinations 
of Paris just as the Balkan races upset the diplo¬ 
matic combinations of Berlin. Owing to the de¬ 
pletion of their populations (the Greeks have lost 
seven hundred thousand and the Armenians one 
million by massacre, deportation, and starvation 
since 1914), Greek and Armenian claims un¬ 
doubtedly comprised vast territories in which 
they were in minority, even with the patriarchal 
agreement to stand in with and support each 
other. But, as Premier Venizelos and Nubar 
252 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 


Pasha pointed out, the Moslem elements were by 
no means all Turkish, and little faith could be 
placed in the official figures. During five years 
of war, the Turks had suffered from losses in 
battle, from disease, and from famine. They 
were weak physically and ruined economically. 
With security and good government, Greeks and 
Armenians would compensate for their possible 
initial numerical inferiority by their higher stand¬ 
ard of education and by the fact that they formed 
almost everywhere the small bourgeoisie. 

The Christian races of Asia Minor cannot be¬ 
come factors of economic prosperity and political 
peace in the Near East unless they are freed from 
Turkish sovereignty. None who has lived in the 
Near East contests this statement. Advocates 
of the retention of Turkish sovereignty over Con¬ 
stantinople and the whole of Asia minor, now that 
it is possible to limit the Turkish state to ethno¬ 
graphical boundaries, are inspired by other rea¬ 
sons than the welfare and interests of the peo¬ 
ple of the Ottoman Empire, Moslem and Chris¬ 
tian alike. On grounds of justice and practica¬ 
bility the claims of Greeks and Armenians may 
seem excessive. Disinterested experts hesitated 
to endorse the Greek and Armenian programs, 
253 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

fearing that it was simply a question of turning 
the tables in religious and racial persecution and 
that the new states would be as weak and as 
much a menace to the world’s peace as Turkey 
has been. But we must bear in mind the com¬ 
mon interests of Greeks and Armenians to suc¬ 
ceed in the experiment of recreating their national 
life. If the two races were at loggerheads, 
there would be no hope of success. As it is, 
Premier Venizelos realizes the importance of a 
strong Armenia in the East as a check against 
the Turks. If Greece were reconstituted in 
western Asia Minor without the Armenians on 
the other side of the Turks, there would be con¬ 
stant fear of an offensive return of the Turks 
against the cities of the Higean coast. Similarly, 
the Armenians have every interest to see Greece 
installed in western Asia Minor. Less than a 
hundred years ago, independent Greece was 
created with three hundred thousand inhabitants, 
a good third of whom were Albanians. The 
great powers had no faith then or later in the 
viability of Greece. European statesmen were 
equally sure that each successive Balkan state 
born against their will could not live without their 
aid and protection. Whatever troubles the Bal- 

254 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

kan States have had were due to the intrigues of 
the great powers. If the society of nations, as 
created by the Treaty of Versailles, is a real in¬ 
ternational instrument for helping the world to 
a better understanding and not a trust of im¬ 
perialistic powers, greater Greece and Armenia 
will have a better chance of becoming strong 
and independent states than had the Balkan 
States. The difficulties seem enormous now: 
but the handicaps are not as great as those of 
Greece, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria after the 
congresses of Paris and Berlin. 

The Asiatic expansion of greater Greece in¬ 
volves the future frontiers of Turkey, the settle¬ 
ment of the status of Constantinople and the 
straits, and resistance to Italian imperialism. A 
different set of problems confronts Armenia. 
Her boundaries are matters of dispute not only 
with the Turks but wi-th the races of the Russian 
Caucasus, the Persians, the Kurds, the Arabs, 
and the Syrians. The Moslem Tartars and the 
Christian Georgians of the Caucasus have shown 
no disposition to come to an understanding as 
to frontiers with the Armenian republic of the 
Caucasus. Persian and Armenian territorial 
claims conflict not only in the Caucasus but in 
255 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Kurdistan. The situation is further complicated 
by the English plan of creating independent 
Azerbaijan at the expense of both Armenia and 
Persia. French and British are rival claimants 
for important districts of Armenia on the Meso¬ 
potamian frontier. France refuses to recognize 
the right of Armenia to Cilicia. French in¬ 
trigues prompted the Syrians to claim the whole 
of the Gulf of Alexandretta with the intention 
of depriving Armenia of a port on the Mediter¬ 
ranean. Against the pressure from all sides, and 
derived of any voice in the Conference of Paris, 
the Armenian national delegation had no means 
of defending Armenian interests. They put their 
whole faith in the United States. 

While the powers were squabbling at Paris, 
Turks and Tartars continued to massacre Ar¬ 
menians, and the Armenian refugees in the Cau¬ 
casus—precious remnant of the race—were al¬ 
lowed to die of starvation. 

Beyond Asia Minor proper and Armenia lie the 
vast Arabic-speaking portions of Asiatic Turkey. 
During the war, the Arabs of the Hedjaz, under 
the Sherif of Mecca, rebelled against the Turks, 
and cooperated with the Entente powers. Be¬ 
fore the end of the war, these regions were con- 
256 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

quered from the Turks by the British. In 1916, 
Great Britain and France made an arrangement 
known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, settling 
their “spheres of influence” in the Arabic-speak¬ 
ing portions of the Ottoman Empire. More than 
a year later, the British Government gave official 
encouragement to Zionist aspirations to possess 
Palestine—under British protection, of course! 
France acquiesced in this. But France was not 
a party to a treaty between Great Britain and 
the Hedjaz, promising Damascus to Emir Feisal, 
son of the King of the Hedjaz (the former Sherif 
of Mecca). The Conference of Paris did not 
bring out all the promises made to the Arabs by 
the British. But there is no doubt that after the 
initial check of the Bagdad campaign, ending in 
the surrender of Kut-el-Amara, the British mili¬ 
tary authorities were prodigal in assurances of 
independence to the Arabic tribes of Mesopo¬ 
tamia. To protect Aden, similar promises were 
given to the tribes of the Yemen. These tribes 
had never acknowledged the political suzerainty 
of the Turks, and had always been virtually in¬ 
dependent, paying no taxes to the Turks and fur¬ 
nishing no conscripts to the Ottoman Army. 
Turkish administrative authority in Mesopo- 

257 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

tamia did not extend far from the banks of the 
Tigris and Euphrates. In Arabia, the Turks 
held only the ports and the sacred cities. They 
were never masters of the entire line of commu¬ 
nication between Arabia and Syria, even after 
the Hedjaz railway was completed. The autono¬ 
mous status of the Lebanon compelled the Turks 
to respect the virtual independence of a large 
portion of Syria. And in the Holy Land, where 
Christian and Jewish establishments were numer¬ 
ous and jealously protected by the European pow¬ 
ers, the Turks scarcely regarded themselves as 
masters in their own house. 

In discussing the future of Mesopotamia, 
Arabia, Syria, and Palestine, it is essential to 
take into consideration the slightness of the bonds 
that attached the Arabic-speaking portions of 
the Ottoman Empire to Constantinople. Un¬ 
doubtedly, the former Arabic-speaking Ottoman 
subjects, Christian and Moslem equally, suffered 
inconvenience from Turkish maladministration 
before the war, and were greatly persecuted by 
the Turks during the war. But the victorious 
powers cannot expect Arabic-speaking Ottoman 
subjects to regard them as liberators. If jus¬ 
tice is done to Armenian and Greek aspirations, 

258 


FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES 

Armenians and “unredeemed” Greeks will bless 
the great war. But the Conference of Paris ran 
the risk of becoming the enslavers, rather than 
the liberators, of the other portions of the Otto¬ 
man Empire. Were Palestinians to submit to 
unrestricted Jewish immigration, meaning the 
eventual rule of aliens? Were the people of 
the Lebanon to lose their independence that had 
been preserved through centuries? Were Syri¬ 
ans to be compelled to choose between the less 
cultivated Hedjaz and French commercial exploi¬ 
tation ? Were the Arabs of the Yemen and Meso¬ 
potamia to assume for the first time in their his¬ 
tory the galling fetters of a centralized and Eu¬ 
ropeanized government, contrary to their in¬ 
stincts, their customs, and their desires? 

The King of the Hedjaz interpreted the inti¬ 
mate sentiments of all Arabs when he said re¬ 
cently that he would prefer the granting of a 
mandate over his country to the Emir of Nejd to 
the protection of Great Britain or any other Eu¬ 
ropean power. The Arabs of the Yemen warned 
the Entente powers that after centuries of suc¬ 
cessful resistance to the Turks, it could not be 
expected that they would submit tamely to the 
rule of infidels. 


259 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Like the Turks whom they dispossessed, the 
British may be able to establish their authority 
along the river valleys of Mesopotamia, and on 
the Persian Gulf as far as the guns of their 
war-ships reach. The French may colonize the 
ports of Beirut and Tripoli and Alexandretta. 
But both Occidental powers will have their hands 
full if they try to make an India and an Algeria 
out of Mesopotamia and Syria. Three years 
ago, I wrote in discussing the relations of Eu¬ 
rope and Islam that the Arabs wanted friends 
and not masters. 1 What was true during the 
war is all the more true after the war. 

1 See my “ Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East,” 
page 153. 


260 


CHAPTER XIII 


THE ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 


D URING the first month of the Peace Con¬ 
ference, I sat with a group of distinguished 
Frenchmen around the green baize table 
in the judges’ room of the Cour de Cassation. 
A Sorbonne professor, pleading for French sup¬ 
port of the Armenian claims to independence, 
called Armenia “the outpost of European cul¬ 
ture and civilization in Asia, our barrier against 
a new Asiatic invasion.” The Persian minister 
to France took issue with this statement. His 
country lay to the east of Armenia and he was not 
disposed to admit the inferiority of Persian civil¬ 
ization and standards to those of Europe. Said 
Samad Khan: “Why do you think that the in¬ 
tellectual class in Persia is confined to those edu¬ 
cated in Europe or along European lines? A 
good education can be had in Persia without 
knowing foreign languages or following the 
courses in foreign schools. By international 
261 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


agreement, you made Russia your representative 
of European culture and civilization among us. 
But the rank and file of Persians are much less 
ignorant than the rank and file of Russians. 
Outside of big cities, there are no schools in Rus¬ 
sia. There are schools everywhere in Persia. 
In purely Persian schools, we learn very pro¬ 
found things that it would be hard for any ex¬ 
cept the Orientalists among you to comprehend. 
Have you ever read the books of Professor 
Browne of Cambridge? The standard of intel¬ 
ligence and education of our village clergy does 
not fear comparison with the Russian popes.” 

“Not by international agreement, Excellency,” 
remonstrated one of the Frenchmen. “The un¬ 
fortunate situation of Persia before the war was 
solely the result of a dual agreement between 
Russia and Great Britain.” 

“Did not your greatest Christian saint blame 
himself all his life long for having stood by and 
held the clothes of those who stoned the first 
martyr?” answered the Persian minister. “All 
Europe, and especially France, consented to the 
martyrdom of Persia. You agreed to allow 
Russia—in fact, to make us accept Russia—as 
the personification of European ideals and po- 
262 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

litical institutions. The British were the accom¬ 
plices of the Russians in keeping us in economic 
slavery* in stifling our new-born democracy. The 
French sacrificed us, just as they sacrificed the 
Poles, to their Russian alliance. France will gain 
influence in Persia only by sustaining our de¬ 
mands for complete independence. And if we 
are to learn to trust and respect England, it will 
be when London has learned to reconstruct Brit¬ 
ish diplomacy in our country along entirely new 
lines. ,, 

During the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, Persia was the victim of the struggle 
between European powers for the mastery of 
Asia. Her political independence and her eco¬ 
nomic prosperity were deliberately sacrificed for 
reasons that had nothing whatever to do with 
Persia herself. When the conflict of their im¬ 
perialistic aspirations threatened to precipitate a 
war, Great Britain and Russia came to an un¬ 
derstanding in Asia. Persia was called upon to 
pay the piper. No commentary is needed to drive 
home to the reader the heartlessness, the immor¬ 
ality, the hypocrisy, the brutality of the European 
powers in their relations with Asiatic races. 
One has only to set forth what took place in Per- 
263 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

sia from 1900 to the end of the recent European 
war. 

From 1900 to 1919 the railway mileage of Asia 
was quadrupled. Not a mile of railway was con¬ 
structed in Persia. The marvelous increase in 
economic prosperity throughout Asia has been 
shared by every country except Persia. All 
over the world, nations have been engaged in 
harbor- and road-building, extension of popular 
education, improvement and consolidation of fis¬ 
cal systems, working out and testing democratic 
institutions. Every effort made by the Persians 
along these lines was opposed and suppressed 
by Russia and Great Britain with the tacit con¬ 
sent of the other powers. What has been al¬ 
lowed to take place in Persia makes one wonder 
whether there is such a thing as an international 
conscience to give birth to and maintain a society 
of nations. 

From the beginning of her expansion in Asia, 
Russia was accustomed to regard Persia as le¬ 
gitimate prey. Russian penetration southward 
on both sides of the Caspian Sea had been at the 
expense of Persia. The provinces of Trans¬ 
caucasia, containing the world’s richest oil-fields, 
were taken from Persia in wars. Most of the 
264 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

Transcaspian Province, especially the portion 
of it across which runs the railway from the 
Caspian Sea to Central Asia, was wrested from 
Persia. Persia is one of the highways to the 
open sea of Russian dreams. It was natural, 
then, that Russian imperialism, when other out¬ 
lets were temporarily or permanently blocked, 
should try to control Persia. 

But Great Britain, on the other hand, was ac¬ 
customed to regard Persia as within her “sphere 
of influence/’ for the simple reason that Persia 
was on one of the routes to India. In 1854 and 
1877, Great Britain prevented Russia from 
reaching the Mediterranean through Turkey. 
Blocked at the Dardanelles, Muscovite ambitions 
turned to the Pacific Ocean and to the Persian 
Gulf. In the Far East, Great Britain stood be¬ 
hind Japan and prepared the way for Mukden 
and Port Arthur. The Persian Gulf had become 
British. Great Britain controlled Afghanistan. 
When Russian penetration into Central Asia 
brought about the building of great railways, 
the British began to fear that the Russian menace 
against India was not a myth. It was in Persia 
that the British Foreign Office and the Govern¬ 
ment of India felt that this menace must be met 
265 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


So the twentieth century opened with Teheran 
the center of intense and tireless diplomatic in¬ 
trigue. Using every tool they could get hold of 
and disregarding the rights and interests of the 
Persians, the British and the Russians fought in 
Persia each other’s dream of dominating Asia. 

In 1900, the Russians showed what use could 
be made of the newly completed Transcaspian 
Railway. On the branch that runs south from 
Merv to the Afghan frontier, twenty thousand 
men with siege trains, rails, and other construc¬ 
tion material, were concentrated in the Kusht 
River valley, in the corner of the Transcaspian 
Province between the Khorasan province of Per¬ 
sia and the Herat province of Afghanistan. 
With this force as a threat against British and 
Persians alike, the Russians forced Persia to per¬ 
mit the Russian Loan Bank to issue a large loan 
whose interest and sinking-fund were guaran¬ 
teed by Persian customs receipts. Should delay 
occur in payments, the Loan Bank would have 
the right to exercise control over custom-houses. 
The Persian Government agreed to make any 
future foreign loan for seventy-five years con¬ 
tingent upon the consent of the Loan Bank. 

266 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

From the custom-house receipts mortgaged to 
this loan were excluded Fars and the gulf ports, 
a concession to British “rights” in South Persia. 
But as the loan was raised partly to pay off the 
Anglo-Persian loan of 1892 and as railway con¬ 
cessions went with the loan, the Government of 
India was greatly alarmed. The railway con¬ 
cession to Russia provided for a line from Julfa 
on the Perso-Transcaucasian frontier to Ham- 
adan, with a branch line from Tabriz to Teheran. 
The railway was to he finished in 1903! 

The extension of Russian influence was felt 
more strongly by the British in 1901, when Rus¬ 
sian diplomacy interfered in the British intrigue 
to detach Koweit from Turkish suzerainty. 
Russia was bold enough to deny Britain’s claim 
to paramount influence in the Persian Gulf. If 
Britain was to have Koweit, Russia must have 
as compensation Bender Abbas (in the Strait of 
Ormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf 
of Oman). To emphasize the intention to con¬ 
test British pretensions, Russia established in 
February, 1901, a line of steamers from Odessa 
to the Persian Gulf ports. 

The greater part of the trade of northern Per- 
267 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


sia was passing rapidly into Russian hands. Ex¬ 
ports from Russia to Persia rose from four mil¬ 
lion to twenty million rubles in five years. 

The widespread discontent in Persia over the 
terms of the loans and railway concessions was 
encouraged by British agents. The same hos¬ 
tility met the announcement of a further loan in 
1902, one of the advantages of which was to en¬ 
able Russia to establish branches of the Imperial 
Bank in Persian cities. 

Feeling ran high in official circles in London 
when it was known that Russia had dared to send 
war-ships into the Persian Gulf, and that Russian 
consuls were endeavoring to purchase land in the 
islands and at Bender Abbas. Lord Curzon, 
Viceroy of India, was ordered to visit the Per¬ 
sian Gulf with an imposing display of British 
naval power. The British experienced a humili¬ 
ating rebuff at Bushire, where Lord Curzon 
waited in vain on his ship for a visit from the 
Persian governor. The governor refused to 
recognize Curzon’s rank as superior to his own 
and would not make the first call. A Russian 
agent was prompting the governor. This led 
Lord Lansdowne to declare in the House of 
Lords that while Great Britain’s claim to su 
268 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

premacy in the Persian Gulf was not based on 
treaties or international law, Great Britain 
would resist by all means in her power the at¬ 
tempt of any other nation to establish herself in 
the Persian Gulf. The old reason that held good 
from Gibraltar to Shanghai was given by Lord 
Lansdowne. Great Britain had the right to 
safeguard India and with this right went a vir¬ 
tual monopoly of trade in all the places where 
the right was exercised. During the nineteenth 
century, the British had been making treaties with 
petty chiefs, regarding some as independent and 
others as Indian feudatories. 

The rigid determination to maintain control of 
the Persian Gulf had no exceptions. Germany 
was opposed at Koweit and Russia at Bender Ab¬ 
bas. France found Great Britain in her path 
when she sought a coaling-station in the Gulf of 
Oman. In 1904, the Sultan of Oman leased to 
France the port of Bender Jisseh. The British 
contended that the Sultan of Oman was an Indian 
feudatory and that he had received a subsidy in 
return for the promise to alienate no portions of 
his territory or to grant no concessions to any 
power without the consent of the Indian Govern¬ 
ment. When the sultan asserted his independ- 
269 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

ence, the British said they would bombard Mus¬ 
cat if the concession to France were not immedi¬ 
ately canceled. France acquiesced in the can¬ 
celation on condition that she receive at Muscat 
the same facilities for coaling as Great Britain 
enjoyed. The incident would have been serious 
but for the fact that the French and British had 
just gotten together in the agreement of 1904, 
and were ready to settle their differences by mu¬ 
tual concessions—always, however, without ask¬ 
ing (and with no regard for the interests of) 
the particular native state that had given cause 
for the conflict between their own interests. 

The defeat of Russia in the Far East had no 
direct influence upon the comparative position 
of Russia and Great Britain in Persia. The 
check in Manchuria led to the redoubling of ef¬ 
forts of Petrograd to open up a way to the sea 
through Persia. In spite of British protests and 
threats, a Russian consulate was established at 
Bender Abbas. Neither of the great powers 
was able to oust the other from Persia. But 
each was able to prevent the other from devel¬ 
oping concessions or following up advantages. 
And as both powers refused to allow Persia to 
seek elsewhere for money and aid in develop- 
270 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 


ment, railways remained unbuilt and the country 
fell into anarchy. 

When Shah Nasreddin was assassinated in 
1896, he left a large private fortune and a fairly 
full public treasury. Ten years later, the death 
of Shah Muzaffereddin showed how well Rus¬ 
sian diplomacy had been able to take advantage 
of a ruler’s weakness. All the inheritance of 
Nasreddin was gone and his son had plunged 
Persia into debt. Much of the money loaned by 
Russia had been given to Muzaffereddin outright 
by the Russians, who knew exactly what they 
were doing. Unscrupulous European bankers 
and politicians acted in Persia as they had done 
in Turkey and Egypt, lending large sums to the 
sovereign with the deliberate intention of en¬ 
slaving the country. The successive advances 
were made to one man over whose expenditures 
there was no public control. The enlightened 
elements of Persia protested and warned the 
bankers, whose methods were identical with those 
of a money shark getting into his toils some young 
prodigal. Would not the Persians be justified 
in repudiating the portions of these loans which 
went directly to the shah’s private purse? It 
is true that a country autocratically ruled must 
271 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


accept the responsibility for its ruler’s acts. But 
in Western countries the law provides safeguards 
against money-lenders and recognizes the re¬ 
sponsibility of the investor who lends to an ir¬ 
responsible person or who acts like a confidence 
man. 

A British commercial mission sent to study 
conditions in Persia in 1906 recommended an 
Anglo-Russian understanding as to “spheres of 
influence.” It was obvious to business men in 
England and India that the policy of Russia 
blocking Great Britain and Great Britain block¬ 
ing Russia was keeping the country in anarchy. 
Intrigues and counter-intrigues prevented either 
power from developing trade or concessions. 
The extension of Russian railways to the fron¬ 
tiers of Afghanistan and Persia and the rapid 
development of Russian influence in Mongolia 
and Tibet, had given London and Calcutta of¬ 
ficials furiously to think. Germany, with her 
Bagdad Railway and her evident intention to en¬ 
ter the field for concessions and trade in Persia, 
made the British feel that a three-cornered fight 
would be more unprofitable even than the effort 
to keep Russia from getting anything. Would 
it not be wise to divide with Russia and keep Ger- 
272 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

many out? Anglo-French relations were im¬ 
proving and Russia was the ally of France. 
Russia, on the other hand, was strongly advised 
by France to come to an agreement with Great 
Britain instead of settling rival claims by war. 
The result of the war with Japan and the warn¬ 
ing of the revolution made Russian officialdom 
more tractable than it had been before the events 
of 1904 and 1905. Great Britain and Russia got 
together as Great Britain and France had done. 

On September 24, 1907, the Anglo-Russian 
Convention for the partition of Persia was com¬ 
municated to the ambassadors of the powers in 
Petrograd. In the preamble, Great Britain and 
Russia affirmed their intention of maintaining the 
independence and integrity of Persia and of al¬ 
lowing (allow is the expression used in the text!) 
equal facilities for trade to all nations. But the 
convention then states that, owing to geograph¬ 
ical proximity to their own territories, Great 
Britain and Russia have “special interests” in 
certain parts of Persia. There are five points 
in the convention. The first establishes the Rus¬ 
sian zone, the second the British zone, the third 
a neutral zone, the fourth the confirmation of the 
existing mortgages of Persian revenues, and the 
273 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


fifth the mutual privilege “in event of irregulari¬ 
ties” of instituting control over the revenues in 
the respective zones. A letter from Sir Edward 
Grey to the British ambassador at Petrograd, 
published simultaneously with the convention, 
stated that the Persian Gulf lay outside the 
scope of the convention, but that the Russian 
Government had agreed during the negotiations 
“not to deny the special interests of Great Britain 
in the Gulf.” 

The moral sense of European public opinion 
in regard to the treatment of non-European races 
had become so warped in the first decade of the 
twentieth century that the Anglo-Russian Con¬ 
vention of 1907 brought forth no protest. The 
Persians, being Asiatics, had no rights. It was 
quite within the province of British and Russian 
diplomatists to do what they saw fit in Persia, 
and to establish a new internal and international 
status for Persia without consulting either the 
wishes or the interests of the Persians. The only 
international law in Asia was the law of might. 
Because they could not oppose force to force, the 
Persians were compelled to submit to the indig¬ 
nity and iniquity of the Anglo-Russian Conven- 
274 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

tion, and to suffer its disastrous political and 
economic consequences. 

The Anglo-Russian conspiracy against the in¬ 
tegrity and independence of Persia was con¬ 
ceived and put into action at the moment when 
Asia was experiencing her 1848. After the 
Russo-Japanese War, a wave of intense national 
feeling swept over Asia, and in every country 
there was a movement to establish democratic in¬ 
stitutions and shake off foreign control. The 
two aims went together. They could not be di¬ 
vorced. In reading accounts of the nationalist 
movements in Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, and 
China, one meets frequently the criticism that 
legitimate agitation for self-government and 
democratic institutions is marred by xenophobia. 
But is not this in the nature of every democratic 
movement ? Europeans and Americans who 
criticize the form and methods of Asiatic and 
African political movements forget their own 
history. The Barons of Runnymede and the 
Boston Tea Party, Joan of Arc before Orleans 
and Henri IV before Paris, Andreas Hofer and 
the Tugenbund, although separated by centuries, 
were staged with the same Leitmotiv, tersely ex- 

275 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


pressed in the rallying-cry of the Italian Risorgi- 
mento —Fuori i stranieri! 

The accession of Mohammed Ali Mirza 
brought hopes of constitutional government to 
Persian liberals. The late shah had provided 
for a national council elected by all males be¬ 
tween thirty and seventy who could read and 
write. The new shah signed his father’s ordi¬ 
nance and convoked the national council at Te¬ 
heran in the autumn of 1906. The council or 
parliament ( Mejliss ) was conceived as an ad¬ 
visory assembly and the constitution promul¬ 
gated by Mohammed Ali was not intended to 
mean the surrender to the Mejliss of adminis¬ 
trative control. It is impossible to relate here 
the story of the conflict between crown and 
parliament during the three years of Mohammed 
Ali’s rule. Persia was in the throes of civil war. 
Nationalists and Royalists fought in Teheran and 
the provinces. In 1908, the shah bombarded the 
House of Parliament, dissolved the Mejliss, and 
established martial law in Teheran. Although 
he declared his intention of maintaining the con¬ 
stitution and ordering the election of a new Mej¬ 
liss, Mohammed Ali proposed the substitution of 
an advisory council of forty, selected by him- 
276 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

self. But the nationalist movement had become 
too strong to be stifled. The proclamation of a 
constitution at Constantinople in 1908 and the 
failure of Abdul Hamid’s subsequent attempt to 
overthrow the constitution was a tremendous en¬ 
couragement to the Persian nationalists. Abdul 
Hamid's deposition was a demonstration of the 
determination of an Oriental people to preserve 
the political liberties they had won, and fore¬ 
shadowed the fall of Mohammed Ali. In the 
summer of 1909, less than three months after 
Abdul Hamid’s deposition, the Persian Cossacks 
went over to the Nationalists. The shah was 
formally deposed by the Mejliss, and his son, 
Ahmed Mirza, declared successor to the throne. 
Mohammed Ali was expelled from Persian ter¬ 
ritory. Shah Ahmed, although only a little boy, 
opened in person a new Mejliss on November 
15, 1909. 

The opportunity had come for the civilized 
world to help Persia to constitutional govern¬ 
ment. Had the Persians been able to accept and 
utilize the loyal and disinterested aid of foreign 
advisers, Persia would have developed into hap¬ 
piness and prosperity. But Russia and Great 
Britain had no intention of allowing Persia to 
277 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


become an orderly and self-supporting state, with 
a constitutional government. The success of 
political institutions in Persia would have caused 
trouble for the British in India and Egypt. Rus¬ 
sia had taken advantage of the last year of the 
civil war to introduce troops into the Azerbai¬ 
jan province. If Persia developed parliamen¬ 
tary government, Russia would have trouble in 
realizing her intention of settling down perma¬ 
nently in the region of Tabriz. The Russians 
had made the Convention of 1907 with their eyes 
open. Since the Persian Gulf was denied them, 
could not the Mediterranean be reached through 
Armenia and Cilicia? The possibility of realiz¬ 
ing this ambition depended upon military and po¬ 
litical control of northwestern Persia. At the 
very moment when nationalism seemed to have 
succeeded in establishing a constitutional regime, 
and when a new era was opening for Persia, 
Great Britain struck her blow. Not only was 
Russian occupation of Persian territory con¬ 
sented to by the British, but Persia was compelled 
to acquiesce in the British pretension of organiz¬ 
ing police forces in southern Persia, to be com¬ 
manded by British officers from the military 
forces of India. 


278 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 


After having thus installed themselves in their 
“zones,” the two powers sent a joint note to the 
Persian Government, informing Persia that they 
would refuse to sanction loans from other pow¬ 
ers, if these loans implied the granting of con¬ 
cessions to any other powers or their subjects 
“contrary to Russian or British political or strate¬ 
gic interests.” As this was tantamount to a de¬ 
mand that Persia accept a Russo-British protec¬ 
torate, the Persian Government refused. Petro- 
grad and London then warned the other powers 
and international financial circles not to lend 
money to or seek concessions from Persia! 

The Persians, in answer to the British com¬ 
plaint that the Persian Government was unable 
to preserve order along the trade routes of south¬ 
ern Persia, said that money was necessary to re¬ 
organize the gendarmery. For this purpose they 
wanted five hundred thousand pounds. The Brit¬ 
ish and Russian governments would not lend the 
money. Moreover, they kept in their own hands 
revenues accruing to the government in the zones 
occupied by them, and prevented Persia from rais¬ 
ing a loan either at Paris or Berlin. The ma- 
noeuver was clear. Disorders were to be fo¬ 
mented everywhere in Persia and the government 
279 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


rendered powerless to take measures to restore 
peaceful conditions. This gave the Russians the 
pretext to send more troops into northern Persia, 
while the British informed the Persian Govern¬ 
ment that the state of anarchy in the south neces¬ 
sitated British intervention to police the south¬ 
ern trade route from Bushire to Shiras and Is¬ 
pahan. 

Some British writers have attempted to excuse 
the underhand and disloyal intrigues of their 
government, in conjunction with the Russian 
Government, by asserting that British officers and 
traders had been robbed and roughly handled— 
even assassinated—in Persia. There is no 
foundation for these assertions. Before British 
and Russians began to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Persia, animosity toward foreigners 
was unknown. Not a single case of molestation 
of either British or Russians can be cited. The 
open encroachments on Persian sovereignty led 
to the first attacks against foreigners in Persia. 
Tribesmen became unruly as a result of intrigues. 
They were provoked to lawlessness in order to 
give an excuse for intervention. 

Let us be fair. What would the British say 
if the Germans tried to excuse the war of 1914 
280 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

and the abominable crimes committed by them, 
on the ground that Germans were roughly treated 
by London mobs in May, 1915? Effects do not 
precede causes. 

Having prepared the ground, the Russian and 
British governments arranged to carry out the 
terms of the agreement of 1907. The Russians 
occupied Tabriz, and appointed a military gov¬ 
ernor for the province of Azerbaijan. When 
the outcry in Persia against this violation of the 
independence of a sovereign state began to find 
its way into the press of western Europe, Rus¬ 
sia instigated an attempt on the part of the ex¬ 
shah, who had been in exile at Odessa, to recover 
the throne. He was allowed to cross Russian 
territory with his followers, to land on the Per¬ 
sian shore of the Caspian Sea, and organize an 
expedition against Teheran. The Russians took 
advantage of the renewal of civil war, started by 
themselves, to excuse the military occupation of 
Persian territory and to extend that occupation. 
Nationalist leaders, civilians and clergy and mil¬ 
itary, whose crime was an effort to protect the 
new regime against the reactionaries of the ex¬ 
shah and Russians alike, were hunted down by 
Russian Cossacks and hanged as outlaws. The 
281 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


British landed troops at Persian Gulf ports and 
sent Indian regiments into the interior. 

In the meantime, Persia was making a serious 
effort to reorganize a central government. 
Frenchmen were employed in the Ministry of 
Justice and the Ministry of the Interior. Swed¬ 
ish officers were engaged to reorganize the 
gendarmery.. To secure reorganization of fi¬ 
nances, free from European political intrigue, 
Persia turned to America. An American mis¬ 
sion to take complete charge of the finances of 
Persia was chosen by the Persian minister' in 
Washington. Its head, Mr. W. Morgan Shus¬ 
ter, a former government official in the Philip¬ 
pines, had been recommended to Persia by the 
United States Government. 

Mr. Shuster went to Persia with the idea that 
he had been enlisted in the service of an inde¬ 
pendent state to work for the interests of that 
state. He refused to recognize, as his employers 
had refused to recognize, the Anglo-Russian Con¬ 
vention. Under the name of Treasury Gendarm- 
ery, he organized a large force to collect taxes. 
As officers he chose Major Stokes and other 
Britishers who were believed at Petrograd to 
entertain strong anti-Russian sentiments—which 
282 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

meant that they probably believed that Persia had 
the same right as any other nation to be mistress 
in her own house! In the face of remonstrances 
from the British embassy, Mr. Shuster sent de¬ 
tachments of the gendarmery under British offi¬ 
cers into northern Persia to collect taxes within 
the “admitted” sphere of Russian influence. At 
Teheran, the Mejliss passed a decree confiscating 
the property of a brother of Mohammed Ali, who 
had joined the ex-shah in the attempt to recover 
the throne. But the Russian consular guard oc¬ 
cupied the property, which the Russian embassy 
claimed to hold on the ground that it was mort¬ 
gaged to Russian subjects. Mr. Shuster re¬ 
ferred the Russian embassy to the courts, which 
were alone competent to decide a question of this 
kind. When the consular guard did not leave 
the property, Mr. Shuster ordered the Treasury 
Gendarmery to execute by force the decree of the 
Mejliss. Russia and Great Britain immediately 
demanded an apology from the Minister of For¬ 
eign Affairs. 

This was not all. Mr. Shuster had dared to 
defy the partitioned of Persia. He was demon¬ 
strating reorganizing ability and energy that 
would certainly end in delivering Persia finan- 
283 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

daily from the Anglo-Russian yoke. Russia 
sent an ultimatum to Persia, demanding the dis¬ 
missal of Mr. Shuster ; the promise to appoint 
thereafter foreign advisers only after consulta¬ 
tion with the Russian and British ministers; and 
an indemnity to cover the cost of maintaining 
Russian troops in northern Persia. In spite of 
protests of fair-minded Liberals in the House of 
Commons Sir Edward Grey declared that the in¬ 
terests of Great Britain dictated the support of 
the first two demands of the Russian ultimatum. 
When a member asked, “How about the interests 
of Persia?” Sir Edward was silent. The Me]- 
Hss rejected the ultimatum. The occupation of 
Teheran by Russian troops and the final extinc¬ 
tion of Persian independence was threatened. 
Yielding to the bullying of the two great pow¬ 
ers, on December 24, 1911, the regent dissolved 
the Mejliss and dismissed Mr. Shuster. 

The Shuster incident aroused a storm of con¬ 
troversy. Friends of Persia, who sympathized 
with the efforts of an unjustly treated people to 
maintain independence and national self-respect, 
were deeply disappointed in the failure of the 
American mission. Mr. Shuster was blamed 
for having uselessly kicked against the pricks. 

284 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

Could he have accomplished more for Persia by 
adopting a less intractable attitude? The ten¬ 
dency was to answer the question affirmatively. 
Mr. Shuster’s lectures and his book, “The Stran¬ 
gling of Persia,” carried conviction as to the 
wrongs done to Persia, but left one undecided as 
to the wisdom of the course pursued by him. 
When it was seen that the Shuster incident was 
used by Russia and Great Britain to destroy the 
new-born parliamentary system and to compel 
the Persian Government to recognize, on Febru¬ 
ary 18, 1912, the Anglo-Russian Convention, 
criticism of Mr. Shuster, solely on the ground of 
the results of his actions, was inevitable. 

But with the perspective of years, the role of 
Mr. Shuster appears in a different light. Al¬ 
though the immediate results proved disastrous to 
Persia, were not the immorality and injustice of 
the Anglo-Russian Convention demonstrated? 
The courage and loyalty and straightforwardness 
of Mr. Shuster awakened the conscience of the 
world, and exposed the hypocrisy and unlovely 
greed lurking behind the altruistic cry of “as¬ 
suming the white man’s burden.” Mr. Shuster 
became a national hero of the Persians. His de¬ 
fiance of Russian and British imperialism, far 
285 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

from failing, gave birth to a wider and deeper 
national movement than had existed before. 
Russian and British diplomatists, in expelling Mr. 
Shuster from Persia, dug the grave of their own 
political and commercial hopes. A Russian who 
was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Petro- 
grad in 1911 told me eight years later that Mr. 
Shuster actually saved Persia from partition. 
The experience of Mr. Shuster in Persia is still 
talked about in Oriental bazaars from Cairo to 
Calcutta. 

What Persia has lived through since the be¬ 
ginning of 1912 should bring a blush of shame to 
the brow of every European, and cause those who 
have given themselves without stint to the defeat 
of German imperialism in Europe to demand of 
their own governments a complete abandonment 
of the imperialism of all nations in Asia. 

After Persia bowed to force and recognized 
the Anglo-Russian Convention, foreign markets 
were closed to her. Money had to be borrowed 
from Russia and Great Britain. The two “pro¬ 
tecting” powers defeated every project of finan¬ 
cial, military, and economic reform. Persia was 
forced to beg small sums at high interest. Bank¬ 
ing operations were exclusively in the hands of 
286 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

Russian and British banks in which customs re¬ 
ceipts of the north and south had to be deposited. 
Persia, whose natural wealth was great and 
whose public debt was small, was reduced to a 
state of financial slavery, and in order to live 
from day to day had to sacrifice her rights and 
her independence. No railways were built, no 
open international trading was allowed, none of 
the great mineral wealth was developed to the 
profit of the Persian state or people. 

Russian subjects did not pay taxes. Infring¬ 
ing upon the terms of the Treaty of Turcmant- 
cha’i, they acquired property at will and without 
restriction. This decreased the revenues of 
Persia and put Persians in a position of inferior¬ 
ity to Russian subjects, since the latter, exempt 
from taxation, competed with the Persians un¬ 
fairly on Persian soil. The Russian and British 
legations, having got rid of the parliament and 
of foreign competitors, exercised constantly pres¬ 
sure upon the government to obtain concessions 
on conditions incompatible with the political and 
economic interests of the country. What Ger¬ 
many intended to do in Rumania after the Treaty 
of Bucharest, Russia and Great Britain had been 
doing for years in Persia. I remember an ed- 
287 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


itorial in the “London Times” pillorying the Ger¬ 
mans for planning to take economic advantage 
of helpless Rumania in the same way as had been 
—and was being—done by the British in Persia. 

Russia tried to limit the military forces of 
Persia to a brigade of Cossacks, organized and 
commanded by Russian officers, using this force 
as a political instrument. It did not allow the 
Government Gendarmery to penetrate into the 
northern provinces. Similarly, in the south the 
British claimed that they could maintain order, 
and the British minister at Teheran told the Per¬ 
sian Government that there was no need for the 
National Gendarmery in the “British zone.” It 
was thus that Persia found herself weakened and 
deprived of resources at the beginning of the war 
of 1914. 

It is easy to understand the hatred of the Per¬ 
sians for the czarist government. Public opin¬ 
ion, especially after the entry of Turkey, de¬ 
manded vengeance against Russia. The feeling 
was not nearly so strong against the British. 
But, naturally, there was little enthusiasm for a 
British victory. Russia and Great Britain were 
allies and their triumph in the war would only 
forge more firmly the fetters binding Persia. 

288 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

However, the government had no confidence in 
the Turks and no love for the Germans. It was, 
after all, a European war. The Persian Gov¬ 
ernment declared its neutrality and succeeded in 
keeping the people neutral. 

The neutrality of Persia, although advan¬ 
tageous to Russia and Great Britain, was not 
respected by either of the powers. When the 
Persian Government asked the Russians to with¬ 
draw their troops from Persian territory in or¬ 
der that Persia might not become a field of battle 
between Russians and Turks, Russia not only re¬ 
fused but brought additional troops into Persia 
and used Persian territory as bases of military 
operations. The consuls and subjects of the 
Central powers were arrested and deported into 
the Caucasus. German commercial establish¬ 
ments were confiscated. The Turks penetrated 
into Azerbaijan under pretext of pursuing the 
Russians, who were menacing their eastern fron¬ 
tier. Expelled at first, the Russians returned in 
force. The whole province was devastated. 
Russians and Turks rivaled each other in bar¬ 
barity toward the unhappy population of the 
most* flourishing province of Persia. During 
this time, German agents were stirring up trou- 
289 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ble for their rivals, and the Turks sent agitators 
among the tribes of Arabistan. The British dis¬ 
embarked their troops in Persian Gulf ports, and 
another field of battle was created in the south 
and southwest. 

In 1915, Hussein Raouf Bey invaded the west 
of Persia with a large Turkish force. He shot 
chiefs of tribes and burned Kerend. The tribe 
of the Sendjabis was massacred because it wished 
to remain neutral. Later, in 1918, what re¬ 
mained of this same tribe was destroyed by the 
British for the same reason! 

Persia became a field of propaganda worked by 
agents of the two groups of belligerents. None 
respected the neutrality of any part of the coun¬ 
try or the feelings of the inhabitants. Intrigues 
and raids and pitched battles increased from day 
to day. It was evidently impossible for Persia 
to do the logical thing, which would have been to 
declare war against both groups of belligerents. 
Protestations were ignored. The political faults 
of the Russians and the British caused them to be 
more hated than the others, and there is no doubt 
that in 1915 public opinion in Persia was against 
the Entente. At the end of 1915, Russian troops 
approached the capital, and the ambassador of 
290 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 

Turkey was arrested in the suburbs by Russian 
troops. The shah and the government wished 
to quit Teheran and were urged to do so by the 
German minister. At the last moment, assur¬ 
ances were given by the Russian and British le¬ 
gations that the Russian troops would not occupy 
the capital. 

The situation in Persia had become intolerable. 
Seeing that Persia was suffering all the horrors 
of the war and stood alone without a friend, the 
Persian Government, conquering its repugnance 
and braving public opinion, thought that the only 
way of safety was to join Russia and Great Brit¬ 
ain. A draft of treaty of alliance was handed to 
the ministers of Russia and Great Britain in 
December, 1915. They promised to refer the 
matter to their governments. The sole response 
was an ultimatum to Persia, dated August 1, 
1916, demanding that the Russian and British 
armies be recognized in occupation of Persia; 
that contingents of troops be raised, commanded 
in the north by Russian officers and in the south 
by British officers; and that the financial control 
of Persia be handed over entirely to Great Brit¬ 
ain and Russia. Already, in March, 1915, the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had been se- 
291 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


cretly amplified by the two powers to do away 
with the neutral zone. 

If Persia received no encouragement to enter 
into the Entente Alliance, she none the less pro¬ 
tested fearlessly against violations of interna¬ 
tional law committed by Germany, and especially 
against the submarine warfare. Persian sub¬ 
jects had lost their lives on torpedoed vessels, in¬ 
cluding a member of the royal family who was 
on the Sussex. Persia also proclaimed her 
adherence to the principles and program of 
President Wilson at the time the United States 
entered the war. 

The situation of Persia after the war would 
have been hopeless had it not been for the Rus¬ 
sian revolution. The revolutionary government 
declared the abrogation of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention and Persia’s right to complete inde¬ 
pendence. The Russian armies were withdrawn. 
The British followed close upon their heels and 
occupied all of Persia. At some places, as at 
Kazvin, they offered large sums to Russians to 
remain in their service. In 1918, the Turks 
came once more into Azerbaijan and fought in 
the province with the British until the armistice. 
During the Peace Conference, the British held 
292 


ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA 


Persia and exercised a strict censorship on all 
communications. It has been their intention to 
fall heir to the political and economic privileges 
of Russia in Persia. 

But the Persians have demanded at the Peace 
Conference, as outlined in a subsequent chapter, 
the cancelation of all treaties and concessions to 
which consent was given under compulsion, with¬ 
out the approval of and against the interests of 
the Persian nation. Did not Mr. Lloyd George 
state in the House of Commons shortly before the 
armistice of November, 1918, that no nation was 
obliged to honor a signature given under com¬ 
pulsion? The British premier was referring to 
the agreements between Rumania and the Central 
powers, which had been dictated to the former by 
the latter. But what he said holds equally in 
regard to all agreements made between Persia 
and Great Britain, which the latter forced the 
former to sign. Persia expects to abrogate all 
treaties and cancel all concessions with Russia 
and Great Britain, invoking the admitted reason 
for Rumania’s similar action. We cannot have 
two moralities any longer—one for Europe and 
another for Asia. Consequently, Persia also ex¬ 
pects Great Britain, when peace is ratified, to 

293 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


evacuate Persian territory without conditions and 
regard Persia hereafter as an absolutely inde¬ 
pendent nation. If the society of nations suc¬ 
ceeds, all of Persia’s expectations will be au¬ 
tomatically realized, and Persia, once more mis¬ 
tress of her destinies, will maintain the open door 
for the trade and welcome the cooperation of all 
nations. 

Should the society of nations plan i>e not ap¬ 
plied to Asia as to Europe and America, Persia 
and other Asiatic nations will make a more 
formidable effort than heretofore to rid them¬ 
selves of foreign masters, whoever they may be 
and by whatever means. We may expect com¬ 
binations between Asiatic states and races, po¬ 
litical and religious; combinations between Asi¬ 
atic states and separate European powers; agita¬ 
tion against Europeans and revolts. There will 
be no peace until Asiatics have the same rights in 
their own countries as Europeans have in theirs. 


294 


CHAPTER XIV 


PERSIA BEFORE THE PEACE 
CONFERENCE 

NLY one independent state of Asia was 



not invited to take part in the Peace Con¬ 


ference. On the ground that Persia had 
been neutral during the war, Persia was not in¬ 
cluded by the allied and associated powers. The 
irony of this decision is apparent when one re¬ 
members that neither the Entente powers nor the 
enemies of Persia had respected her neutrality. 
Russian and British armies fought their foes on 
Persian territory just as if they had a right to. 
Up to the very end of the war, and after the 
armistice, the British sent armies through Persia 
to Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. Persia suf¬ 
fered all the horrors of war—invasion, destruc¬ 
tion of cities and countryside, loss of life among 
the civilian population, famine and economic 
paralysis—without the glory or the advantages 
of belligerency. In 1915, desiring to choose the 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

lesser of two evils, Persia offered to join the 
Entente Alliance. Her proposal was ignored. 
Russia and Great Britain did not want to have 
the Persians bring up the notorious agreement of 
1907 at the peace table! 

Like many others not invited, the Persians sent 
a delegation to Paris and demanded to be admit¬ 
ted and to be heard. Headed by Aligholi Khan, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Persian delega¬ 
tion presented to the conference in February a 
remarkable memorandum which set forth with 
irrefutable logic the reasons for the admission 
of Persia. Aligholi Khan described graphically 
the sufferings of Persia due to the constant vio¬ 
lation of her neutrality by both groups of bellig¬ 
erents, and reminded the victorious powers that 
as far back as 1915 Persia had been willing to 
join the Entente. Persia, therefore, refused to 
believe that the conference would regard her as 
a neutral state. The neutrals had not suffered 
from being the theater of fighting during years. 
In fact, Persia had contributed more to the war 
and had suffered more from the war than many 
so-called belligerents represented in the Paris 
Conference. 

The Persian Government received no answer 
296 


PERSIA BEFORE PEACE CONFERENCE 
to Aligholi Khan’s memorandum. Unofficial as¬ 
surances of sympathy were given to the Persian 
delegation by several statesmen of the big pow¬ 
ers. That was as far as the attempt of the Per¬ 
sians to get an official hearing went. In March, 
the Persian delegation, not discouraged by the 
lack of success of the first memorandum, pre¬ 
sented formally to the Peace Conference the 
claims of Persia. Even if the conference per¬ 
sisted in refusing to receive Persia into its mem¬ 
bership, the case of Persia was none the less put 
before every delegate in Paris. 

The document drawn up by Aligholi Khan 
and his associates is entitled: “Claims of Persia 
before the Conference of the Preliminaries 
of Peace at Paris.” Persia asked territorial 
restoration and reparations, following the line 
of the states in the conference and based upon 
the same arguments. But the unique portion of 
the Persian memorandum was the courageous 
and unreserved denunciation of Anglo-Russian 
policy before and during the war, of which Per¬ 
sia was the helpless victim. This exposition of 
“claims concerning political, juridical and eco¬ 
nomic independence” reads like the memorandum 
of China. With the memorandum of China, it 
297 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

is an unanswerable indictment of the sordid com¬ 
mercial imperialism of the European powers in 
Asia. 

The territorial demands of Persia, accom¬ 
panied by a map, are extremely interesting. All 
the territories to which Persia laid claim had seen 
their former sovereignty disappear during the 
war, and were before the Peace Conference for 
the attribution of a new sovereignty. Persia, 
therefore, was wholly within her rights in pre¬ 
senting her claims. The merit of the claims is 
a different proposition. 

The Persians explained that they were asking 
no annexations but only restitutions of provinces 
wrested from them by Russia and Turkey in the 
wars of aggression carried on during the nine¬ 
teenth century by those two states. 

The first restitution demanded was that of the 
Transcaspian Province, described in the Persian 
memorandum as “part of Persia,” “one of the 
centers of Persian nationality,” and the birth¬ 
place of “a great number of illustrious Persians— 
poets, men of letters, savants, philosophers.” It 
was pointed out that the Persian language is 
widely diffused in the Transcaspian Province, 
that the inhabitants of the region are largely Per- 
298 


PERSIA BEFORE PEACE CONFERENCE 


sian and that the Turkomans belong to the same 
tribes which live in the Astrabad province on the 
Persian side of the old frontier. After the Rus¬ 
sian revolution, the Turkomans of the Trans¬ 
caspian Province appealed to Persia for aid 
against the Bolshevists. In the Persian Trans¬ 
caspian demands, all the territory up to the river 
Oxus (Amu Daria) was included. This meant 
that Persia claimed the khanate of Khiva. 

Between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, 
the penetration of the Russians south of the Cau¬ 
casus had resulted in the nineteenth century in 
territorial acquisitions at the expense of Persia 
as well as Turkey. The eastern half of Trans¬ 
caucasia was part of the Persian Empire up to 
the treaty of 1828. What Persia has claimed 
from Russia includes the famous Baku oil-fields, 
Elisavetpol and Erivan. These demands come 
into direct conflict with the territorial aspirations 
of the Georgians and the Armenians. The Ar¬ 
menians, in fact, have set up an independent 
government at Erivan. 

On the side of Turkey, Persian claims come 
again into conflict with Armenia by the demand 
for Kurdistan. In Kurdistan the Persians in¬ 
cluded the lake region of Van, Bitlis and Mouch; 

299 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the Kharput region of the upper Euphrates, and 
the upper valley of the Tigris from Diarbekir to 
south of Mosul. It was advanced that the 
Kurds are “a people Persian in race and lan¬ 
guage, professing Islamism.” The region of 
Suleymanieh was taken from Persia by Turkey 
in 1847. The rest of Turkish Kurdistan, said 
the Persians, “is bound to Persia for ethnic, geo¬ 
graphical, religious, and other reasons and should 
naturally be joined to that country, more espe¬ 
cially because the religious chiefs and notable 
Kurds have declared themselves desirous to be 
reunited to Persia.” 

The last point in Persia's territorial claims af¬ 
fects the holy cities of the Shiite Mohammedan 
sect. Kerbela and Nedjef are west of the Eu¬ 
phrates on the edge of the Arabian Desert. 
Samara and Kazmein are on the Tigris River 
north of Bagdad in the heart of Mesopotamia. 
The great spiritual leaders of Persia reside in the 
Shiite cities. Commerce and industry is largely 
in Persian hands, and as these cities are centers 
of Persian pilgrimage, their prosperity and ac¬ 
tivity are dependent upon Persian money. Per¬ 
sia, therefore, has a more vital interest than any 
other nation in the future of Mesopotamia and 
3.0Q 


PERSIA BEFORE PEACE CONFERENCE 
wanted a say in whatever arrangements were 
made by the Peace Conference for Mesopota¬ 
mia. 

In their territorial demands, the Persians laid 
especial emphasis upon the words “restoration” 
and “restitution,” and spoke of the provinces 
claimed being “reunited to the mother country.” 
This is the phraseology of all irredentist claims 
before the Peace Conference. And Persian ir- 
redentism, like all other irredentisms, meets 
equally strong counter-irredentist aspirations on 
the part of other nations and races. For in¬ 
stance, in the Transcaspian Province, the Emir 
of Khiva claimed exactly the same territory on 
the same ground, i.e., that it was taken away 
from Khiva by Russia! In Transcaucasia and 
in northern Kurdistan, Georgians and Armeni¬ 
ans told the Peace Conference that Russian, 
Turkish, and Persian claims were all based on the 
same ground—the right of conquest. The 
Kurds of Turkey had a delegation at the Peace 
Conference which said nothing at all about want¬ 
ing to be “reunited” to Persia! 

The Persian claims for reparation are divided 
into three categories: losses from the acts of Rus¬ 
sia; losses from the acts of Turkey; responsibili- 
301 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ties of Germany. Because they knew that it 
would be useless and would prejudice their case, 
the Persians made no claim to reparation for 
losses from the acts of Great Britain. The dam¬ 
ages caused to Persia by Russian violation of 
neutrality and by Russian massacres of Persian 
subjects at Baku were outlined in detail. Turkey 
was responsible for invading Persia, as Russia 
and Great Britain had done, and for forcibly en¬ 
rolling Persian subjects in the Ottoman Army 
during the war. The responsibilities of Ger¬ 
many were engaged toward Persia for “clan¬ 
destine and subversive conduct of her agents who 
constantly created difficulties for the Govern¬ 
ment and disturbed the country,” and for the 
death of Persian subjects on the Lusitania and 
the Sussex. The Persian Government suggested 
to the Peace Conference that a portion at least 
of the Russian reparations could be recovered by 
Persia from canceling Persia’s debts to Russia, 
canceling the concessions obtained by the Rus¬ 
sian Government and subjects, and seizing the 
property of the Russian state in Persia. From 
Turkey and Germany, Persia requested her share 
in the general indemnities. 

To assert her political, juridical, and economic 
302 


PERSIA BEFORE PEACE CONFERENCE 

independence, which had been so shamefully vio¬ 
lated by Russia and Great Britain, Persia pre¬ 
sented ten specific claims to the Peace Confer¬ 
ence: 

(1) That the Anglo-Russian agreement of 
1907 be considered as void, as regards the signa¬ 
tory powers, as regards Persia, and as regards 
all and any powers which might have adhered to 
it or recognized in part or in whole the situation 
created by it; 

(2) That the Anglo-Russian note of 1910, 
prohibiting the granting of concessions of a po¬ 
litical and strategical nature to foreigners, be de¬ 
clared null and void; 

(3) That the Anglo-Russian ultimatum of 
1911, compelling Persia to bind herself not to 
take into her service foreigners without the pre¬ 
vious consent of Russia and England, be declared 
null and void; 

(4) That the foreign powers renounce the 
right, or rather pretension, to extend protection 
in Persia to Persian subjects; 

(5) That the foreign powers abstain from in¬ 
tervening, in any way and for any reason, in the 
internal affairs of Persia; 

303 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


(6) That foreigners be placed on the same 
footing with Persians in all matters affecting the 
payment of taxes; 

(7) That the armed forces of foreign powers 
and their consular guards be withdrawn from 
Persian territory; 

(8) That the treaties made between Persia and 
foreign countries be revised, to the end that all 
clauses infringing upon or limiting the political, 
juridical, and economic independence of Persia 
be eliminated; 

(9) That the concessions acquired by for¬ 
eigners be so revised that they contain hereafter 
no stipulations which prejudice the economic in¬ 
terests of Persia; 

(10) That the right of Persia to frame freely 
and revise her customs tariff without the dicta¬ 
tion or interference of the foreign powers be 
recognized, and that all bans against the free 
transit of goods to Persia be removed. 

Speaking before the Royal Geographical So¬ 
ciety on the day Germany signed the armistice, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, British Military At¬ 
tache in Persia, foreshadowed the preponderant 
role of Great Britain in the renaissance of Per- 
304 


PERSIA BEFORE PEACE CONFERENCE 


sia. He said that the agreement of 1907 could 
be regarded as terminated, and that this meant 
that Great Britain resumed her liberty of action 
and intended to direct the destinies of Persia. 
From the British point of view, the control of 
Persia by Great Britain was essential. The 
tranquillity and prosperity of Persia would now 
affect Great Britain’s new acquisition, Mesopo¬ 
tamia, as well as India and Afghanistan. And 
then did not the Caucasian petroleum deposits 
continue across the Persian frontier into Persia’s 
western mountainous region? 

During the war, Colonel Napier was respon¬ 
sible for much of the misery in Persia, resulting 
from the violation of Persian neutrality. Act¬ 
ing as if the Persians had no rights whatever, 
Colonel Napier carried out over six thousand 
kilometers of military raids. If the British be¬ 
lieve that Persian resentment against having their 
country made a battle-field was confined to Rus¬ 
sian, Turkish, and German invaders and did not 
include equally the British, they have made a 
sad miscalculation. Colonel Napier’s speech re¬ 
veals the curious mentality of the British officer 
who has spent most of his life in Asia. Men of 
his type think of Asiatic states and Asiatic races 
305 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


as created for the greater glory of the British 
Empire. The agreement of 1907 had been a 
drawback to the extension of British influence 
throughout Persia. It never occurred to Colonel 
Napier that the agreement was an iniquitous 
document which delivered a proud race to ex¬ 
ploitation and bullying by foreigners. He re¬ 
joiced over the termination of the agreement 
because now Great Britain would have a free 
hand in Persia! 

The ten claims presented by Persia to the 
Peace Conference are intended to make impos¬ 
sible the realization of hopes like those expressed 
by Colonel Napier. In declaring the agreement 
of 1907 null and void, in asking for the revision 
of all treaties with foreign powers and all con¬ 
cessions granted to foreign companies, Persia pro¬ 
poses to be master in her own house. Petroleum 
deposits in Persia give Great Britain no right to 
dictate the foreign and domestic political and 
economic policy of Persia. Nor does British po¬ 
litical control extended over Mesopotamia mean 
that Great Britain should assume control also 
over Persia. 

The Persians pointed out in Paris that the so¬ 
ciety of nations would be simply a hypocritical 
3 ° 6 


PERSIA BEFORE PEACE CONFERENCE 


cloak to conceal political and commercial imper¬ 
ialism unless all nations, great and small, en¬ 
joyed equal rights and privileges from member¬ 
ship in it. The ten claims presented by the Per¬ 
sians are the sine qua non of any nation’s inde¬ 
pendent existence. No discussion or reservation 
concerning any one of them is permissible. The 
termination of the agreement of 1907 does not 
mean a free hand for Great Britain in Persia. 
It means a free hand for Persia in Persia. 


307 


CHAPTER XV 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


‘1~^APA,” said my eldest daughter, her eyes 
wide with enthusiasm, “I have found out 
how to make a big snowball, the kind of 
snowball that gets so large you have to ask other 
kids to help you roll it.” “Found out? Was 
there anything to find out about making a snow¬ 
ball? Did n’t you just make it?” “Oh, no,” she 
explained. “But I know now. You must n’t 
try to bring the snow to the ball. You have to 
start in one place and keep rolling all around— 
and that’s the way your snowball gets big!” 

The Russian Empire is like Christine’s snow¬ 
ball. Moscow was the starting-point. The do¬ 
minions of the Romanoffs in Europe and Asia 
have grown by expansion in every direction from 
Moscow. The land over which the Russian flag 
waved in 1914 was all contiguous territory. In 
seeking outlets to the sea, the Russians made no 
jumps. They added neighboring countries and 
3°8 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


subjected neighboring races until they were 
masters of the largest continuous land areas in 
the world. Checked in one direction, they took 
up the process of snowball-rolling in another. 
Disaster in battle came always on the fringe of 
the empire. Tannenberg would have been like 
Poltawa and Mukden had not the revolution of 
March, 1917, occurred. Since then, the integ¬ 
rity of the Russian Empire has been in jeopardy, 
not because of outside enemies but because of 
abandonment of traditions of foreign policy. 
The Peace Conference dealt with Finland, the 
Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, Poland, Ukrainia, 
Georgia, and Armenia. But the greater part of 
the Russian Empire was in Asia. And the dis¬ 
appearance of the Romanoffs affects vitally the 
future of every Asiatic country. Although few 
seemed to be aware of it at the time, Japan’s war 
on Russia was a challenge to the doctrine of 
European eminent domain. The Russian revolu¬ 
tion of 1917 has turned out to be the renuncia¬ 
tion of that doctrine on the part of Russia. To 
grasp the potentialities of the new situation cre¬ 
ated by the events of Petrograd and Moscow, we 
must review the expansion of Russia in Asia. 

Russia in Asia has a population of only twenty- 

309 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


five millions. But its area is considerably over 
six million square miles—more than a third of 
the continent of Asia, including the islands. 
Without the map before us, it is impossible to 
have an idea of the problems that arise from the 
readjustment of ownership in Asiatic Russia. 
Russian territory is contiguous to Turkey, Per¬ 
sia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan, and sepa¬ 
rated only by a narrow strip of Afghanistan from 
India. Alaska also is very close at hand. 

Russian Asiatic territories comprised Siberia, 
Transcaucasia, the Steppes, and Turkestan. 

Siberia stretches across the northern part of 
the continent from the Ural Mountains to the 
Pacific Ocean. The political separation between 
Asia and Europe does not follow the line of the 
Ural Mountains, as the European governments 
of Perm and Orenburg include territory east of 
the mountains. In western Siberia, the govern¬ 
ments of Tobolsk and Yeniseisk run from the 
Arctic Ocean south to the Steppes and Mongolia. 
Wedged in between them is the government of 
Tomsk. In eastern Siberia is the enormous 
province of Yakutsk bordering the Arctic Ocean 
and very sparsely inhabited. Between Yakutsk 
and Mongolia and Manchuria lie the govern- 
310 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 

ment of Irkutsk and the provinces of Transbai¬ 
kalia and Amur. The province of Kamchatka 
is the northeastern tip of Asia, ending in Cape 
Chukotskoi, which is near the American islands 
of Saint Lawrence and Saint Matthew in 
Behring Straits. The peninsula from which 
Kamchatka takes its name extends southward 
to the Japanese Kurile Islands and helps to en¬ 
close the Sea of Okhotsk. Along the Sea of Ok¬ 
hotsk and the Japan Sea, running for more than 
a thousand miles, is the Maritime Province. In 
the Sea of Okhotsk, separated from the mainland 
by the Gulf of Tartary, lies the long narrow is¬ 
land of Saghalien, half of which was ceded to 
Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth. Vladivos¬ 
tok is in the extreme south of the Maritime 
Province, just north of the Korean frontier and 
across the sea from the largest island of Japan. 
Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians 
had extended administrative control over the por¬ 
tion of Manchuria through which they were 
building their railway to Port Arthur on the Yel¬ 
low Sea, thus commanding the route from Tokio 
to Peking. 

The Trans-Siberian Railway runs through all 
the governments and provinces of Siberia ex- 

311 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


cept Yakutsk and Kamchatka. From Irkutsk 
to Vladivostok it skirts Mongolia and Manchuria. 
A much shorter section* used as the main line, 
runs across Manchuria from Transbaikalia to 
Vladivostok by way of Kharbin. Kharbin is the 
junction point for the branch which runs south 
to Peking. From Mukden, on the Kharbin-Pe- 
king section, branches run south and east to Port 
Arthur and into Korea. 

Western Siberia comprises the governments 
of Tobolsk and Tomsk; eastern Siberia, the gov¬ 
ernments of Yeniseisk and Irkutsk, and the prov¬ 
inces of Yakutsk, Kamchatka, and Transbaikalia. 
Amur, the Maritime Province, and Saghalien 
form a third administration. The area of Si¬ 
beria is a little less than five million square miles. 
Before the building of the Trans-Siberian Rail¬ 
way, the population was about one per square 
mile. Out of five million inhabitants, consider¬ 
ably less than a million were indigenous. And 
three fourths of the population, virtually all 
Russians, were to be found in the two govern¬ 
ments nearest European Russia. Only eight per 
cent, of the population lived in towns. Half of 
the four million Russians were agricultural im¬ 
migrants and their children, who had settled in 
312 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 

Siberia during the last two decades of the nine¬ 
teenth century. 

The Trans-Siberian Railway, built between 
1895 and 1903, caused the population of Si¬ 
beria to double in fifteen years. From 1897 to 
the outbreak of the war, nearly three million Rus¬ 
sian immigrants followed the railway into To¬ 
bolsk and Tomsk, and several hundred thousand 
settled east and west of Irkutsk. In the Mari¬ 
time Province, the population tripled. Vladi¬ 
vostok jumped from thirty thousand to one hun¬ 
dred and twenty thousand. But the immigra¬ 
tion into eastern Siberia was not distinctively 
Russian as in western Siberia. A large pro¬ 
portion, in spite of regulations and efforts to 
discourage it, was Chinese, Manchu, Korean, 
and Japanese. The disastrous result of the 
war with Japan had an effect upon Russian 
colonization in eastern Siberia the full signifi¬ 
cance of which was realized only after the revo¬ 
lution of 1917. When the imperial machine 
crumbled, it was seen that the Russians had little 
hold or influence east of Lake Baikal. Trans¬ 
baikalia, Amur, and the Maritime Province have 
fallen into the hands of Japan. Only in the prov¬ 
ince of Yakutsk, which proclaimed its indepen- 

313 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


dence in May, 1918, has the distinctively Russian 
character of the revolution been maintained. 

On the other hand, western Siberia has re¬ 
mained in the orbit of Russian affairs. The Re¬ 
public of Siberia, which was proclaimed at Tomsk 
in December, 1917, although it adopted a na¬ 
tional flag, white and green, and asserted its in¬ 
dependence from Russia, has shown from its in- 
cipiency its solidarity with the fortunes of the 
Russian Empire. A duma was opened on Feb¬ 
ruary 5, 1918, and a cabinet constituted. But 
instead of pursuing a policy of independent ac¬ 
tion, inspired by local interests, the Siberian Gov¬ 
ernment received among its members political 
refugees from Petrograd, and joined other ele¬ 
ments in Russia in the civil war against the Bol¬ 
shevist Government. 

Whatever may happen to other portions of 
Russia in Asia, there can be no doubt that west¬ 
ern Siberia will remain Russian. The inhabi¬ 
tants are more than ninety per cent. Russian, and 
they feel rightly that their economic future is 
linked inseparably with the fortunes of European 
Russia. Wheat-growing, which they under¬ 
stand, is developing with immigration as rapidly 
and profitably in western Siberia as in western 
3H 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


Canada and the same phenomenon is apparent. 
The bulk of the new settlers come from an adja¬ 
cent wheat-raising country. When order comes 
out of chaos and a strong Russia is again estab¬ 
lished, it is probable also that the Russians will 
find that they have not lost Yeniseisk and Irkutsk. 
The huge province of Yakutsk may remain Rus¬ 
sian or return to Russia, even if temporarily de¬ 
tached. But the provinces north of Mongolia 
and Manchuria and bordering the Japan Sea and 
the sea of Okhotsk belong to the Far East. They 
have been lost to European eminent domain. 
However Europe and America may feel and 
whatever Europe and America may say, Russia’s 
outlet to the Pacific is a vanished dream, and 
Japan will at last realize the fruits of the victory 
of fifteen years ago. Japan has never regarded 
the Treaty of Portsmouth as more than a tem¬ 
porary makeshift. Her chance to upset it came 
when the Entente Allies decided to intervene in 
Siberia against the Bolshevists. 

Transcaucasia consists of six governments, 
three provinces, and two districts, between the 
Caucasus Mountains and Persia and Turkey. 
On the west is the Black Sea, and on the east 
the Caspian Sea. It is thickly populated, having 
3i5 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

seven and a half million inhabitants for an area 
of less than one hundred thousand square miles, 
much of which is mountainous. Mountains, in 
fact, cover most of the territory except the region 
bordering on the Caspian Sea, which contains the 
famous oil-fields. At the point where Turkey, 
Persia, and Transcaucasia meet is Mount Ara¬ 
rat. In the cradle of the human race are found 
more racial and religious differences than any¬ 
where else in the world. Transcaucasia boasts 
of sixty separate races, professing various brands 
of Mohammedanism and Christianity. 1 In al¬ 
most every center is a large sprinkling of Jews. 

Except on the Caspian Sea coast where the 
Russians control both banks, the frontier between 
Transcaucasia and Persia follows the Araxes 
River from Mount Ararat to the sea. It is an 
excellent natural frontier, and is an historical 
and racial frontier as well: for Georgia lies north 
of the Araxes. The frontier with Turkey, on 
the other hand, is a conventional line established 

1 There are fifty-eight in the province of Daghestan alone. 
In the summer of 1919, the tribes of Daghestan were assert¬ 
ing their right to complete independence according to the Wil¬ 
sonian principles. They sought the aid of the British occupying 
army against one another, against the Bolshevists, against 
Denikine, and against the Georgians. 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 

after the war of 1877. It is an artificial frontier 
which cut the Armenian race in half. 

Extension of Russian sovereignty over Trans¬ 
caucasia was a long and difficult process. After 
the country was wrested from Turkey in two 
wars, it had to be won over again from its own 
inhabitants. Russian penetration into Trans¬ 
caucasia was the logical result of centuries of ex¬ 
pansion at the expense of the Turks. Once the 
Black Sea, which had been a Turkish lake, was 
reached, the Russians wanted to make it a Rus¬ 
sian lake. And from Transcaucasia Russian 
foreign policy saw two chances of an outlet to 
the sea—through Persia to the Persian Gulf, and 
through Asiatic Turkey to the Mediterranean. 
It was in the natural process of empire-building 
that Transcaucasia became Russian territory, 
and the vision of the conquerors was always be¬ 
yond frontiers fixed by treaties. But Trans¬ 
caucasia in itself turned out to be a rich pos¬ 
session. The Baku oil-fields became in the sec¬ 
ond decade of the twentieth century the most pro¬ 
ductive in the world, giving an annual yield larger 
than those of Rumania, Galicia, and Mexico com¬ 
bined, and reaching the astonishing total of one 
fourth of the yield of the United States. Cotton- 

317 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


production had attained 1,750,000,000 pounds 
in the year before the revolution. There were 
twice as many horses and cattle, three times as 
many pigs, and twenty times as many sheep as in 
Poland. Nearly nine million acres of forest 
land were in exploitation. Enough coal for lo¬ 
cal consumption was found. 

Justified by the economic value of the country 
fully as much as by political considerations, Rus¬ 
sia was able to extend her railway system in 
Transcaucasia, develop the ports of Batum and 
Baku, and establish an excellent steamship service 
on the Caspian Sea. Batum and Baku were con¬ 
nected by a railway which crossed the isthmus. 
From Tiflis a line was run south through the 
mountains, which bifurcated to the Turkish and 
Persian frontiers. The western branch, running 
through Kars, ended at the frontier of Turkey. 
The southern branch had its terminus at Tabriz, 
capital of the Persian province of Azerbaijan. 

During the first years of the recent war, the 
Russians maintained their hold in northern 
Persia, and succeeded in joining hands with the 
British north of Bagdad. Their Asiatic cam¬ 
paign against Turkey was crowned with success 
in 1916, after many vicissitudes. Trebizond, 
318 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis were occupied, thus 
completing the conquest of Armenia begun in the 
war of 1877. But the revolution of March, 1917, 
demoralized the Russian army in Persia and Tur¬ 
key. Azerbaijan and Armenia were abandoned. 
The situation grew worse after the Bolshevists 
came into power. By the Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk, the Russians abandoned not only their 
recent conquests, but also the Transcaucasian 
territories incorporated after the war of 1877. 
The Petrograd Soviet declared the disinterested¬ 
ness of Russia in Persia. Disregarding the fron¬ 
tiers decided upon at Brest-Litovsk, the Turks, 
after the occupation of Batum, pushed across 
Transcaucasia to Baku, which was held by the 
Armenians, reinforced by a small British de¬ 
tachment that had come across the Caspian Sea 
from Persia. Against overwhelming numbers, 
the Armenians could not hold. The British 
evacuated Baku. 

But the triumph of the Turks in Transcau¬ 
casia was short-lived. General Allenby s vic¬ 
tories in Palestine and Syria led to the capitula¬ 
tion of Turkey. By the terms of the armistice, 
the Turks withdrew to the frontier of 1914* 
The British reoccupied Baku, and during the 

319 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Peace Conference established garrisons in dif¬ 
ferent cities of Transcaucasia. In the last year 
of the war, however, two independent states 
arose in Transcaucasia: Armenia and Georgia. 
Both states declared their independence from 
Russia, were forced to treat with the Turks and 
the Germans before the armistices, and sent dele¬ 
gates to the Peace Conference in Paris. 

A large portion of the Russian forces in the 
Asiatic campaign had been Armenians. To their 
ardor and courage, the Russians owed what suc¬ 
cess they had against the Turks. The Rus¬ 
sian Armenians possessed an incentive. They 
marched to free their fellow-Armenians from 
massacre and deportation. They had been in¬ 
flamed by the sight and pitiful stories of several 
hundred thousand refugees who had succeeded 
in reaching Transcaucasia, fleeing before the 
Turks. Consequently, when the Russian Army 
broke up, the Armenians preserved their disci¬ 
pline against all attempts of the Bolshevists, and 
were the only force upon which the Allies could 
count in southwestern Asia during the last year 
of the war. The two million Armenians of 
Transcaucasia, increased by several hundred 
thousand refugees from Turkey, persisted in their 
3 2 ° 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 

loyalty to Russia until the Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk delivered them to the Turks. Then they 
formed their own state, which succeeded in main¬ 
taining itself during the period of anarchy and 
famine that Bolshevism brought upon the Rus¬ 
sian Empire. The Armenian Republic of the 
Caucasus comprises the government of Erivan, 
the southern part of the government of Tiflis, 
the southwestern part of the government of Yel- 
isavetpol, and the province of Kars with the 
exception of the region situated in the north of 
Ardahan. At the Peace Conference, speaking 
before the Council of Ten, M. Aharonian, dele¬ 
gate of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus, 
stated that the two and a half million Armenians 
in Transcaucasia wanted to cast in their for¬ 
tunes with the Armenians of Turkey to form a 
Greater Armenia, stretching from the Black Sea 
to the Mediterranean. 

Prince Sumbatoff, delegate of the Georgian 
Government, told the Allied representatives that 
the Georgians, like the Armenians, had hoped 
that the Russian revolution would result in the 
transformation of Russia into a federal state, in 
which the allogeneous races would enjoy auton¬ 
omy. The Georgians were not separatists. But 
321 



THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Bolshevism destroyed the hope of seeing the Rus¬ 
sian people pass from czarism to self-govern¬ 
ment. The Georgians took the lead, assisted by 
the Armenians and the Tartars, in forming a pro¬ 
visional government for all Transcaucasia. But 
the union established at first between the dif¬ 
ferent elements was broken up by Bolshevist and 
Turkish propaganda. The Tartars took sides 
with the Turks after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
When Georgians and Armenians refused to ac¬ 
cept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Turks cap¬ 
tured Kars and Batum, and massacred and 
starved the Armenians and Georgians into treat¬ 
ing with them. The Germans intervened in 
June, 1918, ostensibly to save the Christians of 
the Transcaucasia from the fanaticism and an¬ 
archy aroused by the propaganda and the inva¬ 
sion of their own allies. Realizing that coop¬ 
eration with the Tartars was no longer possible, 
and not wanting to accept the alternative of be¬ 
coming vassals of the Germans, Armenians and 
Georgians dissolved the common government they 
had established at Tiflis, agreed upon a division 
of territory, and each element proclaimed its in¬ 
dependence. If Georgia is allowed to remain an 
independent government, it will cover the greater 
322 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


part of Transcaucasia, and lie between Armenia 
and Russia. Many Armenians will remain un¬ 
der Georgian rule. But the Armenians are 
ready to accept this in reason of the great hopes 
awakened by reunion with the Armenians of 
Turkey. Similarly, the Georgians have con¬ 
sented to make the “sacrifice” of what were his¬ 
torically Georgian territories—portions of the 
Governments of Tiflis, Erivan, and Yelisavetpol. 

United to Turkish Armenia and Cilicia, there 
is a future for the Armenians of Transcaucasia. 
But one wonders whether the Georgians will be 
able to control the territories they have taken in 
hand. Certainly their independence can be safe¬ 
guarded only by accepting a mandatory of the 
great powers, as the Armenians are prepared to 
do. For while the population of the country 
claimed by the Georgians is considerably more 
than four millions, their number is 1,350,000. 
They are outnumbered by the Turco-Tartars, and 
have 300,000 Persians to contend with. As the 
Persians live in territories contiguous to Persia, 
the Persians have invoked the principle of nation¬ 
alities at the Peace Conference to secure rectifica¬ 
tions of frontier at the expense of both the 
Georgian and Armenian republics. Transcau- 

323 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


casia is a country in which the various elements 
lived in comparative security and prosperity un¬ 
der the strong hand of the Russian Government. 
The Grand Duke Alexander told me recently that 
the races were so numerous and so divided by 
religion and traditional feuds that putting one 
over the other would never work. The grand 
duke was born in Transcaucasia, and lived in 
Tiflis, where his father was governor-general. 
He points out that no element in the Caucasus has 
a numerical or cultural preponderance. Chris¬ 
tians belong to different churches: Mohamme¬ 
dans are Sunnites and Shiites. The impractica¬ 
bility of forming an independent government in 
Transcaucasia, along national lines such as the 
Georgians have proposed, is demonstrated by the 
hopeless mixture of races. The experiment of 
forming a government through union of Ar¬ 
menians, Georgians, and Tartars failed. Tiflis 
is a city of nearly 350,000 inhabitants. It has 
no marked racial character. Railway and oil¬ 
field development was due to the intervention and 
control of Russia. 

Decisions taken by the Peace Conference con¬ 
cerning Transcaucasia or by the peoples of the 
country themselves are bound to be temporary. 

3 2 4 



AfOS COWi 


IS TANTiNOPLCi 


\\ORENBURG 


KHABAROVSK 


OMSK 


SMTMH-, 


Vrkutsi 


(DATU) 


SARB/N 


* T/Kl/S ] 


'VLADIVOSTOK 


■/Ira/ 

sea 


russ\an Turkestan 


PORT\SAID 


'•JERUSALEM 


■ LINDEN 


'OHIO. 


'.TABRIZ 


(RASNOVODSK 


KALCAN 

\PEK!N 


r ASHKCND 

._ MAN 012 HAN 


BOKHARA 


'■fiAGOAQ 


V OA!h£N 


SAMARKAND 


nS/NCTAO 


NAGASAKI 


'huSHH 


HERAT 


•PESHAWAR 


lANGHAl 


HAHGCMOWi 


AHORC 


\HANKOW 


*CHANGSHA 


CELLING 


1C A NOW 


KARACHI 


JAIPUR 


YUNNAN 


CAWKPORE' 


'CANTO/ 


iHONGKONG 


\HMAOABAD, 

*BAROBA~~ 


{A OEM 


\CALCURTA 


'TTACONl 


’HONG* 


mmmmVTVI' ha "°'. 


BOMBAY 


PHIL IPPINE 


MANILA 


THE RAILWAYS OF ASIA 


)AAVCl 


LESSER LINES 


MAIN LINES 


WLKfK 


1ACRA.S 


NUMB LR or SQUAR E MILES 

ASIA INCLUOINC 
MALAYSIA . 17300000 


POPULATION 


RAILWAYS 

APPROXIMATE N c or MILLS 


\iC0N 


69.000 

29000 

23000 

375000 

217000 


918.324 000 


AFRICA.11800000 

AUSTRALASIA 3.448.000 

AMERICA_17.208000 

EUROPE.3800000 


126.734000 
5 881000 
149.99+000 
405 759000 


ENGLISH MILES 


LONC/TOPC 

































































RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 

The Russian element in the Caucasus numbers 
more than three millions. Although mostly in 
and north of the mountains that divide Europe 
from Asia, it is still a formidable link to bind to 
Russia all of the lands between the Black Sea 
and the Caspian Sea. Does not the definite po¬ 
litical status of Transcaucasia depend upon the 
evolution of Russia? When the Russians form 
again a stable central government, there is little 
likelihood that the whole of Transcaucasia will 
remain outside. The Persians may get back the 
Araxes River boundary. The Armenians may 
find themselves happily settled in a durable rela¬ 
tionship with the Armenians of Turkey. But 
from Batum to Baku, the territory on both sides 
of the railway and in the Kura River valley, in¬ 
cluding Yelisavetpol, will drift back to the po¬ 
litical union of pre-Bolshevist days. 

The British, however, failed to recognize this 
fact, and are playing a game in the Caucasus 
which would be roundly condemned by British 
public opinion, were the facts known in England. 
A few would protest because of their conviction 
that Russia will one day be strong again and will 
not forgive the disloyalty of her allies of 1914: 
many more would protest on the ground of hu- 

325 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

manity and fair play. The British Foreign Office 
and War Office, working together, decided at the 
beginning of 1919 to use the military occupancy 
to detach definitely Transcaucasia from Russia. 
In this way, the Baku oil-fields could be controlled, 
and a barrier erected against a possible renewal 
of Russian penetration into Persia. The British 
did not hesitate to make friends with the Tartars 
at the expense of the Armenians. Under British 
guidance, the Tartars formed the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, comprising the eastern side of the 
Caucasus and including the oil-fields, and sent 
representatives to the Peace Conference. Gen¬ 
eral Thompson appointed a Tartar, who had been 
a notorious Turkish agent, Governor-General of 
Karabagh, a province where the Armenians have 
preserved their independence for more than a 
thousand years. His successor, General Shuttle- 
worth, employed force to aid the Tartars in dis¬ 
arming the Armenians. Then the Tartars in the 
neighborhood of Schuscha massacred the Armen¬ 
ians. The British had staff officers with General 
Denikine, aiding in the offensive against the Bol¬ 
shevists. But at the same time, other British 
staff officers were aiding Tartars and Georgians 
to prepare to resist an attempt of General Deni- 
326 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


kine to reestablish Russian authority in the Cau¬ 
casus. This tortuous and double-faced policy, 
repugnant to English character, shows how men 
can be carried away by and sacrifice everything to 
the imperial idea. Whatever helps the empire is 
justifiable. 

The Steppes and Turkestan are portions of 
Russia in Asia totally different from huge Siberia 
and tiny Transcaucasia. With a different back¬ 
ground and presenting different features and 
problems, their future is much more a matter of 
speculation. Their political relationship with the 
Russian Empire and with the other countries of 
Asia may not be decided for years. 

The four provinces of the Steppes—Uralsk, 
Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk—form 
with Turkestan what is generally called central 
Asia. Uralsk and Turgai, lying between the 
European governments of Samara and Orenburg 
on the north and Turkestan on the south, are the 
home of the Little Horde. Akmolinsk and Semi¬ 
palatinsk, lying between the Siberian govern¬ 
ments of Tobolsk and Tomsk on the north and 
Turkestan on the south, are the home of the Mid¬ 
dle Horde. The railway from Samara to Turkes¬ 
tan crosses Turgai and a little corner of Uralsk. 

327 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

From Novo Nikolaevsk on the Tomsk section of 
the Trans-Siberian Railway, a branch connects 
up Semipalatinsk. 

The Steppes have a population of four millions, 
very clearly divided. In the western part of 
Uralsk, in the valley of the Ural River and on the 
shore of the Caspian Sea, live the Ural Cossacks. 
Their fisheries, run on a strictly communal basis, 
are the richest in the world, with the greatest fish- 
market in the world near at hand. Cossacks are 
found also in the corner of Turgai, where they 
engage in cattle-raising, and in Semipalatinsk, 
where they devote themselves to bee-culture. In 
northern and middle Akmolinsk, owing to the 
proximity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and to 
river transportation northward into the govern¬ 
ment of Tobolsk, several hundred thousand Rus¬ 
sians have colonized the rich plains and are do¬ 
ing splendidly with grain. The mountains con¬ 
tain copper, coal, and gold, which attract Euro¬ 
peans. In the northern part of Semipalatinsk, 
Russian colonization has penetrated along the 
valley of the Irtish River during the past twenty 
years. 

Eastern Uralsk, most of Turgai and Semi¬ 
palatinsk, and the southern part of Akmolinsk are 

328 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


inhabited by the Kirghiz, who are Mohamme¬ 
dan Turanians. Over ninety per cent, are no¬ 
mads. They devote themselves to cattle-, horse-, 
and sheep-raising. The dry climate, hot in sum¬ 
mer and cold in winter, makes water rare, and 
forestation dwarfed and scarce, even in the moun¬ 
tains. Long stretches of sandy deserts, and a 
rich growth of grass in the spring, complete the 
features of a country not unlike some of our best 
American cattle-range sections. As in our West, 
the possibilities of extensive agriculture depend 
upon irrigation, and those of profitable mining 
upon means of transportation. Owing to its geo¬ 
graphical position, Uralsk may in time become 
Europeanized. The southern half of the other 
three provinces, however, belong racially and 
economically to Turkestan. 

From the historical and geographical point of 
view, Turkestan is the country of deserts and 
plateaus and mountains stretching for a thou¬ 
sand miles east of the Caspian Sea. On the 
north are the Steppes ; on the south, Persia and 
Afghanistan; on the east, China. Two great 
rivers, which have their source in the mountains 
of Central Asia, flow across Turkestan into the 
Aral Sea. The Oxus River (Amu Daria or 

329 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Jihun), after forming the boundary line from its 
source between Russia in Asia and Afghanistan, 
flows north through Bokhara and Khiva. The 
Jaxartes River (Syr Daria or Sihun) consider¬ 
ably farther to the east, has its source in the 
Thian Shan Mountains on the western frontier 
of China. From the administrative point of 
view, the Russian Government has narrowed 
down Turkestan to mean the four provinces of 
Syr Dariisk, Samarcand, Ferghana, and Semiret- 
chinsk. West and south of official Turkestan are 
the protected states of Khiva and Bokhara, and 
the virtually uninhabited Pamir district. The 
enormous region between the Caspian Sea and 
the Aral Sea, and between the protected states 
and the Persian and Afghan frontier, south of the 
Oxus, is called the Transcaspian Province. 

The northern part of the Transcaspian Prov¬ 
ince is a plateau. The southern part is mostly 
the desert of Khiva. But during the last twenty- 
five years, the successful accomplishment of an 
ambitious railway building program has brought 
the Transcaspian Province into political and 
economic prominence. From Krasnovodsk, a 
port on the Caspian Sea opposite Baku, the Trans¬ 
caspian Railway skirts the northern frontier of 
330 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


Persia through the country of the Tekke Turko¬ 
mans to Merv. From Merv, a railway runs 
northeast to Bokhara and Kokand. Between 
Bokhara and Kokand it is joined up with the 
Samara-Tashkent Railway. A branch runs 
south from Merv to the Afghan frontier. It 
would have been possible to connect Meshed in 
the Khorasan province of Persia and Herat in 
Afghanistan with the Russian Transcaspian 
Railway without much additional mileage. But 
the British feared Russia. In spite of the eco¬ 
nomic benefits to the countries concerned, they 
would tolerate railways, built by their rivals, 
neither in Persia nor Afghanistan! 

Semiretchinsk, bordering China, is inhabited 
mostly by Kirghiz, who are engaged in cattle¬ 
raising. But since 1900, a hundred thousand 
Russians have settled there, attracted by agricul¬ 
tural possibilities. Cereals and fruits thrive. 
The Russians had planned before the war to ex¬ 
tend the railway south from Semipalatinsk across 
the province to Tashkent. When this project is 
put through and when a railway is built into 
China, Semiretchinsk will become a thriving coun¬ 
try capable of supporting a population of millions. 
In area, Syr Dariisk is the largest of the Turkes- 
33i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tan provinces. It contains, however, enormous 
stretches of desert. The railway from Samara 
runs through the province following the river 
from which it takes its name. Tashkent, in the 
southeastern corner, is the ninth largest city of 
the Russian Empire, and the largest city except 
Tiflis of Russia in Asia. Tashkent has become 
an important trading-center again, as it used to 
be in the days of caravans. With the develop¬ 
ment of cotton-production in central Asia, the 
Russians have had in mind making Tashkent a 
center for raw cotton and textiles for the Chinese, 
Afghanistan, Persian, and Russian markets. 
Samarcand and Ferghana, both linked up with 
the Central Asian and Transcaspian railways, 
are small mountainous provinces which represent 
the southern limit of direct Russian administra¬ 
tive control. They are conquests of the nine¬ 
teenth century and are inhabited mostly by Kir¬ 
ghiz and Uzbegs. South of Ferghana is the 
mountainous and only partly explored region of 
Pamir, where the frontiers of Russia, Great 
Britain, and China have been agreed upon in un¬ 
inhabited regions, snow-bound for the greater 
part of the year. 

There remain in central Asia, under Russian 
332 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 


protection, the native states of Bokhara and 
Khiva, both inhabited by Uzbegs. They are all 
that is left of the great empire of Timur. The 
two countries have seen their boundaries gradu¬ 
ally narrowed down to the valley of the Oxus 
River through Russian encroachments from the 
north, the west, and the south. A large part of 
the Transcaspian Province has been formed by 
annexations from Khiva and of the Turkestan 
provinces by annexations from Bokhara. After 
the Holy War of 1866, Bokhara lost Syr Dariisk 
and became a vassal state of Russia in 1873. 
The emir agreed to admit no foreigners without 
Russian passports. The Khan of Khiva ac¬ 
knowledged the supremacy of the czar in 1870. 
In 1872, the Russians invaded the khanate and 
exacted a heavy indemnity, which could not be 
paid. It was still being liquidated at the time 
of the Russian revolution in 1917. The exten¬ 
sion of the Russian railways, while bringing eco¬ 
nomic prosperity to the protected states, com¬ 
pleted their political dependence upon Russia. 
The forward march of the Russians into Khiva 
and Bokhara, occurring only a few years before 
the Turco-Russian War of 1877, made the British 
feel that the Crimean War might have to be 
333 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


fought over again. The extension of Russian 
railways in central Asia and Russian interven¬ 
tion in Persia kept alive British apprehensions. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century a war 
between Great Britain and Russia seemed inev¬ 
itable. It was avoided only by the Convention 
of 1907. 

In April, 1917, the Emir of Bokhara and the 
Khan of Kniva threw off the Russian yoke and 
promised a democratic constitution to their peo¬ 
ple. The two rulers announced that they in¬ 
tended to take back the portions of Turkestan 
and the Transcaspian Province wrested from 
them by the Russians. Bolshevism made its ap¬ 
pearance in central Asia at the end of 1917. A 
Soviet government was set up at Tashkent. 
Merv announced its adhesion to the Lenine 
regime. At the time of the last Turkish advance, 
it was reported that the Turks were forming a 
pan-Turanian league, to which the central Asiatic 
emirates and Afghanistan were ready to adhere. 
But after the collapse of Turkey, the British were 
able to send a force to Merv. Through Habibul- 
lah Khan, Emir of Afghanistan, the British tried 
to capture the league of the emirs, and bring cen- 
334 


RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA 

tral Asia under the political influence of the Gov¬ 
ernment of India. But in February, 1919, Ha- 
bibullah Khan was assassinated. His successor, 
Amanullah Khan, although he rigorously pun¬ 
ished the murderers, soon showed anti-British 
tendencies. The British were compelled to evac¬ 
uate Merv, and seem to have lost their temporary 
influence over the khanates. 

As in the Caucasus, the dreams of British im¬ 
perialists are doomed to disappointment. Bol¬ 
shevism is a passing symptom. But the forces of 
order in Russia, when the empire is reconstituted, 
will never consent to the fait accompli of the ex¬ 
tension of British influence through the tem¬ 
porary misfortunes of Russia. On the other 
hand, if Russian imperialism does not revive, an¬ 
other danger confronts the British. The na¬ 
tionalist movements in Turkestan are bound to 
have a repercussion among the other Turanian 
and Iranian Moslems and among the Moslems of 
India. It will then be realized by the Russo¬ 
phobes among the British imperialists that the 
maintenance of European control in western and 
central Asia depended upon a strong Russian im¬ 
perialism successful in extinguishing foyers of 
335 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


nationalist agitation. The day may come when 
Indians, Afghans, and Persians will join Uzbegs 
and Kirghiz in challenging European eminent do¬ 
main. 


336 


CHAPTER XVI 


THE ISLAND EXTENSION OF JAPAN 


F ROM Singapore to Kamchatka, the eastern 
coast of Asia is guarded by a succession of 
islands. They shut off the Pacific Ocean 
and form stepping-stones between Asia and Aus¬ 
tralia. The Dutch* East Indies extend over most 
of these islands. Great Britain, however, holds 
the northern coast of Borneo, Portugal, the east¬ 
ern end of Timor, and (up to the recent war) 
Germany had the eastern part of New Guinea 
and small groups of islands east of the Philip¬ 
pines. The Philippine Islands, the link between 
the Dutch East Indies and the coast of China, 
changed from Spanish to American sovereignty 
at the end of the nineteenth century. 

An island empire takes to islands. But when 
Japan became a world power, Great Britain was 
in full possession of Australia and New Zealand, 
and the other islands over which Japan might 
have extended her economic and political control 
337 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


were already within the colonial spheres of Euro¬ 
pean powers. The opportunity of Japan for 
island expansion, even in her own waters, seemed 
scant. On the south, between Formosa and Ki- 
usiu, administrative control was asserted of the 
Luchu group and the Saki Sima group during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Out 
in the Pacific, southwest of Japan, sovereignty 
was proclaimed also over the Bonin Islands. On 
the north, the Kurile Islands, the link between 
Japan and the southern tip of Kamchatka, were 
ceded to Japan by Russia, bift at the expense of 
waiving the rights of Japan in Saghalien Island, 
historically and geographically one of the Japa¬ 
nese group. 

By the wars with China and Russia, Japan 
secured Formosa and took back the southern half 
of Saghalien. The annexation of Korea gave 
her complete mastery of all the islands in the 
channel between Japan and the mainland, and 
removed anxiety over European efforts to find 
naval bases and coaling-stations. During the re¬ 
cent world war, Japan conquered from Germany 
the Mariana, the Marshall, the Caroline, and the 
Pelew Islands. 

Formosa has an area of nearly fourteen thou- 
338 


THE ISLAND EXTENSION OF JAPAN 

sand square miles and a population of three and 
three quarter millions. Between Formosa and 
the mainland of China, the Pescadores group of 
twelve islands has been attached to Formosa. In 
twenty years, the Japanese built three hundred 
and fifty miles of railways, and constructed good 
roads everywhere. Tea is a flourishing industry, 
and cane sugar has prospered. Refineries have 
been developed on the island. Although trade 
with Japan has been profitable and mining a 
source of great wealth, military expenditures are 
so heavy that the island has never paid its way. 

Japan has had a bitter experience with the 
white man's burden in Formosa. The Chinese 
never attempted to extend administrative control 
over portions of the island inhabitated by the 
aborigines. The effort of the Japanese to do so 
cost them dearly. In the old days, the aborigines, 
savage head-hunting Malays, were left undis¬ 
turbed. The Formosans put up with raids as a 
part of the natural order of things, just as they 
suffered incursions from wild animals. The Chi¬ 
nese had a system of frontier guards which used 
to try to prevent the savages from coming down 
on the plains. For fifteen years, the Japanese 
were content with this system, but they worked it 
339 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


more scientifically. They placed two hundred 
and fifty miles of charged barbed wire along the 
frontier, and put batteries in strategic positions. 

In 1910, however, the government decided to 
do away with the constant menace from the 
aboriginal districts by subjugating the Malay 
tribes. A sum of seven and a half million dollars 
was voted for this purpose and a plan of cam¬ 
paign sketched out to extend over five years. In 
1914, it was reported that five hundred and fifty 
out of six hundred and seventy tribes had made 
their submission, and that twenty-five hundred 
students were in the schools for aborigines. 
This courageous undertaking has opened up rich 
forests and mining areas, and has increased 
greatly the value of plantation lands near the 
old frontiers. It is a striking fact that the Jap¬ 
anese, owing to the willingness of soldiers and 
police to risk their lives, have accomplished far 
more in Formosa than the Dutch in Sumatra and 
Borneo. 

The Japanese have had trouble also with the 
Formosans, who have risen in insurrection nine 
times since the Chinese Republic was first 
declared at Canton. It is difficult to secure 
accurate information about the revolutionary 
340 


THE ISLAND EXTENSION OF JAPAN 

movements in Formosa. The insurrections of 
1913 and 1915 were exceedingly serious. Japa¬ 
nese were assassinated and public buildings 
burned. In 1913, the ringleaders were arrested 
before the troubles had spread far. In 1915, 
nearly fifteen hundred natives were brought be¬ 
fore the military courts, of whom eight hundred 
and sixty-six were sentenced to capital punish¬ 
ment. Upon the occasion of his coronation, the 
present emperor commuted all except ninety- 
five of these sentences. From the way the in¬ 
surrections spread, it is evident that the Japanese 
are no more popular in Formosa than in Korea, 
in spite of the security and prosperity and good 
administration they have brought to the island. 

In 1909, an official effort was started to pro¬ 
mote Japanese colonization in Formosa. It has 
hardly been more successful than that in Korea. 
There are only a hundred and fifty thousand Jap¬ 
anese in Formosa—four per cent, of the popula¬ 
tion. Nor has Formosa developed into an im¬ 
portant rice-producing country for Japan. The 
surplus of rice-production over the needs of the 
population is only fifteen per cent.! 

Saghalien is an enormous island, narrow and 
mountainous. The southern half of it, ceded 


34i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


back to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth, con¬ 
tains a dwindling native population. The planta¬ 
tions abandoned by the Russians have been taken 
up only partially by Japanese settlers who, after 
fifteen years, number seventeen thousand. The 
Japanese Government estimates that while four 
hundred and thirty thousand cho (a cho is little 
less than two and a half acres) are available for 
agriculture and pasturage, the Japanese settlers 
are cultivating five thousand five hundred cho. 
Stock-breeding, forest exploitation, coal, mineral 
oil, iron, and gold are all possibilities in Saghalien. 
But they need capitalists and laborers rather than 
settlers. In the summer, some seventy thousand 
Japanese go over to Saghalien to work. The 
winters are too cold. It is doubtful if Saghalien 
will ever attract Japanese immigrants. At the 
Conference of Paris, I spoke to the Japanese 
delegates about the possibility of getting a com¬ 
plete title to the whole of Saghalien and to the 
Maritime Province of Siberia as well. “Too 
cold,” was their laconic reply. 

The colonial possessions of Germany in the Pa¬ 
cific lay north of Australia and east of the Philip¬ 
pines. Kaiser Wilhelm’s Land, the Bismarck 
Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands, directly 
342 



343 







THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

north of Australia, were conquered by the French 
and Australians. The New Zealanders occupied 
the German possessions in Samoa. The other 
groups of islands—Pelew, Mariana, Caroline, and 
Marshall—were occupied by the Japanese Navy. 
The Marshall Islands belonged to Germany since 
1885, and were administered originally by a pri¬ 
vate company. The other three groups were 
bought after the Spanish-American War, with the 
exception of the largest of the Mariana Islands, 
Guam, which the United States kept for a naval 
station. These islands are not rich nor extensive 
in area. There is no chance for Japanese emi¬ 
gration to them. But their strategic position in 
the Pacific is unrivaled. During the war and 
at the Conference at Paris, Australia bitterly 
opposed the cession of former German islands to 
Japan. In order to avoid unpleasantness, Japan 
handed over to Australia, after the capture, Yap 
Island, which lies between the Pelews and Ma¬ 
rianas. The Australians regarded this as es¬ 
sential to them from the fact that it is the relay 
station for the Hongkong-Sydney cable and 
steamship lines. By the Treaty of Versailles, 
however, Germany ceded the islands to the Allies. 
A compromise between Great Britain and Japan 
344 


THE ISLAND EXTENSION OF JAPAN 

left to Japan all the German islands north of the 
equator. 

The island extension of Japan has done virtu¬ 
ally nothing to provide for her surplus popula¬ 
tion, and little for her trade. And if there is 
to be a real society of nations, the preventive 
and positive strategic advantage of Japanese ex¬ 
pansion in the Pacific since 1895 will count for 
nothing. Australians and New Zealanders are 
anxious, all the same. They do not care to have 
stepping-stones from Asia in the hands of those 
who might be tempted to use them. But if Aus¬ 
tralia and New Zealand, like the rest of the world 
that is not thickly populated, are to remain the 
white man’s preserves, where will the Japanese 
go? 


345 


CHAPTER XVII 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


T HE peninsula of Korea juts out from the 
mainland of Asia toward Japan between 
the Japan Sea and the Yellow Sea. The 
Japan Sea is as important to Japan as is the North 
Sea to Great Britain. The Yellow Sea is as im¬ 
portant to China as is the stretch of the Atlantic 
between Boston and Newport News to the United 
States. Korea has been called a dagger pointed 
at the heart of Japan. This expression is no ex¬ 
aggeration. Were Korea in the hands of any 
European power, the menace to Japan would be 
as the menace to Great Britain of Belgium in the 
hands of Germany. A European power en¬ 
sconced in Korea could separate Japan from 
China and control the outlet of northern China 
to the Pacific. 

For many centuries, Korea, like Japan, was a 
closed country. Attempts of missionaries and 
traders to penetrate Korea ended in disaster. 
34b 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 

The capital fact of contemporary history in the 
Far East is that Japan was open to foreign in¬ 
fluence several decades before the Koreans were 
forced to allow foreigners to settle in their coun¬ 
try. This fact alone frustrated the complete tri¬ 
umph of European eminent domain in Asia. For 
when the Koreans were called upon to incur the 
fate of other weak and backward Asiatic nations, 
the Japanese had become strong enough to have a 
foreign policy of their own and to anticipate the 
insatiable ambitions of European imperialism. 
The fear that Russia or Great Britain would get 
control of Korea led Japan to interfere in the in¬ 
ternal affairs of the Hermit Kingdom, to fight 
two costly wars, and finally to annex the whole 
peninsula. 

Between 1876 and 1892, the ports and interior 
of Korea were opened to foreign settlement and 
trade and missionary effort by treaties with 
Japan, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary. 
Immediately, diplomatic agents of the powers be¬ 
gan the traditional game of intriguing for ex¬ 
clusive concessions and political influence. As 
elsewhere in Asia, their efforts were powerfully 
helped by civil war and administrative anarchy, 
347 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

which they encouraged as much as they possibly 
could. Plots were hatched in foreign legations 
and unsuccessful revolutionaries found refuge in 
the legations. Under cover of the confusion— 
altogether natural—of the first decade of Korea’s 
entrance into the family of nations, the European 
powers tried to secure concessions for naval sta¬ 
tions and to block the efforts of others in this di¬ 
rection. Thoroughly alarmed, Japan championed 
the complete independence of Korea and opposed 
every scheme of Europeans to instal themselves 
in the peninsula. When they saw that they could 
accomplish nothing against Japanese influence at 
Seoul, the powers decided to work through Pe¬ 
king. Was not China the suzerain of Korea? 
Chinese statesmen were susceptible to sugges¬ 
tions from all sides that they assert the rights of 
China in Korea. Through fear and distrust of 
Japan, the Koreans were betrayed into the fatal 
mistake of playing up to China against Japan. 

A situation that had been developing for years 
came to a crisis in May, 1894. The Korean Gov¬ 
ernment appealed to China for aid in putting 
down a serious insurrection. Observing the 
terms of her agreement with Japan, China noti¬ 
fied Japan that two thousand soldiers were being 
348 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


sent into Korea. China did not ask the coopera¬ 
tion of Japan, however, and did not wait before 
sending the troops to see what attitude Japan 
would take. Japan retaliated by landing an army 
of twelve thousand in Korea to occupy the capital 
and the ports. 

A new era began in the history of the Far East. 
In their relations with each other, Japan and 
China had come to a point where they would have 
to adopt a common foreign policy in regard to 
European influences or become enemies. Japan 
had long been uneasy and resentful over the fail¬ 
ure of China to resist encroachments upon Chi¬ 
nese sovereignty. Against the protests of Japan, 
China had been granting concessions to the great 
powers that threatened to put the Far East under 
European control. Chinese statesmen refused to 
see how their weakness and corruption were com¬ 
promising the interests of Japan and the entire 
Far East at the same time as the interests of 
China. The worst fault of China had been to 
allow Russia to get a strong foothold on the coast 
of the Japan Sea north of Korea. Korea became 
the test case. The Japanese did not propose to 
permit Chinese suzerainty in Korea to be the 
means of balking the efforts of Japan to prevent 
349 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the granting of concessions to European powers 
in the peninsula between the Yellow Sea and the 
Japan Sea. Consequently, Japan invited China 
to join in formulating and carrying out a program 
of reforms in Korea. The program was reason¬ 
able and practicable. The Chinese could find no 
objection to it. But they raised the point of sov¬ 
ereignty. What right had Japan to ask to par¬ 
ticipate in the execution of reforms in a country 
where she was a stranger? Peking answered 
that before discussion of any such program could 
be entertained, the Japanese would have to with¬ 
draw the army that had been sent into Korea, 
without justification or permission of the Koreans 
or the Chinese. Coupled with this demand was 
the declaration that Korea must be left to reform 
herself. 

Thereupon, Japan declared war against China. 
This first manifestation to the world of Japanese 
military and naval power, in the summer of 1894, 
ended in the decisive defeat of China. The pow¬ 
ers intervened to revise the treaty imposed by 
Japan upon China. But in Korea, Japanese was 
substituted for Chinese influence, and the King 
of Korea renounced Chinese suzerainty. So far 
as the initial cause of conflict was concerned, 
35o 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


Japan was not robbed of the fruits of her victory. 
The Japanese went ahead with the execution of 
the program of reforms originally proposed to 
be undertaken jointly with China. Korea began 
to adapt herself to the necessary conditions of 
existence of a modern state. If the use of an 
army and a fleet by the Japanese was a revelation 
to Europe, the work of Japanese counselors in 
Korea during the months following the war gave 
also the spectacle of a new unwelcome and dis¬ 
quieting stumbling-block in the path of European 
Far Eastern ambitions. The Japanese demon¬ 
strated that they had been studying the construc¬ 
tive side of European civilization as carefuly as 
military and naval matters. 

Excellent and wise in conception as was the 
Japanese program of reforms, the methods of ap¬ 
plication were resented by a high-spirited people. 
The Koreans felt that they were being made to 
bear the burden of the disappointment and bit¬ 
terness of the Japanese, who had built high hopes 
upon the victory over China. Russia had not 
withdrawn from the struggle for the control of 
Korea. She was quick to take advantage of the 
growing hatred against Japan, which culminated 
in the storming of the palace and the assassina- 
35i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tion of the queen by Japanese troops in 1895. 
When the king, who had been made prisoner by 
the Japanese, escaped, he was received at the Rus¬ 
sian legation. Encouraged and aided power¬ 
fully by the Russians, the king reestablished the 
absolutist regime and abolished the reforms. He 
assumed the title of Emperor. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, international intrigue in Seoul 
was worse than before the Sino-Japanese War. 
All the powers vied with one another for conces¬ 
sions and privileges. But during the first years 
of the twentieth century, the competition for the 
control of Korea narrowed down to a duel be¬ 
tween Russia and Japan. 

In March, 1900, occurred the first of the events 
that led to the Russo-Japanese War. It was an¬ 
nounced that Russia had secured a concession for 
exclusive settlement at Masanpo, the finest harbor 
of Korea, and the promise of the Korean Govern¬ 
ment not to cede the island of Ko-Je to any for¬ 
eign country. Russia declared her intention of 
making Masanpo a winter harbor for war-ships. 
If Masanpo had become a Russian naval station, 
Russia would have dominated the passage from 
the Japan Sea to the Yellow Sea and have been a 
constant menace to Japan. War was averted 
352 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 

only by the action of the Korean Government, 
which repudiated the concession. After a year 
of bickering, the matter was temporarily settled 
by awarding concessions at Masanpo to both Rus¬ 
sia and Japan. At the same time, a joint Korean- 
Japanese company secured the concession for a 
railway from Seoul to the port of Fusan, which 
is near Masanpo and which the Japanese knew 
they could develop in such a way as to control 
Masanpo. 

The second encroachment of Russia upon Ko¬ 
rea occurred in 1903. Inspired by the example of 
France in Siam, where the French were success¬ 
fully following up a lumber concession in the 
Mekong Valley by administrative control of both 
banks of the river, Russia established a settlement 
at Phyong-an Do on the Korean side of the Yalu 
River. The Korean Government protested. The 
Russian minister replied that a settlement at 
Phyong-an Do was necessary for developing a 
timber concession granted in 1896. The Ko¬ 
reans rejected this interpretation. There was 
nothing in the terms of the concession about a 
settlement. The Russian minister then tried to 
force Korea to sign supplementary clauses to the 
original concession, legalizing the occupation of 
353 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


land at Phyong-an Do. Seconded by Great Brit¬ 
ain and the United States, Japan backed up the 
Korean protest. Here the fatal weakness of the 
Korean Government became evident. It was the 
same kind of weakness that was leading to the 
partition of China. Afraid of provoking resent¬ 
ment and unwilling to take either side, Korea 
sought a solution in inaction. She neither in¬ 
sisted upon the Russians leaving, nor did she sign 
the supplementary clauses. To get even with 
Japan, Russia instigated the Korean Government 
to protest against the issue of notes by the Japa¬ 
nese bank at Seoul, the first and only banking en¬ 
terprise in Korea. The Japanese bank-notes were 
declared illegal. No steps were taken, however, 
to prevent their circulation. None could accuse 
the Koreans of partiality! Unable to defend 
their own interests, and unwilling to take sides, 
the Koreans put up their country as a prize to be 
fought for and to be won by the strongest. 

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, the 
impotence of Russia on sea made the military oc¬ 
cupation of Korea easy for Japan. There was 
no opposition from the Koreans themselves^} On 
February 22, 1904, the Korean Emperor was com¬ 
pelled to accept a treaty, adopting Japanese sug- 
354 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 

gestions as to the administration of the country, 
and allowing Japan to occupy strategical positions 
in case of invasion or internal disturbance. In 
return, Japan guaranteed the independence and 
integrity of the country. 

Japan did not wait for victory over Russia to 
assume control of Korea. The geographical sit¬ 
uation of Korea made the country an admirable 
base—in fact, a necessary base—of military op¬ 
erations against the Russians in Manchuria. A 
Japanese Resident and Japanese gendarmes were 
sent to Seoul. The construction of the railway 
through the peninsula from Fusan was rapidly 
pushed on to the Yalu River frontier. Korean 
ports were used for revictualment and naval 
bases. The Japanese Government constructed 
lighthouses all along the coast and on the islands. 
Japanese civilians followed the armies into Korea. 
It was a bloodless conquest, accomplished in war¬ 
time. The fighting was on Chinese territory. 
Korea lost only her navy, which was sunk by the 
Vladivostok Russian squadron. The Korean 
navy consisted of one little steamer that had jus¬ 
tified the creation of many admirals! 

The Treaty of Portsmouth imposed upon Rus¬ 
sia the recognition of Japan’s “paramount inter- 
355 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ests in Korea.” Several weeks before this treaty 
was signed, the alliance between Great Britain 
and Japan was renewed, which also recognized 
Japan’s paramount interests in Korea and her 
right to take special measures to protect them in 
view of “the consolidation and maintenance of 
general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia.” 
Japan had already anticipated these agreements 
with the two powers against whose influence in 
Korea she had been contending for more than ten 
years. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alli¬ 
ance was signed on August 12, 1905, and the 
Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5. But ear¬ 
lier in the year, the Korean military establishment 
had been reduced to ten battalions, and the civil 
administration of the country placed entirely in 
Japanese hands. Korean currency had been 
changed to a gold standard, and new coinage is¬ 
sued on the Japanese model. The notes of the 
Japanese National Bank were made legal tender, 
and on June 1, the bank itself became the gov¬ 
ernment’s central treasury. 

After the war, the Japanese moved with great 
haste to convert Korea into a province of Japan. 
The remnant of the army was disbanded. Only 
fifteen hundred men were allowed to remain un- 
356 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 

der arms as the emperor’s palace guard. Japan 
took over the railways and telegraphs and post- 
offices, and discontinued the issue of Korean 
stamps. In November, Marquis Ito forced the 
emperor to sign a treaty that put the control of 
the foreign affairs of Korea in the hands of Japan, 
and the administration of the country under the 
supervision of a resident-general in Seoul. Jap¬ 
anese advisers were placed in all the departments 
of the government and in the imperial household. 

The Korean Government had neither been noti¬ 
fied of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance nor consulted 
in the Treaty of Portsmouth. The emperor de¬ 
clared that his signature to the treaty dictated 
by Marquis Ito was a case of force majeure. A 
telegram of protest was sent to the United States. 
Two cabinet ministers committed suicide. But 
the powers paid no attention to Korean protests. 
The United States was the first to withdraw its 
minister from Seoul. Others followed suit. 
The legations were closed and Korean matters 
treated through Tokio. 

During 1906, revolts against the Japanese in 
the southern and eastern parts of the peninsula 
had to be suppressed by troops. Koreans abroad 
fomented insurrections. Marquis Ito arrested 
3*7 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

the leaders of the conservative parties and prom¬ 
inent officials, and made the emperor virtually a 
prisoner in the palace. In the spring of 1907, a 
plot to assassinate the ministers who had signed 
the treaty of 1905 led to the execution of thirty- 
three leaders of rank and position. The next 
move of the Koreans was the appearance of a 
mission at The Hague Conference in June, 1907, 
to protest against the violation of Korean sover¬ 
eignty by Japan. No attention was paid by The 
Hague Conference to the protest. But news¬ 
paper comment was wide-spread and favorable to 
the Koreans. The resentment of the Japanese 
was aroused. The emperor was compelled to 
disown the mission, to condemn its members to 
death, and then to abdicate. This caused an up¬ 
rising in Seoul. Japanese were killed in the 
streets. The army of occupation retaliated by 
shooting down hundreds of Koreans. After a 
month of fighting in the provinces, organized re¬ 
sistance ended. But individual murders contin¬ 
ued. The hatred of everything Japanese was so 
strong that Marquis Ito had to advise against im¬ 
migration from Japan. During the next year, 
twelve thousand insurgents were killed by the 
Japanese with a loss of less than two hundred 
358 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


men. From a military standpoint, the situation 
of the Koreans was hopeless. But they continued 
their agitation. The remarkable increase in con¬ 
verts to Christianity led the Japanese Govern¬ 
ment to suspect that the revolutionaries were us¬ 
ing the new religion as a cloak for conspiracy. 

Korean secret societies, composed of political 
refugees, kept up the spirit of protest abroad and 
did not hesitate to use violent means to prevent 
their cause from being forgotten. In 1908, Mr. 
Stevens, an adviser of the Japanese Government, 
was murdered by two Koreans at San Francisco 
because he gave out an interview commending the 
work of Japan in Korea. In 1909, when Prince 
(formerly Marquis) Ito left Korea, he was mur¬ 
dered at Harbin. In December of the same year, 
an attempt was made to assassinate the Korean 
Premier, who had declared that Japanese dom¬ 
ination was “inevitable.” Although they sup¬ 
pressed every movement ruthlessly, the Japa¬ 
nese had a large insurrection on their hands in the 
summer of 1909. Before the end of i 9 ° 9 > J a P an 
abandoned as hopeless the policy of reconciliation 
and decided that the only means of keeping con¬ 
trol of Korea was annexation pure and simple. 

In May, 1910, General Terauchi was appointed 
359 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Resident-General at Seoul. He went to Korea 
with the mandate to annex the country. Japan 
had promised to maintain the independence and 
integrity of Korea. But she knew there would 
be no opposition from the European powers if 
she could come to an agreement with Russia. For 
all the powers were in possession of colonial titles 
acquired by disregard of treaty obligations. No 
time would be wasted by the pot calling the ket¬ 
tle black. Japan was aware of the terms of the 
Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian conventions. 
She had studied British policy in Egypt. She 
was conscious of her growing power. She was 
able to reap the fruits of her forbearance and 
sagacity at Portsmouth and come to an under¬ 
standing with Russia about Manchuria. This en¬ 
abled the withdrawal from Manchuria for use in 
Korea of most of her army on the continent of 
Asia. On August 22, 1910, the Emperor of Ko¬ 
rea signed a new treaty recognizing the sover¬ 
eignty of Japan over Korea. 

The Korean minister at Petrograd, who had 
been unable to keep Russia from agreeing to the 
annexation, committed suicide. There was no 
organized protest in Korea. Four years of sup¬ 
pression had cowed the Koreans into submission. 

360 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


Without arms and without friends, they could do 
nothing. In notifying the powers of the annexa¬ 
tion, Japan assured them that the tariffs in force 
would be maintained for ten years and the inter¬ 
national regulations for coast trade and treaty 
ports respected. The only exception was Ma- 
sanpo, which Japan decided to close in order to 
make it a naval base. 

The former Emperor of Korea was promised 
maintenance of his title and rank and continuance 
of the grants heretofore allowed him and his 
father. The two ex-emperors were to receive 
seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars per 
annum. At the same time, in order to forestall 
opposition and intrigue and to make it worth 
while for the Korean nobility to accept the new 
order of things, seventy-five Koreans, including 
five members of the former imperial family, 
were created peers. They received sums of 
money running from ten thousand dollars to a 
hundred thousand dollars—four to five times the 
amount usually granted new peers in Japan. 

For ten years, Korea has been the Japanese 
province of Chosen. The visitor to Chosen, who 
knew the Korea of ante-Japanese days, is struck 
by the contrast. There can be no doubt about the 
361 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


material evolution of Korea under the Japanese 
occupation. I have on my desk a copy of the 
last “Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in 
Chosen, compiled by the Government-General/’ 
It is presented “with the compliments of Field- 
Marshal Count Hasegawa,” who succeeded 
Field-Marshal Count Terauchi in October, 1916. 
Illustrated with photographs to show the remark¬ 
able work of the Japanese administration and 
filled with imposing tables of statistics, the book 
indicates that nothing in the way of enlightened 
colonial administration has been neglected by the 
Japanese. They have built railways which rep¬ 
resent an investment of eighty million dollars, 
and have constructed good roads and bridges in 
every province. They have established a finan¬ 
cial system and reformed the currency, intro¬ 
duced schools and law-courts, and developed agri¬ 
culture and forestry and trade. The section on 
sanitation is the most remarkable part of the re¬ 
port. Only in regard to education and police and 
criminal courts and legislation has one reason for 
qualifying his admiration of what Japan has 
accomplished. 

The survey of the peninsula—an enormous 
task—was completed in 1918. Ports have been 
362 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


modernized and railway construction pushed with 
astonishing rapidity. The great natural wealth 
of fisheries and forests is being exploited. In 
nine years, although the budget has been doubled, 
Korea stands on her own feet, independent of 
imperial grants. And there is something tangi¬ 
ble and permanent to show for the money spent 
in the peninsula. Where irrigation difficulties 
have been overcome, all cleared land is under in¬ 
tensive cultivation. Cotton and fruit culture and 
stock-raising are being increased by scientific 
methods. Gold, iron, graphite, coal, and other 
mining enterprises are adding to the wealth of 
Korea and furnishing new opportunities for la¬ 
bor. The problem of rice yield has not yet been 
solved, but it is estimated that Korea will pro¬ 
vide before the end of 1920 for her total salt 
consumption: and soya beans are being exported 
to Japan. 

The population of Korea is about sixteen mil¬ 
lions. The Japanese represent a little less than 
two per cent. Although the three hundred thou¬ 
sand Japanese in Korea are six times as many 
as when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, the 
hope of providing opportunities for Japanese 
agricultural settlement in Korea has not been 
363 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


realized. In spite of extensive propaganda and 
the organization and subsidizing of the Oriental 
Development Company to encourage the emigra¬ 
tion of farmers to Korea, most of the Japanese 
settle in cities and engage in trade. The failure 
of the emigration policy is partly due to the fre¬ 
quent insurrections that keep alive the intense 
hatred of Koreans for Japanese. The principal 
reason, however, is that the peninsula does not 
afford the attractions and advantages to new set¬ 
tlers expected at the time of the occupation. 

Both of the deposed emperors have died. 
Prince Li, who succeeded to the ex-throne at the 
beginning of 1919, was educated in Japan and 
is married to a Japanese princess of the blood. 
In common with most of the nobility, who have 
been made to feel a financial and social interest 
in the status quo, he seems to have accepted the 
definite incorporation of his country with Japan. 
But the intellectual class and the masses have 
not become resigned to the loss of independence. 
A conspiracy brought to light in 1911 proved to 
have extensive ramifications, especially in Chris¬ 
tian communities. The notorious trial of 1912, 
which resulted in the sentence of more than a 
hundred “rebels” to penal servitude of from five 
364 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


to ten years, brought an outcry from missionary 
circles, given wide publicity in Europe and Amer¬ 
ica. The missionaries—and other foreigners— 
declared that the prisoners had been tortured 
in preliminary examination, and remonstrated 
against the unfairness of the trial. In the 
autumn of 1914, a Korean secret society at 
Shanghai endeavored to foment a new revolution. 
The plan was discovered by the police before it 
had grown to serious proportions. 

During the world war, the Koreans kept quiet. 
Like the Egyptians, they refused to lend them¬ 
selves to German intrigues, but looked forward 
to the Peace Conference for the remedying of the 
injustice done to them. They were inspired by 
the promises of Entente statesmen that the war 
against Germany was being fought to liberate all 
small nations from foreign masters and they were 
encouraged by the idealism of President Wilson. 
When the United States, followed by China and 
Siam, entered the war, the Koreans began to 
feel that they would not be forgotten in the for¬ 
mation of the society of nations. 

After the armistice, the new movement for 
independence manifested itself at first in simple 
demonstrations, as in Egypt. But repression at 
365 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Seoul was as ruthless as at Cairo. The Koreans 
answered by formally declaring their independ¬ 
ence at Seoul on March i, 1919. A delegation 
was appointed to the Peace Conference. Kore¬ 
ans in America held meetings in Independence 
Hall, passed resolutions, and sent cablegrams to 
the Peace Conference. 

Telegrams from Shanghai and letters from 
missionaries gave graphic details concerning con¬ 
ditions of terror in Korea in April. The reports 
read very much like those put out by the Egyp¬ 
tians—burning of villages, looting, refined cruel¬ 
ties, violation of women and girls, shooting down 
unarmed demonstrators with machine-guns. Ac¬ 
cording to Japanese journals, more than eight 
hundred Korean students abandoned their 
courses at the University of Tokio in protest 
against the massacres. On April 14, five thou¬ 
sand Koreans attacked the gendarmery building 
at Seoul. They were literally mowed down, but 
kept coming in waves, driven to sacrifice them¬ 
selves in a mad frenzy. The Japanese arrested 
Son Peuing Hui, who was head of the politico- 
religious association that had fomented the in¬ 
surrection. On April 23, representatives from 
thirteen Korean provinces met at Seoul and 
366 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 

elected Dr. Synghman Rhee to take his place. 
Dr. Rhee has been a leader of Young Korea 
since 1894. A graduate of Harvard and Prince¬ 
ton, he is well known in America, where he has 
many warm friends. 

The Koreans had no more success in gaining 
a hearing for their cause at Paris than at The 
Hague twelve years before. It became perfectly 
clear during the course of the Peace Conference 
that the Entente powers intended to apply the 
principles they had proclaimed only in the case of 
nationalities subject to their enemies, and that 
President Wilson had not the courage to practise 
what he preached. 

The hope for Korea is not in the society of 
nations and in the enlightened conscience of the 
civilized world, but in the growth of democratic 
feeling in Japan. There is a spirit of liberalism 
in present-day Japan that frightens the imperial¬ 
ists. Viscount Kato, leader of the Kenseikai, 
has become an enfant terrible, as Gladstone was 
in England. In the height of the Korean agita¬ 
tion, he did not hesitate to say: 

The act of union between Japan and Korea cannot be 
set aside: but it would be dangerous for the Govern¬ 
ment to think that the Japanese people are satisfied with 
367 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


things as they are. Many of our leading men have long 
known that reforms were necessary. The defects of 
Marshal Terauchi’s administration have long been rec¬ 
ognized, also the desirability of substituting a civil for 
a military governor. While the material prosperity of 
the Koreans, compared with a generation ago, is unques¬ 
tioned, we must pay attention to the spiritual and intellec¬ 
tual needs. 

The agitation in Japan forced the government 
to direct Governor-General Hasewega to insti¬ 
tute on April 20 courts martial for the trial of 
officers and soldiers guilty of outrages against 
the Koreans. On May 15, the emperor presided 
at a meeting of the Privy Council in Tokio, which 
decided to revise the organic system of the Ko¬ 
rean Government. It is declared that military 
rule will be abolished and a large measure of 
self-government granted the Koreans as soon as 
they abandon their agitation for complete inde¬ 
pendence. Although the official bulletin given to 
the press after this important meeting explained 
that the independence of Korea is impossible be¬ 
cause it is “incompatible with the military defense 
of the Empire as well as with Japan’s paramount 
industrial and commercial interests,” Japan may 
in the end find that the friendship of an inde¬ 
pendent neighbor is more valuable than the hatred 
368 


KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE 


of an alien race in a subjugated province. But 
that will not be until the Japanese are sure that 
no other power cherishes any longer the hope of 
economic and political domination in Korea. 
Korea lost her independence through the imperi¬ 
alistic ambitions of European powers in the Far 
East. She will regain her independence only 
through the definite renunciation of those ambi¬ 
tions. 


369 


CHAPTER XVIII 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 


T HE intervention of the powers to rob Japan 
of the fruits of her victory over China was 
believed by the Japanese to be due to Rus¬ 
sia. When this belief was confirmed by the Rus¬ 
sian penetration into Manchuria and the Liao¬ 
tung peninsula, the Japanese knew they would 
either have to measure arms with Russia or be¬ 
come—together with China and Korea—vassals 
of Russia. The fortification of Port Arthur was 
a direct challenge to Japan. And the Japanese 
saw that the European powers, who had united to 
prevent the Japanese from getting a foothold in 
China, did not oppose effectively the ambitions 
of Russia. When Russia, after completing the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, made a settlement on 
the left bank of the Yalu River, in Korean terri¬ 
tory, and secured a concession from Korea for a 
naval base at Masanpo, a port opposite Japan, the 
Japanese had to choose between fighting Russia 
37o 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

or allowing Russia to become the dominant power 
in the Far East. 

The second alternative was never entertained 
for a moment. During the decade that followed 
the war with China, the Japanese strained every 
nerve to prepare to expel Russia from China, 
Manchuria, and Korea. They consented to stu¬ 
pendous financial sacrifices for building up their 
army and navy. They followed the example of 
Germany in realizing that military strength could 
not be developed apart from industrial and com¬ 
mercial growth. Energy, discipline, and com¬ 
plete sacrifice of self were the qualities needed 
to prepare for the great struggle. The Japanese 
were not found wanting. 

The evolution of Japanese foreign policy in re¬ 
gard to China and the great powers after the 
Sino-Japanese War, and the attitude of Japan to¬ 
ward Korea, are discussed in other chapters. 
The scope of this chapter is limited to the direct 
relations between Japan and Russia. 

In June, 1903, General Kuropatkin, Russian 
Minister of War, visited Tokio as the guest of 
the emperor. He was given a friendly reception. 
Japanese statesmen insisted strongly upon the de¬ 
sire of Japan to prevent war. The tone of the 
37i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Russian press, also, was moderate and friendly. 
But while the Russians were prodigal with assur¬ 
ances of admiration and friendship for Japan, 
words were not translated into actions. Russia 
continued to occupy Phyong-an Do on the Korean 
side of the Yalu River, to fortify Port Arthur, 
and to build up a Pacific fleet. The encroach¬ 
ments upon Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria 
and the provinces north of Peking were more 
alarming than ever. 

On August 12, 1903, the Japanese ambassador 
at Petrograd presented a proposal for arranging 
the mutual interests of Russia and Japan in Man¬ 
churia and Korea. The Japanese demanded the 
fulfilment of the agreement Russia had signed 
with Japan in 1898, by which both powers recog¬ 
nized Korea’s independence. But at the same 
time, Japan desired Russia to recognize the 
Japanese agreement with Korea of the same 
year, which granted Japan preferential rights 
for railway construction. For several months 
there was a deadlock in the negotiations. A 
conference was held in Tokio in October be¬ 
tween the members of the Japanese cabinet and 
the Elder Statesmen. The latter urged the 
cabinet to make all possible concessions to Russia. 

372 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

But public opinion in Japan was thoroughly 
aroused. It was felt that a continuation of nego¬ 
tiations indefinitely would simply mean allowing 
Russia more time to strengthen her naval and 
military position in Liao-tung and Manchuria. 
The proposal of the Elder Statesmen that Japan 
limit her demands to a pledge from Russia to re¬ 
spect Chinese and Korean integrity and sover¬ 
eignty was considered as a makeshift to put off 
the evil day. The Japanese cabinet summoned 
Russia to recognize the independence and integ¬ 
rity of the Chinese and Korean empires; to admit 
Japan’s special interests in Korea in return for 
Japan’s admission of Russia’s special interests in 
Manchuria; and the mutual declaration of equal¬ 
ity of opportunity for Russia and Japan in con¬ 
cessions and trade in both Manchuria and Korea. 
November passed without an answer from Rus¬ 
sia. On December 5, the Japanese Diet met and 
voted confidence in the cabinet only with the 
stipulation that immediate action be taken. The 
emperor addressed the Diet in person on Decem¬ 
ber 10, declaring that his ministers had shown 
prudence and circumspection in the negotiations 
to protect the rights and interests of Japan. 
The Diet unanimously replied that the cabinet 
373 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


was temporizing at home and neglecting oppor¬ 
tunities abroad. The emperor immediately dis¬ 
solved the Diet. It could not be concealed, how¬ 
ever, that Russia had sent an unsatisfactory re¬ 
ply and that the Russian military authorities were 
pouring troops into Manchuria. The Japanese 
press called upon the government to declare war 
against Russia. 

On December 21, Russia was asked to recon¬ 
sider her reply. The answer, received on Janu¬ 
ary 6, demanded recognition by Japan of Man¬ 
churia and the Liao-tung peninsula as outside the 
Japanese sphere of interest, and consented not to 
interfere with the enjoyment by Japan and other 
powers of treaty rights acquired within Man¬ 
churia. The establishment of foreign settle¬ 
ments in the province was, however, excepted: 
and Japan was informed that if a neutral zone 
were established, it must be on the Korean side of 
the Yalu River alone, and that Japan must prom¬ 
ise to refrain from using any part of Korea for 
strategic purposes. With the single modification 
that she was willing to pledge herself not to act 
in advance of any other power in regard to settle¬ 
ments in Manchuria, Japan rejected the Russian 
proposals. Japanese statesmen may have hoped 
374 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

for a further reply and new proposals from Rus¬ 
sia. If they did, they were disappointed. On 
the other hand, Russian statesmen did not seem to 
regard their silence as making war inevitable. 
They affected astonishment in Petrograd when 
the Japanese minister demanded his passports on 
February 6, 1904. 

A Russian official communique, given to the 
press on February 9, asserted the surprise of the 
Russian Government at the events immediately 
following the breaking off of diplomatic relations 
by Japan. The Russians tried to make it seem 
that they had no intention of entering into war 
with Japan: and that Japan was the clear aggres¬ 
sor. The Russian note said that the army in 
Manchuria numbered barely one hundred thou¬ 
sand. But is the man who strikes the first blow 
necessarily the aggressor? Should a nation, any 
more than an individual, be bound to wait until 
the enemy is ready to strike? Must aggression 
be limited to the use of armed force? A nation 
pursuing an imperialistic policy should never be 
surprised if another nation prefers to declare war 
rather than to accept a change of the economic 
and political status quo in territories where that 
change affects security and economic prosperity. 

375 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

The day after the Japanese minister left Petro- 
grad, Admiral Uriu appeared before the port of 
Chemulpo and ordered a Russian cruiser and a 
Russian gunboat to leave the harbor within 
twenty-four hours. The commanders of French, 
British, American, and Italian war-ships in the 
port protested to Admiral Uriu. By refusing to 
receive the protest, Admiral Uriu signified to the 
powers the disappearance of the last vestige of 
their tutelage over Japan. A new “great power” 
had been born in the decade following the Sino- 
Japanese War. If Europe and America needed a 
demonstration of this unpalatable fact, they were 
not to wait long. The two Russian war-ships 
made an attempt to escape. Not succeeding, they 
returned toward the port and sank themselves in 
shallow water. On the same day, the main Japa¬ 
nese fleet attacked the Russian fleet outside the 
harbor of Port Arthur, inflicted considerable 
damage, and forced the Russians to withdraw 
under the protection of the guns of the fortress. 
For two months, Admiral Togo kept the Russian 
fleet busy by repeated and daring torpedo-boat 
attacks. He was unsuccessful, as the Americans 
had been at Santiago, in trying to bottle up Port 
Arthur by sinking ships at the mouth of the chan- 
376 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

nel. But he kept firing into the harbor and pre¬ 
vented the Russians from coming out. On April 
13, the Russians lost two battle-ships by running 
into a mine field. The Russian Vladivostok 
squadron had succeeded in making a few raids in 
the Japan Sea, but could not interrupt the trans¬ 
port of the Japanese army into Korea. 

Secure in their control of the sea by these bril¬ 
liant naval operations, the Japanese occupied 
Korea and made the peninsula their base for at¬ 
tacking the Russians in Manchuria. At the end 
of April, the Japanese won the first victory of the 
war on land by crossing the Yalu River and es¬ 
tablishing bridge-heads in Manchuria. General 
Kuroki ordered an immediate advance to cut off 
the Russians, who retreated to avoid being sur¬ 
rounded. Large stores fell into the hands of the 
Japanese. At the same time, a second Japanese 
army, under General Oku, landed on the Liao¬ 
tung peninsula at two points on the east coast. 
Using his right wing as a protection, the Japanese 
general pushed his left wing across the peninsula 
to Port Adams. The railway to Port Arthur was 
cut. Then the Japanese marched south and occu¬ 
pied Dalny, on May 30, which was converted into 
a naval base. By this time, a third army was 
377 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


formed, which, under command of General Nogi, 
invested Port Arthur. General Oku followed the 
line of the railway northward to connect his 
operations with those of General Kuroki, who was 
now firmly established west of the Yalu. 

In August, as General Nogi was approaching 
Port Arthur by land, the Russian fleet put to sea. 
This movement had been intended to coincide with 
a sortie of the Vladivostok fleet. There was a 
mistake somewhere, and the Japanese were able 
to gain a decisive victory. Some of the Russian 
ships were sunk. Others fled to refuge in 
Chinese treaty ports, and the remnant managed 
to get back to Port Arthur. Three days later, 
the Vladivostok fleet was beaten by the Japanese 
in the Tsushima Straits. One cruiser was sunk, 
and the other two succeeded in returning to Vladi¬ 
vostok, but wholly disabled for further fighting. 
The value of these victories was incalculable. 
They left the Japanese admirals free to prepare 
for the coming of the Russian fleet from Europe. 
The morale of the Japanese people was strength¬ 
ened. It had been a hazardous undertaking to 
send a large army to the mainland of Asia; and 
the Russians were concentrating imposing forces 
in Manchuria, the main theater of military opera- 
378 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

tions. In number of vessels and in armament, 
the Russian fleets in the Far East had been su¬ 
perior to those of Japan. Coupled with the ships 
Russia was planning to send from Europe, the 
menace to Japan would have been exceedingly 
serious. But in measuring themselves on sea 
with the Russians, the Japanese found that they 
were superior in skill and courage. 

Fighting from August to October was in favor 
of the Japanese. But they were unable to take 
Port Arthur, and the Russians in Manchuria, con¬ 
stantly reinforced, were resisting stubbornly. 
Although General Kuropatkin had to retreat on 
Mukden, he prevented attempts to surround him 
and retired his guns and supplies without loss. 

The Japanese redoubled their efforts against 
Port Arthur, whose conquest was essential to 
them before the Russian fleet from European 
waters could reach the Pacific. By consenting to 
stupendous sacrifices, the Japanese convinced the 
defenders of Port Arthur that further resistance 
was useless. On New Year’s Day, 1905, Port 
Arthur surrendered. 

The Liao-tung peninsula and a small portion 
of Manchuria were now in the hands of Japan. 
But at the beginning of 1905, Russia had more 
379 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

men and artillery and supplies in Manchuria 
than when the war broke out. In the early part of 
March, the Japanese gained a great victory over 
the Russians at Mukden. Had they been able to 
follow it up immediately, they might have brought 
about the surrender of the Russian armies. But 
they themselves had suffered heavily and were 
exhausted by three weeks of continuous fighting. 
The inability of a modern army to win a decisive 
victory in a pitched battle, so unmistakably dem¬ 
onstrated in the recent European war, was the 
lesson of the Battle of Mukden. Since 1914, the 
world has had so many similar experiences that 
the criticisms of Japanese failure to follow up 
their success, made by military writers who have 
commented on the Battle of Mukden, now seem 
unjustified. In movements affecting hundreds 
of thousands of men, the question of transporta¬ 
tion alone robs the twentieth-century general of 
the possibility of repeating Sedan. 

On October 15, 1904, Russia sent the Baltic 
fleet from Libau to the Pacific. After intermin¬ 
able delays, thirty-six Russian vessels, which had 
reached eastern waters in several sections, arrived 
off the coast of Korea on May 27, 1905. In an 
380 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

action that lasted only an hour, the issue of the 
battle was decided. The Russian fleet scattered 
and tried to escape in every direction. Twenty- 
two of the thirty-six vessels were sunk, six were 
captured, six took refuge in neutral ports where 
they were interned, and only two reached Vladi¬ 
vostok. The price of the victory was three Japa¬ 
nese torpedo boats. 

But the Japanese were not in an enviable posi¬ 
tion for forcing the end of the war on land. 
They captured the island of Saghalien in July and 
sent two armies to invest Vladivostok. Further 
military operations against the Russians might 
have led to another Mukden. But would it have 
been worth while to make a new effort in Man¬ 
churia without the certainty of winning a de¬ 
cision? On the other hand, the Russians saw 
that a continuation of the war might lead to the 
loss of Vladivostok and the entire Maritime Prov¬ 
ince without any hope of turning the fortune of 
arms in Manchuria. Russia was also troubled 
by the fear of an internal revolution. As both 
sides were in the mood for peace, an overture 
of mediation from President Roosevelt met with 
success. The proposal of the American Presi- 
381 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


dent was made and accepted shortly after the de¬ 
struction of the Russian fleet. Fighting in Man¬ 
churia ceased at the beginning of summer. 

On August 9, the Russian and Japanese pleni¬ 
potentiaries met at Portmouth, New Hampshire. 
Among their stipulations, the Japanese demanded 
a pecuniary indemnity and the cession of 
Saghalien—two points on which the Russian 
plenipotentaries did not have power to yield. 
After a fortnight of debate, during which all the 
other conditions were agreed upon, Russia con¬ 
sented to compromise by ceding the southern half 
of Saghalien, while Japan waived her claim to an 
indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed 
on September 5, was ratified in October by both 
countries. 

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia recog¬ 
nized Japan’s paramount interests in Korea; 
transferred to Japan her lease of Port Arthur 
and all concessions, establishments, and railway 
and mining rights in the Liao-tung peninsula and 
southern Manchuria; ceded the southern half 
of Saghalien; and granted fishing rights to the 
Japanese in the Pacific waters of Russia. There 
was a reciprocal undertaking to evacuate Man¬ 
churia and restore to China sovereign rights 
382 


THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

throughout the province; to give up prisoners 
and pay the expenses of their maintenance dur¬ 
ing the war. An additional provision regulated 
the strength of the military forces Russia and 
Japan were to keep in Manchuria to protect the 
railways and other concessions. 

The Japanese people, who believed themselves 
the unquestioned victors in the war, were deeply 
disappointed. Riots broke out in Tokio and 
elsewhere when the terms of the treaty were 
made public. The Japanese felt especially that 
the waiving of an indemnity was putting upon 
them the financial burden of a war they had not 
sought. They did not see why Russia should 
be allowed to retain any interests in Manchuria 
and be left in undisturbed possession, without re¬ 
strictions, of Vladivostok. 

It soon came to be admitted, however, that the 
prolongation of the war for the sake of an in¬ 
demnity might have meant throwing good money 
after bad. As for Saghalien, Vladivostok, and 
northern Manchuria, the compromise might lead 
to the establishment of friendly relations with 
Russia. In the minds of Japanese statesmen, 
there was no longer reason for fearing Russia 
or considering Russia an enemy after Russia 
3 8 3 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


had been expelled from Korea and the Liao¬ 
tung peninsula, and had agreed to divide Man¬ 
churia. Japan did not covet any other Asiatic 
territory over which the Russian flag waved. 
The Maritime Province and Siberia were too 
cold for Japanese settlement, and could not pro¬ 
duce rice. With fishing rights secured, what 
more did Japan want from Russia in Siberia? 

The moderation shown by the Japanese at 
Portsmouth was as good politics as their remark¬ 
able forbearance during the negotiations preced¬ 
ing the war. In the fulfilment of the aspiration 
of Japan to be the dominant power in the Far 
East, the expulsion of Russia from Korea and 
the sea-coast of China was the first point gained. 
None could deny the legitimacy of the aspira¬ 
tion—if Japan were going to use her power to 
protect other Asiatic nations against Europe as 
the United States was doing in maintaining the 
Monroe Doctrine on behalf of other American 
nations. When the opportunity presented itself 
and when Japan, having recovered from the 
strain of 1904 and 1905, felt herself strong 
enough to hold her own once more against 
Europe, the turn would come of the other Euro¬ 
pean powers to be ousted from China. 

384 


CHAPTER XIX 


CHINA THE VICTIM OF EUROPEAN 
IMPERIALISM 

I N the discussion and solution of no problem 
before the Conference of Paris were the in¬ 
sincerity and bad faith of the great powers 
more apparent than in the disposition of the 
Shangtung question. The facts of history were 
distorted. The principles for which the Entente 
powers and the United States declared they had 
fought were ignored. The powers showed their 
inability to rise to the high level of international 
morality essential for the creation of a society 
of nations. Instead of trying to lay the founda¬ 
tions of a durable peace in the Far East, the 
statesmen of the Entente powers and the United 
States decided for the continuation of a policy 
that has provoked several wars and given rise 
to injustice and oppression. For the European 
powers and Japan, the solution proposed for the 
Shangtung question was the holding fast to tradi- 
385 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tions and practices of the past. For the United 
States, it was the abandonment by our Govern¬ 
ment of the idealism and disinterestedness that 
for more than half a century have characterized 
American diplomacy in the Far East. 

The solution of the Shangtung question incor¬ 
porated in the treaty dictated to Germany is the 
triumph of the policy of economic exploitation 
through political blackmail against which John 
Hay and his predecessors in the American State 
Department struggled with skill and a large 
measure of success. By simply telling the story 
of the attitude of the powers toward China since 
the Sino-Japanese War, the truth of this assertion 
can be established. 

On April 17, 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
ended the war between China and Japan, which 
was undertaken by Japan to prevent China from 
becoming the victim of European imperialism. 
China ceded the Liao-tung peninsula and the 
island of Formosa to Japan, agreed to pay an 
indemnity of a hundred and fifty million dollars 
and to accord commercial privileges to Japan 
in China. Russia thereupon induced France and 
Germany to join her in forbidding the execution 
of the treaty in so far as the Liao-tung peninsula 
386 


CHINA THE VICTIM 

was concerned. Li Hung Chang, the leading 
statesman of China, who had been compelled to 
accept the responsibilities and disgrace of having 
signed the treaty with Japan, showed his grati¬ 
tude to Russia and France by sacrificing the in¬ 
terests of China to a much greater extent than 
would have been the case had the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki been allowed to stand in its orig¬ 
inal form. Russia obtained the right to construct 
the Siberian Railway across northern Manchuria, 
and France a rectification of frontier in the Me¬ 
kong Valley and railway and mining concessions 
in the Kiangsi and Yunnan provinces. Both 
powers were given permission to make settle¬ 
ments at Hangkow. Then Li Hung Chang nego¬ 
tiated a secret treaty at Moscow which put Russia 
in the place Japan hoped to have in the Liao¬ 
tung peninsula, with the right to fortify Port 
Arthur. In return for this sacrifice, China re¬ 
ceived from Russia a loan that would pay less 
than half the indemnity exacted by Japan! 

Great Britain protested that the territorial ex¬ 
tension granted to France was a violation of 
an agreement entered into between China and 
Great Britain several years earlier. But in¬ 
stead of insisting that France should give up what 
387 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

she had received from China, Great Britain 
forced China to make compensation by agreeing 
to a further extension of the frontiers of Burma. 

It was after these encroachments upon Chinese 
sovereignty were made that Germany decided to 
have a finger in the pie. Using the pretext of 
getting satisfaction from China for the murder 
of two missionaries, Germany seized the Bay of 
Kiao-chau on the Yellow Sea side of the Shang- 
tung peninsula. China was bullied into leasing 
Kiao-chau to Germany for ninety-nine years, 
with liberty to erect fortifications, build docks, and 
exercise all the rights of sovereignty. Then Ger¬ 
many, invoking precedents established by other 
powers elsewhere in China, began an economic 
penetration into the province of Shangtung by the 
usual game of railway and mining concessions. 
Russia and Great Britain retaliated, not by oppos¬ 
ing Germany, but by pressing further claims at 
Peking. Russia secured a lease of Port Arthur, 
of which she was already in full occupation, and a 
concession for a railway from Port Arthur north 
through the Liao-tung peninsula to connect up 
with the Manchurian section of the Siberian 
Railway. Great Britain demanded and obtained 
a similar lease for Wei-hai-wei, on the north coast 
388 


the great powers 

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CHINA THE VICTIM 

of Shangtung opposite Port Arthur. When Ger¬ 
many penetrated Shangtung, Russia declared that 
she must have exclusive privileges in Manchuria, 
and Great Britain chose the Yangtse Valley as her 
preserve. France already had her concessions in 
the two southernmost provinces bordering Indo- 
China. Japan demanded exclusive privileges in 
the province of Fuhkien. Italy asked for a lease 
of a coaling-station at Sanmun, on the coast of 
Chekiang, together with a grant of railway and 
mining rights in that province. But by this time 
the limit of endurance was reached at Peking. 
Italy was bluntly refused and decided not to press 
the matter by force. All the other powers, al¬ 
ready in possession of their “bits,” frowned on 
Italy. 

Space is lacking to go into the details of the 
scramble for concessions in China from 1896 to 
1899. Peking was the center of international 
rivalry, where each power struggled against the 
others. The greed and brutality and hypocrisy 
of concession-hunters, officially backed by their 
respective governments, was an exhibition of 
European diplomacy that aroused the resentment 
of the peace-loving Chinese and contaminated 
the Japanese. To assert that the Germans were 

389 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

alone to blame or even the first to blame, as has 
been so frequently done during the recent war, 
is to deny the facts. This statement must be 
made, and impartial readers referred to the his¬ 
tory of these years, in order that the present 
attitude of Japanese and Chinese toward Euro¬ 
peans may be clear. The Japanese have no more 
contempt and the Chinese no more dislike for 
Germans than for other Europeans. All are 
tarred with the same brush. All have set the 
same example to Japan. All have acted in the 
same way toward China. It just happened to be 
Germany’s turn in 1914. Eet us not deceive our¬ 
selves! As for American concession-hunting in 
China, the difference is that the American Gov¬ 
ernment never officially supported any demands 
and did not use economic concessions as a cloak 
for the extension of political influence. All the 
others did. 

At this juncture, two forces arose to prevent 
the partition of China or at least the further im¬ 
pairment of Chinese sovereignty and economic 
exploitation of the country by foreigners. The 
first of these was the ferment of dissatisfaction 
among the Young Chinese of official classes and 
of commercial classes in the ports, who had come 
39o 


CHINA THE VICTIM 

under the influence of Western education and who 
realized the strength of Japan as opposed to the 
weakness of China because of Japan’s admirable 
and successful adaptation of Western civilization. 
The Young Chinese believed that their country 
could be saved from humiliation and slavery only 
by the diffusion of Western education and more 
intimate contact with Occidentals and Occidental 
methods. They opposed neither missionaries nor 
concession-developers, and regarded treaty ports 
and foreign settlements and foreign-built and 
foreign-run railways as necessary evils—to be 
endured until the nation was transformed. To 
get rid of foreign influence—which meant vir¬ 
tually foreign domination—the Young Chinese 
realized that reforms must be introduced into the 
administration, an army and navy built up, a 
national spirit created through schools and news¬ 
papers, and eventually the overthrow of the Man- 
chu dynasty with its military and civilian official¬ 
dom. 

The other force was the reactionary element 
which wanted to see China undisturbed by Occi¬ 
dental influences. The reactionaries were not 
interested, as were the Young Chinese, in a 
strong and united China that could hold her own 
39i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


with the great powers by adopting and developing 
the sources of strength of the modern state. 
They hated the foreigners because they felt in¬ 
stinctively that foreign control not only would 
limit and destroy their power and privileges, but 
would also provoke a movement of regeneration 
within China. The effort for reform, inaugu¬ 
rated by the Young Chinese in 1898, caused them 
as much alarm as the encroachments of the Euro¬ 
pean powers and Japan. Unfortunately, the re¬ 
actionaries made use of a powerful agency, which 
was successful in arousing the hatred of the 
common people through stirring up the fanati¬ 
cism of ignorance and superstition. 

The disastrous war with Japan led to the or¬ 
ganization in 1895 of a secret anti-foreign 
society, I-Ho-Chuan (the righteous harmony 
fists). The members of this society, called Box¬ 
ers by missionaries and newspapers, were de¬ 
ceived by the ritual of initiation to believe that 
they were made invulnerable to bullets or swords. 
Gathering in Taotist and Buddhist temples, they 
swore to drive the foreigner and his religion 
out of China. The movement spread rapidly in 
the northern provinces, and was helped by the 
affairs of Kiao-chau, Wei-hai-wei and Port Ar- 
392 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


thur. The building of railways and development 
of mines by foreigners, and the creation of con¬ 
cession settlements in ports and railway centers, 
fanned the flame of hatred. 

In 1899, Yu-Hsien, founder of the I-Ho-Chuan, 
became Governor of the Province of Shangtung. 
Almost immediately, attacks upon foreigners be¬ 
gan. The murder of English missionaries in 
Shangtung brought forth a strong protest from 
the British, French, German, and American min¬ 
isters. In spite of promises from the empress- 
dowager, who was all-powerful, that the guilty 
parties would be punished, outrages and murders 
became more frequent in Shangtung and in Chi-li, 
the province in which Peking is located. In 
March, 1900, another protest of the ministers, 
this time with the addition of the Italian minister, 
resulted in the appointment of Yuan-Shih-Kai as 
Governor of Shangtung, with orders to suppress 
the Boxers, and an imperial rescript to the Gov¬ 
ernor of Chi-li, denouncing by name the Boxer 
Society. 

The empress-dowager soon showed that she 
was hand in glove with the Boxers. She secured 
from the emperor a decree stating that his health 
was so bad that he could not have a son, and ask- 
393 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ing the empress-dowager to select a successor 
to the throne. The empress-dowager named Pu 
Chung, son of Prince Tuan, who was a patron of 
the Boxer Society. The headquarters of the 
movement was established in May in the palace 
of Pu Chung. 

A Boxer proclamation was issued denouncing 
the emperor and the mandarins as incompetent 
and corrupt, and declaring: 

Foreign devils have come with their doctrine of Chris¬ 
tianity. Converts to their own Catholic and Protestant 
faiths have become numerous. These churches are de¬ 
void of human principles and full of cunning. They 
have attracted the greedy and avaricious as converts to 
an unlimited degree. They practice oppression and cor¬ 
ruption until even the good officials have become covetous 
of foreign wealth, and are servants to the foreigners. 
Telegraphs and railways have been established; foreign 
cannon and rifles manufactured; railway engines and elec¬ 
tric lamps the foreign devils delight in. . . . The for¬ 
eigners shall be exterminated; their houses and temples 
shall be burned; foreign goods and property of every 
description shall be destroyed. The foreigners shall be 
extirpated, for the purpose of Heaven is determined. A 
clean sweep shall be made. All this shall be accomplished 
within three years. The wicked cannot escape the net 
of destruction. 

Prince Tuan used very cleverly the discussion 
in European parliaments and press, which spoke 
394 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


openly of the partition of China. He had proofs 
of European intentions in the successful en¬ 
croachments of France, Russia, Germany, and 
Great Britain, and in the demand of Italy which 
had been put forward at Peking in a brutal and 
undiplomatic manner. Circulars were sent to 
the provincial governors of the approaching mas¬ 
sacre of foreigners. Prince Tuan did not con¬ 
ceal his intention of seizing the foreign ministers 
at Peking and holding them as hostages until 
Europe consented, in his own words, to treat 
China “as a sealed book.” 

The Boxer uprising, the seriousness and im¬ 
minence of which the powers had failed to ap¬ 
preciate, broke out in Peking on June 13, 1900. 
The railway connecting Peking with Tientsin 
was literally torn up and the telegraph poles 
sawed off close to the ground. All foreign 
property in Peking was looted. Bodies were 
taken out of the graves in the foreign cemeteries 
and burned. For several days, a massacre raged 
in which thousands of native Christians were 
slain and which ended in a fire that burned the 
principal shops of Peking. Prince Tuan and 
other members of the imperial family directed 
the massacre. 


395 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Rescue parties sent out by the legations saved 
several hundred women and children who had es¬ 
caped death by hiding. All the foreigners in the 
city and refugees from the surrounding country 
were received in the legations. On June 19, the 
foreign ministers were informed that the powers 
were at war with China, and that they must leave 
within twenty-four hours or the government 
could not be responsible for their safety. As it 
was impossible to start out not knowing what 
means of transport were available and what meas¬ 
ures had been taken to escort the foreigners to the 
coast, the ministers asked to be received by 
Prince Tuan to arrange for the departure. No 
reply came. The next morning, after a meeting 
at the French legation, the ministers decided to 
go in a body to make representations to the gov¬ 
ernment. On the way, the German minister, 
Baron von Kettler, was murdered by a Manchu 
official in full uniform. The Chinese authorities 
told the ministers that they could give no guaran¬ 
tee of escort to Tientsin. 

For two months, about six thousand foreigners 
and Christian refugees, of whom more than half 
were in the grounds of the British legation, de¬ 
fended themselves against the mob and against 
396 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


government troops. When it was seen that the 
inter-allied relief column was approaching Pe¬ 
king, a decree was issued ordering the foreign 
ministers to be conducted safely to the coast “in 
order once more to shpw the tenderness of the 
Throne for the men from afar.” But the for¬ 
eigners preferred to trust to their own resources. 
On August 11, government troops began to bom¬ 
bard the British legation. The relief column 
reached Peking on the afternoon of August 13, 
just two months after the uprising was started. 
It was none too soon. 

The relief of Peking was an international oper¬ 
ation. The first attempt to reach Peking was 
made on June 10, before the troubles had broken 
out. But the force of bluejackets of the different 
navies, under Admiral Seymour, was totally in¬ 
adequate. As the railways were destroyed, 
progress was slow, and Admiral Seymour could 
not break through the Chinese army. In fact, 
his men would have been annihilated had he not 
been relieved by reinforcements. An uprising 
broke out in Tientsin in the relief column’s 
rear. On June 17, the ships of the great powers 
had to fire on and capture the Taku forts. Then 
Tientsin was occupied. When Admiral Sey- 
397 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


mour returned to Tientsin, it was realized that 
an army would have to be sent to Peking. There 
was no news from Peking, and it was feared that 
all the Europeans had been massacred. The Rus¬ 
sians had only four thousand troops within reach, 
and the British three thousand. Two thousand 
Americans were despatched from the Philip¬ 
pines and eight hundred French from Indo- 
China. The Germans, Austrians, and Italians 
had virtually no free effectives. Japan was 
called upon to save the day. She contributed 
ten thousand troops, half of the force which 
finally set out from Tientsin on August 4. It 
took nine days to reach Peking, and the losses of 
the international army were severe. 

On the morning after the entry into Peking, 
the empress-dowager and the imperial court 
fled to the interior to the province of Sanshi. But 
the Chinese continued to resist. The Imperial 
City was not surrendered until August 26. 

After the relief of Peking, the international 
troops continued to increase in number. Under 
the command of Count von Waldersee, the mili¬ 
tary occupation of the province of Chili was or¬ 
ganized. But there had been a divergency of 
views among the powers as to the attitude to 
398 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


adopt after the relief of Peking. The Russian 
Government, which considered that all of China 
north of Peking was within its sphere of influence 
and which had agreed to the expedition only as a 
measure for the relief of the legations, pro¬ 
posed the immediate evacuation of Peking. 
Japan, hostile to the principle of European inter¬ 
vention, insisted that the Chinese Government 
be invited to return to Peking immediately. The 
Japanese were wild with apprehension over the 
news that had come from Manchuria, where the 
Russians had taken advantage of the Boxer 
troubles to throw large forces into the province, 
attack the Chinese troops, and occupy strongly 
Mukden. The Russians looted the palace at 
Mukden and were massacring civilian Chinese. 
All the powers were afraid that Germany might 
seize the opportunity of extending her influence 
from Shangtung into Chi-li. 

These jealousies made very acceptable the pro¬ 
posal of the empress-dowager, through Li Hung 
Chang, to conclude peace on the basis of an in¬ 
demnity and reaffirmation or modification of old 
commercial treaties in return for the cessation of 
military operations and the withdrawal of foreign 
troops. In spite of the insistence of Russia and 
399 


THE NEW MAP OF ASTA 


Japan, the other powers participating in the in¬ 
ternational occupation refused to agree to evac¬ 
uate Peking and Tientsin until peace was signed. 
On the contrary, they reinforced their contin¬ 
gents so that all the cards should not be in the 
hands of the Russians and Japanese. 

Several months were spent in debate. On De¬ 
cember 19, a joint note was sent to the Chinese 
Government, formulating the demands of the 
powers. The stipulations were: apology at Ber¬ 
lin by an imperial prince for the murder of 
the German minister; reparation to Japan for 
the murder of the chancellor of her lega¬ 
tion; punishment of Princes Tuan and Chu- 
ang, and other instigators and leaders of the 
Boxers; erection of expiatory monuments in 
foreign cemeteries where tombs had been 
desecrated; permission to maintain perma¬ 
nent legation guards at Peking; razing of forts 
at Taku and between Peking and the sea, and 
military occupation by international troops of the 
Tientsin-Peking railway line; assurance that pro¬ 
vincial governors would be held personally re¬ 
sponsible for violation of the treaty or future 
anti-foreign outbreaks; revision of commercial 
treaties; reform of the palace system of govern- 
400 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


ment at Peking, and modification of court cere¬ 
monial for the reception of foreign Ministers; 
any payment of indemnities to governments, cor¬ 
porations and missionary bodies, and individuals. 

The peace protocol was signed at Peking on 
January 14, 1901. But when the conference be¬ 
gan between the foreign ministers and the gov¬ 
ernment to arrange for carrying into effect the 
terms of peace, Li Hung Chang realized the lack 
of agreement among the powers. There was no 
solidarity in negotiations. In private interviews, 
Li Hung Chang was able to secure a betrayal of 
the general interest of all by making an appeal 
to the special interests of each. Russia was will¬ 
ing to encourage Chinese resistance to the pun¬ 
ishment clause in return for additional advan¬ 
tages in the Manchurian treaty she was negotiat¬ 
ing with China. Other powers, also, gave secret 
instructions to their ministers not to press claims 
for punishment too vigorously. Sordid political 
and commercial considerations prevented insist¬ 
ence upon measures that would have been con- 
tructively helpful to China and that would have 
aided China to learn and profit by the lesson of 
the Boxer revolution. 

On the other hand, all the powers with the ex- 
401 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ception of the United States were united in de¬ 
manding* exaggerated indemnities. By becoming 
creditors of the Chinese government, the powers 
hoped to gain further economic advantages and 
to have means of pressure to keep China in tute¬ 
lage. In May, China was saddled with an enor¬ 
mous debt, to be paid off at four per cent, interest 
within forty years. The total interest and prin¬ 
cipal amounted to nearly a billion and a half 
dollars. The legation compounds in Peking 
were united and surrounded by a loop-holed wall. 
China had to agree to the permanent maintenance 
of this fortress by legation guards. On Sep¬ 
tember 17, 1901, Peking was evacuated. The 
court returned on January 7, 1902. 

In the meantime, the powers negotiated 
secretly with China and with one another to pre¬ 
serve advantages already acquired to advance 
their own schemes, and to block the schemes of 
others for further impairment of Chinese sover¬ 
eignty and further exploitation of Chinese terri¬ 
tory. 

While the Peking negotiations were in prog¬ 
ress, Great Britain and Germany signed an agree¬ 
ment to observe a common policy in China. They 
promised mutually to sustain the open door in 
402 


CHINA THE VICTIM 

every part of Chinese territory where they could 
exercise their power, and not ‘‘make use of the 
present complication” to obtain for themselves 
any territorial advantages. But in case another 
power should obtain territorial advantages as a 
result of the Boxer rebellion, they agree “to come 
to a preliminary understanding as to steps which 
may have to be taken for the protection of their 
own interests in China.” When Russia secured 
exclusive rights in Manchuria, Germany did not 
support Great Britain in her protest at Peking. 
On the other hand, when Germany asked China 
to promise not to grant any power special ad¬ 
vantages in the Yangtse Valley, Lord Lansdowne 
telegraphed that Great Britain would pay no at¬ 
tention to any pledge of the Chinese Government 
by which freedom of action in the protection of 
British interests in the Yangtse region would 
be limited. A copy of this telegram was shown 
to the German Ambassador at London, who an¬ 
swered that Germany's policy was to support 
China in a firm refusal to part with sovereign 
rights in any part of the empire. And France, 
while refusing, as Germany had done, to join 
Great Britain in a protest against special privi¬ 
leges to Russia in Manchuria, announced that the 
403 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


withdrawal of her troops from China was under¬ 
taken with the express stipulation of reserving 
the right to intervene militarily in China “in case 
the integrity of China was threatened by the ag¬ 
gressive action of any other power or by internal 
Chinese troubles.” 

The participation of Germany in suppressing 
the Boxers received more attention from the 
world than its importance warranted. The mur¬ 
der of Baron von Kettler was ample justification 
for Germany's particular interest in the expedi¬ 
tion to Peking. But Germany had only a handful 
of soldiers available, and the appointment of 
Field Marshal Count von Waldersee to command 
the international army was due, not to German 
pressure or intrigue, but to the hopeless jealousy 
between British and Russians and Japanese. 
Japanese and Russians vetoed each other, and 
the British were heavily involved in the Boer 
War. The British Government, unable to send 
many troops and fearful of a Russian or Japanese 
occupation of Peking, suggested the appointment 
of a German in the hope that the kaiser would 
send a large force. He did. By the end of 
November, Germany had twenty thousand men 
in China. The official statement issued by the 
404 


CHINA THE VICTIM 

German Government was dignified and reserved. 
It was declared that the army to be sent to China 
would be composed entirely of volunteers, that 
the purpose was to rescue Europeans in Peking 
and exact retribution for the murder of Baron 
von Kettler and other atrocities, but that the par¬ 
tition of China was against German policy. It 
was the kaiser whose theatrical pronouncements 
discredited the German effort. He has never 
lived down the speech in which he expatiated upon 
Attila and the Huns. The protest against the 
brutality of the kaiser’s speech was as strong in 
Germany as in other countries. When German 
soldiers acted on the advice of the kaiser, there 
was sharp criticism in the Reichstag and in the 
press of the whole idea of the expedition and the 
way it had been carried out. The Germans in 
1900 were ashamed of their kaiser, and did not 
hesitate to ridicule what they called “the Walder- 
see theatricals.” Only the British accepted 
loyally the command of Field Marshal Count 
von Waldersee. French and Russians treated 
him with scant courtesy. The confiscation by 
German troops of astronomical instruments in the 
imperial palace and their conveyance to Germany 
did not receive the approval of the German peo- 

405 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


pie. The “Norddeutscher Zeitung” declared that 
the German Government offered to return them, 
but that China declined to take them back. How¬ 
ever that may be, the instruments remained in 
Germany—until the Treaty of Versailles! 1 

On March 15, 1901, Chancellor von Buelow 
told the Reichstag that some powers pursued 
commercial interests and other powers played 
politics in China. Germany was in the first cate¬ 
gory, and for this reason the Anglo-German 
agreement had been signed with the hope of main¬ 
taining the integrity of China as long as possible. 

1 First at Tientsin and later at Peking, the soldiers of the 
international army, and their officers as well, vied with one an¬ 
other in looting. The stealing of the astronomical instruments 
stood out from other acts of brigandage because it was done 
officially, and the Imperial German Government was not ashamed 
to receive the loot. To the eternal disgrace of our Occidental 
civilization, however, looting was one of the features of the in¬ 
ternational intervention. American officers returning from the 
expedition, brought back to the United States all sorts of ob¬ 
jects they had either themselves stolen or had purchased know¬ 
ing they were loot. I once saw in the home of an American 
general some wonderful teak furniture concerning the origin 
of which the owner was reluctant to speak. In Volume II, p. 
288, of Professor Johnson’s “America’s Foreign Relations,” we 
read, however, that “the American troops distinguished them¬ 
selves both by their efficiency and by their orderly and humane 
conduct, presenting a fine contrast to some of the others, who 
disgraced themselves by committing outrages as vile as those of 
the Chinese mob itself.” Testimony is concordant that the 
American troops respected the lives and honor, if not the prop¬ 
erty, of the Chinese. 


406 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


The wording of the agreement showed that it had 
no reference to Manchuria, where there were no 
German interests worth mentioning. “As re¬ 
gards the future of Manchuria, really, gentlemen, 
I can imagine nothing which we regard with more 
indifference. But it is our interest to see, in 
close cooperation with other powers, that China 
does not unduly diminish her resources until her 
debts are paid.” The words of the German 
chancellor sum up tersely the cynical attitude of 
European statesmen toward China. The inde¬ 
pendence of Korea ? Attacks upon Chinese 
rights in Manchuria? Shangtung? Wei-hai-wei? 
Shanghai ? Hongkong ? From the beginning of 
European encroachment in China, changed in 
later days largely to Japanese encroachment, 
European diplomacy has acted on the von Bue- 
low principle. The other fellow’s rights? 
Never! Our interests? Always! 

Liberal circles in Great Britain felt during the 
siege of the legations that the delay in going to 
the relief of Europeans in Peking was due to the 
unwillingness of the other powers to allow the 
Japanese or the Russians to save the day. Thus 
the risk was run of sacrificing helpless women and 
children to diplomatic considerations. The full 
407 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


extent of the immorality and lack of chivalry of 
international diplomacy was demonstrated when 
Indian troops, who had been despatched to pro¬ 
tect foreigners in Shanghai, had to stay on their 
ships until a certain proportion of French and 
German troops landed. 

Speaking in parliament on August 2, Sir Ed¬ 
ward Grey declared that “the idea that China was 
ripe for partition and that any liberty could be 
taken with her was the main fault of the present 
trouble.’’ The tendency to lay the blame for the 
Boxer uprising at the door of Germany because 
she had seized Kiao-chau, and thus exculpating 
the imperialism of the other powers, did not enter 
into the minds of the statesmen of the day. Sir 
Edward Grey did not take Germany to task when 
the Boxer troubles were reviewed in the House 
of Commons. Speaking for the British Govern¬ 
ment, Mr. Broderick paid Count von Waldersee 
a high tribute. He said that England’s inter¬ 
ests were often found to be running side by side 
with those of Germany, that the government wel¬ 
comed German intervention, and he hoped that 
“as good comrades, Germany and England might 
advance together again, certainly to victory, and, 
let us all trust, also toward the strengthening of 
408 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


the ties between that great nation and ourselves.” 

In the year following the Boxer uprising, Rus¬ 
sia completed her hold on the Liao-tung penin¬ 
sula and Manchuria. France and Germany re¬ 
fused to protest or to join with the other powers 
in preventing Russia from doing exactly what 
they themselves had several years before united 
with Russia in preventing Japan from accomplish¬ 
ing. The opposition to Russia came from Great 
Britain, Japan, and the United States. It led to 
an alliance between Great Britain and Japan that 
has lasted to this day. It stimulated the Ameri¬ 
can Government to take the initiative in cham¬ 
pioning the integrity of China and formulating 
the policy of the open door, a diplomatic effort 
that won for the United States the affection of 
the Chinese nation. But neither Anglo-Japanese 
combined effort nor American diplomatic activity 
prevented Russia from accomplishing her pur¬ 
pose. Russian imperialism, at the expense of 
China and Korea, developed uninterruptedly until 
the menace became too great for Japan. It was 
checked by force of arms. 

Not content with permission to construct the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad across Manchuria, or 
even to get economic and political control of the 
409 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

portion of Manchuria through which the railway 
ran, Russia wanted all of Manchuria and the 
Korean and Liao-tung peninsulas. In secret 
negotiations with Li Hung Chang, in addition 
to the railway from Mukden to the point of the 
Liao-tung peninsula and the Port Arthur and 
Dalny concessions, Russia secured land for a 
settlement at Tientsin, on the left bank of the 
river Pei-ho opposite the British concession. 
This led to similar demands from the other pow¬ 
ers, and Tientsin, the port at Peking, became 
a center of international rivalry, with the powers 
fighting for lands and wharves with complete dis¬ 
regard of Chinese sovereignty. In 1901, instead 
of withdrawing her troops from southern Man¬ 
churia and the province of Chili, Russia, through 
Li Hung Chang, tried to negotiate a separate 
treaty with China. Some of the powerful man¬ 
darins and public opinion in Peking, encouraged 
more or less openly by Great Britain and Japan, 
opposed the Russian demand. Then Russia pre¬ 
sented the proposed treaty to China as an ulti¬ 
matum, with a date fixed before which the terms 
must be accepted. The Manchurian demands 
were as follows: civil administration to be re¬ 
stored to China, but China to accept the assistance 
410 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


of Russia in keeping order and Russia to main¬ 
tain a military force for the protection of the 
Manchurian Railway; no munitions of war to be 
imported and no military force to be kept in Man¬ 
churia without Russia's consent; no foreigners 
except Russians to be employed in organizing 
land and sea forces in north China; Chinese 
officials in Manchuria and Liao-tung who prove 
themselves obnoxious to Russia to be dismissed; 
district of Kin-chau, at the northern end of the 
Liao-tung Gulf, to pass under Russian adminis¬ 
tration; no mining or railway concessions to be 
granted to foreigners in Manchuria, Mongolia, or 
Turkestan; indemnity for injury to Russian in¬ 
terests and for Russian expenses in Manchuria 
arising from the Boxer troubles; the damage 
caused to the Manchurian Railway to be compen¬ 
sated by granting a new concession or modifying 
the old one; and the concession for a new railway 
connecting the Manchurian Railway with the 
Great Wall. These demands meant virtually 
Russian control from Petrograd to Peking. 

China resisted at first. After the protocol to 
settle the Boxer affair had been signed, Russia 
presented a new project of treaty very similar 
to the ultimatum. At this juncture, Li Hung 
411 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Chang died. But the Russian troops remained in 
Manchuria, and Russia was in a position to exer¬ 
cise the rights China refused to grant. The 
Trans-Siberian Railway was completed in No¬ 
vember, and the Russians prepared Dalny as ter¬ 
minus of the Liao-tung branch. In defiance of 
China and the powers and in violation of their 
rights, the Russians remained in occupation of 
the treaty port of Niuchuang. 

In January, 1902, Great Britain and Japan in¬ 
formed China that they would not assent to the 
concession of exclusive rights to Russians in 
Manchuria. Next month, the terms of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance were published, in which 
the integrity and independence of China and 
equal trade opportunities for all were assured. 
The United States protested vigorously at Petro- 
grad and Peking. Russia assured the United 
States that equal commercial rights would be 
maintained within “the Russian zone.” This 
same assurance was given to Great Britain and 
Japan. France did not ask for it: nor did Ger¬ 
many. It was no secret that French capitalists 
expected to draw the biggest portion of the profit 
from Russian exploitations in Manchuria. And 
Germany intended to watch closely every step in 
412 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


Russian encroachment. Any additional privilege 
granted to Russia in Manchuria would be re¬ 
garded as a precedent for demanding the same 
privilege in Shangtung! 

A Russo-Chinese agreement was signed on 
April 8, 1902. Russia promised to withdraw her 
troops from Manchuria within eighteen months, 
to restore the entire Manchurian Railway to 
China, to entrust the guarding of the railway to 
Chinese troops, and to consider Manchuria as 
“an integral portion of the Chinese Empire.” On 
the other hand, China was to put the executive 
control of the railway into Russian hands, and 
to grant no concessions for other railway con¬ 
struction in Manchuria without the consent of 
Russia. This was what the world knew. Russia 
asked for secret clauses, accompanying the agree¬ 
ment, by which China would grant exclusive rail¬ 
way and mining exploitation in Manchuria to 
the Russo-Chinese Bank. But the secret clauses 
were discovered by the other powers. The con¬ 
vention was signed without the secret clauses. 

The railway to the tip of the Liao-tung penin¬ 
sula was completed at the end of July, 1903. 
Russia showed the intention of not fulfilling her 
obligations to China. New stipulations were 
413 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


made for withdrawing troops from Manchuria, 
which amounted to renewing the secret clauses 
of 1902 and to closing Manchuria, including Liao¬ 
tung, to foreign trade other than Russian. The 
Russian ambassadors in London and Washing¬ 
ton denied that any such negotiations were taking 
place. But the American minister at Peking had 
been able to secure proofs of Russia's bad faith. 
Instead of evacuating Manchuria on October 8, 
Russia held military and naval manceuvers at 
Port Arthur and reoccupied Mukden with strong 
forces on October 28. Admiral Alexieff gave 
the excuse that Russia had found it impossible to 
“extend civilization in Manchuria" without ad¬ 
ministering the country. At the same time, re¬ 
ports reached the outside world that the Russians 
had erected forts in northern Mongolia and were 
sending their agents, commercial and political, 
into that province. Russian engineers were sur¬ 
veying a railroad route in Mongolia. 

Once more, as at the time of the Russian men¬ 
ace to Korea, China was at the parting of the 
ways. Yuan-Shih-Kai, who came to the front as 
new commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, 
declared for a policy of rapprochement with 
Japan. He tried to get Peking to see that Russia 
414 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


might fight for Manchuria. By declaring war 
against Russia and inviting the cooperation of 
Japan, China could anticipate Japanese action 
against Russia and save Manchuria and the Liao¬ 
tung peninsula. Yuan-Shih-Kai was not listened 
to. European representatives at Peking, while 
opposing Russia and each other, worked against 
any agreement between China and Japan. 

The result of failure to follow Yuan-Shih-Kai’s 
advice has been constant antagonism between 
China and Japan, whose real interests on the eve 
of the Russo-Japanese War were identical. How 
different might have been the history of the past 
fifteen years for China had she sided with Japan 
in the defense of her territorial integrity against 
all European encroachment! While Japan en¬ 
gaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia, 
China remained neutral. The Chinese suffered 
the ignominy of neutrality with all the incon¬ 
veniences of belligerency. In Manchuria, they 
saw their homes destroyed, their possessions 
subjected to requisition, and Chinese civilians 
forced to work for both armies. Japanese and 
Russians lived on the country, and finally made 
a peace with each other, disregarding China, and 
agreeing upon the division of Manchuria. 

4i5 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA . 

During the period between the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki and the Treaty of Portsmouth, the 
only power that sided with China was the United 
States. Our attitude was one of consistent ideal¬ 
ism and disinterestedness. We opposed the dis¬ 
graceful scramble for “leases” and “zones.” 
American public opinion did not regard the en¬ 
croachment of one power upon the sovereignty 
of China as a justification for other powers, in¬ 
cluding ourselves, following the policy we were 
denouncing. Is any more striking proof needed 
that the world is not ready for a society of na¬ 
tions than the unwillingness or the inability of the 
nations to set forth and live up to a high standard 
of international morality? In international re¬ 
lations, the powers seem determined to accept as 
standards of conduct the actions and policies of 
one another, no matter how base. One power 
commits an injustice against China. An outcry 
is raised. Then the other powers do exactly the 
same thing! The excuse is always either: “X 
did it first,” or “If we did n’t do it, X would.” 

The war with Spain, ending in the acquisition 
of the Philippines by the United States, brought 
America into the company of the Asiatic colonial 
powers. Our position in the Far East was 
416 


CHINA THE VICTIM 

materially strengthened. The American Gov¬ 
ernment felt this and determined to make its voice 
heard to save China from partition. When 
Great Britain and Russia agreed to divide China 
into “spheres of influence,” Secretary John Hay 
formulated his “open-door” policy. On Septem¬ 
ber 6, 1899, he invited the great powers, includ¬ 
ing Japan, to adhere to an international conven¬ 
tion that would supersede the system of spheres 
of influence. No power was to have exclusive 
rights in any treaty port or zone; the Chinese 
tariff was to be administered by Chinese officials 
at the same rates throughout China; and there 
was to be no discrimination against any nation 
or in favor of any nation in port dues or railway 
rates. Only Great Britain, whose supremacy in 
Chinese trade had long been secured, accepted 
and approved the scheme. Mr. Hay insisted 
upon definite replies. Then came the Boxer re¬ 
bellion, which not only saved the powers from 
taking a definite stand for or against “the open 
door,” but enabled them to defeat Mr. Hay’s in¬ 
itiative. The United States declined to partici¬ 
pate in the shelling of the Taku forts, and showed 
reluctance in the famous Peking relief expedi¬ 
tion. There is no doubt that the action of the 
4T7 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

international squadron did much to aggravate 
the Boxer troubles. All the powers showed too 
great alacrity to take advantage of the situation 
created by the anti-foreign outbreak. Instead of 
making an honest effort to establish the causes of 
the uprising and to allay the agitation by assur 
ing the Chinese of their good-will and good inten¬ 
tions politically toward China, the powers acted 
as if they wanted the disorder to increase to the 
point where intervention would be justified. The 
propaganda in the European press was very much 
like that which later appeared in regard to Fe2 
when the French were seeking for a means to cir¬ 
cumvent the Act of Algeciras, and the reports 
circulated about Cairo when Great Britain wanted 
to hasten the acknowledgment by her allies of 
the protectorate over Egypt before a peace 
treaty was presented to Germany. When the 
United States finally decided to participate in the 
expedition, Secretary Hay declared, on July 3, 
1900: “The policy of the Government of the 
United States is to seek a solution which may 
bring about permanent safety and peace to China, 
to preserve Chinese territorial and administra¬ 
tive entity, protect all rights guaranteed to 
friendly Powers by treaty and international law, 
418 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


and safeguard for the world the principle of 
equal and impartial trade with all parts of the 
Chinese Empire.” 

After the Boxer uprising, the United States 
dissented from the exaggerated indemnity de¬ 
mands put forth by Germany, France, and Russia. 
Secretary Hay saw clearly that the object of these 
demands was to make China bankrupt and to give 
a pretext for seizing territory in the place of 
money. Great Britain, who already had her well- 
developed ports in China, had every reason for 
supporting the American position. Japan, whose 
interest was to prevent one and all of the Euro¬ 
pean powers from getting a hold on China, sided 
also with the United States. The final amount of 
indemnity agreed upon, however, was so far in 
excess of the losses incurred that the United 
States refused to accept more than half of the 
amount allotted to her. 

But Secretary Hay failed in preventing Russia 
from closing the door in Manchuria, and after 
the Russo-Japanese War, when Russia was 
limited to northern Manchuria, Mr. Hay’s suc¬ 
cessor, Secretary Root, protested in vain against 
the surrender by China of her right of control 
over the municipalities of northern Manchuria. 

419 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


In December, 1909, a third American Secretary 
of State tried by diplomatic means to restore 
Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and thus 
secure equal privileges for the trade of other 
powers in Liao-tung and Manchuria. Mr. 
Knox proposed that the railways be turned back 
to the Chinese Government, and that their 
management be freed from Russian and Japanese 
influences, which were discriminating against 
American trade. The Japanese and Russian 
Governments rejected this proposal and compelled 
China to cancel a concession for a railway in 
northern Manchuria that had been granted to a 
British-American syndicate. This latter act es¬ 
pecially was a failure for American prestige, be¬ 
cause Secretary Knox had asserted that the syn¬ 
dicate would have the complete diplomatic back¬ 
ing of the American Government as a test to 
establish the open door once more in Manchuria. 

Several Chinese statesmen, who had an active 
part in the affairs of their country during the 
years between the Boxer uprising and the Revo¬ 
lution of 1911, have described to me graphically 
the growing feeling of despair and resentment 
among educated Chinese over the exploitation of 
their country by the European powers and Japan. 

420 


CHINA THE VICTIM 

They have confessed to me ajso their lack of faith 
in the promises of the United States to give ef¬ 
fective aid to China. “You talk much: you do 
nothing,” was the laconic way in which a Chinese 
delegate to the Conference of Paris expressed his 
opinion of American diplomacy. To prove his 
statement, he gave me an illuminating review of 
the notes of Secretaries Hay and Root, and ex¬ 
plained how the Chinese felt about our supineness 
after Secretary Knox had openly announced “the 
determination of the American Government” to 
secure the neutralization of the Manchurian Rail¬ 
way. During the recent war, the United States 
promised to loan China money to send troops to 
Europe. After having given the promise, the 
American Government yielded to the pressure of 
the diplomacy of our allies, who did not want 
active Chinese participation on the field of battle, 
and broke faith with China. During the Peace 
Conference, the Chinese delegates say they re¬ 
ceived the solemn assurance from President Wil¬ 
son that he would not consent to yield “one iota” 
in the application of the principle that no terri¬ 
tories should change political sovereignty with¬ 
out the manifest will of their inhabitants. After 
the Shangtung decision, which violated this state- 
421 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ment, had already been made, Secretary Lansing 
(who was of course unaware of the President’s 
surrender) told one of the Chinese delegates that 
the Japanese demand in regard to Shangtung 
would not be agreed to by the United States. 

Threatened by the European powers and 
Japan, seeing the resources of their country pass 
into the hands of foreigners, realizing that their 
future was being mortgaged, patriotic Chinese at 
home and abroad decided that the only way 
to save China was the complete reform of the 
country along the lines that Japan had accom¬ 
plished. The movement for reform and change 
gained ground rapidly after the Russo-Japanese 
War. An imperial commission, sent to study the 
representative systems of government in foreign 
countries, made a report that led to the edict of 
September i, 1906. The edict promised a con¬ 
stitution with universal suffrage, but wisely de¬ 
clared the necessity of first reforming the admin¬ 
istrative system, revising the laws and court 
procedure, encouraging education, regulating 
finances and reorganizing the army and gendarm- 
ery. Great progress was made in the autumn of 
1906. Fifteen universities were established and 
public schools opened for girls. Thirteen thou- 
422 


CHINA THE VICTIM 


sand students went to Japan and several thousand 
more to Europe and to the United States. Two 
important facts mark the seriousness of the 
change that was taking place. The first was the 
promulgation of the edict gradually abolishing 
the production and sale of opium in ten years. 
The second was the beginning of xenophobia 
among the intellectual classes—a symptom in¬ 
variably accompanying national movements. 
After several years of agitation, China launched 
upon the supreme effort to save her unity. Old 
institutions were swept away. China astonished 
the world by becoming a republic. 


423 


CHAPTER XX 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 


U NTIL our traders began to exploit China 
and sought the support of statesmen and 
diplomatists, the Chinese Empire, as a po¬ 
litical organism in the sense we Occidentals un¬ 
derstand a state, did not exist. We had to have 
a central authority from which we could wring 
concessions and which we could hold responsible 
for protecting those of us who penetrated the se¬ 
clusion of China for the purpose of filling our 
pockets. At the time of the opium war and of 
the Anglo-French Expedition to Peking, the 
Manchu Dynasty had moral and cultural rather 
than political authority. In a vast country where 
communications were slow and difficult, adminis¬ 
trative authority was in the hands of provincial 
viceroys. The viceroys in turn were limited in 
the exercise of power. They were strong or 
weak according to their personal ability and the 
424 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

physical features of the provinces they governed. 
Local autonomy was due to circumstances that 
never changed, not to pressure of peoples upon 
rulers. 

Absence of caste spirit, feudal privileges, po¬ 
litical prerogatives based on heredity, and condi¬ 
tions analagous to those of European and Ameri¬ 
can economic and political evolution, have made 
it difficult for us to comprehend Chinese history 
and institutions. Communities did not have to 
come together for the purpose of defending 
their lives and homes and economic interests 
against invaders of another race. Nor did 
the Chinese awaken to national feeling and po¬ 
litical solidarity under the pressure of seeking 
markets abroad for what they produced. China 
was a civilization, not a nation. Until European 
imperialism troubled China and inspired and con¬ 
taminated Japan, the Chinese needed no army 
and navy to defend common interests. The im¬ 
perial throne was a symbol. Statesmen and dip¬ 
lomats were non-existent. 

During the latter half of the nineteenth cen¬ 
tury, the intervention of European powers in 
China led to a counter-intervention of Japan. 
The Manchu Government at Peking was forced 
425 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


to speak for the Chinese people. The Chinese 
woke up from the seclusion of centuries to find 
themselves involved in debts and concessions and 
foreign wars—all within the space of a few dec¬ 
ades. Great Britain, Russia, and France, in¬ 
stalled in neighboring countries, began to en¬ 
croach upon Chinese provinces. Followed by 
Portugal, Germany, and Italy, they seized ports, 
bombarded undefended cities, landed troops, and 
mapped out spheres of influence. They imposed 
the principle of extra-territoriality in half a hun¬ 
dred places, the term “treaty port” meaning 
often an inland city. Then Japan entered the 
game. By looking to Peking to represent and 
bind and be responsible for all China, the great 
powers at first acted in ignorance. Later, when 
they realized the nature of the imperial institu¬ 
tion, they still refused to accept the difference be¬ 
tween the Chinese and the European conception 
of statehood. They insisted upon the authority 
and responsibility of the imperial throne. In or¬ 
der to clothe their predatory schemes with a sem¬ 
blance of legality, they regarded China as a united 
and cohesive state at the very moment they were 
conspiring against Chinese unity. 

The story of the dealings of Europe and Japan 

4^6 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

with China is told in other chapters, where for¬ 
eign aggression is set forth to explain the political 
evolution of Japan, the policies of Russia and Ger¬ 
many and France and Great Britain in the Far 
East, and the international aspects of the Boxer 
uprising. But we cannot understand the phe¬ 
nomenon of the birth of the Chinese Republic, 
involving the disappearance of the Manchus and 
the confusing years of coups d'etat and civil war, 
without emphasizing again the successive attacks 
of the great powers upon Chinese territorial and 
political integrity and their attempt to enslave 
China economically by loans and concessions. If 
the Manchu Dynasty had profited by its oppor¬ 
tunity to make the throne the rallying-point of 
successful resistance against all the powers, 
there would have been no Republican movement 
of irresistible appeal. But .the weak and cor¬ 
rupt officials at Peking, tolerated in the old days, 
came to be regarded as the instruments of the 
“foreign devils.” And they were. So the 
Manchu Dynasty was doomed. What we have 
witnessed during the last decade is the transfor¬ 
mation of a civilization into a nation. China— 
the state—was born. It was not political evo¬ 
lution from imperial to republican institutions. 

427 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


It was the awakening to national consciousness 
of the most numerous race in the world. 

The revolution of 1911 was preceded by un¬ 
mistakable symptoms of the new spirit in China. 
Through the concessions and the opening of 
more “treaty ports” and the increase of taxation, 
the Chinese of the provinces began to realize 
willy-nilly that the foreigners were insisting that 
Peking exercise the prerogative of speaking for 
China—but in a sense inimical to the interests of 
China. The great powers were demanding that 
the central government assume all the rights of 
sovereignty and exercise direct administrative 
control over the provinces in order that the rights 
of sovereignty and administrative control be 
transferred to them! This was the lesson of 
the diplomatic activity of Great Britain and Rus¬ 
sia and France, of Germany’s entrance into Far 
Eastern affairs, of Japan’s “defense of China,” 
of the settlement after the Boxer uprising. If 
the Peking Government was to be able to pledge 
the resources of China for the payment of inter¬ 
est on loans and indemnities, to cede ports and 
whole provinces to foreigners, to open the door 
wide to foreign exploitation, it was high time 
that the Chinese race became the Chinese nation 
428 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

and banded together to defend its economic in¬ 
terests by asserting its political sovereignty. 
The great powers wanted to regard China as a 
state in order to mulct China. China decided 
to become a state to frustrate the schemes of the 
conspirators. Hence the symptoms that fore¬ 
shadowed the transformation of China from an 
Oriental civilization into an Occidental state. 

The first symptom was interest in military 
training. In spite of increased taxation, public 
opinion supported the raising of armies. Force 
must be met with force. Imperceptibly the Chi¬ 
nese began to learn how to fight as the “foreign 
devils” fought, and to gather the means of fight¬ 
ing. Long ago, General Gordon had declared 
his admiration of the fighting qualities of the 
Chinese, and their amenability to discipline. But 
the profession of arms, because it was super¬ 
fluous, had not appealed to the people. And 
there was no necessity of training fighting-men 
in the Occidental fashion, and to use Occidental 
weapons. But at the end of the nineteenth cen¬ 
tury, provincial viceroys discovered that it was 
easy to get recruits—recruits enthusiastic about 
drilling, recruits who could learn in a short time 
the infantry and artillery tricks of the foreigners. 

429 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

After the Boxer uprising, military preparation 
was intensified. Military drill was introduced 
into the curriculum of schools. Sons of princes 
and nobles were encouraged to enter the army. 
In Shanghai and other centers, where the people 
had come into actual contact with foreigners and 
where they had seen—and sometimes suffered 
from—foreign troops, recruiting for the army 
brought marvelous results. In the autumn of 
1906, after the reform edicts had been promul¬ 
gated, in one month more young men offered 
themselves for military service than had been the 
previous existing strength of the Chinese Army. 
The manufacture of munitions of war became 
an industry in almost every provincial capital. 
Small arms and ammunition took a prominent 
place in imports—to the delight of European 
traders. An illustration of the military poten¬ 
tiality of China was afforded by the effort of 
Yuan-Shih-Kai during the five years he was 
Minister of the Army Reorganization Coun¬ 
cil, a position he filled simultaneously with that 
of metropolitan viceroy. Yuan-Shih-Kai suc¬ 
ceeded in raising and equipping six infantry di¬ 
visions in North China, the leadership of which 
made him a powerful factor in the empire. At 

430 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

the same time, he put through a plan of army 
reorganization in the provinces that unfortu¬ 
nately awakened the jealousy of rivals, who con¬ 
spired for his dismissal. But the ball had been 
started rolling. 

The second symptom was interest in adminis¬ 
trative, financial, educational, and social reforms. 
The edict of September i, 1906, followed by 
changes in the administration in November, 
marked the beginning of the effort to convert 
China into a state along Occidental lines. China 
had never before been faced with the necessity 
of raising enormous sums of money for a central 
government to pay out. The Chinese had never 
before seen foreigners appear in the ports, on 
river banks, and in the provinces with authority 
from Peking to seize land and take over its ad¬ 
ministration. Just as in military affairs the Chi¬ 
nese woke up to the imperative necessity of hav¬ 
ing to meet force with force, so in administrative 
and financial affairs they began to realize that 
the millenia of laisser-faire were over. The 
struggle for existence against the foreigner, in¬ 
cluding the Japanese neighbor, called for learn¬ 
ing how to do things as they were done elsewhere 
in the world. Cutting off pig-tails, abandoning 
43i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

baby shoes for women, revising the examination 
system for civil service, going abroad or to for¬ 
eign institutions to study, founding newspapers 
by the thousand, exhibiting sudden jealousy over 
the maintenance of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet 
and Mongolia, clamoring for universal suffrage 
and representative government, recognizing the 
equality of womanhood—all these miracles are 
commented upon in books on twentieth-century 
China as evidences of the religious and cultural 
influence of Occidental civilization upon the Chi¬ 
nese. Nonsense! The influence has been po¬ 
litical and economic. The Chinese, like the Jap¬ 
anese, have imitated us and adopted our insti¬ 
tutions because we forced them to do so. Far 
from believing in the superiority of the new ways, 
they are filled with misgivings. Witness the 
edict of December 31, 1906, which raised Con¬ 
fucius to the same rank as Heaven and Earth. 

The third symptom was the determination to 
get rid of opium. This was a feature of the Sep¬ 
tember, 1906, reforms, and the opium dens of 
Peking were closed on the day of the elevation 
of Confucius. The edict concerning opium pro¬ 
vided for the abolition of its use in ten years. All 
officials, except those of the palace and the very 
432 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

old, were commanded to abandon the habit. For 
several years Chinese showed continued interest 
and energy in suppressing the growth of the 
poppy and the use of opium. But the action of 
provincial authorities differed widely. Some 
were thorough, others supine. The Chinese cru¬ 
sade was greatly helped by the generous attitude 
of the Government of India and by the closing 
of opium dens in Hongkong and in foreign set¬ 
tlements. China had the loyal cooperation of the 
European powers and the United States. When 
one considers that opium furnished nearly a 
quarter of the revenues of Hongkong and more 
than half of those of Singapore and the Straits 
Settlements, and six per cent, of the entire rev¬ 
enues of India, the attitude of the British author¬ 
ities—who had to contend with powerful local 
opposition in the colonies—is worthy of the high¬ 
est praise. Great Britain, in answer to the re¬ 
quest of China, agreed to suppress the importa¬ 
tion of opium into China one tenth each year, 
beginning in 1908, until the complete extinction 
of the trade in 1917. There was to be an experi¬ 
mental period of three years, and the British 
promise was contingent upon the success of China 
in curtailing the culture of opium one tenth each 
433 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


year. In 1911, Great Britain offered to shorten 
the period of ten years by stopping importation 
entirely as soon as China stopped production en¬ 
tirely, and by tripling the import tax against 
China’s tripling the production tax. Following 
this new agreement, other powers agreed to re¬ 
fuse the right to their subjects to deal in opium 
in the treaty ports, to receive other opium than 
the certified Indian product, and to suppress rig¬ 
orously contraband for transit across their terri¬ 
tories. An opium convention was signed by 
twelve powers on January 23, 1912, at The 
Hague. A second Hague Convention met in the 
summer of 1913. As far as importation into 
China goes, the Chinese have nothing to com¬ 
plain of in the attitude of the powers. The opium 
question has become an internal Chinese problem. 
Owing to the civil war, it is not yet solved. But 
the Chinese have rid themselves of one of the 
most baneful and corrupting aspects of European 
trade through treaty ports. 

The fourth symptom was the growing mani¬ 
festation of hostility to foreigners. This was no 
longer confined to reactionaries and the ignorant. 
It could no longer be explained by imputing anti- 
foreign agitation to officials who resented the di- 
434 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

minishing of their ability to graft, to villagers 
who did not like missionaries for various reasons, 
and to peasants the graves of whose ancestors 
were being disturbed by railw’ay construction. 
The Chinese educated abroad were returning in 
great numbers to point out to their fellow-coun¬ 
trymen the shame of being exploited economically 
and of not being masters in their own house. 
Why should foreigners be given exceptional priv¬ 
ileges in China when humiliating restrictions 
were laid down for the entry of Chinamen into 
the United States and many parts of the British 
Empire? Why should coolies, hired like cattle 
and transported like cattle, be shut up like slaves 
or criminals in South African mining-camps? 
Anti-American feeling began to spread in South 
China. American goods were boycotted The 
Chinese Government made representations at 
Washington, similar to those of the Japanese 
Government, regarding our immigration laws, 
and to Great Britain concerning the treatment of 
Chinese in South Africa. For the first time in 
history, China threatened reprisals if Chinese 
subjects and Chines-e interests were not given full 
and courteous attention by governments that 
had always demanded in China scrupulous re- 
435 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


spect for treaty rights, privileges, and conces¬ 
sions acquired by violence or dubious diplomatic 
means. It was impossible for an intelligent 
Chinaman to travel abroad or study in a foreign 
institution in China without becoming a hater of 
foreigners. How could it be otherwise ? It used 
to be that we did not treat the Chinese badly and 
try to exploit them and apply to them the prin¬ 
ciple of might makes right, or at least that the 
Chinese, not having traveled or not having found 
out by reading our conception —for ourselves — 
of what constitute inalienable individual and na¬ 
tional human rights, did not realize how badly 
we were treating them. 

Xenophobia, instead of being condemned and 
denounced, ought to be regarded as an encourag- 
ing sign in China of the twentieth century. For 
xenophobia in the Chinese means self-respect and 
an intelligent conception of the obligations and 
privileges of nationhood. Xenophobia will grow 
in China as rapidly as education spreads and 
intercourse increases with the outside world. 
And it will not die out until we are ready to 
apply the Golden Rule in our dealings with 
China and the Chinese. 

Concentration of power in the hands of the 
436 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

imperial government, which began in 1907, led 
immediately to a movement for democratic con¬ 
trol, and the primary reason given by leaders in 
the agitation in all the provinces for the over¬ 
throw of autocracy was that the establishment of 
representative government at Peking was the only 
means to resist the development of concessions 
and the encroachment of European powers and 
Japan upon Chinese sovereignty. Throughout 
China, temples were converted into schools. At 
every meeting to support the program of reforms 
and to advocate a constitutional system of gov¬ 
ernment, women participated, and the resolutions 
voted contained a paragraph calling upon Peking 
to resist the demands for favors of all foreign 
governments. At a great public meeting in Can¬ 
ton, there was a protest against British vessels of 
war doing police work in Chinese waters. In 
1908, the leaders of the constitutional movement 
promised that success would result in the control 
of all railways and mines by Chinese, and the 
abolition of Russian and Japanese right to ad¬ 
ministration and jurisdiction in Manchuria. The 
empress and the old empress dowager both died 
in November. The new emperor was only five 
years old. His father, Prince Chun, himself a 
437 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


very young and inexperienced man, was named 
regent. Yuan-Shih-Kai, who had reorganized 
the army and was in charge of the drafting of a 
constitution, succumbed to the intrigues of the 
old nobility. 

The first step toward constitutional govern¬ 
ment was the convening of an imperial assembly 
on October 3, 1910. Of the two hundred mem¬ 
bers, one half were Manchus—imperial princes 
or dukes, clansmen, hereditary nobles, high func¬ 
tionaries, and great landowners. The other 
half were members of provincial assemblies 
chosen by the viceroys. The imperial assembly, 
under the influence of the demand of the provin¬ 
cial assemblies for parliamentary government, 
urged the regent to convene a national parliament 
at an early date. The government, which had 
at first decided upon 1917 as the earliest possible 
date for putting into effect constitutional changes, 
compromised. On November 4, 1910, an edict 
appeared promising the inauguration of the par¬ 
liament after three years. The edict contained 
provisions for the constitution of the cabinet and 
parliament and regulations for election. The as¬ 
sembly, not satisfied, insisted on a much earlier 
date. At the same time, the government was 
438 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 


warned against sanctioning a foreign loan and 
against granting further concessions to foreign¬ 
ers. 

Under pressure of foreign diplomats and for¬ 
eign financiers, the imperial government did not 
listen to the warning. This was the direct cause 
of the revolution that led to China becoming a 
constitutional state as a republic rather than as 
an empire. An epidemic of bubonic plague was 
taken advantage of by Russia and Japan to get 
a Chinese and an international acknowledgment 
of their sovereignty and spheres of influence in 
Manchuria. The Chinese became thoroughly 
alarmed when Russia established consulates in 
towns where importance of trade was no excuse, 
when Mongol princes visited Petrograd, and 
when Peking refused to all-ow the viceroy of 
Yunnan to take measures to prevent the British 
from extending the frontier of Burma The 
last straw was the signing of railway agreements 
with foreign financiers, and the borrowing of 
money from a foreign group for currency re¬ 
form and industrial enterprises in Manchuria. 
The revolution broke out in South China. Man- 
chu garrisons were massacred. 

Yuan-Shih-Kai, who was leading successfully 
439 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

an army against the revolutionaries, had to be 
recalled to Peking to assume the premiership. 
But neither his military nor political ability could 
save the Manchu Dynasty. Province after 
province went over to the revolution. The ad¬ 
miral of the Yangtse fleet adhered to the revolu¬ 
tion. Yuan-Shih-Kai failed in his attempt to 
form a coalition cabinet. Some of those whom 
he asked to join him, such as Wu Ting Fang, for¬ 
mer Minister to the United States, responded by 
becoming members of the Republican govern¬ 
ment that had been proclaimed at Shanghai. At 
the beginning of December, the regent resigned. 
Yuan-Shih-Kai agreed to an armistice and pro¬ 
posed federal government for China. The revo¬ 
lutionaries, however, insisted that the Manchu 
Dynasty abdicate and the republic be proclaimed. 
On the last day of the year, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, 
organizer of the revolution, who had lived for 
fourteen years in exile and had just returned, 
was unanimously elected president at Shanghai. 
On January 5, 1912, a manifesto to the foreign 
powers proclaimed the establishment of the re¬ 
public. Two weeks later, the success of the 
movement was assured by the splendid spirit of 
Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who offered to resign the presi- 
440 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 
dency in favor of Yuan-Shih-Kai, if the emperor 
abdicated and all the provinces agreed. 

With the diplomats looking on bewildered, the 
revolution marched apace. On February 12, 
the emperor signed three edicts, abdicating, creat¬ 
ing a constitutional republic, and granting full 
power to Yuan-Shih-Kai to establish a provisional 
government in conjunction with the revolution¬ 
aries. On February 17, Yuan-Shih-Kai was 
elected provisional president by the representa¬ 
tives of seventeen provinces, and the Western 
calendar adopted. On March 16, Yuan-Shih-Kai 
was inaugurated. He promised to develop a re¬ 
public and create the nation from the five races— 
Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Mohammedan, and 
Tibetan—symbolized in the stripes of the Repub¬ 
lican flag. On April 1, Sun Yat Sen and the 
members of his cabinet gave up their seals of 
office, and agreed to Peking instead of Nanking 
as seat of government. Parliament was to be 
summoned within six months. 

Public opinion in America and Europe and in 
Japan was far from being hostile to the Chinese 
Republic. As in the case of the establishment 
of a constitutional regime in Turkey three years 
earlier, press comment was universally sympa- 

441 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


thetic. But foreigners who were in business in 
China and the European diplomats in the Far 
East had a totally different attitude. They in¬ 
fluenced their governments not to recognize the 
republic and frustrated the effort of Yuan-Shih- 
Kai to float a foreign loan in any other way than 
through legation channels. The formation of an 
army was not looked upon with favor by Russia 
and Japan. When these two nations joined the 
six-power group, they stipulated that China 
should not spend more than one twentieth of the 
money she borrowed for military purposes. The 
Republican government gave European diplom¬ 
acy a terrible jolt by negotiating a loan of ten 
million pounds with a private British Arm on eas¬ 
ier terms than those laid down by the six-power 
group. The foreign ministers at Peking pro¬ 
tested. Owing to the Boxer indemnity, they held 
the whip hand over China. At the same time, 
the Russian and British Foreign Offices were 
highly indignant because the new government re¬ 
fused to admit the thesis that Mongolia and Tibet 
were “practically independent”—which meant 
that these two provinces were sufficiently de¬ 
tached from China to be attached to the Russian 
and British empires. 


442 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 


Elections were held in January, 1913. The 
parliament was inaugurated on April 8 at Pe¬ 
king. Five hundred out of five hundred and 
ninety-six representatives, and one hundred and 
seventy-seven out of two hundred and seventy- 
four senators, were present. Never in history 
had such a large body of delegates of the Chinese 
provinces met together. It would have been 
surprising had difficulties not arisen. From the 
beginning, Yuan-Shih-Kai met with opposition 
from his old enemies, the original revolutionaries, 
and it was not long before a revolt broke out in 
the Yangtse Valley which spread in the South, 
and at the head of which were Dr. Sun Yat Sen 
and others of the first Canton government. Per¬ 
haps this was in the nature of things. But much 
of Yuan-Shih-Kai’s trouble would have been 
averted had not European intrigues continued at 
Peking. 

The powers backed their financiers in impos¬ 
ing a large loan from a consortium of banks, 
which was secured by mortgaging the salt reve¬ 
nues and the future surplus of maritime cus¬ 
toms. It was stipulated that the foreign interests 
should have inspectors and advisers in various 
departments of the Ministry of Finance. The 
443 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


United States was the only government to recog¬ 
nize officially Yuan-Shih-Kai. 

The new revolt was put down before the end 
of summer. In the presidential election, held in 
October, Yuan was overwhelmingly chosen presi¬ 
dent for five years. In November, when Parlia¬ 
ment was considering limiting the power of the 
president, Yuan-Shih-Kai dissolved the Southern 
Party, most of whom were his bitter opponents, 
and declared their seats vacant. The members 
excluded were nearly half of the senators and 
little more than half of the representatives. On 
January n, 1914, Yuan-Shih-Kai dissolved the 
parliament. A committee appointed by him to 
draft a constitution proposed a one-chamber par¬ 
liament, the abolition of the cabinet, and the sub¬ 
stitution of the premier by a Secretary of State, 
who would act under the direct orders of the 
president. The new assembly was not to be 
strictly representative nor to have full powers. 

When the European War broke out, Yuan- 
Shih-Kai was the dictator of China, although his 
authority was by no means recognized every¬ 
where. He had against him the exiled revolu¬ 
tionaries and the Manchu conspirators—the two 
extremes. He was facing the serious uprising 
444 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 

of the mysterious leader who was known as the 
White Wolf. He had been struggling against 
the intrigues of Russia in Mongolia, of Great 
Britain in Tibet and Yunnan, and of Japan in 
southern Manchuria. He had to accept the un¬ 
popularity of increasing taxation to meet obli¬ 
gations to foreign powers, and of enforcing re¬ 
spect for concessions. After Japan entered the 
war, Yuan-Shih-Kai was confronted with a new 
situation due to the substitution of Japan for 
Germany in the Shangtung peninsula. 

In June, 1915, President Yuan-Shih-Kai issued 
a manifesto on his negotiations with Japan. He 
admitted that China had suffered by the conces¬ 
sions in Manchuria and Mongolia, and was called 
upon to suffer a more serious menace than Ger¬ 
many had been from the fact that Japan was now 
installed on both sides of the capital. He ex¬ 
pressed sorrow and shame for the humiliation 
the country had been forced to bear. But in view 
of the political weakness of the Chinese people, 
none of these abdications of sovereignty and im¬ 
pairment of national interests had been possible 
to avoid. A spirit of solidarity must be created. 
The people must work together for reforms. 
When China became a strong nation, wrongs 
445 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


would be righted. In the last months of 1915, 
in spite of the virtual veto of the Entente powers, 
the Council of State, after a dubious referendum 
to the provinces, formally asked Yuan-Shih-Kai 
to become Emperor of China. The president 
consented. This led to a new revolt. On De¬ 
cember 26, 1915, the province of Yunnan de¬ 
clared its independence from China. The coro¬ 
nation was fixed for February 9, 1916, but at the 
end of January, Yuan-Shih-Kai announced the 
indefinite postponement of the inauguration of 
the monarchy. This did not calm the rebels. By 
the end of April, nearly all of South China— 
seven provinces—had separated from Peking. 
The movement kept spreading in spite of Yuan- 
Shih-Kai’s declaration that the scheme to re¬ 
establish the monarchy was totally abandoned. 

Yuan-Shih-Kai conveniently died on June 6. 
The vice-president, Li Yuan Hung, who suc¬ 
ceeded according to the provisions of the con¬ 
stitution, convened the old parliament on Aug¬ 
ust 2 and declared adherence to the constitution. 
As General Li was acceptable to the South, unity 
was restored. 

But traces of trouble remained; for the North 
and the South were not harmonious on questions 
446 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 


of policy. Southern leaders were more liberal 
and radical than those of the North, as the North¬ 
ern Party was recruited from military men, who 
had been under the training of Yuan-Shih-Kai 
and who believed that the first things China 
had to do were to build up a large army and or¬ 
ganize a centralized administrative system like 
that of France. 

Most Chinese were profoundly indifferent to 
the war in Europe. They had been treated so 
abominably by all the European powers that they 
could not see any great rtforal issue. Undoubt¬ 
edly, Chinese reactionaries and military men had 
a certain amount of sympathy and admiration 
for Germany, but not any more than the similar 
class in Japan and Russia, both of which coun¬ 
tries were at war with Germany. It is equally 
true that Chinese liberals believed in the princi¬ 
ples proclaimed by the Entente leaders, and held 
imperial Germany in abhorrence. But faith in 
the sincerity of the Entente powers was lacking, 
especially in view of the fact that two members 
of the Entente Alliance, Russia and Japan, had 
been and were still doing in China exactly what 
they were fighting to prevent Germany from ac¬ 
complishing in Europe. Without exception, an 
447 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


educated Chinaman would tell you that Great 
Britain had one morality for Europe and another 
for Asia. Chinese neutrality was primarily due 
to skepticism, born of experience, concerning the 
sincerity of Entente statesmen’s belief in the 
ideals they so loudly proclaimed. 

The break between the United States and Ger¬ 
many changed the situation completely. The 
Chinese had been following closely President 
Wilson’s speeches. The analogy between their 
own wrongs and those bitterly denounced by the 
American President, and the wonderful vista of 
independence that would come to China in the 
world-wide application of the Wilsonian princi¬ 
ples, inspired the Chinese with the deep longing 
to see the triumph of the Wilsonian philosophy 
in international relations. It was not to be won¬ 
dered at that when the United States sent a note 
to China advising her to take sides with the En¬ 
tente powers, diplomatic relations were broken 
with Germany on the ground of Germany’s in¬ 
tention to prosecute unlimited submarine war¬ 
fare. That China did not follow also America’s 
example by declaring war against Germany im¬ 
mediately after America had done so was due to 
internal considerations. The Chinese of the 
448 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 


South, liberals and Americanophiles as they 
were, did not want to strengthen the hands of the 
Northern Party by giving the government the 
opportunity of proclaiming a state of siege, which 
would follow the declaration of war. The 
Southerners, fearing the use the premier—a 
Northern military man—might make of his pow¬ 
ers in war-time, asked that a new cabinet be 
formed, with larger representation for the South, 
before war was declared. The premier refused. 
This explains why an anti-German and pro- 
American parliamentary majority refused to pass 
the bill declaring war against Germany. 

President Li dismissed the premier, believing 
that only by taking this step could China be 
brought into line with the United States and enter 
the European War. The Northern leaders then 
revolted against the president. The Southern 
provinces separated once more. Civil war broke 
out in August, 1917. After President Li re¬ 
stored the premier, the North declared war 
against Germany, although most of the Northern 
leaders were at heart friendly to Germany—or 
at least no more inimical to Germany than to 
Germany’s enemies. 

The declaration of war was illegal, as there 
449 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


was no parliament in session and the whole coun¬ 
try had not passed upon it. The Southern lead¬ 
ers, who were quite willing to confirm the declar¬ 
ation of war (they had been willing from the 
beginning), demanded that the old parliament 
should be convened once more. But the North 
said that this was impossible because the South¬ 
erners were opposed to the war policy. In order 
to legalize the declaration of war, the Peking 
cabinet passed a new electoral law and convoked 
a new parliament. 

The Southern Party summoned the old parlia¬ 
ment to meet at Canton. This action resulted in 
a division of China that continued throughout 
the war and the peace negotiations in Paris. The 
Southerners controlled completely the three pro¬ 
vinces of Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, and Yunnan. 
These provinces acknowledged the authority of 
the Canton parliament alone. It has been civil 
war, however, in theory rather than in fact; for 
neither faction, as during the earlier period of 
conflict between North and South, has tried to 
conquer the other by force of arms in a serious 
and persistent military campaign. During the 
Paris Peace Conference, the two parties came to¬ 
gether at Shanghai. They were united as far 

450 


CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC 


as foreign policy was concerned. The Southern¬ 
ers did not weary of declaring their approval of the 
war against Germany; but they would not accept 
the illegal declaration of war, which would have 
meant the acknowledgment of the authority of 
the new Peking parliament. The Southerners 
have regarded the allied and associated powers 
as allies, and have treated the Germans in the 
same way as the rest of China. In order that 
China might appear united before Europe and 
America at the Peace Conference, the Peking 
Government gave representation to the South¬ 
erners on the delegation sent to Paris. 

The success of Japan in prosecuting her claims 
to Shangtung at the Conference of Paris, and 
the disregard of the rights of China by the vic¬ 
torious powers, including the United States, 
helped greatly in bringing Northern and South¬ 
ern leaders together. Peking and Canton were 
in harmony in the decision not to sign the Treaty 
of Versailles. 

The fitness of the Chinese for self-government 
and the possibility of China becoming a united 
and constitutional state should not be questioned 
because eight years of confusion and lack of har¬ 
mony have followed the proclamation of the re- 
451 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

public. What government in Europe or Amer¬ 
ica has not passed through initial stages of in¬ 
ternal discord, marked by revolution, bitter par¬ 
liamentary dissension, attempted secession of 
provinces, and civil war? The assumption of 
superiority by the white man in creating and 
maintaining the machinery of government is un¬ 
fair. If we compel non-European races to erect 
governments patterned after our own in order 
to escape from our political and economic yoke, 
should we not give them a little time before hail¬ 
ing with delight their “incapacity for self-gov¬ 
ernment” ? Rome was not built in a day. Why 
China? 


452 


CHAPTER XXI 


THE CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 


OF JAPAN 


HE eagerness of Orientals to learn our ways 



flatters the superficial Occidental observer. 


He misinterprets the motive. He thinks 
that Orientals imitate us—our institutions, our 
methods—because they believe in the superiority 
of our civilization. None makes this mistake 
who realizes that necessity is the mother of imi¬ 
tation as well as of invention. The most stu¬ 
pendous and admirable efforts made by human¬ 
kind, collectively and individually, are subjecting 
the heart to the head, the instinct to the will, the 
innate conviction to the outward adaptation, the 
theory to the fact. If conformity were an act of 
conscience, the problems of society would disap¬ 
pear. We should cast off the cloak of hypocrisy. 

No Oriental nation is comparable with Japan 
in the rapidity and success of the process of Oc- 


453 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

cidentalization. We forced ourselves upon Japan 
less than seventy years ago. Because of their in¬ 
sularity, the Japanese had been able to keep se¬ 
cluded. Submitting to the menace of our cannon, 
Japan entered the family of nations. But the 
Japanese did not propose to have their islands be¬ 
come a happy hunting-ground for European and 
American commercial imperialism. From the 
day we pointed our cannon at Japan, the Japanese 
realized what they would have to do to save them¬ 
selves from slavery. If Japan became European¬ 
ized in two generations, it was solely to remain 
Japanese. This statement is not paradoxical. 
The Japanese followed the wise course. The 
possibility of resisting an enemy of superior force 
depends upon becoming his equal. The history 
of contemporary Japan—domestic and interna¬ 
tional—is the story of a nation, conscious of its 
material inferiority, imitating Europe and Amer¬ 
ica to attain material equality in order to resist 
the application in Japan of the principle of Eu¬ 
ropean eminent domain. Never have the Japa¬ 
nese admitted the moral superiority of our civil¬ 
ization or shown any inclination to adopt our re¬ 
ligion and our ideals. Consequently, the trans¬ 
formation of Japan, under European and Ameri- 
454 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

can influence, is a transformation in the realm of 
the practical and material, and not in the realm of 
the moral. 

The constitutional evolution of Japan is inex¬ 
tricably bound up with the evolution of the for¬ 
eign policy of Japan. The repercussion of one 
upon the other has been continuous. This is not 
surprising when we consider that constitutional¬ 
ism was born of the necessity of adopting a for¬ 
eign policy, and that the miraculous economic and 
political changes of the past seventy years have 
been effected by the relations of Japan with the 
outside world. 

The political life of Japan demonstrates that 
there has been no slavish imitation of Western 
institutions and Western practices. What has 
been borrowed from Europe and America has 
been adapted, not adopted. Two hereditary clans 
which survived the pressure of the shoguns began 
and carried through the revolutionary movement 
of the middle of the nineteenth century. Mem¬ 
bership in the Shoshu and the Satsuma is a family 
matter. If one is not born in a clan, entrance is 
possible only by formal adoption or by marriage. 
This is the essential difference between clans and 
political parties. A party is a free-will associa- 
455 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tion to which one belongs by inclination or con¬ 
viction or interest. 

The Japanese constitution, like that of Ger¬ 
many, does not admit the principle of governmen¬ 
tal responsibility. The emperor names and dis¬ 
misses cabinets at will. If parliament refuses to 
support the government, the emperor has the right 
to dissolve the Chambers. Up to the present 
time, the general election after dissolution of 
parliament has invariably given a majority to the 
cabinet chosen by the emperor. 

Until the year of the European War, the Sho- 
shu and the Satsuma controlled cabinets. But 
opposition to the clans had gradually devel¬ 
oped in parliament and press. When public 
opinion, formed by universal education, wider 
circulation of newspapers, participation in two 
wars and extension of suffrage, began to make 
itself felt in Japan, parliamentarians and pub¬ 
licists outside of the clans were able to form 
political parties along the lines of Europe and 
America. About 1890, parties—as distinct from 
and opposed to clans—came into prominence. 
The original political parties had decided opinions 
concerning the goal of constitutional life. The 
liberal Diyuto demanded universal suffrage and a 
456 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

single Chamber. The Kaisinto, conservative and 
aristocratic, stood for two Chambers and limited 
suffrage. Both parties advocated the change in 
the constitution essential to their success, i.e., the 
establishment of the responsibility of the cabinet 
to parliament. 

In the decade following the war with China the 
development of a national consciousness and a 
spirit of patriotism, which accepted the burden 
of military service and heavy taxation for the 
modernization and increase of armaments, made 
the political parties a factor to be reckoned with 
by the government. They could no longer be 
ignored, not that they had power to overthrow 
the clans, but that the clans needed their coopera¬ 
tion in rallying the nation to the support of a 
vigorous and prudently aggressive foreign policy. 
When they thus received recognition and were 
joined by the younger element, now fully edu¬ 
cated, the party leaders became gradually less 
radical and outspoken. The basis of party life 
was unfortunately changed from principles to 
personalities. After 1900, when the qualification 
for voting was reduced from fifteen yen ($7.50) 
to ten yen ($5.00) personal direct tax per annum, 
resulting in tripling the electorate, this evolution 
457 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


was accentuated. The Diyuto has become the 
Seiukai (Society of Political Friends). The 
Kaisinto gradually changed into the Doshikai 
(Society of People having the same Ideas)*. Re¬ 
cently, a fraction of the Seiukai joined the Doshi¬ 
kai to form the Kensenkai. There is a third 
party, a little more chauvinistic than the other 
two, known as the Kokuminto (National Party). 
The earlier extremists in liberalism and the theo¬ 
retical socialists of the end of the nineteenth cen¬ 
tury lost their faith and abandoned politics or 
became conservative. 

Up to the outbreak of the war with Russia, the 
Genro—a group of Elder Statesmen belonging to 
the clans—were the real rulers of Japan. They 
advised the emperor, and no parliament dared 
oppose their will. The first sign of public opin¬ 
ion influencing politics came during the stirring 
months before the declaration of war against 
Russia. Feeling ran high in Japan. There was 
a conviction that the Genro were too long-suffer¬ 
ing, and that China was taking advantage of the 
forbearance of Japanese diplomacy to strengthen 
her navy in Asiatic waters and her army in Man¬ 
churia. The pressure of public opinion was so 
strong that parliament did not accept the explana- 
458 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

tion in the speech from the throne. A virtual 
reprimand of governmental policy, as dictated by 
the Genro, was passed. The emperor infmedi- 
ately dissolved parliament. Eighteen months 
later, after the terrible struggle was over, the 
same recalcitrant spirit was manifested when the 
terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were pub¬ 
lished. There was serious rioting in Tokio. 
Parliament, press, and people united in denounc¬ 
ing the failure to insist upon an indemnity and 
the complete cession of Saghalien. 

In the decade between the Russo-Japanese and 
European wars, the democratic evolution of Japan 
was greatly helped by discontent over taxation. 
Japan had peculiarly heavy burdens to bear as a 
result of the war. Added to this, statesmen were 
unanimous in their belief in the necessity of a sub¬ 
stantial increase of the navy and in the mainten¬ 
ance of a larger standing army. Every year more 
people were reading. The influence of newspapers 
could not be disregarded. The first triumph of 
the advocates of constitutionalism came at the be¬ 
ginning of 1914. The clans, hitherto impecca¬ 
ble in financial matters, were involved in a dis¬ 
graceful naval scandal. The Yamamoto minis¬ 
try had to resign. A distinct break with prece- 
459 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


dent was caused by the call of Marquis Okuma, 
who belonged to no clan, to the premiership. 
Marquis Okuma constituted a party cabinet. 
This was tolerated by the Genro, who had every 
interest in wishing the scandal to die down for 
the sake of the prestige of the clans, and who 
realized that a sop had to be thrown to public 
opinion in order to get the people to accept the 
program of increasing the standing army by two 
divisions. Although Marquis Okuma was the 
founder of the Kaisinto, of which the Doshikai 
was the successor, he did not have the whole¬ 
hearted backing of the Constitutional Party. 
Leaders of the Doshikai disliked the new premier 
because they knew he had little faith in their liber¬ 
alism. However, by appointing Viscount Kato, 
leader of the Doshikai, as Foreign Minister, 
Marquis Okuma was able to form a party cabinet 
and carry on the government with the support of 
a parliamentary majority. 

The test of the sincerity of Marquis Okuma 
came in December, 1914, when his cabinet was 
defeated over the army estimates. Had the pre¬ 
mier consented to disregard parliament, the em¬ 
peror and the Genro would have sustained him. 
But Marquis Okuma insisted on the dissolution of 
460 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

parliament. In spite of the fact of his seventy- 
five years and a wooden leg, Marquis Okuma 
made speeches all over the country in support of 
the larger army program. He sent phonograph 
records to places he could not visit personally. 
The general election, on March 25, 1915, was a 
triumph for the government. In minority be¬ 
fore the dissolution, the Ministerialists returned 
to Tokio with a clear majority of over forty seats. 

Marquis Okuma resigned on October 3, 1916. 
The reason he gave was his extreme age. But it 
was popularly supposed that the Genro, who had 
tolerated the policy of party government in order 
to let the naval scandal blow over and win the 
people to the increased military and naval esti¬ 
mates, forced Marquis Okuma out of office. This 
suspicion was confirmed when the emperor re¬ 
fused to accept the retiring premier’s suggestion 
that Viscount Kato succeed to the premiership. 
The Doshikai, Kato’s party, had been returned 
with so substantial an increase at the last general 
election that the suggestion was logical if party 
government were to continue in Japan. The 
Genro went to the emperor of their own initiative 
and advised that Count Terauchi, Governor-Gen¬ 
eral of Korea, be made premier. The appoint- 
461 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


ment would be popular with the people, as well 
as a victory for the clans. 

Count Terauchi, raised to the rank of field mar¬ 
shal, had military and administrative reputation. 
But he belonged to no party and had no parlia¬ 
mentary support. He chose a cabinet composed 
entirely of clansmen. It was a return to the old 
state of affairs. As soon as the new cabinet pre¬ 
sented itself before parliament, Mr. Inukai, the 
veteran leader of the National Party (Koku- 
minto), moved a vote of lack of confidence. In 
combination with the Kensenkai, the motion 
would undoubtedly have passed. Premier Ter¬ 
auchi dissolved the House. In order to return to 
power, the Seiukai became governmental in the 
elections. The Okuma-Kato party was defeated. 
Although the Nationalists gained a few seats, the 
change from Kensenkai to Seiukai was sufficient 
to give Count Terauchi a majority. Mr. Inukai 
then made his peace with Count Terauchi. 

The details I have given are necessary to show 
that the bitterness of Japanese party politics is 
not due to radical differences in the convictions of 
the leaders or of the rank and file of parliament. 
The clans continue to control the government. 
The Genro have not lost their power. They took 
462 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

in their sails for a couple of years because of the 
storm of indignation over scandals and increased 
taxation. But sailing became smooth again at 
the end of 1916. The trouble is that neither the 
clans nor the parties represent the great mass of 
the people, which has not yet made its voice heard 
in public affairs. Even among the educated, the 
democratic spirit has not permeated. Poor men, 
having secured a university education, are de¬ 
pendent upon government jobs. Merchants and 
manufacturers stick to traditions. No party 
calls forth idealism and enthusiasm and devotion 
by the proclamation of principles or the defense 
of particular interests. A keen Frenchman, M. 
Felicien Challaye, who went to Japan during the 
war to study the political situation, told me on his 
return that the bourgeoisie had no political convic¬ 
tions. A large manufacturer of Osaka said to 
M. Challaye: “I do not belong to any clearly de¬ 
fined party. I am of the party of the nation, that 
is to say, of the party of the Emperor. There¬ 
fore, always of the party of the Government, 
since it is the Emperor who chooses the Govern¬ 
ment, I naturally support the Government in 
power. ,, 

But a new factor has appeared in recent years, 

463 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


whose influence in Japan as in China cannot be 
overestimated. Everybody reads the newspa¬ 
pers. And the newspapers, almost all of them 
anti-governmental, are far more radical than the 
parliamentarians. Two radical newspapers, the 
“Asahi” and the “Nishi Nishi,” both with simul¬ 
taneous editions at Tokio and Osaka, have each 
reached a daily circulation of over half a million. 

A constitutional regime was established in Ja¬ 
pan as a means of enabling the country to resist 
the menace of European and American encroach¬ 
ment. The motive of its birth has remained the 
keynote throughout its evolution. Japan was 
modernized, not to become an Occidental country 
or similar to an Occidental country, but to become 
as strong as an Occidental country. The Japa¬ 
nese have built upon their own foundation and 
have clung to their own ideas and their own civil¬ 
ization. As Japan emerged from her shell and 
became strong, she insisted with quiet dignity 
upon respect for her rights at home and abroad. 
Critics of the Japanese denounce their jingoism 
and imperialism. The Japanese are the Prus¬ 
sians of the Orient! They are imbued with mili¬ 
tarism ! They think only of conquests and world 
power! If we do not take our precautions in 
464 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

time, they will menace us! Look at what they 
have done in Korea and are doing in China! 

If one believes in the divine right of the white 
race—or a certain branch of the white race—to 
rule the whole world, he has reason to feel an¬ 
noyed and alarmed over Japan’s stupefying re¬ 
sponse to our ultimatum: “Be neighborly or be 
bombarded!” Did we intend to add Japan to 
our Asiatic trading and concession preserves? 
Or did we sincerely want Japan to wake up for 
her own sake, and for what the world could give 
her in exchange for what she could give the 
world? I fear that most of the animosity and 
resentment against Japan is due to the fact that 
the Japanese refuse to allow themselves to be 
exploited by us, as the other Asiatic countries 
have been. Instead, they have had the presump¬ 
tion to assume that what was happening on the 
mainland of Asia opposite them interested them 
more than it did Europe and America. 

When Commodore Perry “knocked at the rusty 
doors of Japan and opened her to the Society of 
Nations,” the Japanese had not forgotten their 
last contact with Occidental civilization three 
hundred years before. Jesuit missionaries, who 
had been hospitably received, were followed by 

465 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

traders. It became evident that the Westerners 
were preparing to take possession of Japan. So 
the Jesuits were expelled by force of arms. 
Three hundred years of profound and uninter¬ 
rupted peace had intervened between the Spanish 
and Dutch intrigues and the visit of Commodore 
Perry. All European countries were looked 
upon by the Japanese as predatory and unscrupu¬ 
lous in their dealings with Eastern races. The 
experience the Japanese had had with Spaniards 
and Dutch was being repeated in China, this time 
with British, French, and Russians as aggressors, 
at the moment Japan opened her doors to foreign 
trade. It is impossible to overestimate the in¬ 
fluence upon the modern history of Japan of the 
opium war of 1840 and the war of 1857-1860. 
In the opium war, the British prevented the Chi¬ 
nese from curtailing the opium trade, and took 
Hongkong from China, thus establishing the 
precedent of preying upon China’s weakness for 
territorial and economic advantages. In the war 
of 1857-1860, France joined Great Britain in the 
capture of Peking. Large indemnities were ex¬ 
torted from the Chinese after both wars. Japan 
started her modern life with the consciousness 
that she must strain every effort to avoid the fate 
466 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

of the rest of Asia. We have seen Japan de¬ 
velop into a militaristic state. We have watched 
the anomaly of a people becoming educated and 
establishing institutions similar to our own, and 
at the same time acquiescing in a despotic form of 
government. The explanation is the instinct of 
self-preservation. For half a century, Japan 
lived for the day her army stormed the forts of 
Port Arthur and her navy swept the Russians 
from the Pacific. 

Great Britain and Russia did not stop at Hong¬ 
kong and Vladivostok. The British had designs 
on the Chusan Archipelago, near Shanghai. 
They even went to Moose Island and Port Ham¬ 
ilton in the channel between Korea and Japan. 
Russia planned to occupy Tsuhima, which com¬ 
mands the Korean channel. British and Rus¬ 
sians blocked each other. But there was al¬ 
ways the nervous feeling that the two European 
powers would come to an understanding or would 
fight for the spoils of the Pacific. No Euro¬ 
pean power had any regard for the rights of 
Asiatics. If an Asiatic nation was helped by one 
power against another, it was always for a price. 
The most striking instance of this policy— 
fraught with menace for Japan—occurred when 
467 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Japan was painfully emerging from her seclu¬ 
sion and adjusting herself to the international 
morality of the world in which she was called to 
live. When the British and French occupied 
Peking in i860, Russia helped China. But she 
demanded the cession of the Maritime Province. 
China consented. This brought the Russians to 
Vladivostok, and gave them the Asiatic mainland 
opposite Japan. Russia immediately claimed the 
lower half of Saghalien Island, which was his¬ 
torically part of Japan. Japan, still too weak to 
oppose Russia, waived her rights over Saghalien 
in exchange for the Kurile Islands. 

For thirty years, Japanese statesmen devoted 
their energies to the material and moral devel¬ 
opment of the country. But all the time they 
were getting ready to contest any further effort 
to extend European eminent domain in eastern 
Asia. To prevent Korea from falling into the 
hands of Russia, Japan wanted China to unite 
with her in developing and protecting Korea as 
an independent nation. Unfortunately, Chinese 
statesmen did not realize that the interests of 
China were identical with those of Japan in re¬ 
gard to Korea and in regard to Europe. China 
refused Japanese cooperation in Korea on the 
468 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

ground that Korea was a vassal state. Japan 
fought China in 1894 to prevent Korea from 
falling into the hands of Russia. 

The terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
caused an outcry in Europe. Russia, France, 
and Germany united to compel Japan to reduce 
the indemnity and to renounce the annexation of 
the Liao-tung peninsula and littoral. Had this 
intervention been inspired by the desire to pro¬ 
tect China, it would have been justified. It 
would have promoted peace in the Far East, and 
the intervening powers would have shown them¬ 
selves the real friends of Japan. But it soon 
appeared that the motives that impelled the three 
powers to “curb Japanese imperialism” were of 
the basest. Russia proceeded to instal herself in 
Liao-tung. Germany did what she refused to 
allow Japan to do on the opposite peninsula of 
Shangtung. France negotiated with China for 
exclusive privileges in two southern provinces. 
As an eminent Japanese put it to me: “The dis¬ 
gusting hypocrisy of the European intervention 
to save China destroyed what little faith some of 
us had in the friendship of Europe and in Eu¬ 
ropean sense of justice and decency. Having 
completed the partition of Africa, the European 
469 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

powers turned their attention toward the East. 
They intended to take advantage of the impo¬ 
tence of China, as revealed in our war, to cut 
up China like a watermelon.” 

The Japanese do not regard the war with 
China as a victory. They did not at the time. 
General Kawakami, Chief of the General Staff, 
called the Japanese Moltke, was guest of honor 
at a dinner given to celebrate the victory. Some 
one suggested the erection of a triumphal arch 
to commemorate the war. General Kawakami 
responded in a voice trembling with indignation: 
“There is no reason for that! There is no rea¬ 
son for that! We fought the war simply to con¬ 
vince China that we must go hand in hand. We 
have failed. In fact, our success has only helped 
to bring about the partitioning of China by the 
European thieves.” 

The diplomacy of the European powers in 
China at the end of the nineteenth century made 
the Japanese feel that salvation lay in the devel¬ 
opment of force to oppose force. China was un¬ 
able or unwilling to resist European aggression. 
The European powers refused to subscribe to the 
American policy of open door and equal oppor¬ 
tunity. The national safety of Japan and of the 
470 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

Far East depended upon the Japanese Army and 
Navy. The Japanese believed that everything 
had to be subordinated to the responsibility they 
must assume of opposing the further extension 
of European eminent domain . 1 Japan would 
gladly have united with Europe and America in 
following the easier and more sensible path of 
mutual renunciation of exclusive political and 
commercial advantages in China and Korea. 
America was willing. Europe was not. If 
Japan has had to play Europe’s game in Europe’s 
way during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, who is to blame? 

As a result of her successful war with Rus¬ 
sia, Japan became a great power. Japan owed 
her victory entirely to her own efforts. The 
United States was in sympathy with Japan in 
the diplomatic position Japan took at Peking be¬ 
fore the war. But the United States exercised 
no strong pressure either upon Russia or Japan. 

1 The greater part of the taxation in Japan is for the interest 
and the amortization of war debts and especially for the main¬ 
tenance of the army and the navy. Before the recent war, the 
Japanese were shouldering by far the heaviest tax burden in the 
world, one fifth of the income of the working classes going for 
taxes. If the League of Nations succeeds in reducing arma¬ 
ments, Japan will be able to divert an important part of her 
national income to constructive expenditures and reduce taxes 
substantially. 

471 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great 
Britain helped Japan only morally and financially. 
Japan paid a big price for her victory. And the 
victory was not complete. Russia remained in 
Manchuria: and there was no reconciliation be¬ 
tween China and Japan. Has Japan been given 
full credit by the Chinese and other Asiatics for 
the influence of her victory over Russia upon the 
internal life of nations suffering from European 
over-lordship? Especially in China have the sac¬ 
rifices of Japan borne fruit. After the Russo- 
Japanese War, the Chinese began the movement 
to redeem their national rights which had been 
mortgaged to foreign powers. The example of 
Japan triumphing over a great European power 
inspired the Young Chinese to start the move¬ 
ment for reform that led to the overthrow of the 
Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of the 
republic. 

While Japan was preparing to oppose the ex¬ 
tension of European sovereignty in China and 
Korea, she worked quietly to rid herself of the 
derogations of her own sovereignty admitted in 
the treaties signed after the opening up of Japan. 
The first effort was the mission of Prince Iwa- 
kura, who went to Europe and America in 1871 

472 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

to ask for a revision of the treaties. Japan de¬ 
manded the recovery of complete judicial and 
tariff autonomy. But it was not until the year 
of the Sino-Japanese War that the first step in 
accomplishing this legitimate aspiration of a 
self-respecting nation was concluded. In 1894, 
Great Britain agreed to waive her special rights 
in Japan. From 1895 to 1897, the United States, 
Italy, Russia, Germany, France, and Austria- 
Hungary made similar concessions. The aban¬ 
donment by the powers of what was virtually a 
capitulatory regime was eloquent testimony not 
only to the success of Japan in adapting her ju¬ 
dicial and economic standards and methods to 
conform with those of European and American 
nations, but also to the realization of the powers 
that Japan had become a diplomatic force to 
reckon with. Less than ten years after Great 
Britain agreed to treat Japan as an equal, the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. This 
‘‘agreement for guaranteeing peace in the Far 
East,” made in 1902, was replaced by a treaty of 
alliance in 1905. The rapproachement proved 
popular in both countries and worked out to the 
advantage of both; for it was revised and re¬ 
newed for ten years in 1911. The influence of 
473 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian treaties 
was felt almost immediately in the Far East. 
Japan entered into agreements with France in 
1907 and with Russia in 1907 and 1910. Ger¬ 
many was diplomatically isolated in Asia as in 
Africa. When Japan entered the European 
war, she became an integral member of the En¬ 
tente Alliance and signed the Pact of London. 
A closely knit convention with Russia in 1916 
completed the prestige of Japan as a great power. 

The diplomatic triumphs of Japan, fully as 
much as the wars that made them possible, en¬ 
couraged Japanese imperialism. Some writers 
have found the source and inspiration of Jap¬ 
anese imperialism in the Shinto religion, and have 
pointed out the religious significance of the 
expansionist movement. The Japanese consider 
themselves, we are told, the chosen people, des¬ 
tined to enlighten, modernize, unify, protect, and 
liberate the other Asiatic races. In support of 
the thesis of the religious and mystical and racial 
basis of Japanese imperialism, the writings of 
Baron Tokutomi, editor and proprietor of the 
great newspaper “Kokumin,” are cited. There is 
remarkable resemblance between his point of 
view and that of German imperialists. 

474 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

But if Japanese imperialism has much in com¬ 
mon with the imperialism of Germany and Italy, 
especially as manifested in the recent war, is it 
not because of similar international conditions 
confronting the three countries? Japan, like 
Germany and Italy, became a strong nation— 
economically and politically—after most of the 
world had been preempted by other nations. 
Like Germany and Italy, her population has 
grown by leaps and bounds. Like Germany and 
Italy, she needs raw materials and world mar¬ 
kets to keep the mouths of her increasing 
population fed, and she needs lands for settling 
her overflow. Instead of being grieved and 
shocked that Japan should want to expand, as 
other nations have done, we should view with 
the deepest sympathy the problems confronting 
Japan. The causes of German imperialism have 
been aggravated rather than mitigated by the 
solution we have given to the world war. This 
lesson ought to teach us something in our deal¬ 
ings with Japan. Not until nations learn that 
live-and-let-live is a better policy than being a 
dog in the manger will there be any chance of a 
society of nations and a durable peace. 

The menace of Japanese imperialism is a fav- 
475 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

orite theme in the American press and in club 
conversations where an American naval officer 
happens to be present. The American naval of¬ 
ficer—and the journalist as well—may be able to 
cite numerous facts from personal observation 
of the chauvinistic spirit of Japan. His warning 
that the Japanese are advocates of Asia for the 
Asiatics—meaning by that formula the hegemony 
of Asia for Japan—is probably true. But when 
the Japanophobes go to the extent of talking 
about a landing in California or an alliance be¬ 
tween Japan and Mexico, the reductio ad absur- 
dnm has been reached. Japan has no aggressive 
intentions against America or Europe. The 
ideas of Japan about the future of Asia and the 
islands of the Pacific form a different problem— 
a totally different problem. If we expect that 
we Americans and Europeans are going to con¬ 
tinue indefinitely to keep Asiatics out of our con¬ 
tinents and out of Africa as well and at the same 
time pretend in most places to superior and in 
many places to equal rights, politically and com¬ 
mercially, in Asia, we shall precipitate a great 
struggie that may have its repercussions in our 
own hemisphere. The “Yellow Peril” is far 
from imaginary so long as Europe asserts the 
476 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 
right to dominate and exploit Asia. But if we 
reconcile ourselves to treating Asiatics equitably 
in their own continent (they do not ask more 
than that!), we shall not need to prepare for “the 
next war” with Japan. Japanese imperialism will 
have no longer a raison d'etre. There never 
would have been any Japanese imperialism had 
European powers not been conscienceless hogs. 

Internal signs of strong democratic evolution 
in Japan are encouraging. If America and Eu¬ 
rope make a sincere effort to form a society of 
nations on the basis of equality, the growth of 
democratic feeling and liberalism in Japan will 
undoubtedly lead to anti-militarism. A new era 
will open for the Far East—an era of Korean 
autonomy, if not independence, and of rap¬ 
prochement between Japan and China. It be¬ 
hooves us to study carefully recent events in 
Japan. We shall find in them—always provided 
we are willing to do our share!—the solid hope of 
the pacific intentions of Japan toward America 
and Europe. 

Anti-militarism in Europe, and to a certain ex¬ 
tent in America, finds its greatest support among 
the Socialists. In spite of the growth of indus¬ 
try and the remarkable radicalism of newspaper 
477 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


thought in Japan, socialism as a party and as a 
creed is forbidden. To understand the rigorous 
taboo put upon socialist teaching, we must real¬ 
ize the universally respected theory of the sacro¬ 
sanct character of the imperial institution. 
However enlightened they have become, however 
advanced in their thinking, the Japanese are not 
yet ready to give up the mikado and what he 
stands for. Socialist teaching, from the politi¬ 
cal point of view, cannot be other than subver¬ 
sive of the public order. No socialist journals 
or other publications are allowed in japan. 
Since the hanging of Kotoku (a disciple of Kra- 
potkin), his wife, and ten of his followers, in 
1910, open and avowed socialism had not reap¬ 
peared. 

At the end of 1916, the democratic movement 
began to make rapid progress throughout Japan. 
Europe and America, engrossed in the struggle 
with Germany, have given little attention to re¬ 
cent changes in Japan that may affect profoundly 
the relations of Japan with China and with the 
world in general. When the expulsion of the 
Germans from Shangtung was followed by disas¬ 
ters to the Russians, Japan began to breathe more 
freely than at any time since she became a mod- 
478 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

ern state. The collapse of Russia changed the 
political situation of the Far East to the ad¬ 
vantage of Japan much more than the expulsion 
of German influence from China and the islands 
of the Pacific. Then, too, the European war was 
dragging on. The Japanese watched with sat¬ 
isfaction and delight the increasing exhaustion 
of Europe. All the European states were losing 
the flower of their manhood and piling up huge 
war debts. Their energies were turned from 
productive industries. Their shipping was being 
sunk by submarines or requisitioned for war pur¬ 
poses. This was the opportunity for Japanese 
commerce and shipping. It was also the first as¬ 
surance Japan had ever been able to count upon 
that European aggression in the Far East need 
no longer cause fear. The people of Japan, pros¬ 
perous and feeling secure, were able to begin to 
take internal politics seriously. 

The action of the Genro in upsetting the prece¬ 
dent of 1914 by forcing the Terauchi cabinet 
upon parliament gave rise to profound resent¬ 
ment. The general election that seemingly con¬ 
firmed the return to clan supremacy in the gov¬ 
ernment did not interpret public opinion. The 
action of the Seiukai in supporting Count Terau- 
479 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

chi accounts for the failure of the election to pro¬ 
nounce a verdict upon the reversion to the old 
order. In the late summer of 1918, the Terauchi 
cabinet resigned in the face of the national de¬ 
mand for a party government. This time, un¬ 
like the Okuma experiment of 1914, all the mem¬ 
bers of the cabinet, except the Ministers of War 
and Marine, were party men. The new premier 
was leader of the majority party. Mr. Hara was 
the first commoner to preside over the destinies of 
Japan. His cabinet was certainly much less of 
a compromise with reactionary and imperialistic 
forces than its predecessors. Raised to the peer¬ 
age, Viscount Hara kept his promises in regard 
to greater freedom of speech and of the press. 
In March, 1919, a new electoral law lowered the 
financial qualification of electors to three yen 
($1.50) direct tax per annum. This has brought 
the number of electors to nearly three millions. 
If Japan is not threatened with international com¬ 
plications, the progressive tendencies will con¬ 
tinue. Universal suffrage is bound to come. 
The aristocracy and bureaucracy, grouped around 
and supporting itself upon the imperial institu¬ 
tion, will disappear. The ideal of the Japanese 
480 


EVOLUTION OF JAPAN 

is to have their emperor occupy a position simi¬ 
lar to that of the King of England. 

The possibility of rapid success is great. Once 
freed from the anxiety caused by European im¬ 
perialism, the Japanese will be able to democra¬ 
tize their institutions with little difficulty. Their 
aristocracy is indigenous. As there were no in¬ 
vasions for nearly three thousand years, a con¬ 
quering race or caste (like the Manchus in China) 
does not exist. 

The military caste, Germanophile throughout 
the war, and the noisy imperialists have been 
given serious food for thought by the complete 
collapse of Germany. There is more inclination 
to put faith in the admirable Japanese character¬ 
istics of moderation and patience that have al¬ 
ways been shown by the leaders of the nation in 
moments of crisis. The growth of democracy 
does not imply the danger of extreme national¬ 
ism. The ultras, violent in their criticism of the 
cautiousness of the Genro, of the persistent de¬ 
termination of liberals not to antagonize the Eu¬ 
ropean powers and America, and of the Ito-Kato 
policy of conciliation with Korea and China, are 
coming around to the idea that Japan may arrive 
481 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

at her dream of the emancipation and regenera¬ 
tion of Asia without rattling the saber. Is an¬ 
other principle than that of force to rule inter¬ 
national relations? If so, the Japanese will be 
the first to welcome the change. They long to 
devote their energies to peaceful constitu¬ 
tional evolution and to the peaceful extension 
of their culture and commerce in the part of the 
world where it is natural that they should be 
the dominant power. 

How Japan acts in the next decade depends 
upon the reasonableness and the good faith of the 
Occidental powers. 


482 


CHAPTER XXII 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED FROM ASIA 

I N the second decade of the German Empire, 
after Prince Bismarck had piloted Germany 
successfully through the difficult period of 
political and economic readjustment, the question 
of a place in the sun was posed. The two Amer¬ 
ican continents were protected by the Monroe 
Doctrine. The Ottoman Empire had been 
granted a new lease of life by the Congress of 
Berlin. Australia and New Zealand and most 
of the islands of the world were British. Great 
Britain and France and Russia were in posses¬ 
sion of every bit of land on the Continent of 
Asia over which European eminent domain 
could be extended. France had just seized Tunis 
and Great Britain was installing herself in Egypt. 
Both Occidental powers were penetrating Africa. 
Although Germany came in for a share in the 
final partition of Africa, the best parts were al¬ 
ready preempted. It was the same with the is- 
483 


THE 'NEW MAP OF ASIA 


lands of the Pacific. In 1883 and 1884, Ger¬ 
many planted her flag in Togoland, Kamerun, 
and Southwest and East Africa. In the Pacific 
she gained footholds in New Guinea and an ad¬ 
jacent archipelago. In 1886, some of the Solo¬ 
mon and the Marshall Islands were occupied. 
The Spanish-American War, which drove Spain 
from the Pacific, gave Germany the opportunity 
of buying in 1899 the Caroline, Pelew, and 
Mariana Islands. An agreement was made be¬ 
tween Great Britain and Germany (to which the 
United States adhered) on November 14, 1899, 
to establish the title of the islands of the Pa¬ 
cific. By this agreement Germany ceded some 
of the islands of the Solomon group and re¬ 
ceived a clear title to Savaii and Upolu, the larg¬ 
est of the Samoan Islands. The total area of 
these possessions was less than a hundred thou¬ 
sand miles, nearly three quarters of which was 
on the island of New Guinea. Outside of New 
Guinea, the population of the German posses¬ 
sions was scarcely fifty thousand. 

The Pacific islands cost more than they brought 
in, afforded no opportunity for settlement and 
very little for trade, and interested chiefly mis¬ 
sionaries. Their only value was for naval pur- 
484 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED 


poses. They gave Germany places she could 
call her own on the path from America to Aus¬ 
tralia and from Asia to Australia. They af¬ 
forded an opportunity for coaling-stations, for 
cable landings, and for wireless telegraphy. 
And that was all. But to Germany they looked 
important because they were all that Germany 
had. 

As Germany was not mistress of the sea, she 
had no means of defending these possessions 
when the European war broke out. Kaiser Wil¬ 
helm’s Land, on the mainland of New Guinea, 
was seized by the Australians at the beginning 
of September, 1914. New Zealand sent an ex¬ 
peditionary force to Samoa. The Japanese 
gathered in the other groups of islands. Before 
the end of 1914, Great Britain and Japan agreed 
upon the division of the booty. Samoa went to 
New Zealand, the German islands south of the 
equator to Australia, and those north of the 
equator to Japan. The Treaty of Versailles im¬ 
posed upon the Germans the cession of all her 
possessions in the Pacific, which were divided 
among the victors in accordance with the Anglo- 
Japanese arrangement. 

The one possession of Germany in Asia that 

485 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


had intrinsic economic value was on the Shang- 
tung peninsula in China. The story of the acqui¬ 
sition, development, and loss of Kiao-chau re¬ 
quires telling in more or less detail. For the 
disposition of the Shangtung lease and conces¬ 
sions has become a powerful bone of contention 
in the final settlement of the European war. 

When Russia, France, and Germany inter¬ 
vened in 1895 to prevent the execution of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, it was agreed among 
them that each should be paid by China for pro¬ 
tecting China from Japanese imperialism. Rus¬ 
sia stepped right into the places from which 
Japan had been expelled. France, as she held 
the outlet to the sea of one whole Chinese prov¬ 
ince and a portion of another, was able to get 
concessions in Yunnan and Kwangsi, and in¬ 
trigue peacefully for the lease of Kwang-chau- 
Wan, a good and convenient port. The German 
Asiatic squadron searched the coast of China for 
a naval base and harbor. An official German 
commission recommended the Bay of Kiao-chau 
on the ocean side of the Shangtung peninsula. 

A most fortunate occurrence in the right place 
gave the excuse. In November, 1897, two Ger¬ 
man missionaries were killed in the interior of 
486 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED 

Shangtung province. Four German men-of-war 
landed marines on the coast of Kiao-chau Bay 
and raised the German flag. After several 
months of negotiation, “His Majesty the Em¬ 
peror of China, guided by the intention to 
strengthen the friendly relations between China 
and Germany and at the same time to increase 
the military readiness of the Chinese Empire” 
(as the first article puts it), signed a convention 
on March 6, 1898, leasing to Germany for ninety- 
nine years a zone of fifty kilometers surround¬ 
ing the Bay of Kiao-chau. The lease read “that 
Germany, like other Powers, should hold a place 
on the Chinese coast for the repair and equip¬ 
ment of her ships, for the storage of materials 
and provisions for the same, and for other ar¬ 
rangements connected therewith.” A second 
section of the convention gave the Germans the 
concession for constructing two railway lines in 
Shangtung Province, with mining-provisions. A 
third section extorted a promise from China that 
“if within the Province of Shangtung any matters 
are undertaken for which foreign assistance, 
whether in personnel or in capital or in material, 
is invited, China agrees that the German mer¬ 
chants shall first be asked whether they wish to 
487 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

undertake the works and provide the materials.” 
A supplementary agreement was signed on 
March 21, 1900, specifying the terms under which 
the Kiao-chau-Chinan Railway was to be built. 

The idea in the minds of many Europeans and 
Americans that the entrance of Germany into 
Kiao-chau, the wringing of a lease from China, 
and the subsequent economic penetration of the 
province was a unique act, peculiarly resented by 
the Chinese, is far from the truth. During the 
past five years writers have been losing their 
sense of fairness, and have become special 
pleaders. The German leases and concessions in 
Shangtung are modeled upon and are not different 
from leases and concessions exacted by other for¬ 
eign powers elsewhere in China. I have talked 
with numerous Chinese, including members of the 
government, about the way Germany entered 
into Shangtung and her actions in the peninsula. 
They are unanimous in assuring me that there is 
no greater resentment against the Germans than 
against other foreigners, and that to the Chinese, 
leases and concessions held by European states 
and European companies are regarded as having 
been acquired and worked in the same way. In 
fact, an open-minded examination of the docu- 
488 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED 


ments submitted by the Chinese delegation to 
the Peace Conference leads one to believe that 
the Chinese had much less to complain of in re¬ 
gard to the Germans in Shangtung than in regard 
to the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria and 
Liao-tung. 

The Germans were not oppressive masters of 
the natives within the leased territory. Their 
control led to improved sanitary conditions and 
to economic prosperity . 1 One of the most re¬ 
markable successes of their administration was 
the method they devised of collecting land-taxes 
through the Elders of the villages. Germany did 
not follow the tactics of Russia and Japan in us¬ 
ing the railway concession as a means of perma¬ 
nent military control. When the railway was 
completed, the German troops were withdrawn. 
Even within the fifty-kilometer zone, Germany 
agreed to confine her troops, reduced to less than 
a thousand, to the port of Tsingtao by a definite 

1 Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference lay emphasis upon 
the fact that Japanese impairments of Chinese sovereignty are 
much more serious for the Chinese to contend with than Euro¬ 
pean leaseholds and economic penetration. The standard of 
living of the Japanese is sufficiently like that of the Chinese to 
make Japanese trading and labor competition inimical to the 
interests of the inhabitants. Protected by their government, 
Japanese traders and coolies compete with Chinese. The Chi¬ 
nese do not have this to fear from Europeans or Americans. 

489 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


agreement signed in 1905. In 1911, by the Min¬ 
ing Area Delimitation Agreement, Germany re¬ 
nounced privileges accorded in the convention of 
1898. The Shangtung Mining Company relin¬ 
quished all the mining-rights with the exception 
of two collieries and one mine. 

The military efforts of the German Govern¬ 
ment were concentrated in making at Tsingtao, 
on the tip of the northern promontory of Kiao- 
chau Bay, a powerful fortress. But the idea of 
creating a naval base was linked from the begin¬ 
ning with the plan of developing a port as a com¬ 
mercial outlet for the whole province of Shang¬ 
tung. In the fifteen years from 1899 to 1914, 
Tsingtao was transformed from a fishing-village 
into a railway terminus and port, equipped with 
every modern improvement and representing an 
investment of hundreds of millions of marks. 
In government buildings, warehouses, and dock 
facilities, Tsingtao became a model of European 
enterprise in the Far East. 

The Pacific islands of Germany were of slight 
importance commercially. German colonial ex¬ 
periments in Africa brought forth meager fruit 
in proportion to the energy and money expended. 
It was not the same with the Kiao-chau colony. 

490 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED 


Here Germany had one opportunity to show what 
she could accomplish under favorable conditions. 
The result was to the credit of her officials and 
engineers and capitalists. 

In 1899 two companies were formed to finance 
and develop the Shangtung concessions. The 
Schangtung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft built and ran 
the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway. This line, with 
two small branches, is 434 kilometers long. It 
was completed in June, 1904. The Schangtung 
Bergbau Gesellschaft held the mining-concessions 
which consisted of the development of the Fantse 
and Hungshan collieries and the iron mines near 
Kinglinschen. This latter company was merged 
into the railway company in 1913. Six months 
before Germany lost Kiao-chau, she secured the 
option to finance and construct and supply ma¬ 
terials for two lines of railway, west from Tsinan 
and south into Kiangsu province. In June, 1914, 
Germany was assured of a loan option in financ¬ 
ing other lines in Shangtung. 

Early in August, 1914, the British Govern¬ 
ment asked Japan to intervene in the war under 
the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It 
was pointed out to Japan that German cruisers 
and armed vessels were a menace to commerce, 
491 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


and that therefore it was question of “the peace 
of the Far East and the immediate interests of 
the Japanese as well as of the British Empire.” 
Great Britain wanted German influence de¬ 
stroyed in China. The reward for Japan was 
permission to take over the German lease of Kiao- 
chau and the German concessions of Shangtung. 
Baron Kato said to parliament: 

Japan has no desire or inclination to become involved 
in the present conflict. But she believes she owes it to 
herself to be faithful to the Alliance with Great Britain 
and to strengthen its foundation by ensuring permanent 
peace in the East, and protecting the special interests of 
the two Allied Powers. Desiring, however, to solve the 
situation by pacific means, the Imperial Government has 
given the following advice to the German Government. 

The advice was an ultimatum to Germany on 
August 15, 1914, asking for the immediate with¬ 
drawal of German men-of-war and armed ves¬ 
sels of all kinds from Chinese and Japanese wa¬ 
ters, and the delivery at a date not later than 
September 15 of the entire leased territory of 
Kiao-chau to the Japanese authorities, with a 
view to the eventual restoration of the same to 
China. An unconditional acceptance of the “ad¬ 
vice” was asked by noon on August 23. Ger¬ 
many ignored the ultimatum. What answer 
492 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED 


could she have given? Japan had couched the 
ultimatum, even to the use of the word “advice,” 
on the terms of the Russo-Franco-German ulti¬ 
matum concerning the restoration of Liao-tung 
to China, when the three powers combined to 
prevent the execution of the Treaty of .Shimo- 
noseki. It took ten years for Japan to get even 
with Russia. After twenty years, the opportun¬ 
ity came to punish Germany. 

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war on 
Germany. The Japanese fleet blockaded Kiao- 
chau. The Germans had only four thousand 
soldiers and sailors in the fortress of Tsingtao. 
There was no hope of relief by land or sea. 
The Chinese Government, although not previ¬ 
ously consulted, saw through the Japanese game. 
China offered to join the Entente powers, and 
could very easily have undertaken the invest¬ 
ment of Tsingtao by land. Japan did not need 
to send a single soldier. But the offer of China 
was rejected. Instead of investing the German 
fortress, Japan landed twenty thousand troops at 
Lungkow, on the northern coast of Shangtung a 
hundred and fifty miles away from the Germans. 
They were in no hurry to attack the fortress. 
During the month of September, the Japanese 
493 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


took possession of the railway line all the way 
from Kiao-chau Bay to Chinan, and the German 
mining-properties. They occupied the principal 
cities of the peninsula—places that the Germans 
had never gone to—seized the Chinese postal and 
telegraph offices, and expelled the Chinese em¬ 
ployees from the railway. The investment and 
capture of Tsingtao was the matter of a few 
days. But the bombardment and assault of the 
forts, in which fifteen hundred British soldiers 
cooperated, did not occur until the end of Octo¬ 
ber. In the meantime, the Japanese were thor¬ 
oughly installed in one of the richest provinces 
of China in a way the Germans had never 
dreamed of. 

The garrison of Tsingtao capitulated on No¬ 
vember 7, 1914. The Japanese permitted the 
governor and officers to retain their swords, and 
when the vanquished arrived at Tokio, they were 
met by Japanese women who offered them 
flowers. 

Thousands of Germans remained, however, in 
other parts of China. China declared war upon 
Germany in August, 1917. At first, the Ger¬ 
mans were not molested. But gradually French 
and British diplomacy at Peking secured the in- 
494 


GERMANY IS EXPELLED 


ternment of German subjects, the cancellation of 
German concessions, and the closing up of Ger¬ 
man educational and missionary establishments. 
After the final defeat of Germany, measures were 
taken to expel, by repatriation to Germany, all 
German subjects in China. The same disaster 
met German enterprises in Siam. From other 
parts of Asia, including the Ottoman Empire, 
Germans and everything German gradually dis¬ 
appeared. 

By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Ger¬ 
many formally renounced, not only her territorial 
possessions, but also her shipping and trade and 
missionary work in every part of Asia. 


495 


CHAPTER XXIII 


JAPAN AND CHINA IN THE 
WORLD WAR 

W HEN Japan declared war upon Russia, 
the United States insisted upon “the 
maintenance of the neutrality and in¬ 
tegrity of China during and after the war.” 
The Chinese were very grateful for this disin¬ 
terested intervention. But, as usual, the action 
of the United States was limited to sending a 
note. We were not willing to use the only argu¬ 
ment worth while, a show of force, to protect 
Chinese neutrality. The very nature of the 
struggle made it impossible for the belligerents to 
accede to the polite American request. Russia, 
ensconced in Manchuria, was quite ready to 
promise not to fight there if Japan did not attack 
her. But Russia was using Manchuria as a 
military base against Korea, and the Liao-tung 
peninsula as a naval base. Since the object of 
Japan in the war was to expel Russia from these 
496 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

very places, Japan told the powers that she would 
have to conduct military operations in the por¬ 
tions of Chinese territory held by Russia. Japan 
pointed out to the United States that the reason 
she was fighting was to compel a respect of 
Chinese neutrality. She had always been willing 
to respect Chinese neutrality if Russia would do 
the same. She had to fight for China simply be¬ 
cause China could not protect her own neutrality. 

When Japan declared war against Germany 
ten years later, the same situation arose. Ger¬ 
many protested at Peking against the landing of 
troops outside the leased zone, and also against 
the seizure by the Japanese Army of the German 
railways in the Shangtung province. President 
Yuan sent a note to Japan and Great Britain in 
regard to the violation of Chinese neutrality: but 
he told Germany that it was impossible to prevent 
or oppose the action of the Japanese and the Brit¬ 
ish. The Entente powers backed the Japanese 
contention that Japan was acting once more as 
the friend of China. If operations had not been 
undertaken against Kiao-chau, Germany would 
have used Kiao-chau as a naval base. The im¬ 
potence of China to compel respect for her neu¬ 
trality led to utter disregard of her neutrality. 

497 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


After the expulsion of the Germans from the 
Shangtung peninsula, the Japanese installed them¬ 
selves in the place of the Germans as they had 
done ten years before in the place of the Russians 
in the Liao-tung peninsula and southern Man¬ 
churia. They reopened Kiao-chau for trade on 
December 28, 1914. No Germans were left in 
the interior of the peninsula. But the Japanese 
continued to occupy militarily the entire German 
railway- and mining-concessions. China re¬ 
minded Japan of the promise to restore Kiao- 
chau to its rightful owner. Had not the Japa¬ 
nese fought the Germans for that purpose? 
Japan answered that no promise of any kind had 
been given to China in this matter, but that the 
restoration of Chinese sovereignty was contem¬ 
plated after the war. In the ultimatum to Ger¬ 
many, it was true that Japan had called upon 
Germany to evacuate the lease in order that 
China might enter into possession of her sover¬ 
eign rights. But had Germany yielded to the ul¬ 
timatum? Not at all! Japan had to fight to ex¬ 
pel the Germans. The indirect promise in the ul¬ 
timatum would have bound Japan only if Ger¬ 
many had turned over the lease as a result of the 
ultimatum. 


498 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

Japan was not disposed to waste time in long 
diplomatic negotiations with China. The Eu¬ 
ropean powers were at war. The United States, 
from the unbroken experience of the past, could 
be relied upon to limit interference to an aca¬ 
demic protest. On December 3, 1914, the Japa¬ 
nese minister at Peking was given the text of 
twenty-one demands for presentation to the 
Chinese Government. They were divided into 
five groups. Minister Hioki was told that there 
was to be no compromise in regard to the de¬ 
mands of the first four groups. He was assured, 
to quote his instructions, that “believing it ab¬ 
solutely essential for strengthening Japan’s posi¬ 
tion in eastern Asia as well as for the preserva¬ 
tion of the general interests of that region to 
secure China’s adherence to the foregoing pro¬ 
posals, the Imperial Government are determined 
to attain this end by all means within their 
power.” The articles of the fifth group were 
also to be presented as demands, but could be 
modified. The Japanese minister held the 
twenty-one demands up his sleeve for six weeks, 
during which the Chinese Foreign Minister kept 
protesting against the decision of Japan to main¬ 
tain a special military zone in Shangtung and the 
499 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


seizure and holding of the railway traversing the 
province. On January 16, 1915, the Chinese 
Government gave the Japanese minister a note 
pointing out that “two months have elapsed since 
the capture of Tsingtao; the basis of German 
military preparations has been destroyed; the 
troops of Great Britain have already been and 
those of your country are being gradually with¬ 
drawn. This shows clearly that there is no more 
military action in the special area. That the 
said area ought to be cancelled admits of no 
doubt. ... As efforts have always been made 
to effect an amicable settlement of affairs be¬ 
tween your country and ours, it is our earnest 
hope that your Government will act upon the 
principle of preserving peace in the Far East and 
maintaining international confidence and friend¬ 
ship.” 

In response, the Japanese minister presented 
the twenty-one demands. The first group dealt 
with the province of Shangtung. China was 
asked to agree in advance upon whatever ar¬ 
rangements would be made between Germany 
and Japan concerning “the disposition of all 
rights, interests, and concessions which Ger¬ 
many, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, pos- 
500 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

sesses in relation to the province of Shangtung.” 
Japan claimed recognition of her inheritance of 
German rights to finance, construct, and supply 
materials for railways running from Shangtung 
into Chili and Kiang-su, the two neighboring 
provinces to north and south. Group Two de¬ 
manded preferential rights, interests, and priv¬ 
ileges for Japan and Japanese subjects in South 
Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, most 
important of which was the extension to ninety- 
nine years of the old Russian port and railway 
leases. In Group Three, China was asked to 
agree to the exclusive exploitation by Japanese 
capitalists of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, an 
important iron-works in the Yangtse Valley. 
Group Four contained the single demand of a 
formal declaration by China that “no bay, harbor 
or island along the coast of China be ceded or 
leased to any Power.” The Fifth Group related 
to the employment of Japanese advisers in po¬ 
litical and financial and military affairs; the pur¬ 
chase from Japan of fifty per cent, or more of 
her munitions of war; railway rights; Japanese 
missionary propaganda; and a veto power 
against any foreign concessions being granted in 
the province of Fukien. 

501 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


China made a great outcry. She called the 
world to witness that Japan was trying to accom¬ 
plish against her the very things the Entente 
powers, of whose alliance Japan was a member, 
claimed they were fighting to prevent Germany 
from doing to European neighbors. There was 
the usual mild protest from America. But the 
European powers, while demurring for form’s 
sake, gave Japan secret assurance that they 
would not interfere with her ambitions in China. 
She could go ahead and treat China as she 
pleased, subject only to the caution of not harm¬ 
ing French and British interests in China. 
Japan was urged also to come to an agreement 
with Russia about the spoils. 

With the knowledge that the Entente powers 
were behind her—or that they would not op¬ 
pose her—Japan cut short China’s protests by an 
ultimatum delivered on May 7, 1915. It was 
modeled on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to 
Serbia of the previous year. If China did not 
yield to all the demands of the first four groups 
and the Fukien demand of the fifth group in 
forty-eight hours, Japan would use force. The 
other demands of the fifth group were not in¬ 
sisted upon solely because some of them infringed 
502 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

upon the real or fancied privileges of Japan’s 
allies in other parts of China. Before these 
screws were tightened, further negotiation was 
required with Great Britain and France and Rus¬ 
sia. Again the United States sent a note. 
China, with no backing anywhere in the world, 
had to accept the demands of Japan or enter into 
war. On May 25, a series of notes dictated by 
the Japanese minister at Peking and signed by 
the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave 
Japan control of Shangtung and put China in the 
hands of her island neighbor. 

To show the danger of secret diplomacy to the 
maintenance of good faith in international rela¬ 
tions, we have no more convincing example than 
the negotiations between Japan and Russia in the 
summer of 1916. At the suggestion of the 
French and the British, who were nervous about 
the pro-German influence at Petrograd and 
wanted to do everything they could to propitiate 
the Russian Foreign Office, Japan came to an 
understanding with Russia. A treaty was 
signed at the beginning of July, 1916, which was 
given out to the press. It read as follows: 

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Imperial 
Government of Russia, resolved to unite their efforts to 
503 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

the maintenance of lasting peace in the Far East, have 
agreed upon the following:— 

Article One: Japan will not be a party to any po¬ 
litical arrangement or combination directed against Rus¬ 
sia. Russia will not be a party to any political arrange¬ 
ment or combination directed against Japan. 

Article Two: Should the territorial rights or the 
special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting 
parties recognized by the other contracting party be 
threatened, Japan and Russia will take counsel of each 
other as to the measures to be taken in view of the sup¬ 
port or the help to be given in order to safeguard and 
defend those rights and interests. 

The British press hailed this agreement as 
highly satisfactory: and it was pointed out by the 
government in parliament that Japan was not 
only acting fairly toward China and living up to 
the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but was 
also doing all she could to knit more closely the 
bonds uniting the powers at war with Germany. 

But after the Russian revolution, the archives 
of the Russian Foreign Office were published. 
A. secret treaty, signed on July 3, 1916, was 
discovered. By its terms, Russia and Japan 
bound themselves mutually to safeguard China 
“against the political domination of any third 
Power entertaining hostile designs against Rus¬ 
sia or Japan/’ It was an offensive and defen¬ 
sive alliance, operating from the moment “any 
504 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

third Power” should attack either Russia or 
Japan in their vested positions on Chinese terri¬ 
tory. The signing of this treaty was a violation 
of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and 
of Article Three of the Anglo-Japanese treaty 
of alliance of July 13, 1911. As both contract¬ 
ing parties agreed that “the present convention 
shall be kept in complete secrecy from every¬ 
body,” this evidence of bad faith might never have 
come to light had it not been for the publication 
of the Russian archives. But did not Great 
Britain in the following year make a secret 
treaty with the King of the Hedjaz, promising 
Damascus to the Arabs in violation of a previous 
agreement with France about the disposition of 
Syria? And what European government has 
the courage to publish its documents of the last 
quarter century? Let him who is without sin 
cast the first stone! Those who believe in the 
necessity of a complete change in diplomatic 
methods, if we are to have a durable peace, are 
encouraged by the determination of the Entente 
powers to bring Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II to trial 
as responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. 
For this trial will naturally lead to the publica¬ 
tion of all the documents in the Foreign Offices 
505 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


of the belligerent powers. In this way, and in 
this way alone, will the responsibility of secret 
diplomacy in causing—or at least in not prevent¬ 
ing—wars, be established. 

Without the knowledge of China, the Entente 
powers gave secret assurances (written except in 
the case of Italy) that when it came to signing 
peace with Germany, Japan should have the 
Shangtung peninsula and the German islands 
north of the equator. These negotiations, sanc¬ 
tioning a violation of the principles the Entente 
powers assured the world they were fighting for, 
were carried on and terminated at the very mo¬ 
ment the United States was getting ready to en¬ 
ter the world war and to bring China with her to 
the aid of the Allies. The dates of these secret 
agreements are sadly significant. They are all 
in the early part of 1917, between the time Amer¬ 
ica broke diplomatic relations and declared war. 
There was need for haste. When the Peace 
Conference assembled, the Entente powers 
wanted to be able to show the United States ar¬ 
rangements concluded before America became a 
belligerent. The Russian promise to Japan was 
given on February 20, following the British 
promise of February 16. France’s obligation to 
506 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

support Japan against China was signed on 
March i. On March 28, the Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs stated orally that “the Italian 
Government had no objection regarding the mat¬ 
ter” 

In the autumn of 1917, Viscount Ishii visited 
the United States. After his negotiations with 
President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, the 
Department of State gave out for publication an 
exchange of notes between Secretary Lansing 
and Viscount Ishii, in which the two governments 
acknowledged complete agreement in regard to 
the intention not to “infringe in any way the in¬ 
dependence or territorial integrity of China” 
and the adherence “to the principle of the so- 
called ‘open door’ or equal opportunity for com¬ 
merce and industry in China.” But the United 
States recognized “that Japan has special inter¬ 
ests in China, particularly in the part to which 
her possessions are contiguous.” The notes 
were accompanied by a curious statement of Sec¬ 
retary Lansing, which destroyed the impression 
of sincerity the simple publication of the notes 
might have made. It was evident from Mr. 
Lansing’s verbose accompanying statement that 
the agreement with Viscount Ishii was a war 

507 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

measure inspired by the need of more effective 
Japanese cooperation against Germany. The 
possibilities of the effects of the Russian revolu¬ 
tion in Siberia were beginning to be envisaged. 
The Russian archives have given us the opinion 
of M. Krupensky, Russian minister at Peking at 
the time of the twenty-one demands, and ambas¬ 
sador at Tokio when Japan was negotiating with 
the United States. While Viscount Ishii was 
in Washington, the Japanese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs told M. Krupensky that “the Japanese 
Government does not attach much importance to 
its recognition of the principle of the open door 
and the integrity of China,” and that “in the ne¬ 
gotiations by Viscount Ishii at Washington, the 
question at issue is not some special concession to 
Japan in any part of China, but Japan’s special 
position in China as a whole.” When M. 
Krupensky asked Viscount Motono “whether he 
did not fear that in the future, misunderstand¬ 
ings might arise from the different interpreta¬ 
tions by Japan and the United States of the 
terms 'special position’ and 'special interests’ of 
Japan in China,” the Russian ambassador gained 
the impression “that Viscount Motono is con¬ 
scious of the possibility of misunderstandings in 
508 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

the future, but believes that in such a case Japan 
would have better means at her disposal for car¬ 
rying into effect her interpretation than the 
United States”! 

The Chinese, when the Lansing-Ishii notes 
were published, could not help feeling that the 
United States was beginning to act like a Eu¬ 
ropean power. It was the first time in the history 
of American diplomacy that our government had 
been guilty of negotiating a diplomatic under¬ 
standing regarding a great friendly nation with¬ 
out consulting that nation. Consequently, the 
Chinese Government protested against the Lan¬ 
sing-Ishii agreement, and declared that China 
could not permit herself to be bound by any 
agreement made between other nations. The 
suspicion that the United States had been “let 
in” was strengthened by the publication at Petro- 
grad of Ambassador Krupensky’s telegrams, 
which were never intended to see the light. But 
when President Wilson became a party to the 
Entente secret agreement concerning Shangtung 
and accepted the Japanese contention, without 
consulting the Chinese delegation at the Peace 
Conference, the Chinese concluded that Amer¬ 
ican diplomacy had become contaminated, to the 

509 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


point of losing all moral sense, by close contact 
with European methods and the European point 
of view. 

In other chapters have been set forth the rea¬ 
sons for the entry of Japan into the world war, 
the military operations in the Shangtung penin¬ 
sula, and the conquest of the German islands in 
the Pacific. The direct cooperation of Japan 
with the Entente powers was limited to the Kiao- 
c-hau expedition, and in a naval way to patrolling 
the Pacific and Indian oceans, with the exception 
of a few destroyers sent into the Mediterranean. 1 
From 1915 to 1917, there was frequent agitation 
in the Entente press for the participation of 
Japanese armies in Europe and western Asia. 
For a long time, French public opinion believed 
that Germany and her allies could not be con¬ 
quered on land without the aid of more effectives 
than France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia 
could put into the field. Those who held this 
view certainly had reason on their side. For, 

1 At the Paris Peace Conference, Baron Makino told the press 
correspondents that the Japanese fleets in the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans and in the Meriterranean traversed over one million, two 
hundred thousand miles in the work of protecting transports and 
merchant vessels from the submarines. Three quarters of a 
million men, “rushing to the aid of France and Britain,” were 
escorted by the Japanese. 

510 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

while Germany grew constantly weaker inter¬ 
nally, owing to the blockade, her armies seemed 
able to go from victory to victory. Not only did 
they hold in check the Entente armies, but each 
year they gained more ground. The interven¬ 
tion of the United States turned the tide in favor 
of the Entente. Japanese troops were no longer 
needed. But would not the victory have come 
sooner had Japan helped in Europe and in Meso¬ 
potamia ? This question cannot be definitely an¬ 
swered. It raises another question: how many 
troops could Japan have sent to Europe? Trans¬ 
portation was lacking. What the United States 
accomplished later is no criterion. The dis¬ 
tance across the Atlantic was much shorter. 
America was able to use more than half a million 
tons of German ships seized in her ports. She 
built herself an enormous tonnage with miracu¬ 
lous rapidity. 

Whether the practical difficulties of transport 
of troops could have been solved or not, it is 
doubtful that Japan would have consented to suc¬ 
cor her allies in this way. There was a large 
pro-German party in Japan, and in military 
circles the Japanese thought, up to the last few 
months of the war, Germany was going to win 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


out on land. Japan had plenty of available 
troops. Her standing army was over two hun¬ 
dred thousand. More than half a million men 
per year were eligible to military service. It 
would have been possible to mobilize a million 
and a half trained men without difficulty. 

But Japan had other fish to fry. It was not to 
her interest to see the war end quickly or to have 
Germany crushed by her enemies. The longer 
the war lasted in Europe, the weaker the white 
race would become. And Japan, like the United 
States, was making money! She was left undis¬ 
puted mistress of many markets. The manufac¬ 
turing disorganization of Europe opened new 
vistas for Japan, of which she was quick to take 
advantage. I remember seeing in the summer 
of 1916 in the private office of a New York mer¬ 
chant a collection of articles Japan was offering. 
They covered almost everything Europe had pro¬ 
duced before the war. In addition to this per¬ 
manent manufacturing and trade development, 
which meant so much to the prosperity of Japan, 
Japanese houses had all the war orders they could 
fill. In this field, Japan rendered real services 
to her allies. Russia was cut off in western 
512 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

Europe, and relied upon Japan for cannon and 
ammunition and war material of all sorts. Why 
should Japan fight in a war that did not involve 
her direct interests? None had rendered her 
practical aid during the life-and-death struggle 
with Russia. In 1914 and 1915, Japan returned 
to Europe the “watching with sympathetic inter¬ 
est” she had received from Europe ten years 
earlier. 

Politically as well as economically, Japan made 
hay while the sun shone. She worked feverishly 
to strengthen her position in southern Man¬ 
churia, Liao-tung and Shangtung. As military 
measures were over in Shangtung, the Chinese 
tried to persuade the Japanese to terminate their 
military occupation of the province. We have al¬ 
ready told the story of the twenty-one demands, 
and how Japan bullied China into accepting 
them. Japan was anxious above all things that 
China should not become a belligerent. A second 
Chinese proposal to enter the war, made in No¬ 
vember, 1915, was bitterly opposed by the Japa¬ 
nese. When the intervention of the United 
States became inevitable, we have seen how 
Japan took her precautions, by means of secret 
5i3 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


agreements with her allies, to discount any ef¬ 
fort of China at the Peace Conference to secure 
a fair hearing of the Shangtung question. 

China severed diplomatic relations with Ger¬ 
many on March 14, 1917, after sending a note of 
warning against the consequences of the sub¬ 
marine warfare. The declaration of war 
against Germany and Austria, for reasons of in¬ 
ternal politics that are explained elsewhere, was 
not made until August 14, 1917. During these 
months, Japanese diplomacy worked hard to keep 
China out of the war. 

When China became a belligerent, she en¬ 
couraged the sending of laborers to work behind 
the battle lines in northern France. They were 
a great help to the British and French, and num¬ 
bered before the armistice over one hundred and 
thirty thousand. In addition to these workers 
in France, a large number of Chinese were em¬ 
ployed by the British in Mesopotamia and Ger¬ 
man East Africa. Chinese seamen were a 
precious aid on ships that might otherwise have 
been held up for lack of crews. China seized 
the German ships in her ports, and placed nine 
steamers at the disposal of the Allied govern¬ 
ments. But when Peking offered to despatch an 
5i4 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

army of one hundred thousand to France, there 
was immediate opposition. France and Great 
Britain had by this time fully rallied to the 
Japanese point of view that accepting armed aid 
from China would undoubtedly create “an em¬ 
barrassing situation” at the Peace Conference. 
The Chinese proposal to send troops was enthu¬ 
siastically received by the Inter-Allied Council 
in Paris, and accepted en principe. Later, the 
Chinese Government was told that the necessary 
tonnage for transport could not be assured. 
America promised ships: and then went back on 
her promise. Bad faith in dealing with this pro¬ 
posal of China is evident when we consider that 
there was always shiproom for the transport of 
many more than a hundred thousand Chinese 
coolies. France, also, was able to find accommo¬ 
dation for Chinese who were willing to work in 
munition factories. 

The collapse of Russia turned the attention of 
the world to the war in the Far East after three 
years of quiet. A new situation was created for 
both China and Japan. Before China entered 
the war, the Bolshevist government began to ne¬ 
gotiate with China. The Bolshevists declared 
that Russia renounced all treaty rights in Mon- 

515 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

golia and Manchuria and in regard to the Boxer 
indemnity. Upon becoming a belligerent, China 
had to fall in with the Entente policy of refusing 
to recognize the Bolshevists. A commission of 
Entente powers was formed at Harbin, upon 
which America and China had representatives, to 
manage the North Manchurian Railway. The 
Chinese Government was called upon to police 
northern Manchuria, and this led to fighting 
with the Bolshevists, who had confiscated the 
railway and the properties of the administration. 
Although Russia dropped out of the war, the 
Russian Asiatic Bank at Peking took control of 
the North Manchurian Railway in the interest of 
the shareholders, most of whom were French. 
But China is determined to prevent a return to 
the old order of things. Most of the treaties be¬ 
tween China and Russia were of a political na¬ 
ture, and were imposed upon China. In 1913, 
Russia compelled China to recognize the auton¬ 
omy of Mongolia. The Manchurian agree¬ 
ments are a clear violation of Chinese sover¬ 
eignty. China has notified the powers that she 
will never again recognize the Russian treaties. 
Czarist Russia is to have no heir in so far as 
privileges in China are concerned. 

516 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

In the early part of 1918, the powers requested 
the cooperation of Japan in an international ex¬ 
pedition against the Bolshevists in Siberia. The 
reason for Allied intervention was three-fold: 
to aid the Czecho-Slovak Army; to save the vast 
international stores in Vladivostok and elsewhere 
along the Siberian Railway from falling into the 
hands of the Bolshevists and German escaped 
prisoners; and to prevent the formation of a 
Bolshevist government in Siberia, which might 
become an ally of Germany. Although Japan 
was called upon to furnish the major portion of 
the expeditionary force, she was asked to give a 
pledge that she had no territorial designs in Si¬ 
beria. In the United States and Japan, and in 
some circles in Europe, the idea of this expedi¬ 
tion was bitterly opposed. It was a violation of 
the sovereignty of Russia, and the aims of Japan 
were suspected. Common agreement was 
finally reached. Japan did her part well. Her 
expeditionary force cooperated in the occupation 
of Vladivostok, and seized considerable supplies 
of arms as well as a number of small vessels that 
had been armed by the Germans on the Amur 
River. The Japanese penetrated as far as Ir¬ 
kutsk. Baron Makino said in Paris that the ma- 
5i7 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


jor portion of Japanese troops had already been 
withdrawn and that Japan “will be glad when the 
day arrives on which, under the terms of the 
agreement, all foreign troops may be withdrawn 
from Siberia or from Russian territory, and an 
orderly government set up in those countries.” 
The Chinese are afraid, however, that some 
secret agreement has been entered into by which 
Japan will eventually receive northern Man¬ 
churia and Vladivostok. 

A prominent Chinaman, who had exceptional 
opportunities of knowing the inside of European 
diplomacy, told me shortly after the United 
States and China entered the war: “I am col¬ 
lecting carefully the speeches and newspaper 
comments in Great Britain and France on the 
proposals of Germany to the Pope concerning- 
Belgium. The arguments of British and French 
statesmen and publicists are logical and just. 
Belgium has a right to the restoration of her en¬ 
tire and unrestricted independence. The pre¬ 
tensions of Germany to a special economic posi¬ 
tion in Antwerp are preposterous. Geographical 
propinquity and economic necessity are no longer 
acceptable arguments for violating the inherent 
rights of a nation to her own sovereignty. We 
518 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

Chinese believe in President Wilson. We are 
encouraged by the speech of Mr. Asquith, who 
has said that the new era the Peace Conference 
will initiate is one in which the nations of the 
world, banded together in a league, are going to 
insist upon each nation being master of its own 
destinies, when historic wrongs will be righted, 
and when great powers who, by sheer military 
superiority, by bullying or by fraud, have taken 
another’s property, will be compelled to disgorge. 
At the Peace Conference, we shall confront 
Japan, Great Britain, and other European na- 
tons with the deadly parallel. No special plead¬ 
ing, no sophistry, will be able to turn aside our 
just demands. We have our Antwerps in the 
hands of the foreigner. The title to them is no 
better than Germany’s title to the great Belgian 
seaport.” 

This was the attitude of the Chinese when the 
Peace Conference assembled. The Chinese dele¬ 
gates felt that the Treaty of Versailles would 
be drafted on the basis of President Wilson’s 
“fourteen points and subsequent discourses.” 
Had not this solemn assurance been given to the 
world by the Supreme War Council at Versailles 
in regard to the treatment of Germany before the 
5^9 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


armistice was signed? If enemies were to be 
treated on the basis of justice, how much more 
had allies the right to just treatment! Conse¬ 
quently, the Chinese delegation formulated de¬ 
mands for the return of the Shangtung peninsula 
to China, and expressed the hope of a readjust¬ 
ment in the Far East that would make possible 
the formation of a society of nations, working 
in common for the establishment and mainte¬ 
nance of a durable peace. 

The European statesmen received enthu¬ 
siastically every demand of China that was 
against the interests of Germany. Of course 
Germany should give up all the privileges and 
concessions she had wrested from China! Of 
course Germany should waive for her subjects 
rights of extraterritoriality and special trading- 
privileges! Of course Germany should restore 
to China the astronomical instruments stolen 
from Peking! Of course Germany should re¬ 
ceive no more Boxer indemnity! The French 
and the British went farther. They pointed out 
that this was a golden opportunity for China to 
expel all Germans and Austrians, business men 
and missionaries and educators alike, from her 
territory. But when it came to giving up any 
520 


JAPAN AND CHINA 

of their own privileges, similarly wrested from 
China, to waiving their own Boxer indemnities, 
the victorious powers could not see it that way. 
And President Wilson was confronted with 
secret treaties between Japan and the other En¬ 
tente powers by which Japan was given Ger¬ 
many’s place in Kiao-chau and the Shangtung 
peninsula. President Wilson denied his own 
principles. He betrayed the faith the Chinese 
had put in him. In vain the Chinese delegates 
reminded the American President that he had 
formally invited them to enter the world war, 
pledging the United States to fight for and secure 
the triumph of the principles that were now being 
violated. 

A new era of unrest, leading inevitably to war 
and wrecking the conception of the society of na¬ 
tions, was inaugurated in the Far East by the 
insertion in the Treaty of Versailles of Articles 
156, 157, and 158. Germany renounces in favor 
of Japan “all her rights, titles and privileges 
which she acquired in virtue of the treaty by her 
with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other ar¬ 
rangements relative to the Province of Shang¬ 
tung.” Instead of the Shangtung settlement be¬ 
ing an “open covenant, openly arrived at,” the 
521 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Chinese Government had no say in it. The 
Chinese delegates did not know about it until sev¬ 
eral days after it had been agreed upon. When 
they presented a memorial to the “Principal Al¬ 
lied and Associated Powers,” pointing out that a 
population of Chinese as large as the total popu¬ 
lation of France was being turned over to an 
hereditary enemy without being consulted or even 
notified, President Wilson and his associates did 
not deem it necessary to answer the Chinese pro¬ 
test. What could they have said? 

One of the most remarkable documents the 
Peace Conference has given birth to is the state¬ 
ment issued by the Chinese Peace Delegation. 
Dignified and restrained, but remorselessly log¬ 
ical, it is a scathing indictment of the Treaty of 
Versailles in its effect upon the Far East. I can¬ 
not close this chapter better than by quoting its 
salient points: 

China came to the Conference with strong faith in the 
lofty principles adopted by the Allied and Associated 
Powers as the basis of a just and permanent world peace. 
Great, therefore, will be the disappointment and disillu¬ 
sionment of the Chinese people over the proposed settle¬ 
ment. If there was reason for the Council to stand firm 
on the question of Fiume, there would seem all the more 
reason to uphold China’s claim relating to Shangtung, 
which involves the future welfare of thirty-six million 
522 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

souls and the highest interests of peace in the Far 
East. . . . 

The German rights in Shangtung originated in an act 
of wanton aggression in 1897, characteristic of Prussian 
militarism. To transfer these rights to Japan is there¬ 
fore to perpetuate an act of aggression which has been 
resented by the Chinese people ever since its perpetra¬ 
tion. 

Moreover, owing to China’s declaration of war against 
the Teutonic Powers, and the abrogation of all treaties 
and agreements between China and these Powers, the 
German rights automatically reverted to China. This 
declaration was officially notified to and taken cognizance 
of by the Allied and Associated Governments. . . . The 
Council has bestowed on Japan rights not of Germany 
but of China, not of the enemy but of an ally. Such 
virtual substitution of Japan for Germany in Shangtung, 
serious enough in itself, becomes grave when the posi¬ 
tion of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner 
Mongolia is read in connection with it. Firmly en¬ 
trenched on both sides of the Gulf of Peichili—the water 
outlet of Peking—with a hold on three trunk lines issu¬ 
ing from Peking and connecting it with the rest of China, 
the capital becomes but an enclave in the midst of 
Japanese influence. Besides, Shangtung is China’s Holy 
Land, packed with memories of Confucius and Mencius 
and hallowed as the cradle of Chinese civilization. . . . 

The Chinese Delegation understands that the decision 
of the Council has been prompted by the fact that Great 
Britain and France had undertaken in February and 
March, 1917, to support at the Peace Conference the 
claims of Japan to German rights in Shangtung. To none 
of these secret agreements, however, was China a party, 
she informed of their contents when she was 

523 


nor was 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


invited to join the war against the Central Powers. The 
fortunes of China appear thus to have been made an 
object of negotiation and compensation after she had 
already definitely aligned herself with the Allied cause. 


524 


CHAPTER XXIV 


THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN 
EMINENT DOMAIN 


T HE most important events in the contem¬ 
porary history of Asia are the Russo- 
Japanese War and the participation of 
Japan in the war of 1914. Together they con¬ 
stituted a challenge to the doctrine of European 
eminent domain. The immediate objectives of 
Japan were the elimination of Russia and Ger¬ 
many as colonial factors in Eastern Asia. The 
ultimate objective was the elimination of all 
European powers as the masters of Asiatic races. 
The imperialists in Europe who rejoiced over 
the discomfiture of Russia and Germany saw no 
farther than the end of their noses. They wel¬ 
comed the aid of Japan in destroying the aspira¬ 
tions of rivals, thinking that what Japan was do¬ 
ing would contribute to their own security in 
Asia. Fear of Russian aggression had haunted 
the British. The schemes of Germany were a 

525 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

menace to the British and the French. What a 
foolish delusion! 

In the eyes of Asiatics, the victories of the 
Japanese over the Russians on the battle-fields of 
Manchuria were the victories of Asiatics over 
Europeans. They were the beginning of the 
great struggle for emancipation. Europeans 
were no longer invincible. They no longer en¬ 
joyed the monopoly of ability to handle armies 
and navies. The doctrine of European eminent 
domain had been imposed upon Asiatics by force. 
An Asiatic race had given proof of superior 
force. The repercussion of the Russo-Japanese 
War was felt throughout Asia. Nationalist 
movements, which had long been in the embryo, 
came to light from Cairo and Constantinople to 
Batavia and Peking. The European powers had 
to deal with Young Egyptians, Young Turks, 
Young Persians, Young Hindus, Young Siamese, 
Young Chinese—all claiming the same thing, the 
right of Asiatics to govern Asia. In the midst 
of this ferment came the war of 1914. Japan 
did not hesitate. She summoned Germany to get 
out of China. When Germany refused, Japan 
forced her out. A triumph for the Entente 
powers? The answer depends upon whether we 
526 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


believe that the action of Japan in the Shangtung 
peninsula was inspired by enmity to Germany 
or by the splendid opportunity to eliminate easily 
another European intruder. 

In this book we have seen how Japan followed 
up her victory over Russia and her victory over 
Germany. In 1915 as in 1906 Japan demon¬ 
strated clearly that her challenge was to the doc¬ 
trine of European eminent domain and not to the 
doctrine of eminent domain. She had studied 
European models in creating an army and a navy. 
She used European models also in establishing 
a foreign policy. Her attitude toward Korea, 
Manchuria, and China was inspired by long and 
careful observation of the diplomacy of London, 
Paris, and Berlin. Instead of promulgating, as 
they could have done, a Monroe Doctrine for 
Asia, the Japanese became a great power with 
imperialistic ambitions. Japan accepted and 
started to put into force the doctrine of eminent 
domain. If the war of 1914 had remained 
throughout a struggle between two groups of 
belligerents, its only result in Asia would have 
been the addition of Japan to the European 
powers as a factor not to be ignored in the fu¬ 
ture division and readjustment of colonial spoils. 
527 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

Great Britain would have had to make sacrifices 
to appease Japan and keep her friendly, as she 
had done with France in 1904 and with Russia 
in 1907. 

But the war did not end as it had begun. The 
United States entered in 1917, followed by China 
and Siam. When the time for making peace ar¬ 
rived, the prophetic words of an English writer 
were realized. In “The Problem of the Com¬ 
monwealth,’’ Mr. L. Curtis had written: 

If it is true in America that people must be left to 
govern themselves irrespective of their capacity for the 
task, then it is also true in Europe, Asia and Africa. 
The world is not large enough to contain two moralities 
on a subject like this. 

During the war the public pronouncements of 
premiers and cabinet ministers of the belligerent 
powers were wholly academic. Secret diplo¬ 
macy, far from being abandoned, was more per¬ 
nicious than ever in its activities. In anticipa¬ 
tion of victory, statesmen carved up empires and 
allotted territories and peoples with no thought 
of seeking the consent of those whose destinies 
were being bartered. Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, although pressed by radical deputies 
and newspapers to state frankly Germany’s gen- 
528 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 

eral conception of what the peace terms should 
be, consistently refused. He was unmoved by 
the argument that such a statement was needed 
to prove to the enemies of Germany—and to the 
German people as well—that Germany was not 
pursuing a war of conquest. In spite of the 
formal resolution voted by the Reichstag in July, 
1917, Doctor Michaelis continued his predeces¬ 
sor’s policy of silence. The German answer to 
the Pope’s peace overture was as vague as all 
other official statements of Germany’s war aims. 
The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest 
were “old-fashioned” in every particular. Up 
to the moment of collapse, when all was lost, no 
German statesman had expressed the intention 
of making any other than a purely imperialistic 
peace. 

Unfortunately, there was the same reluctance 
on the other side. Until the United States en¬ 
tered the war we knew nothing definite and con¬ 
crete about the ideas of Entente statesmen con¬ 
cerning peace. They were unresponsive to the 
argument that a general statement of peace terms, 
in detailed and explicit form, would have con¬ 
vinced the German people that their kaiser and 
leaders had lied to them in declaring that Ger- 

529 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


many was fighting a defensive war. If a de¬ 
cisive military victory had come to either side, 
there would have been no statement of the bases 
of peace before the armistice was signed. 
Statesmen had no other thought than to put down 
cards that spelled vae victis. This is what Presi¬ 
dent Wilson had in mind and feared when he 
told European statesmen that a just and durable 
peace must be a “peace without victory.” 

In the heat of the struggle, independent think¬ 
ers in the belligerent countries had the courage 
to protest in press and parliament against secret 
diplomacy. They pointed out that if the diplo¬ 
matic arrangements of the war were envisaged 
in the same spirit and concluded in accordance 
with the same principles that have prevailed in 
Europe u]3 to this time, there would be a ship¬ 
wreck of hopes of general disarmament and 
formation of the society of nations. But even 
in Great Britain and France, where public opinion 
is most enlightened and best informed, protests 
against secret diplomacy were greeted with 
suspicion, and the setting forth of constructive 
programs met with ridicule and opprobrium. 
Because they condemned Prussian ideas of di¬ 
plomacy, critics of “diplomatic agreements” were 
530 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


denounced as Prussian sympathizers—and then 
persecuted in the Prussian way! The old bane¬ 
ful secrecy was maintained against leading ques¬ 
tions in parliaments. Inquisitive articles were 
suppressed by the censorship. The great mass of 
intelligent men feared having their patriotism 
questioned when they tried to express their 
thoughts logically and constructively. It is a sad 
commentary on democracy that, although M. 
Sazonofif in Russia, M. Delcasse in France, and 
Lord Grey in England were dismissed from of¬ 
fice, the public who dismissed them blindly con¬ 
tinued to support and fight for the accomplish¬ 
ment of territorial and political changes ar¬ 
ranged by these Foreign Ministers, although still 
in ignorance of the nature and extent of the 
changes. How strong is the force of tradition! 
How pervasive is the unwillingness to resist the 
current of national passion! 

President Wilson’s suggestion of a Monroe 
Doctrine for the world did not have a good press 
among the belligerents. There were two rea¬ 
sons for this, resentment of the intrusion of an 
outsider and the determination that no neutral 
should be allowed to have any say or part in the 
reconstruction of the world after the war. To 
53i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


old-fashioned diplomatists and to Tories and 
Junkers and Imperialists, President Wilson’s 
ideas were subversive. There had been a lot of 
talk on both sides about fighting for freedom of 
small nationalities and about a new era in inter¬ 
national relations. But that was to create and 
maintain fighting-spirit and to gain the support 
of neutral sentiment. Even if, in order to win, 
there would have to be a limited application of 
the principle of freedom for small nationalities 
in Europe, the proclamation of the principle was 
never, come what may, intended for extra-Euro¬ 
pean consumption. The inner circles in Europe 
were planning another Congress of Vienna, and 
they had been successful for two and a half years 
in keeping the management of the war and inter¬ 
national negotiations in their own hands. So¬ 
cialists and Radicals made a big noise but had 
slight influence. Then came the events of the 
early spring of 1917 which removed from the 
power of the diplomats the shaping of the des¬ 
tinies of Europe and the world, and brought into 
question the secret treaties that had been con¬ 
cluded among belligerents. 

The Russian revolution soon got into the hands 
of the extremists. Moderate liberal elements 
532 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 

had not shown themselves fearless enough 
and powerful enough to overthrow czarism. 
This told against them when they tried to get 
control of the new regime. Because they had 
made the revolution, the Socialists became mas¬ 
ters of Russia. While assuring their allies that 
they would continue the war, they stated clearly 
what M. MiliukofY had tried to administer in the 
form of a sugar-coated pill, with more sugar than 
pill. The new Russia did not feel herself bound 
in the slightest way by secret diplomatic agree¬ 
ments entered into without the knowledge and 
consent of the Russian people. Since fighting 
for conquest and for the domination and enslave¬ 
ment of nations was contrary to the very nature 
of the Russian revolution, the other Entente 
powers were asked to revise the existing diplo¬ 
matic agreements and to put the common cause 
openly and frankly upon the high plane of a bat¬ 
tle of democracy against autocracy. When Rus¬ 
sia came under the control of the Bolshevists, she 
could no longer be considered as a colonial 
power. Disorder and anarchy led to a voluntary 
renunciation of interest, not only in new colonial 
projects, but in the future of Russia’s Asiatic 
possessions. 


533 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 

A few weeks after the deposition of the czar, 
the refusal of Germany to withdraw her declara¬ 
tion of unlimited submarine warfare brought the 
United States into the conflict. Immediately 
President Wilson’s speech before the American 
Senate, which had aroused the bitter resentment 
of European diplomatists in January, became 
vitally significant. President Wilson said that 
the United States had entered the war with the 
sole view of securing peace to the world by over¬ 
throwing German militarism and autocracy. He 
solemnly repeated his previous declaration that 
the United States committed herself to the estab¬ 
lishment of a new era in world history and in¬ 
ternational relations by the application of the 
principle of “the consent of the governed.” In 
the first enthusiasm over American intervention, 
M. Ribot said to the French Chamber of Depu¬ 
ties: “The only peace that can be entertained 
by Europe is a peace based upon the right of 
every nation to decide its own destiny.” 

I have quoted M. Ribot’s exact words. But 
he would be the first to protest with vehemence 
if they were taken to mean every nation in the 
world. He would probably reply without hesita- 
534 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 

tion: “Why, of course it is understood that I 
was speaking of European nations!” Is it un¬ 
derstood? If understood by Europeans, is it un¬ 
derstood by extra-Europeans, Americans as well 
as Africans and Asiatics? Here comes the chal¬ 
lenge to European eminent domain. What 
started as a European war became a world war, 
the first real world war of history. During four 
centuries, European nations fought one another 
in Europe and outside of Europe for the control 
of other continents. “Natives’’ of the other con¬ 
tinents were enlisted by Europeans to kill other 
Europeans—but on extra-European soil. From 
its incipiency the recent war was different. To 
meet the first shock of the German invasion 
Great Britain and France introduced into Europe 
as many Asiatics and Africans as they had avail¬ 
able, called them their “brothers in arms fighting 
in the common cause of the defense of civilization 
against the barbarians” and invited them to die 
for their liberties on the battle-fields of Flanders 
and eastern France. “Native” troops were used 
prodigally in Egypt and Mesopotamia, at Gal¬ 
lipoli and Saloniki. To stimulate their fighting 
ardor and reconcile them to hardships and sacri- 
535 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


fices, Asiatics and Africans were told that the 
war was their war, fought for the establishment 
of world-wide justice and freedom. 

One could not go into a factory town of France 
without meeting at every turn laborers from the 
French African and Asiatic colonies, brought to 
Europe (in some cases forcibly) to work in muni¬ 
tion plants. Africans and Asiatics unloaded 
ships at French ports, and took up the garbage 
and swept the streets of Paris. Japan patrolled 
the Pacific waters, escorted troop-ships from 
India, New Zealand, and Australia, helped put 
down the Singapore mutiny, and cooperated 
against submarines in the Mediterranean. 
French editors invited Japan to send armies to 
Europe, believing that it was the only way to 
secure victory. Japan did cooperate in the ex¬ 
pedition into Siberia against the Bolshevists. 
China sent several hundred thousand laborers to 
France, tens of thousands of whom were used by 
the British at the front and were subjected to the 
dangers of combatant troops. Siam actually 
sent troops to France. Great Britain accepted 
millions of pounds as war gifts from Indian 
princes. Most of the states of the two Americas 
became belligerents. Lastly—and this is by no 
536 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 

means the least significant of the facts I have 
enumerated—Russia, in victorious offensives as 
well as in hours of bitter defeat, leaned heavily 
upon Asiatic contingents. Have we not always 
heard that the best Russian troops were Asiatics 
—Cossacks and Tartars? The hold of Bolshe¬ 
vism upon Russia was gained and has been main¬ 
tained by Kirghiz and Chinese mercenaries. 
When the two Americas were called upon for 
help in winning a peace based upon the principle 
of the freedom of nations to decide their own 
destinies, the Entente powers had in mind only 
Belgium and Serbia and Poland and Bohemia 
and Rumania. But they set in motion forces 
which, in their own population and in the self- 
governing dominions of Great Britain as well 
as in the United States and the other American 
republics, are going to insist upon a wider ap¬ 
plication of the principle. Asiatics and Afri¬ 
cans, who contributed to the blocking of German 
schemes to world empire and whose aid is still 
being relied upon in enforcing the decisions of 
the Peace Conference, have plenty of backing in 
America—and also in Europe—when they insist 
that the principle of freeing subject nationalities 
from the yoke of the foreigner be applied to them 
537 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


also, and that they sit as equals in the new society 
of nations. 

A dilemma confronted the peacemakers at 
Paris: their formula had to be either the rees¬ 
tablishment of the status quo ante-bellum or a 
world-wide territorial and political readjustment. 
Once the status quo of 1914 was upset and ques¬ 
tions raised of how titles were acquired and what 
"‘the consent of the governed” meant, the doc¬ 
trine of European eminent domain was chal¬ 
lenged. Quite unconsciously, I think, Mr. Lloyd 
George was betrayed into making the challenge 
himself, when he told the House of Commons 
that Germany’s African colonies could not in 
justice be returned to Germany “without the con¬ 
sent of the natives”! If the natives of Ger¬ 
many’s African colonies are intelligent and ad¬ 
vanced enough to have an opinion as to whom 
they prefer for masters, is it not equally true of 
the African colonies of other European powers? 
Unless the same principle be applied everywhere, 
outside of Europe as well as in Europe, we either 
acknowledge the fallacy of declaring that we are 
acting in accordance with the idea that right 
makes might or we are self-convicted hypocrites. 
I am not sentimental and impractical, nor am I 
538 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


trying to confuse the issues of the war by fishing 
in troubled waters. I am setting forth here other 
issues of the war that have not occurred to those 
whose vision goes no farther than the defeat of 
Germany. The challenge to European eminent 
domain is the inevitable result of attempting to 
change the status quo in Europe by the applica¬ 
tion of another principle than the law of force. 
We cannot get away from the truth tersely ex¬ 
pressed by Mr. Curtis: “The world is not large 
enough to contain two moralities on a subject 
like this.” 

The weakest point of the project for the so¬ 
ciety of nations presented by President Wilson 
to the Peace Conference was Article X, which 
provided for the guarantee by all the members of 
the society of each member’s territorial integrity. 
I believe that it was the sponsorship of this ar¬ 
ticle which caused President Wilson to lose the 
support of many thoughtful men who had up to 
that moment stood behind him. In all the course 
of history no political combination was ever de¬ 
vised to consecrate the infallibility of the deci¬ 
sions of a peace conference. The Conference of 
Paris became a more secret and closer corpora¬ 
tion than its predecessors of the nineteenth cen- 
539 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


tury. Uncontrolled either by public opinion or 
an intimate and comprehensive knowledge of 
many of the matters they were deciding upon, 
four men tried to make a treaty of peace, by bar¬ 
gaining and compromising, which they expected 
the enemy to accept without discussion and the 
League of Nations to guarantee for all time! 

President Wilson’s society of nations pro¬ 
posal, as he presented it to the Peace Conference, 
was a document intended to secure the guaran¬ 
tee of the world for the new territorial and po¬ 
litical order in Europe and for the continuance 
of the old order outside of Europe. 

The political organisms of Europe, as they ex¬ 
isted in 1914, were determined partly by a suc¬ 
cession of wars through centuries and partly by 
the working out of economic laws. The title to 
virtually all of the colonial possessions of Europe 
overseas rests on superior force. European co¬ 
lonial possessions were gained by the waging of 
wars. Titles passed from European states who 
could not defend their colonies to more aggressive 
European states who ousted the former posses¬ 
sors by fighting. A study of the evolution of 
Europe into states and of the expansion of Eu¬ 
rope outside of Europe is a necessary antidote to 
540 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


the plausibly expressed and glibly repeated pro¬ 
grams of politicians and partisan writers for re¬ 
making the map of Europe and the rest of the 
world. When one comes to appreciate the influ¬ 
ence of economic factors in determining political 
boundaries and colonial expansion, wars appear 
most often as results rather than causes, and con¬ 
flicting national propagandas are seen to be the 
efforts of rival traders to extend market areas. 
Condemning pan-Germanism, we must remember 
that in statements of aspiration and underlying 
motives, there is a striking similarity between 
German irredentism and the irredentism of other 
nations, and that in longing for her “place in the 
sun,” Germany is acting just as other European 
nations acted in the century following the 
achievement of their national unity. Past his¬ 
tory is not needed to corroborate this statement. 
We have a contemporary example. Italy, who 
achieved her political unity at the same time as 
Germany, exhibits to-day exactly the same ir¬ 
redentist and colonial empire symptoms. 

If we approve and are willing to give our sons’ 
blood for the maintenance of the changes in the 
status quo of Europe, on the ground that the old 
status quo was the result of the working of the 
54i 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


law of force and violated the principle of self- 
government, are we logical in our position unless 
we reject equally the extra-European status quo 
on the same ground ? 

For many years before the outbreak of the 
war, I supplemented reading polemical and 
propagandist literature by personal investiga¬ 
tion in most of the parts of Europe where a 
change in the status quo ante-bellum has been 
made by the Treaty of Versailles. I have also 
studied the polemical and propagandist literature 
of African and Asiatic movements, and have vis¬ 
ited in their homes many leaders in the effort to 
rid these countries of their European masters. 
The similarity between the arguments against the 
maintenance of the status quo advanced by Euro¬ 
pean and extra-European subject races is remark¬ 
able, and the arguments used by the possessors, 
in one case and the other, to justify their titles 
are identical. Even the blindest of partisans can 
hardly refuse to see and admit the parallels. 

1. Present rulers: “We have won this coun¬ 
try (colony, protectorate) by the expenditure of 
blood and treasure.” Subject race: “We do 
not recognize your title acquired by force.” 

2. Present rulers: “This country (colony, 

542 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


protectorate) came to us by a treaty made with 
its former possessor and which all Europe rati¬ 
fied, if not specifically, at least tacitly.” Subject 
race: “We had no say in the treaty of which 
you speak, so it does not bind us; and as you mean 
by 'all Europe’ the statesmen of the great pow¬ 
ers, we answer that they did not consult us, that 
their approval was based upon a real or fancied 
advantage to themselves and was influenced 
neither by our desires nor by our welfare. Your 
title, then, based on such consent and ratification, 
is null and void.” 

3. Present rulers: "Your king (chief) gave 
us this country (colony, protectorate).” Sub¬ 
ject race: " But times are changed, and you 
fought the recent war because you denied the 
right of a ruler to decide the destinies of his 
people.” 

4. Present rulers: "We have been here a long 
time, and the time is past when our title can be 
challenged. You have become an integral part 
of our empire.” Subject race: "The French 
have always maintained in regard to Alsace and 
Lorraine that title based on right cannot be out¬ 
lawed. If this be true in that case, it is equally 
true in our case.” 


543 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


5. Present rulers: “We are in possession, and 
in peaceful possession. We maintain order here. 
No other states, and not even you yourselves, op¬ 
pose us.” Subject race: “You are in posses¬ 
sion, and in peaceful possession, because you have 
quartered upon us an armed force, for which you 
make us pay. Other states do not dispute your 
title, solely because they know you would fight 
them to maintain it, and they are either not 
strong enough or do not want us badly enough 
to challenge your title.” 

6. Present rulers: “If we leave you, you can¬ 
not defend yourselves against an aggressor.” 
Subject race: “What happens if you get out 
concerns us and not you. If you think it does 
concern you and that it would be a calamity to 
your interests to have another nation installed 
here in your place, you would fight to defend us 
anyway. But have you not created a society of 
nations to protect the status quo established by the 
Peace Conference? If you realize that ideal, this 
argument of yours for staying here will no longer 
have value.” 

7. Present rulers: “But we cannot leave you 
because of our enormous investments in this 
country (colony, protectorate). Not only have 

544 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


we put, as individuals and as a government, 
enormous sums in the development of your 
country (colony, protectorate), but you owe a 
large part of your national debt to us.” Subject 
race: “We waive the observations we could 
justly make, namely, that your investments were 
at your own risk and for your own profit, and 
that you have loaned us as a nation money which 
you have spent for us without our consent or ad¬ 
vice, and a large part of it to strengthen your 
hold over us. We point simply to the fact that 
you would never accept this argument, if it were 
directed against you. Nor do you accept it when 
directed against Belgium and other small states. 
You have larger private investments and larger 
interest in the national debt in very many inde¬ 
pendent states than you have in ours.” 

8. Present rulers: “But we are here for your 
benefit and your interest.” Subject race: 
“Only secondarily. Whenever our benefit and 
our interest happen to be contrary to yours, your 
officials here act against us and for the interest 
of the country from which they came.” 

9. Present rulers: “Our rule has given you 
material prosperity beyond anything you ever had 
or ever dreamed of before, and which you would 

545 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


no longer enjoy if left to yourselves.” Subject 
race: “Material prosperity does not compensate 
for the lack of the right of self-government, 
which you hold to be your most precious posses¬ 
sion and the cause of your high degree of civil¬ 
ization, but which you deny to us.” 

10. Present rulers: “You are not ready for 
self-government.” Subject race: “A race that 
does not have the chance to guide its own des¬ 
tinies, no matter how well off it may be in sub¬ 
jection, can never advance morally and become 
highly civilized and self-respecting.” 

11. Present rulers: “Officials of your own 
race, and your substantial land-owning and in¬ 
dustrial classes, do not want us to get out. They 
would consider it a calamity if we did get out.” 
Subject race: “You have bribed our official 
classes by paying them large sums out of our 
pockets, and they are your creatures because they 
are dependent on you and not on us for their jobs. 
As for our substantial land-owning and industrial 
classes, you keep them favorable to your rule by 
favoring their privileged position in a way that 
you do not favor similar classes in your own 
country. You are advocates of universal suf¬ 
frage, equality before the law, and other demo- 

546 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


cratic principles in your own country. Here you 
deliberately protect feudalism and irresponsible 
bureaucracy because you know that in no other 
way would you have indigenous partisans of your 
rule.” 

12. Present rulers: “If we withdrew, an¬ 
archy would follow. We repeat what we have 
said above, that we have put a lot of money into 
this country (colony, protectorate) and have 
guaranteed your debts. Not only our own citi¬ 
zens but those of other nations have settled and 
invested money in this country (colony, protec¬ 
torate) because they had confidence in us as your 
rulers. So we do not intend to get out or let 
the reins of government pass from our control.” 
Subject race: “What nation has evolved to self- 
government except by passing through anarchy, 
civil wars, and revolutions, during which prop¬ 
erty was destroyed and lives were lost? We are 
not foolish enough to believe that we shall attain 
your civilization without passing through such 
periods ourselves. But we ask you in the name 
of fairness, do you think that you could have 
been prepared for self-government by an alien 
race, different in background, in religion, in lan¬ 
guage, and which considered itself superior to 
547 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


your race? Had some outside nation prevented 
your evolution, where would you be to-day ? As 
for the financial argument, since you bring it up 
again, do you intend to interfere in the evolution 
of Russia on the ground of unwillingness to see 
your investments and trade and the lives of peo¬ 
ple jeopardized ?” 

In these twelve pros and contras, I have tried 
to cover the ground of contention between sub¬ 
ject races and their masters. If we are hon¬ 
estly working for constructive world peace, it is 
of prime importance to consider the arguments 
of dominant races and subject races wholly aside 
from the heat and passion that remains from the 
conflict between the two groups of European 
powers. The reason for doing this sautent aux 
yeux, as the French say. 

Nationalist movements interested the world at 
large very little before the recent war. The 
general public was unacquainted with the exist¬ 
ence of most of them, let alone with their merits 
and demerits. Aside from students and travel¬ 
ers and those who were directly affected, none 
took the trouble to familiarize himself with those 
movements. Consequently, when the war broke 
548 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


out, public opinion all over the world, lacking 
ante-bellum knowledge of the aspirations and 
claims of subject races, accepted at face-value 
statements of partisan writers who did not hesi¬ 
tate to denature the truth for the sake of propa¬ 
ganda. We were asked to believe, for example, 
that the Ukrainian and Finnish movements were 
the work of German agents and not at all on the 
same footing as the Czech and Yugo-Slavic 
movements; that Turkey was responsible for 
anti-British feeling in Egypt and India; and that 
only the natives of the German colonies in Africa 
were eager to get rid of their white masters. 
Hostility in Albania to the Serbians during the 
retreat of 1915 and to the Italians afterward 
was represented as the result of Austrian in¬ 
trigue. Similarly, German newspapers told 
their readers that the troubles of Austria-Hun¬ 
gary with her Slavic elements and the revolt of 
the Arabs against Turkey were due to the ma¬ 
chinations of the Entente. 

Woefully misled were statesmen, publicists, 
college professors, and lecturers who believed 
that during the war and the Peace Conference 
patriotism demanded of them, if not actual sng- 
gestio falsi, at least suppressio veri. When 
549 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


Ex-President Taft was speaking at a great meet¬ 
ing in championship of the League of Nations 
and mentioned the necessity of establishing the 
principle of self-determination for the former 
Baltic provinces of Russia, some one interrupted: 
“How about Ireland?” Mr. Taft answered: 
“Let us be practical. Ireland is an internal ques¬ 
tion of the British Empire, and it is not our busi¬ 
ness to mix up in it.” If the League of Nations 
is conceived as a combination of victorious pow¬ 
ers to enforce principles only to the detriment of 
conquered enemies, the answer was logical. But 
unless we are pro-human instead of anti-German, 
unless we are universal in our consideration of 
the aspirations and claims of weak nations and 
subject races, we are using our influence against 
the triumph of the conception of a genuine so¬ 
ciety of nations. The war has awakened in all. 
humanity a demand for a new international and 
colonial morality. 

The proposition to establish a society of na¬ 
tions is before the world. Its corollary is the 
challenge to European eminent domain from four 
sources: the nations, big and small, who are not 
rich in colonies and protectorates; the self-gov¬ 
erning dominions of the British Empire; the “na- 
55o 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


rives” who are the political and social, and in 
many cases economic, victims of the doctrine of 
European eminent domain; and the democrats of 
all countries, including those who hold colonies 
and protectorates. The challenge from the first 
and second of these sources is motived by inter¬ 
est, from the third by the very logic of the new 
order proposed in the society of nations, and 
from the fourth by hatred of hypocrisy and by 
the conviction that imperialism is the deadly foe 
of democracy. 

Those who demand the open door to trade in 
Africa and Asia, on the basis of absolute equality 
with the owners of colonies, cannot accept the 
doctrine of European eminent domain, incorpor¬ 
ated in a charter of a new-world order of which 
they are to be co-guarantors. Overseas Britons, 
having helped to defend old colonies and win new 
ones, want a share in the ownership and manage¬ 
ment of them. Those who are denied the right 
of self-government simply because they are not 
Europeans or Americans protest against the ap¬ 
proval of their tutelage by the society of nations. 
The questions opened and the problems posed by 
these three groups of challengers are too numer- 
and complicated to be discussed here. By 
55i 


ous 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


far the most important challenge is that of the 
fourth group, which believes that the peace of 
the world is dependent upon the triumph of de¬ 
mocracy. 

Putting idealism aside and basing our argu¬ 
ment on recent European history, we have the 
most practical grounds for asserting that Eu¬ 
ropean eminent domain can be considered a per¬ 
manent danger to the world’s peace. In the 
prosecution of the recent war and in drawing up 
the terms of peace, we adopted toward Ger¬ 
many Cato’s attitude toward Carthage. But 
we must not allow ourselves to forget that 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, British 
statesmen and British newspapers regarded 
France, and not Germany, as the “disturber of 
the world’s peace.” After France, Russia was 
considered Britain’s potential enemy. On the 
other hand, in the minds of British imperialists, 
Germany was a friend to be cultivated. Easily 
accessible proofs of these statements are not lack¬ 
ing. We have the testament of Cecil Rhodes 
as well as the letters of his later years; the cor¬ 
respondence between the Foreign Office and the 
British Minister in Morocco where the British 
were cooperating whole-heartedly with the Ger- 
552 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 

mans in opposing France; and the files of London 
newspapers, particularly the “Daily Mail, ,, in 
which the present Lord Northcliffe’s aversion for 
France was as marked as his admiration for 
Germany. Events since 1914 prove that there 
was no natural antipathy between French and 
British. But war was averted fifteen years 
earlier only because France was not strong 
enough to back by force her own colonial ambi¬ 
tions in Africa against Great Britain’s. War 
between Great Britain and Russia was averted 
only because Japan attacked Russia first. Is it 
possible to study the history of India and Egypt 
during the past generation without seeing that the 
seeds of trouble for Great Britain in these coun¬ 
tries were sowed not by Germany but by Russia 
and France? 

Speaking at Leeds on September 26, 1917* Mr. 
Asquith formulated the aspiration of democracy 
the world over. He said: 

Prussian militarism has been and is our objective, 
since it chose to force matters to an issue. But the peace 
for which we are fighting is not the restoration of the 
status quo, not the revival in some revised shape of 
what used to be called the balance of power. It is the 
substitution for one and the other of an international 
system, in which there will be a place for great and for 

553 


THE NEW MAP OF ASIA 


small states and under which both alike can be ensured 
a stable foundation and an independent development. 
For the first time in history, we may make an advance to 
the realization of an ideal. It is the creation no longer 
of a merely European policy, but since our kinsmen 
across the Atlantic have joined hands with us, of a world¬ 
wide polity, uniting the peoples in a confederation of 
which justice will be the base and liberty the corner¬ 
stone. 

Mr. Asquith is right. He has voiced a truth 
which will prevail against the irresolution and 
expediency of the Conference of Paris. The 
moment has passed when peace could be patched 
up, to use Mr. Asquith’s own words, on the basis 
of “nebulous and unctuous generalities.” The 
leader of British liberalism held up to us the 
“newer and truer perspective.” 

When we examine analytically and weigh dis¬ 
passionately arguments advanced for the main¬ 
tenance of European eminent domain, we realize 
that they are based upon principles we have pro¬ 
scribed. They are the principles of Prussian 
militarists and of the German Imperial Govern¬ 
ment. For European eminent domain is the 
doctrine of the Uebermensch put into practice. 
Races, believing in their superiority, imposed by 
force their rule and Kultur upon inferior races. 
European eminent domain has no justification, 
554 


EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN 


unless one believes either (a) that our particular 
idea of civilization is so essential to the world’s 
happiness and well-being that it must be built up 
and spread and maintained by force; or (b) that 
“superior races” have the right to exploit, or at 
least to direct the destinies of, “inferior races”; 
or (c) that the bestowal of material blessings 
upon people is adequate compensation for deny¬ 
ing them the right of governing themselves. 

Can a man believe in “the white man’s burden” 
—with all that this phrase implies—and at the 
same time condemn what we fought Germany to 
destroy ? 


555 




















V 












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INDEX 


Abd-el-Keru Island, 57 
Abdul, Emir of Afghanistan: 
14; cited on British policy, 

15; 16 

Abdul Hamid, 146, 151, 156, 
161, 168, 181, 276, 277 
Aden, 8, 57, 60 
Adrianople, 172 

Afghanistan: 7, 8; British con¬ 
trol forced upon, 9; situation 
of Great Britain and, 11, 12; 
a shield of India, 13 et seq.; 
trade relations of, with India, 
15; provisions of Covenant 
of 1907 in relation to, 19, 20; 
23, 57 , 58, 60, 265, 33 i _ 
Africa: French colonization in, 
95 , 96 

Aguinaldo, 129 
Aharonian, M., 321 
Ahmed Mirza, succession of, to 
Persian throne, 277 
Ahmed Niazi, Major, quoted, 

150, 151 

Alaska, 310 

Albania, 167, 549 

Alexander, Grand Duke, cited, 

324 

Alexieff, Admiral, 414 
Algeria, 96 
Aligholi Khan, 296 
A l Kibla, journal of King of 
Hedjaz, 209 

Allenby, General Sir Edmund: 
campaign of, in Palestine, 
190, 192; 202, 208, 319 
Alliance Israelite Universelle 
at Jerusalem, 201 


All-India Moslem League: 51; 

resolutions of, quoted, 52 
Alsace-Lorraine, 96, 238 
Amanullah Khan, 235 
Ambero, 115 

America: natives of, in British 
Asiatic possessions, 58; 
French colonies in, 95. See 
United States 

America’s Foreign Relations, 
by Professor Johnson, quot¬ 
ed, 406, footnote 
Anatolia, 164 
Andaman Islands, 57, 59 
Angkor-Battambang, 82 
Anglo - Franco - Russo - Ital¬ 
ian Treaty, 241 

Anglo-French: Agreement of 
1904, 77; Convention, 83, 84, 
86; expedition to Peking, 424 
Anglo-German agreement as to 
China, 406 et seq. 
Anglo-Japanese: terms of, alli¬ 
ance of 1902, 412, 413; 

Treaty, 4 73 , 485 
Anglo-Russian: Agreement of 
1907, 7; Convention, 19, 33. 
274, 285; status of, Conven¬ 
tion of, 1907, with the Bol¬ 
shevists, 23, 24; Treaty, 474 
Anglo-Siamese Treaty, 81 
Annam: 78, 99-113, passim; de¬ 
scription of, 103-105; desire 
of, for autonomy, no; edu¬ 
cational facilities in, 112 
Arabia, 166, 189 
Arabs, 142-171, passim; 194, 
257 et seq. 


557 


INDEX 


Armenia, 157, 320 
Asahi, journal of Japan, 454 
Asia: Great Britain in relation 
to control of southern, 7; 14; 
French colonial empire in, 95 
et seq.; “for the Asiatics” 
principle advocated by Japan, 
476 et seq.; expulsion of Ger¬ 
many from, 483-495 
Asquith, Mr.: 519; quoted on 
Prussian militarism, 553, 554 
Attila, 405 

Australia, 344, 345, 485 
Austria-Hungary: 148, 153; in 
relation to Turkey, 177; 550 


Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of, 57 
Bagdad Railway, 12, 243 
Bahrein Islands, 8, 57, 60 
Baker, Secretary of War, quot¬ 
ed, 141 

Balfour, Mr.: quoted on Zion¬ 
ist movement, 193, 194; 197. 
219, 222 

Balkan States: attitude of 
Great Britain toward affran¬ 
chisement of, 4, 5; 142-171, 
passim, 192 
Balkan War, 144 
Bangkok, 79, 87 
Basel, Congress of, 210 
Bassorah, 187 

Beaconsfield, Lord, in relation 
to Treaty of San Stefano, 5 
Beersheba, 210 
Beirut, 201 
Belgium, 537 

Beluchistan: 8, 9, 13, 57; rela¬ 
tion of, to Great Britain, 59, 
60 

Bender Abbas, 268, 270 
Bengal, Gulf of, 7 et seq. 
Bergson, Henri, 204 
Berlin Congress, The, 200, 247 
Berlin, Treaty of, 144, 193 


Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor 
von, 528, 529 

Bhutan, 8, 10, 11, 26, 28, 60 
Bieberstein, Baron Marschall 
von, 181-183 

Bismarck, Prince: attitude of, 
toward colonial empire, 96; 

483 

Boer War: object of Great 
Britain in fighting, 6; Dutch 
in relation to, 117 
Boghos Nubar Pasha, 252 
Bohemia, 537 
Bokhara, 8, 330, 331 
Bolshevists : 23 ; attitude of, to¬ 
ward Afghanistan, 24, 25; 54, 
315, 321, 515 et seq., 533, 536 
Bombay: 47, 60; action of, 
Congress, 52, 53 
Bompard, M., 178 
Borneo, 8, 58, 67, 115-123, 
passim 

Bosnia, 153, 167, 168 
Bourbons, The, 95 
Boxers: 392; uprising of, 393 
et seq.; aftermath of uprising 
of, 408, 409 et seq.; 419, 
420 

Breda, Peace of, 116 
Brenier, M., opinion of, on 
French mission in Far East, 
101 

Breslau, The, German war- 
vessel, 175, 176 

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 322, 
529 

British Empire. See Great 
Britain 

British North Borneo: 57, 58, 
60; acquisition of, by Great 
Britain, 73; area, population, 
revenue, and debt of, 74 
Broderick, Mr., quoted on al¬ 
lied interest of England and 
Germany, 408, 409 
Brooke, Sir James (Raja): 


INDEX 


acquisition of Sarawak by, * 
71, 72; quoted, 72 
Brunei: 57, 60; British protec¬ 
torate theory applied to, 73; 
area, population, revenue, 
and debt of, 74 
Brussels, 174 

Bryan, William Jennings, 126 
Bucharest, Treaty of, 529 
Buelow, Chancellor von; cited 
on action of Powers in 
China, 406; quoted in refer¬ 
ence to Manchuria, 407 
Bulgaria, 172-191, passim 
Burma: 8; absorption of, by 
British India, 9; 36, 59, 67, 
106, 439 

Cambodia: 78, 99-103, passim; 
description of, 103; school 
facilities in, hi, 112 
Canada, 315 
Canton, 437, 450 
Cape of Good Hope, 4 
Caroline Islands, purchase of, 
by Germany, 484 
Cato, 552 
Celebes, The, 120 
Ceylon: 4, 8, 57; survey of 
British administration of, 60 
et seq. 

Chagos Archipelago, 57 
Challaye, Felicien, quoted on 
political convictions of Jap¬ 
anese, 462 

Chamber of Deputies, French, 
82 

Chamberlain, Mr., 219 
Chandernagor, 97, 98 
Charles II, 116 

Chelmsford, Lord, report of, 
on India, 50, 51 
Chentabun, 82 

China: 8; relations of, with 
Great Britain on Tibetan 
question, 25-27; suggestion 


of, to Great Britain in regard 
to Tibetan trade questions, 
28; politico-social struggle in, 
during World War, 37; 41, 
57, 60; attitude of, toward 
British control of Hongkong, 
63 et seq.; influence of Unit¬ 
ed States upon, in regard to 
War, 76; 86, 115, 331; rela¬ 
tion of, to Korea, 348 et seq>; 
370; victim of European im¬ 
perialism, 385-423; Russia’s 
encroachment of territory of, 
386 et seq.; claims of Great 
Britain on, 387 et seq.; debt 
of, due to Boxer treaty, 402; 
struggle of, for unity, 423; 
birth of, the Republic, 424- 
452; growth of militarism in, 
429 et seq.; Occidental re¬ 
forms in, 431; fight of, 
against opium, 432 et seq.; 
revolution in south of, 438; 
struggle of, for solidarity, 
445 et seq.; influence of Pres¬ 
ident Wilson’s War princi¬ 
ples upon, 448; at Peace 
Conference, 451; 468; Euro¬ 
pean diplomacy in relation to 
China, 470; in World War, 
496-524; protest of, against 
Shangtung agreement, quot¬ 
ed, 522-524 
Chosen. See Korea 
Christmas Island, 60, 68 
Chuang, Prince, 400 
Chun, Prince, 437, 438 
Chusan Archipelago, 467 
Cocos Islands, 68 
Cochin-China: 99-113, passim; 

description of, 102 
Committee of Union and Prog¬ 
ress, 161 et seq. 

Confucius, 432 
Convention of 1907, The, 12 
Cossacks, 537 


559 


INDEX 


Crimean War: object of, 4; 
143 . 334 

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
46 

Curtis, Mr., quoted, 539 
Curzon, Lord, 268 
Cyprus: 8, 56, 57, 60; annexa¬ 
tion of, by British, 62, 63 
Czecho-Slovaks, 517 

Daily Mail, London, cited, 553 
Dalai Lama, of Tibet, The: 
functions of, 26, 27; flight of, 
to Mongolia, 32; return of, 
to Lhasa, 34; flight of, to 
India, 35; relation of, to 
Germany, 36 
Dalny, 410 

Damad Ferid Pasha, 244 
Damao, 115 
Damascus, 200 

Dane, Sir Lewis, mission of, to 
Habibullah Khan, 17, 18 
Dedeagatch, 172 
Delcasse, M.: attitude of, to¬ 
ward Siamese situation, 81; 
82, 84, 531 
Denmark, 98 

Dewey, Admiral, 114, 128 
Dingdings, The, 68 
Dingley, 136 
Dio, Island of, 115 
Diyuto (liberal party of Ja¬ 
pan), The, 456, 458 
Doshikai (Society of People 
Having the Same Ideas), 
The, 458, 460, 461 
Dowager-Empress of China: 
relation of, to Boxer Society, 
393 et seq.; 398; death of, 
437 

Dutch. See Holland 
Dutch East Indies, 115-123, 
passim 

East India Company, 38, 39 


Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli- 
tiques, 75 

Egypt: 4; occupation of, by 
British, 5, 6, 9; attitude of 
Nationalists in, toward Ger¬ 
many, 40; 57, 62, 83, 186; 
Turkey’s part in anti-British 
feeling in, 549 

Emden, The, sinking of Allies’ 
cruisers by, 69 

England. See Great Britain 

England's debt to India, 45 

Enver Pasha (formerly Bey), 
181-183 

European eminent domain, doc¬ 
trine of: 525-555; relation 
of, to world’s peace, 552 

Fashoda, compromise of 
France and Great Britain in, 
affair, 6 

Feisal, Emir: quoted, 210, 
footnote; 226 

Flanders, 12 

Foreign Office, British: atti¬ 
tude of, toward affrahchise- 
ment of Balkan States, 4; 5; 
policy of control by, ex¬ 
tended, 7; 30; relations of 
India and, 59; 98, 153, 215 

Foreign Office, French, 98 

Formosa: 339-341; cession of, 
to Japan, 386 

France: compromise of Great 
Britain and, in Fashoda af¬ 
fair, 6; pact of, and Great 
Britain, 12; 14; in relation 
to Kuria Muria Islands, 57; 
69; relations between, and 
Siam, 77 et seq.; seizure of 
Krat by, 84; position of, in 
colonial world, 96; in Asia, 
95 -II 3i colonial expansion 
of, 96 et seq.; attitude of, 
toward Turkey, 177; in 
Egypt, 199 et seq.; in Holy 


560 


INDEX 


Land, 200 et seq.; 229; cul¬ 
ture of, in Ottoman Empire, 
238; Near-Eastern policy of, 
243; encroachments of, on 
Chinese territory, 387; con¬ 
cessions to, by Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, 387; attitude 
of, toward Russian privi¬ 
leges in Manchuria, 403, 404; 
409, 426, 460; Asiatic policy 
of, 467, 468; 483; obligation 
of, to support Japan, 507; 
530; pre-War relations of, 
and Great Britain, 553 
Franco-Prussian War, 96 
Franz-Joseph, 148 
Fraser, Lovat, author of India 
under Curzon and After, 43 
French Guiana, 95 
Friedlaender, Dr. Julius, cited, 
209, 210, footnote 
Fuhkien, 389 

Gallipoli, 182 
Gaikwar of Baroda, 50 
Genro, The, 458, 459, 461, 479 
George, King, appeal of, to 
Sultan or Turkey, 177 
Germany: attitude of, toward 
Great Britain, 3; 7; the 

Bagdad Railway and, 12; 
75; control by, of Bankok 
shipping interests, 89 et seq.; 
declaration of war with, by 
Siam, 90; attitude of, toward 
colonial expansion, 96 et 
seq.; 100, 114; in the Pacific, 
124 et seq.; 174, 175; object 
of alliance of, with Turkey, 
187 et seq.; 229, 272, 289, 
320; colonial holdings of, in 
Pacific, 342, 343; intrigues 
of, in Korea, 365; colonial 
expansion of, in China, 388; 
powers’ jealousy of, after 
Boxer uprising, 399; 4°4 et 


seq.; loot of Peking by 
troops of, 405 et seq.; 409, 
447; similarity of Japanese 
constitution and that of, 
456; 460, 474, 475; expulsion 
of, from Asia, 483-495: 498, 
511; renunciation to Japan 
by, of all Shangtung rights, 
521; present condition of, as 
to empire symptoms, 541; 
pre-War attitude of Great 
Britain toward, 552 

Ghurkas, 10 

Gladstone, W. E., 367 

Goa, 97, 115 

Goeben, The, German war- 
vessel, 175, 176 

Gordon, General, cited on 
fighting qualities of Chinese, 
429 

Government of India Act, 39, 
40 

Great Britain: development of 
policy of, in regard to ap¬ 
proaches to India, 3-12; in 
Napoleonic campaigns, 4; at¬ 
titude of, toward affran¬ 
chisement of Balkan States, 
4; attitude of, toward Suez 
Canal, 5; occupation of 
Egypt by, 5, 6; occupation 
of southern Persia by, 9; re¬ 
lations of, and Afghanistan, 
11 et seq.; 14; Habibullah 
Khan and, 16 et seq.; poli¬ 
tical advantage of Conven¬ 
tion of 1907 to, 21; declara¬ 
tion of independence of, by 
Afghans, 24, 25; relations 
of, with Tibet, 25; invasion 
of Tibet by, 30, 31; treaty 
between, and Tibetans, 32; 
views held in, on Indian 
question, 39 et seq.; obliga¬ 
tion of, to India during 
War, 50; public opinion in, 


INDEX 


regarding present Indian 
policy, 54; Asiatic colonies 
and protectorates of, 56 et 
seq.; Asiatic sentinels of, 
57; area of Asiatic posses¬ 
sions of, 58; forms of at¬ 
tachment to, of Asiatic ter¬ 
ritory, 59, 60; annexation of 
Cyprus by, 62, 63; strategic 
Chinese holdings of, 63-69; 
relation of, to Straits Set¬ 
tlements, 68 et seq.; forma¬ 
tion of Federated Malay 
States by, 70, 71; relation 
of, to Sarawak, 71-73; re¬ 
formative processes of, in 
Siam, 75-94; acquisition of 
Siamese territory by, 80 et 
seq.; effect of intervention 
of, in Siam, 85 et seq.; 115, 
116; efficiency of Asiatic of¬ 
ficials of, compared with 
those of France, 109, no; 
124, 142; relation of, to Ot¬ 
toman Empire, 146; 174, 177; 
abandonment of antagonistic 
policy toward Russia by, 179 
et seq.; policy of, in Meso¬ 
potamia,’ 187; French policy 
of, 198, 199; attitude of, to¬ 
ward Zionist program, 203, 
225, 226; 229, 238, 242, 252; 
attitude of, toward Persia, 
265 ; 273, 278, 287, 288, 307,387 
et seq.; agreement between 
Germany and, as to Chinese 
policy, 402 et seq.; 405, 409; 
in relation to Manchurian 
demands, 410 et seq.; atti¬ 
tude of, toward America’s 
position in Boxer settlement, 
419; 426, 428; assistance 

given to China by, in opium 
crusade, 433; attitude of, to¬ 
ward Chinese Republic, 444, 
445; Japanese view of ag¬ 


gressions of, 466; policy of, 
in regard to all Asiatics, 467, 
468; 483, 514; attitude of, 
toward Russian aggression, 
526 et seq.; pre-War attitude 
of, toward France, 553 
Greco-Armenian Agreement, 
250; quoted, 251 
Greece: agreement of, with 
Great Britain, in relation to 
Cyprus, 62, 63; 146, 174 , 175 
Grey, Lord: 274; quoted on 
Chinese partition, 408; 531 
Guadeloupe, 95 
Guam, 124, 125 

Habeas Corpus Act, India and 
the, 47 

Habibullah Khan, Emir of 
Afghanistan: relation of, 

with British Government, 16 
et seq.; 18, 21, 22; neutrality 
of, 23; 334 

Hague Conference, 358, 434 
Helevy, Jehuda Ben, 217 
Hampden, John, 47 
Hara, Viscount, 480 
Hasegawa, Gov., Field-Mar¬ 
shal Count, 362 
Hawaii, 125 et seq. 

Hay, John: State policy of, 
386; “open door” policy of, 
417 et seq.; 421 

Hedjaz, King of, 198-224, pas¬ 
sim; 256, 259 
Hellenism, 248 et seq. 

Herat, 17 

Herzegovina, 15-3, 167, 168 
Hioki, Minister, 498; quoted, 
499 

History of India, by Captain 
Trotter, 43 

Holland: in relation to colo¬ 
nial expansion, 95; Asiatic 
colonization by, 115-123; re¬ 
sources of colonial posses- 


INDEX 


sions of, 122, 123; early 

dealings of, with Japan, 466 
Hongkong: 8, 57, 60; control 
of, by Great Britain, 63 et 
seq.; 407, 434 
Hussein Raouf Bey, 290 
Hyndman, H. M., author of 
The Awakening of Asia, 45 

I-Ho-Chuan (“the righteous 
harmony fists”; otherwise 
“Boxers”), 392 et seq. 

India: importance of, in rela¬ 
tion to foreign policy of 
Great Britain, 4 et seq.; 
Britain’s approaches to, 4- 
12; trade relations of, with 
Afghanistan, 15; mission 
from British, to Afghanis¬ 
tan, 17 et seq.; 23; invasion 
of, by Afghans, 24, 25; Tibet 
as shield to, 25; Great Britain 
and famines in, 42; soldiers 
of, on French battle-fields, 
48; attitude of Nationalists 
in, toward Germany, 49; in 
twentieth century, 38-55; se¬ 
curity of, to Britain deter¬ 
mined by sentinel islands, 57, 
58; evolution of self-govern¬ 
ment in, 59; 61; in relation 
to Malay Federation, 71; 
French colonies in, 97; 142, 
265; aid of, to China in 
opium crusade, 433; influ¬ 
ence of Turkey in creating 
anti-British feeling in, 549 
India Under Curzon and 
After, by Lovat Fraser, 43 
India-China: French, 8; 78, 

93; colonial expansion in 
French, 99 et seq.; area and 
population of French, 102; 
part played by, in World 
War, 108, 109; debt of, hi; 

389 


Inter-Allied Council, 515 
International Zionist Commis¬ 
sion, 210 
Irkutsk, 315 

Ishii, Viscount, 507, 508 
Isthmus of Suez, attitude of 
British Government toward 
piercing, 5 

Italy: seizure of Tripoli by, 
168; 172, 175, 229; in rela¬ 
tion to Boxer uprising, 395 
Ito, Prince (formerly Mar¬ 
quis), 357, 358, 359 
Ito-Kato policy, 481 
Iwakura, Prince, mission of, 
472 , 473 


Japan: relation of, to British- 
Tibetan Treaty, 32; 37, 58, 
66, 67, 69, iii; destiny of, 
in Indo-China, 113; 229; 

Korean policy of, 347; island 
extension of, 337-345; ac¬ 
complishment of, in Korea, 
362; relations of, and Russia, 
371 et seq.; service of, in 
Boxer uprising, 398; rap¬ 
prochement policy with, 
urged upon China, 414 et 
seq.; “defense of China” by, 
428; attitude of, toward Chi¬ 
nese Republic, 442; in 
Shangtung, 445; 47; diplo¬ 
matic coups of, 470-474; con¬ 
stitutional evolution of, 453- 
482; expansion of, 475; so¬ 
cialism in, 478; suffrage in, 
480; military caste in, 481, 
482; cession of German ter¬ 
ritory to, 485; ambitions of, 
in China, 498-503; in World 
War, 496-524; pro-German 
party in, 511; 553 

Java, 115 et seq. 

Jebb, Richard, author of Stu- 


563 


INDEX 


dies of Colonial Nationalism, 
quoted, 44, footnote 
Jewish Chronicle, quoted on 
Zionist movement, 195 
Jews, 192-228, passim 
Johnson Professor, author 
America's Foreign Relations, 
quoted, 406, footnote 
Johore, 70 

Jones, Congressman; Philip¬ 
pine bill of, 138 


Kafiristan, 13 

Kaiser Wilhelm’s Land, 342; 

seized by Australians, 485 
Kaisinto (conservative party 
in Japan), The, 457 , 458 
Kamerun, occupation of, by 
Germany, 484 
Karikal, 97 

Kato, Baron: 367; quoted, 367, 
368; 460; quoted on Japan’s 
ultimatum to Germany, 492 
Kelantan, 9 

Kettler, Baron von, slain by 
Boxers, 396; 404, 405 
Khan of Khiva, 333, 334 
Kiamil Pasha, 183; quoted, 240 
Kiao-Chau: 408; facts leading 
to German possession of, 
486 et seq. 

Kitchener, Lord, 48 
Klobukowski, attitude of, to¬ 
ward French Asiatic coloni¬ 
zation, 101 

Knox, Secretary, attitude of, 
toward Manchuria, 420; 421 
Kokuminto (National party), 
The, 458 

Korea; struggle of, for inde¬ 
pendence, 346-369; policy of 
Japan with regard to, 347; 
population of, 359; becomes 
Japanese province of Cho¬ 
sen, 361; natural resources 


of, 363; independence of, 
declared, 366; 370, 384, 407, 
414, 468, 469, 472 
Kotoku, hanging of, 478 
Koweit, 57, 60 
Krapotkin, 478 

Krupensky, Ambassador, 508, 

509 

Kurapotkin, General, 371, 372 
Kurdistan, 166, 298-307, pas¬ 
sim 

Kuria Muria Islands, 57, 60 
Kutchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, 
142 

Kwang-chau Wan, 102 
Kwang-si, 450 
Kwang-tung, 450 

Laccadive Islands, 57, 60 
Lansdowne, Lord, 30, 268, 269 
Lansing, Secretary: 507; cited 
on cession of Shangtung, 422 
Laos: 99; description of, 106; 
administration of, 107; 108, 
hi 

League of Nations: in relation 
to question of India, 40; 113, 
122, 221; covenant of, 

quoted, 231, 232; effect of, 
on taxation, 471, footnote; 
539 , 540 , 550 

Levy, Grand Rabbi, cited on 
Zionist movement, 204; 
quoted, 213 
Lhasa, 26, 29, 31 
Liao-tung: 370-384, passim; 
cession of, to Japan, 386; 
409, 410, 411, 414, 420 
Li Hung Chang: 387; negotia¬ 
tion of Boxer Treaty by, 
399 et seq.; 410 
Li, Prince, of Korea, 364 
Li Yuan Hung, General: pres¬ 
ident of China, 446; War 
policy of, 449 et seq. 

Lloyd George: attitude of, to- 


564 


INDEX 


ward Zionism, 223; quoted, 
538 

London, Convention of, 117 
Loti, Pierre, 154 
Louis Philippe, attitude of, to¬ 
ward French colonial ex¬ 
pansion, 95; 200 
Luang Prabang, 100, 106 
Lusitania: bearing upon Per¬ 
sia of sinking of, 302 

MacArthur, General, 128 et 
seq. 

Macedonia, 147, 150 
MacMahon, 19 
Madura, 118 

Maha Chalulong Koru, of 
Siam, 92 

Maha Vajiravudh, attitude of, 
toward British, 92, 93 
Mahe, 97 

Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, 181; 

quoted, 181, footnote 
Maimonides, Moses, 217 
Makino, Baron, cited, 510, 
footnote; 517, 518 
Malabar, 97 

Malacca Straits, 58, 67, 86 
Malay States, Federated, 57, 
58, 70 et seq. 

Maidive Islands, 57, 60 
Mallet, Sir Louis, 178 
Malta, 4, 8 

Manchu Dynasty, 472 
Manchu Government, 424 et 
seq. 

Manchuria, 383, 437, 445* 489, 
5i6 

Manchurian Railway, 410 
Manila, 126-141, passim 
Mariana Islands, purchase of, 
by Germany, 484 
Marshall Islands: occupation 
of, by Germany, 484 
Martinique, 95 
Mauritius, 4 


Massacres in Palestine, cause 
of, 206 

McKinley, President, 129 
Mehemet Ali, 200 
Mehong Valley, 82, 83, 99, 
106 

Mesopotamia, 23, 48, 152, 166, 
167; 183-191, passim; 192, 
259, 260 

Metternich, Prince, 143 
Michaelis, Dr., 529 
Midhat Pasha, 146 
Mikado: attitude of Japanese 
toward the, 478 
Mikweh Israel Agricultural 
School, 201 
Miles, General, 130 
Miliukoff, M., 533 
Mohamet Ali, 4 
Mohammed Ali Mirza, 276 et 
seq. 

Monastir, 151 

Mongolia, 12, 32, 432, 442, 445, 
5i6 

Monoto, Viscount, quoted on 
Japan’s position in China, 

508; 509 

Monroe Doctrine, The, 95, 114, 

117, 384, 483, 527 

Montagu, Mr., Secretary of 
State for India: 50, 51; 

quoted on India’s claim for 
liberty, 55 

Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 
50 et seq. 

Montenegro, 146, 160 
Moose Island, 467 
Morocco, 6, 83 
Moros, religion of, 127 
Moslems, 142-171, passim 
Mosul, 300 

Mukden: Russian outrages in, 
399; 410, 414 

Napier, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
cited, 304, 305 


INDEX 


Napoleon I, 4, 60, 116, 122 
Napoleon III: 95, 96; acquisi¬ 
tion of territory in Cochin- 
China by, 99 

Nation, The (London), quoted 
on War “gift” of people of 
India, 48, 49 

Nazin Pasha, assassination of, 

183 

Negri Sembilan, 70 
Nepal, 8, 10, 11, 26, 60 
New Guinea: 118; Germany 
gains foothold in, 484 
New Zealand, 345, 485 
Nicholas, Czar, 148 
Nicobar Islands, 57, 59 
Nishi Nishi, newspaper of 
Japan, 464 
Nogi, General, 378 
Norddeutscher Zeitung, cited 
on loot of Tientsin and Pe¬ 
king by German troops, 406 
Northcliffe, Lord, pre-War at¬ 
titude of, toward France, 253 

Odessa: bombardment of, by 
Turks, 178; 267 
Okhotsk, 315 
Oku, General, 377 
Okuma, Marquis: cabinet of, 
dissolved, 460; campaign of, 
461; 480 

Oriental Development Com¬ 
pany, 363 

Ottoman Empire: cause of 
Great Britain’s championship 
of, 4; 5, 62; disintegration 
of, 142-171; in the World 
War, 172-191; 192, 193, 196, 
224; destiny of peoples of 
the, 229-260; 483 
Ouchy, Treaty of, 173 
Oxford, 76 

Pahang, 70 


Palestine: General Allenby’s, 
campaign, 190; the Zionists 
and, 193-228 

Paris Peace Conference, 3, 24, 
53, 54, 76, 82, 203, 204; in re¬ 
lation to Zionism, 211, 212; 
214, 230, 261; Persia before 
the, 295-307; 325 , 326, 344 ; 
the Shangtung question at 
the, 385; 421, 450 , 45 L 489; 
dilemma confronting the, 
538 ; 539 
Patas, 36, 37 
Payne Tariff Law, 136 
Peking: 34, 35, 66, 388, 389, 
395 ; relief of, during Boxer 
uprising, 397 et seq.; surren¬ 
der of, 398; occupation by 
allied forces, 417 et seq.; 
442 

Pelew Islands, purchase of, by 
Germany, 484 
Penang, Island of, 67 
Perak, 70 

Perim Island, 8, 57, 60 
Perry, Commodore, and Japan, 
465, 466 

Persia: 7, 8; occupation of 
southern, by Great Britain, 
9; 13, 21, 23, 41, 57, 181; 
before the Peace Confer¬ 
ence, 295-307 
Petchaburi, 87 
Petrograd, 27, 189, 439 
Philippines, 58, 112; United 
States in the, 124-141; tariff 
law of the> 136; public 
school system in the, 139, 
140 

Poland: experience of, during 
World War, 241, footnote; 
537 

Pondicherry, 97 
Pope, proposal to the, by Ger¬ 
many, 518 

Port Arthur: 58, 265, 376; 


INDEX 


siege of, 378, 379; 410, 414, 
467 

Portsmouth, Treaty of, 342, 
355 , 382, 416, 458 
Portugal: relation of, to colo¬ 
nial expansion, 95; 97; colo¬ 
nization of Asiatic territory 
by, 114-123 

Problem of the Common¬ 
wealth, The , by L. Curtis, 
quoted, 527 

Program of Miirszteg, 148 
Pu-Chung, relation of, to 
Boxer Society, 393 et 
seq. 

Quetta, 19 

Rai, Laipat, attitude of, to¬ 
ward British rule in India, 
44; quoted, 45 
Reichstag, The, 405 
Reinach, Joseph, 204 
Ressortissants, meaning of ex¬ 
pression, 79, 80 
Reunion Island, 95 
Rhee, Dr. Synghman, 366, 367 
Rhodes, Cecil, attitude of, to¬ 
ward German-British alli¬ 
ance, 14; cited, 552 
Ribot, M., quoted on peace, 
534 

Risorgimento, The, 164, 275 
Roosevelt, President, in rela¬ 
tion to the Philippines, 130; 
quoted on Philippine ques¬ 
tion, 131, 132 

Root, Elihu, attitude of, to¬ 
ward Chinese control of 
Manchurian territory, 419 
et seq. 

Rothschild, Lord, 193; cited, 
214 

Rumania, 146, 537 

Russia: Lord Beaconsfield 


and, 5; agreement of, with 
Great Britain in regard to 
approaches to India, 6, 7; in 
relation to Asiatic questions, 
11, 12; attitude of, toward 
British colonial supremacy, 
14; plea of, for equalization 
of commercial privileges in 
Afghanistan, 16, 17; advan¬ 
tages of Convention of 1907 
to, 20, 21; 22, 23; in relation 
to British-Tibetan Treaty, 
32; 34; Asiatic, 58; 69, in, 
146, 148, 156, 157; attitude 
of, toward Persia, 264; ex¬ 
pansion of, across Asia, 308- 
336; struggle of, for control 
of Korea, 351 et seq.; rela¬ 
tions between Japan and, 
371 et seq.; Trans-Siberian 
Railway right granted to, 
387; 410; bad faith of, in 
relations with China, 413 et 
seq.; 426; attitude of, to¬ 
ward Chinese Republic, 442; 
447, 469; 472; collapse of, 
515; expulsion of, from 
Eastern Asia, 525 
Russo-Chinese Agreement of 
1902, terms of, 413 
Russo-Japanese Agreement of 
1916, text of, 503, 504 
Russo-Japanese War, 66; first 
event leading to, 352; 353- 
375. passim; results of, to 
status of Japan, 471 

Saadia, 217 

Saghalien: 341, 342; cession 
of, 459 

Said Halim Pasha, 174, 175 
Saigon, 102 
Saint Pierre, 95 
Saloniki, 152 

Samad Khan, quoted on Euro¬ 
pean culture, 261, 262 


567 


INDEX 


Samoa, 344 

Sanders, General Liman von, 
183, 184 
Sanmun, 389 

San Stefano, Treaty of, 4 
Sarawak: 58, 60; acquisition 
of, by Sir James Brooke, 71, 
72; area, population, and 
revenue of, 74 

Sarrault: opinion of, on 

French mission in Asia, 101; 
attitude of toward Far-East 
policy of France, 112, 113 
Savii, 484 
SazanofF, M., 531 
Schangtung Eisenbahn GeselU 
schaft, 491 

Seiukei (Society of Political 
Friends), The, 458 
Selangor, 70 
Serbia, 537 
Seychelles, The, 4, 8 
Seymour, Admiral, in Boxer 
uprising, 397 et seq. 

Shah Muzaffereddin, 271 
Shah Nasreddin, assassination 
of, 271 

Shanghai, 407, 430 
Shangtung: 58; the Peace Con¬ 
ference and the, question, 
385 et seq.; 389, 451, 460, 
486; importance of, in final 
settlement of the European 
War, 486 et seq. 

Shasa, 386 

Sherif of Mecca (King of 
Hedjaz), 177-224, passim; 
256 

Shimonoseki Treaty, 386, 387, 
416, 469 

Shinto religion, 474 
Shuster, W. Morgan: head olt 
American mission to take 
care of Persia’s finances, 
282; organization by, of 
Treasury Gendarmery, 283; 


becomes a national hero of 
the Persians, 286 
Siam: 7, 8, 9; condition at 
outbreak of World War, 75; 
British reformative process 
in, 75 et seq.; history of, for 
past twenty years, 76 et seq.; 
status of illegitimate chil¬ 
dren in, 81; sources of 
wealth in, 88; protest of, 
against obsolete treaty 
terms, 91, 92, footnote; 108; 
France and, in relation to 
Laos, 113; 495, 536 
Siberia: 11, 41; Republic of, 
proclaimed, 314; Japan’s at- 
tude toward, 384 
Sikkim, 26, 28, 29, 60 
Singapore, 8, 57, 58, 67, 86 
Sino-Japanese War, 371 
Sinkiang, 8 

Society for Promoting Chris¬ 
tian Knowledge, 43 
Sokalof, 199 

Sokotra, Island of, 8, 57, 60 
Solomon Islands, occupation 
of, by Germany, 484 
Son Peuing Hui, 366 
South America, 25 
Spain: colonial expansion of, 
95; 114, 121; early dealings 
of, with Japan, 466 
Spanish-American War: rela¬ 
tion of, to the Eastern ques¬ 
tion, 416 et seq.; 484 
Stokes, Major, 282 
Studies in Colonial National¬ 
ism, by Richard Jebb, quoted, 
44, footnote 

Straits Settlements: 60; rela¬ 
tion of, to Great Britain, 67 
et seq. 

Strangling of Persia, The, by 
W. Morgan Shuster, cited, 
285 

Sudan, The, 5, 8 


568 


INDEX 


Suez, 5, 57, 199 
Sultan of Oman, 269 
Sulus: 58; religion of, 127 
Sumatra, 115-123, passim; 340 
Sumbateff, Prince, cited, 321 
Sun Yat Sen, Dr.: elected 
President of China, 440; 443 
Sussex, The: torpedoed, 292; 
bearing of, incident upon 
Persia, 302 
Swat, 13 
Syria, 4, 57 
Szechuan, 8 

Tabriz: 267; occupation of, by 
Russians, 281 

Taft, William Howard: in 
Philippines, 128 et seq.; 
cited on League of Nations, 
550 

Tartars, 322 et seq., 537 
T e r a u c h i, Field-Marshal 
Count: 359, 360, 362; minis¬ 
try of, 362, 480 

Tibet: 7, 8, 10; in relation to 
Russian Asiatic expansion, 
12; a shield of India, 13 et 
seq.; population of, 25; mis¬ 
sion from, to the Czar, 27; 
Trade relations between, and 
British India, 26 et seq.; 
terms of treaty between, and 
Great Britain, 32; 60, 432, 
442 

Tientsin, 395, 397, 410 
Timor, Island of, 115 
Togo, Admiral, 376 
Togoland, installation of Ger¬ 
many in, 484 
Tokio, riots in, 383, 459 
Tonking: 78, 99-113, passim; 
described, 105; self-govern¬ 
ment aspirations of, no, in 
Transcaspian Railway, 266, 267 
Transcaucasia, n, 298-307, 
Passim; 318 


Trans-Siberian Railway: 327, 
370, 409; completion of, 412 
Trebizond, 250 

Tripoli: 153; seizure of, by 
Italy, 167; 173, 192, 211, 260 
Trotter, Captain, author of 
History of India, 43 
Tsingtao, 489, 494 
Tuan, Prince, 394 et seq., 400 
Tugenbund, The, 164 
Turkestan: 17; description of, 

329 

Turkey: attitude of Great 
Britain toward, 4; alliance 
of, with Germany, 22; re¬ 
sponsibility of, for anti- 
British feeling in Egypt and 
India, 549; See also Otto¬ 
man Empire 

Uganda, 219 

United States: influence of, 
upon China and Siam, in re¬ 
lation to War, 76; France 
and, in relation to Marti¬ 
nique, 98; 114; occupation of 
Philippines by, 124-141; at 
Peace Conference, 141; sug¬ 
gested as “promised land” 
of Zionism, 223; 292; Korea 
and the, 357; 384; policy of, 
in relation to Shangtung, 385 
et seq.; attitude of, toward 
concessions in China, 390; 
and the Boxer treaty, 402; 
soldiers of, at loot of Pe¬ 
king, 406, footnote; opposi¬ 
tion of, to Russia in Man¬ 
churia, 409; attitude of, to¬ 
ward Chinese Government, 
416; war of, with Spain, 416 
et seq.; in relation to indem¬ 
nity demands after Boxer 
uprising, 419; criticism of, 
diplomacy by Chinese states¬ 
men, 420, 421; 420-422; aid 


569 


INDEX 


of, to China during opium 
crusade, 433; attitude of, to¬ 
ward Chinese Republic, 441; 
recognition of Yuan-Shih- 
Kai by, 444; 451, 471, 472; 
influence of, upon evolution 
of Japan, 454, 455; inten¬ 
tions of Japan toward, 477; 
Chinese opinion of, on pub¬ 
lication of Lansing-Ishii 
correspondence, 509; trans¬ 
portation accomplishment of, 
during War, 511; 529; War 
aims of, 529 
Upolu, 484 
Uriu, Admiral, 375 

Vasco da Gama, 95 
Venizelos, Premier, 174, 246, 
248-254, passim 
Verdun, 189 

Versailles, Treaty of, 229, 244, 
406, 451, 485, 495 , 52 i 
Victoria, Queen, assumption 
by, of title “Empress of 
India,” 39 

Vienna Conference, 4, 142, 144, 
193 

Vladivostok, 312, 383, 467, 517 

Waddington, Mr., 200 
Waldersee, Count von, in 
China, 398 et seq., 405 
War, World: bearing of, upon 
control of approaches to In¬ 
dia, 7; participation of China 
in, 37; entrance of Siam 
into, 75, 76; attitude of 

China toward, 447, 448; 

Japan in, 474; effect of, upon 
Japan’s evolution, 478-480 
Washington. See United 
States 

Waterloo, 117 
Wazeristan, 13 

Wei-hai-wei, 56, 57-bo; acqui¬ 


sition of, by Great Britain, 
65 et seq.; 388, 407 
Weinzmann, Dr., 197, 198, 199; 
quoted, 201; at Peace Con¬ 
ference, 204; 208, 219, 222, 
227 

White Wolf, The, Chinese 
Leader, 444, 445 
Wilhelm II, Kaiser: mission 
sent by, to Afghanistan, 23; 
attitude of, toward colonial 
expansion, 97; attitude of, 
toward Chinese during 
Boxer uprising, 405 et seq.; 
proposed trial of, 505, 506 
Wilhelmina, Queen, cited on 
improving conditions in 
Dutch colonies, 121 
Wilson, President: cited, 76; 
136, 204; quoted, 216; 221, 
222, 226; 235; 241, 292; 

Korea in relation to idealism 
of, 365 5 367 5 and the 

Shangtung decision, 421; ef¬ 
fect of principles of, upon 
China, 448; 507, 509, 510; 
faith of Chinese in, before 
Peace Conference, 519; atti¬ 
tude of, toward own princi¬ 
ples, 521; 522; suggestion 
by, of Monroe Doctrine for 
whole world, 531, 532; 

speech of, on War aims of 
United States, cited, 534; 
539 

Wood, Major General, 133 
Wu-Ting-Fang, 440 

Xenophobia, spread of, in 
China, 424-452 

Yamamato, 459 
Yanoon, 97 

“Yellow Peril,” 476, 477 
Younghusband, Colonel, nego¬ 
tiation of Chinese-Tibetan 


570 


INDEX 


trade questions by, 27, 28- 
33. passim 

Young Chinese, reform move¬ 
ments of, 390 et seq. 

Young Turks, 142-171, passim 
Yuan-Shih-Kai, President: 
393, 414 et seq., 430, 438- 
440; inauguration of, 441; 


443-445; death of, 446; cited 
on Chinese neutrality, 497 
Yu-Hsien, founder of Boxers, 
393 


Zionists, The: in Palestine, 
193-228; 258 


























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